

THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
FROM
1799 to 1818.

“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

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OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,
FROM
1799 TO 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH

VOLUME THE SEVENTH.

A NEW EDITION.

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THE DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
IN
THE PENINSULA,
IN
1810 AND 1811.

To Major General the Hon. W. Lumley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 22d November, 1810.

‘ I received last night your letter of yesterday evening. The midshipman of the Navy who has the command of the boats stationed for the communication was directed to let you know where they were placed.

‘ I am very anxious to hear whether you see the road from Santarem to Torres Novas from Almeirim or the neighborhood.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Lumley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL, ‘ Cartaxo, 22d November, 1810, 8 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter by Churchill. It is, I think, now tolerably certain that the enemy are not going to cross the Zezere; and we must now endeavor to discover what they are about.

‘ Desire Fane to endeavor to get people up the left of the Zezere, to discover whether they are marching on the other (this) side by Cabaços and Espinhal. They appear to intend to retire that way, or to remain in the country till they get reinforcements from Spain; and I am inclined to think the former is their plan.

‘The rivulets were so much swelled yesterday that we could do nothing on their right. I am just going to our left, to see what we can do this morning.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘MY DEAR HILL, ‘Cartaxo, 24th November, 1810, 11 A. M.

‘The enemy reconnoitred our left on the 22d, instead of my reconnoitring their right. They brought forward about 700 or 800 men on that side, and drove in our piquets to the bridge of Calhariz, but retired again in the night. This circumstance, and all the information, tends to prove that they have brought up their troops from the rear to the support of the right of their position at Santarem.

‘I do not understand the enemy’s meaning in the continued removal of artillery and boats up the river. Has the artillery been removed from Golegão? Do you observe the further removal of the boats after they have left Golegão?

‘We heard some time ago that the enemy intended to throw a bridge across the Tagus at Punhete, on the left of the Zezere; and their fortifying the heights on the two sides of the Zezere gives some reason for a belief that this is their intention, with a view possibly to attack Abrantes, or to open Alentejo to their parties.

‘Barquinha also appears to me to be not a bad situation for a bridge over the Tagus. If Captain Squire should be with you, I request you to let him examine the river from opposite Golegão up to Abrantes, particularly at Punhete and Barquinha, and see whether the enemy would have any facilities in throwing their bridge over at any of those places.

‘It would be very desirable if you could get somebody over the river to ascertain to what places the enemy take their boats and materials, and what number of boats there are still remaining at Santarem. I am endeavoring to get this information by emissaries from this side.

‘In respect to Fane’s detachment, and Don Carlos de España’s, there is no doubt that, when Fane could no longer exercise his command, Don Carlos should be the person to exercise it as the senior Officer.

‘ In the existing state of affairs, I think that the detachment ought to be brought rather nearer to you, and that the following objects should be attended to in the position of the Portuguese, as well as the Spanish part of it.

‘ First, to take care of the boats, &c., of the bridge of Abrantes.

‘ Secondly, to observe the enemy’s bridge over the Zezere, above Punhete, and keep an accurate account of all that passes.

‘ Thirdly, to observe the river from Chamusca to opposite to Punhete, particularly those parts which may be deemed the most favorable situations for the passage of the enemy, and to give you the earliest intimation of the collection of materials, &c.

‘ I received yesterday a letter from General Hamilton, stating some difficulties in the passage of a rivulet in his neighborhood. This is important in every view of the case; and you should immediately take measures to have the communication made as good as it can be made from Chamusca to the place where you disembarked, and where you would have to embark in case you should again come over to the right of the Tagus. It is also important to enable you to get up your artillery, and collect your corps, if you should find that the enemy propose to cross the Tagus.

‘ Indeed, notwithstanding that if we should have to return to the lines we shall want your artillery, I think that you ought now to have with you one, if not two, brigades of artillery, and one brigade at Almeirim with General Lumley. General Lumley ought also to have with him a detachment of cavalry, to enable him to watch the Tagus from Almeirim to Chamusca.

‘ If we should again return to our lines, I propose to make the following arrangement of your corps. To march General Hamilton’s infantry, and all the artillery, baggage, and cavalry, to Aldea Galega, where the Admiral will have boats to transport them across the river. To march the 2d division of infantry to the place where it disembarked, and there embark it again in Sir Thomas Williams’ flotilla, and bring it over the Tagus to Alhandra, either by the main channel, if this part of the army should still possess the right bank

of the Tagus, or, if not, by the eastern channel. The baggage of the 2d division of infantry would have to go round by Aldea Galega.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 24th November, 1810.

‘ The enemy have made no alteration of importance in their position since I addressed you on the 21st instant. The assembly and movements of our troops towards the right of the position at Santarem, notwithstanding the continuance of the rain and the swelling of the rivers, have occasioned some jealousy on that flank; as, on the 22d, they brought up a large body of troops, apparently from Torres Novas and the rear, which drove in the piquets of Major General Anson’s and Brig. General Pack’s brigades at the bridge of Calhariz, where they halted, and the enemy retired in the night. This circumstance, and the information which I have received, tend to prove that large detachments of the troops which have marched to the rear have returned to the neighborhood of Santarem. The artillery and baggage, however, still continue to move on the road from Santarem up the Tagus to Golegão.

‘ The enemy have a detachment of about 4000 men at Punhete, on the left of the Zezere; but the bridge upon that river is a very bad one, and very unequal to bear the passage of an army.

‘ I have ascertained that no detachments of the enemy’s troops have passed to the frontier through Lower Beira, excepting one of cavalry and infantry of about 1500 men, under General Foy, which I informed your Lordship, in my dispatch of the 10th instant, had returned to Sobreira Formosa, after having been at Villa Velha, where the bridge of boats was destroyed. This detachment afterwards marched to Ciudad Rodrigo; and I understand that General Foy is with the troops which are now upon the frontier.

‘ I have received accounts from General Silveira to the 16th instant. The advance of the enemy’s corps had arrived at Pinhel, and he attacked it on the 14th. He drove in

their advanced posts, and took four Officers and many soldiers prisoners; and many of the enemy were killed and wounded. General Silveira states his loss to be 30 killed, and about the same number wounded. He mentions, in high terms, the conduct of the Officers and troops, particularly of the 24th regiment.

‘Some of the enemy’s detachments had likewise appeared upon the Upper Coa; and I imagine that, if they enter Portugal, it will be by Celorico and the valley of the Mondego.

‘My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 24th November, 1810.

‘I enclose you a letter which I have received from General Cameron, to which I request to draw your Lordship’s attention. He has served His Majesty with zeal and ability, as far as his line of service has gone, till at last he is quite worn out, and I propose to give him leave of absence.

‘In this country he has always conducted himself to my satisfaction; and in the battle of Talavera, his brigade, which was in Sir J. Sherbrooke’s division, was very prominently engaged, and sustained much loss.

‘It would give us all in this army great satisfaction if some mark of the King’s favor were conferred upon this old gentleman; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you can recommend him for such.

‘I have heard that he is desirous of being made a baronet; and if that cannot be done, I should think him deserving of a Government. He raised the 79th regiment at the commencement of the late war, which he commanded, with credit to himself, in every service in which the army was engaged, till he was made a General Officer; since which time he has served, as he says, in this country; and I know no man more deserving.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘Cartaxo, 25th November, 1810.

‘I have sad reports of the Lusitanian Legion pulling to pieces the houses in Alemquer. I request you to call before you Baron Eben, and the Commanding Officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, and inform them that I have had reason to complain of that corps more frequently, since they joined the army, than I have of all the other corps of the army taken together; and that I cannot but attribute the variety and the frequency of these acts of misconduct and indiscipline entirely to the want of attention on the part of their Commanding and other Officers; that if I do not see an early change in the habits of that corps, I shall turn them out of the army, and send them to a distance from the other troops, with which they are unfit to serve; and I shall report to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the names of the Officers whose inattention to their duty must be the cause of the gross misconduct of the troops. I shall also consider it my duty to report to His Majesty the names of the Officers of his service who are serving in the Lusitanian Legion.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
A. Campbell.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cartaxo, 25th November, 1810.

‘I enclose a copy of my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State. Since writing that letter I have received further accounts of the position of the French army, which appears to be principally collected about Torres Novas and Golegão; and I am afraid that I shall not be able to do any thing of importance with them, without putting matters in a state of risk.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 26th November, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 25th. I think it much more probable that I shall have to retire, and resume our

position, than that I shall be able to advance. The enemy is in considerable strength at and on their right of the position of Santarem, and they have their whole army at Torres Novas, Golegão, &c, with a post at Leyria, and one on the other side of the Zezere, at Punhete.

‘ I could not attack them without incurring the risk of placing the fate of the Peninsula on the result of a general action, in which the advantage of ground would be much in favor of the enemy. Indeed, the continued bad state of the roads, and the swelling of the rivers, would prevent my moving for the present, even if it were desirable for other reasons; and in the meantime, I received accounts last night of the advance through Lower Beira of a detachment of 6000 men of those troops which I had been informed were upon the frontier.

‘ The larger body, I believe, still remains upon the frontier, at least they were still in Silveira’s front on the 17th. These accounts must prevent, for the present, at least, the execution of a plan which I had in contemplation to strike a blow on that detachment of the enemy which was across the Zezere.

‘ Under these circumstances, that to which I must look for from General Hill’s corps, is to get the English infantry belonging to it back to Alhandra as expeditiously as possible, when I shall find the enemy likely to advance again. I had settled the following plan for the passage of the whole corps.

‘ First, that the artillery, cavalry, Portuguese infantry, and baggage, should march along the left bank to Aldea Galega, where I would have requested you to embark them in boats, and to have them carried over.

‘ Secondly, that the English infantry, about 5500 men, should embark in the flotilla at , and proceed in the boats at once to Alhandra, by the great western channel, if this part of the army should still be in possession of the right bank of the river, as far as Valada; if not, by the eastern channel, covered by Lyceria.

‘ A conversation, however, which I had yesterday with Sir Thomas Williams, has induced me to alter this plan. It appears that it is desirable to get the boats down the river again, and the seamen into their ships; and I have settled with Sir Thomas Williams, that when it may be desirable to

pass over General Hill's corps, the flotilla shall come up to where the British infantry will embark, unless it should be found practicable to march across the island of Lyceria; in which case a bridge will be thrown from Çamora to the island, and the troops will embark on the island opposite to Alhandra.

' I am convinced that the roads in Lyceria are of that description that troops cannot march upon them in the wet season; and, therefore, the embarkation of the British infantry at Çamora, where the flotilla can be in one tide, and of the cavalry, artillery, baggage, and Portuguese infantry at Aldea Galega, appears to be the plan best suited to all the circumstances of the case; and I will give you notice when I shall wish to carry it into execution.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

' WELLINGTON.

' P. S. Since writing the above I have received a letter of the 20th from Silveira, from which I learn that the troops coming in from Lower Beira are 12,000 or 14,000 men, and Drouet's corp appears still to remain in Castille.

' W.'

To Lieut. General Hill.

' MY DEAR HILL, ' Cartaxo, 26th November, 1810, 3 P.M.

' I have received your letter of yesterday, for which I am much obliged to you. The reinforcement on its march through Lower Beira consists certainly of convalescents and detachments from the troops now in Portugal. It is said by some to consist of 5000 to 6000; by others of 10,000 or 12,000 men. The 9th corps does not form part of this reinforcement. This corps is still on the frontiers of Castille.

' I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the 6 pounders and howitzers mentioned in the enclosed letter, (which you sent to me,) and two 12 pounders, which came across the Tagus with General Fane, and all the ordnance and stores on the left bank of the river, with the exception of those belonging to your own corps, to be sent back to the arsenal at Lisbon without loss of time, by Aldea Galega.

‘The rocket carriages may as well go back likewise by the same route.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Hill.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I shall be very glad to have the route and distances from opposite to Abrantes to Aldea Galega, with a draft of the route, if you can send it to me. ‘W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 26th November, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 25th, with its enclosures. I have repeatedly written to Government respecting the pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect. I have no doubt but that some more assistance must be given to this country.

‘I do not like the Conde de Redondo’s paper, because he attempts to prove that we are in debt to the Government where no debt exists; and he attempts to prove this debt from a statement in a ministerial newspaper, instead of from the actual engagements of the Government and the state of transactions under those engagements.

‘That which they ought to do is to make out a statement of their claims under the actual engagements of the British Government, and the payments; they ought then to show what their actual receipts of revenue, contribution, &c. have been under the different heads, and their expenses; also their future expected income and expense; and from all this show how inadequate the subsidy from Great Britain is to defray the expense which it is intended to cover.

‘I have had in contemplation different modes of increasing the army; but I do not advise drafting any part of the militia. One thing to do is to make the Lusitanian Legion two regiments of Caçadores, and to add four other regiments of Caçadores, and two regiments of the line. All this put together will make an increase to the establishments of 6000 men of infantry, which we want most. But it is impossible to do anything of this kind with the existing Government.

‘You will have received the accounts from the north and Lower Beira. I doubt the 9th corps coming in. I believe

the troops now marching through Lower Beira are the convalescents and detachments belonging to the regiments already in Portugal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th November, 1810, 9 A. M.

‘ I have just received your letter, enclosing a number from Colonel Lobo, who appears, as usual, to think that the whole force of the enemy is coming upon him. I should think that one fact which he mentions in another letter, viz., “ that the enemy have strongly fortified the church of Punhete, and have made intrenchments upon the road from thence to Abrantes,” might convince him that the enemy’s measures on that side of the Zezere are merely defensive, and that the force stationed there is intended to cover the march of the reinforcements and convoys coming through Lower Beira.

‘ There is one part of Colonel Lobo’s last letter which requires an immediate answer, and that is the postscript regarding the bridge.

‘ If the enemy should attack Abrantes, it was my intention to assist the place from the left of the Tagus; and, in that view, the preservation of the bridge was an object: and I desired Fane to have it laid over the river, excepting four or five boats on the right bank, which might be added when we should want to use the bridge.

‘ I am afraid, however, that the enemy might get at the boats of the bridge, notwithstanding the fire of the works of Abrantes; and this being the case, I think, upon the whole, it would be best to take up the bridge, and have all the boats brought over to the left bank, there to be kept in charge of Don Carlos’s people. We should thus keep up the communication, and support the garrison by boats, in case it should be necessary,

‘ I beg you will read this letter to Colonel Lobo.

‘ I wish that the gentlemen in Abrantes, and particularly —, would begin to have some little confidence in themselves, and in that which they have been repeatedly told; viz., that the enemy can make no serious attack upon

Abrantes without sending a large force across the Tagus, that he cannot send a large corps across the Tagus without exposing himself to loss on one side or the other; that if he makes an attack upon Abrantes without sending a force across the Tagus, I must have it in my power, and will relieve and reinforce the place; and lastly, that the successful attack upon Abrantes is impracticable, if these gentlemen are of good heart and do their duty; and that the regular attack of the place, at this season of the year, is out of the question, and that the enemy are unprovided with means to undertake it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — and H. F. Sampaio, Esq.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th November, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th instant, relative to the freight to be paid for transports to be sent to Algiers for corn.

‘ Early in this month I received an application from His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon, that I would request the Admiral to allow 3000 tons of transports to proceed to Algiers to bring back to Lisbon cargoes of corn, for which Mr. Sampaio, the importer of corn, would pay the usual freight for such a voyage.

‘ In consequence of this application, I wrote, on the 4th November, a letter to Admiral Berkeley, of which I enclose a copy; and I am much disappointed to find that the vessels have not yet sailed, and that they are detained, because it is wished to alter the terms on which Mr. Sampaio himself requested that he should have the use of the vessels.

‘ It is impossible for me to interfere any further in this concern. If the vessels should sail, I shall consider myself bound to take care that Mr. Sampaio shall pay no more than the usual freight for such a voyage. If they should return without cargoes, Mr. — and Mr. Sampaio must abide by the decision of the Treasury, to be exempted from all demands of freight; to which indulgence I should think their claim would have been strengthened, if the vessels had been dispatched at the moment they were applied for and granted,

and much valuable time had not been lost in discussions to make the bargain rather better.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — and

‘ WELLINGTON.

H. F. Sampayo, Esq.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th November, 1810.

‘ From a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. — and Mr. Sampayo, I am sorry to observe that the former has contrived at last to mix himself up in our concerns, by entering into partnership with the latter in the Algiers purchases of corn; and I recognise his efforts to make the bargain better, in the discussions which have lately taken place respecting freight, from which delay and inconvenience will, I am afraid, be experienced.

‘ It would be worth while to give Sampayo a hint that he will not improve his situation by a connexion with Mr. —. He knows that I have always treated him handsomely, and have been disposed to give a liberal consideration to any statement of losses incurred by those who have served the army. But I will not be forced to authorize a bargain in the first instance which is inconsistent with the regulations and instructions of the Treasury, which is what Mr. — has invariably driven at since he has turned his mind to our concerns; and the consequence of Sampayo’s connexion with him will be, that he will exclude himself from them in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th November, 1810, Noon.

‘ I have received yours of the 29th, which ought to have been dated the 28th.

‘ I have had more trouble with Don Carlos de España and his provisions than I have with those of the whole army; and I am sorry to observe, from a letter which Marshal Sir W. Beresford put into my hands, that Don Carlos has threatened to make his soldiers take provisions wherever they can find them. I beg that you will tell Don Carlos that I do not allow of such conduct in any Officer or troops; and that, if I find that he and his troops are guilty of that or

any other misconduct, I shall have him provisioned to the frontiers of Estremadura, to which province he shall go.

‘ The inconvenience which Don Carlos has felt, if he has felt any, is to be attributed entirely to his own irregularity : first, in coming to Abrantes without any previous orders from the Marques de la Romana, or any communication with me by which I could order arrangements to be made for his supply ; and secondly, from the total want of system and arrangement in his own brigade, and his want of Officers to make the deliveries to the troops. From this cause the Portuguese or British magazines are obliged not only to supply the articles for the consumption of his troops, but to supply Commissaries to make the detailed deliveries to the troops.

‘ When the Marques de la Romana’s army came into Portugal I promised to supply them with provisions, and those have been regularly supplied of whose march I have been apprised ; and, notwithstanding the irregularity of Don Carlos de España’s arrival, he has been supplied also. His complaints upon this subject have been without foundation ; for it is a curious circumstance, that on the very day I received the first of them, I likewise received from the Portuguese Government a representation of the expense of provision stores at Abrantes, by his being in the neighborhood.

‘ I had already given Fane directions upon this subject, and I beg now that you will settle whether Don Carlos de España’s brigade is to receive provisions from the magazine at Abrantes, or from your Commissary at Chamusca, or elsewhere ; and you will direct accordingly that the quantity of provisions required for this brigade may be issued to the person or persons whom Don Carlos de España shall send to receive them, either daily or every two or three days, as you may find most convenient, upon the regular requisitions and receipts for the service.

‘ I beg of you to send to Don Carlos de España a copy of this letter ; and I can only say that if I shall receive any further complaints, either from, or of the conduct of, this brigade, I shall request the Marques de la Romana to relieve me from the pain of having anything to do with it.

‘ I am happy to learn that you are better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To James Duff, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Cartaxo, 30th November, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 17th November, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what are the causes, besides the scarcity of money, at Cadiz, which have prevented you from continuing your remittances of specie for the use of the army in this country. The military chest is now very low, and it would be very desirable to receive from you as much as it may be in your power to send.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*J. Duff, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Captain Churchill.*

‘SIR, ‘Cartaxo, 30th November, 1810.

‘I have received your note, and I have written to Lord Liverpool a letter in favor of Mrs. Catlin Craufurd, which will go by the post to-morrow. I know that Mrs. Craufurd is acquainted with Lord Wellesley, and I think she had better state her case to him herself.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain Churchill.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD, ‘Cartaxo, 30th November, 1810.

‘Captain Churchill, the aide de camp of the late Brig. General Catlin Craufurd, has informed me that it is intended by his friends to apply to Government for some provision for his widow, who has been left with a large family in very bad circumstances.

‘Although General Craufurd was not killed in action, he certainly died of a fever which he caught in the performance of his duty in this country; and as he was a respectable Officer, who had served in the Peninsula with distinction, and I believe that his widow is a person of excellent character, I beg leave to recommend her case to the favorable consideration of Government.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

* Colonel C. H. Churchill, Quarter Master General in Bengal.

To His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 30th November, 1810.

‘ The Governors of the Kingdom will, without doubt, transmit to be laid before your Royal Highness, a detailed account of recent events and transactions in Portugal; and I should not think it necessary to trouble your Royal Highness upon this occasion, if some discussions which I have lately had with the Governors of the Kingdom had not rendered it desirable that I should make your Royal Highness acquainted with the opinions which I have entertained, and the principles on which I have acted.

‘ Your Royal Highness is informed, that till the recent change made in the Government of this country, I had the good fortune to possess the confidence and good opinion of the Governors of the Kingdom; and notwithstanding the magnitude, the variety, and the intricacy of the affairs which I had transacted with them, there had existed no difference of opinion upon any point of importance.

‘ When the peace was made in Germany, in October, 1809, it was necessary that I should consider of the system of military operations to be carried on by the allied armies of your Royal Highness and of His Majesty, the command of which had been intrusted to me, in reference to the state of affairs in the Peninsula; to the description of the troops of which the armies were composed; and the defence of your Royal Highness’s dominions.

‘ Having formed the plan in concert with Marshal Beresford, I went to Lisbon early in February last from the frontiers of Beira, purposely to communicate it to the Governors of the Kingdom, whose approbation, including that of the Patriarch, it received.

‘ It is not necessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness with a detail of this plan. It was founded upon the fact, that the allied army under my command was the only organized body existing in the Peninsula which could keep the field against the enemy.

‘ I considered that Lisbon and the Tagus were the sinews of your Royal Highness’s Government, the point of communication with your Royal Highness’s person and with His Majesty’s Government; and that they were the objects which

it was essential for the allies to retain, and for the enemy to get possession of.

‘ I also considered that it was expedient, in the existing state of the war in the Peninsula, to avoid risking the fate of the whole in one general action, the result of which might, from circumstances, be doubtful. I therefore made the possession of Lisbon and the Tagus the principal object of my attention; others were considered subordinate to these, and were to be maintained or not, according to the circumstances of the moment, and to the chance I had of success in a contest to maintain them with the force which the enemy should employ to obtain possession of them.

‘ These principles were thoroughly understood, and were approved of, as well as the details of the plan which was founded upon them; and I have invariably acted upon these principles in all the operations which I have carried on since I have commanded the allied army.

‘ Unfortunately, one of the gentlemen who was appointed by your Royal Highness to be a member of the new Government, in the month of _____, did not approve of the plan of operations, or of the principles on which it was founded. Possibly, when your Royal Highness appointed me to be the Marshal General of your armies, and to hold that office with all the powers and privileges which were enjoyed by the late Duque de Alafoës, your Royal Highness intended that I, and not the local Government of Portugal, much less any individual member of the Government, should be responsible for the plan and conduct of the military operations. At all events, His Majesty, with the command of whose troops I am likewise intrusted, considers me responsible for the honor and safety of his army; and I could not allow any individual, however respectable, to interfere in the performance of duties peculiarly and exclusively, in my opinion, my own.

‘ The Principal Souza, however, was of opinion, that the war ought to have been maintained, at all events, upon the frontiers of Beira; that an offensive operation ought to be carried on within the Spanish frontier; that a general action ought to be fought, at all risks; and he entertained and delivered other opinions upon the details of the operations, with which, in my judgment, he had no concern whatever.

‘ Entertaining these opinions, both of the plan of operations which was adopted and of that which ought to have been adopted, he, by his influence over the other members of the Government, prevailed on the Government to omit and delay to carry into execution many measures recommended by me, which were calculated to aid the military operations, and to be of service to the people of the country themselves; in order to refer to me, and discuss, the propriety of adopting another system of operations which he preferred.

‘ As it was probable that circumstances would render it advisable to bring the contest to a decision in the neighborhood of the capital, it was necessary that the different divisions of which the army was composed should retire from the frontier; and I recommended that the people of the country should be directed to remove out of the enemy’s reach, carrying with them, as far as was possible, their valuable property and what could be useful to the enemy, and rendering useless the mills. This measure had been successfully adopted in Upper Beira, under the provisions of a Proclamation issued by me on the 4th August, 1810 *; and it could be carried into execution effectually, and with convenience to the inhabitants of other parts of the country, only by being adopted at an early period; and it was recommended at an early period to the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘ But it was delayed in respect to the country between the Tagus and the Mondego till the last moment, by various discussions, and under various pretences, and particularly because it was contended by the Principal Souza, that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier. The inhabitants consequently had not time to carry it into execution; and the enemy have found, in Portuguese Estremadura, everything which could tend to their comfort and subsistence, and to enable them to maintain their position in Portugal, notwithstanding that, as your Royal Highness is aware, the local circumstances of Portuguese Estremadura afforded means of removing these articles out of their reach, which do not exist in other parts of the country.

* See vol. vi. p. 308.

‘ Although I have adopted the plan of operations which I have followed upon mature reflection, and every day’s experience convinces me of its propriety, it is possible that the Principal Souza may be right, and I may be wrong; and that it would have been expedient to adopt the system recommended by him, which I had thought the experience of the misfortunes in Spain had exploded. But even in this case, I contend for it, that the Governors of the Kingdom ought to have adopted without delay the measures which I recommended to them, to aid and conform to the plan of the military operations.

‘ As I have already explained to your Royal Highness, some of the Governors of the Kingdom, including the Patriarch, approved of the plan which was adopted; but even if they had not (and I admit that the Principal Souza had not), it was still their duty to aid and co-operate in that plan by every means in their power, and particularly not to thwart or delay measures recommended by me. If I was wrong; if I had showed myself incapable of executing the great trust reposed in me, the proper steps to be adopted would have been to request your Royal Highness and His Majesty to dismiss me from my command; but as long as I continued to exercise it, the Governors of the Kingdom were bound, as honest men and wellwishers to their country, to aid and co-operate with me as I recommended.

‘ By the delays occasioned by the opposition to those measures given by the Principal Souza, they have been rendered nugatory, and parts of your Royal Highness’s dominions, and some of your people are now suffering.

‘ The influence of Principal Souza has, in this instance, been pernicious; and I leave it to your Royal Highness to determine, whether it is expedient that that gentleman should continue to be a member of the Government.

‘ It is with pain that I make this appeal to your Royal Highness. I am fully aware of the patriotism and of the integrity of this gentleman, and of his connexion with persons of high rank in your Royal Highness’s service and of consideration in this country. But I cannot conceal from your Royal Highness, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting business with your Government since he has been a member of it; all confidence is at an end; and your

Royal Highness will judge whether it is possible for things to go on as they are.

‘It is unnecessary that I should trouble your Royal Highness upon the sentiments of each individual member of the Government, on the questions to which this letter relates. In late instances, I believe that a large majority of the members of the Government have decided at once to adopt the measures which I have recommended to them; and have not suffered them to be delayed by farther references to me, and by the discussions proposed by the Principal Souza; and I am convinced, that, if this gentleman should be removed from the Government, affairs will be conducted with the same unanimity and satisfaction to me as they had been till his appointment.

‘I cannot conclude this letter without stating to your Royal Highness, in justice to myself, that I have never obtruded my opinion upon your Government on any subject not immediately connected with the military service, or the operations of the army, on which they have not previously desired to have it. The differences of opinion which I have had with the Government, or, more properly speaking, with Principal Souza, have been either on subjects exclusively military or on others intimately connected with the military operations; for in nothing else do I take any concern.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Royal Highness*

the Prince Regent of Portugal.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.’

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 30th November, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of the draft of a letter which I have addressed to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, on the subject of the recent discussions which I have had with the local government of this country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ General Lumley writes word that eight pieces of artillery, with ammunition, entered Santarem yesterday afternoon, of which I give you intelligence, although I think it of very little importance, and not a sign of any hostile movement on the part of the enemy. We had a patrol yesterday at Pernes, where the enemy have about four battalions, and as much, with two regiments of dragoons, at Alcanhede: this does not look very formidable.

‘ The reinforcement which had arrived at Cardigos has returned in some haste to Sobreira Formosa; a movement which I do not exactly understand. The ordenanza do them much mischief, and they are in the greatest distress.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and a memorial by Colonel Lord Aylmer and Lieut. Colonels De Lancey and Elley, in which these Officers express their desire to receive the medal which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer on certain Officers of the British army lately.

‘ In transmitting this application from these Officers, it is but justice to them to state that they have performed their duty in a most satisfactory manner since they have been under my command, and that there are no Officers in the army who are more highly deserving of His Majesty’s favor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 27th and 29th. I have had some reports on the Island of Lyceria, and I wait

some further information to decide definitively upon the plan by which I shall get General Hill at the river again, if it should be necessary.

‘ I am obliged to you for the report on the late bridges of Villa Velha and Punhete. You see that we shall require fresh materials for two bridges at least.

‘ I have sent to inquire about the pontoon bridge which you mention at Villa Franca.

‘ The Commissary General and the Portuguese Government are now employed in carrying off the forage from the ground you mention, and I hope this object will be soon effected.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to direct that the *Flora* transport, which is loaded with 10,000 stands of arms, and with accoutrements, stores, &c., may be sent to Cadiz under convoy; and that the Captain of the *Flora* may report his arrival to Mr. Wellesley, His Majesty’s Minister with the Regency, and deliver the letter which I have the honor to enclose.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810, 1 P. M.

‘ Adverting to the intelligence received this day from Colonel Lobo, that the enemy’s reinforcements have returned from Cardigos to Sobreira Formosa, I wish that you would order Colonel Otway’s brigade of Portuguese dragoons to move up the Tagus by Gavião and Niza, and observe what passes on the other side of the river, as far on as the little river Sever. Let him send to all the owners of

barcas, or boats, to put them in places of security and concealment on the left of the Tagus.

‘ I hope you are better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send to Cadiz the *Flora* transport, which is laden with arms, and accoutrements, and stores, of which I enclose you the return and the invoice, and this letter will be delivered by the master.

‘ I beg that you will give directions that these arms, &c. may be issued to such of the Spanish corps as you may think proper. I rather think that the ordnance, &c. might be sent to General O'Donnell, in Catalonia, with much advantage.

‘ There is another transport in the Tagus, laden in the same manner, which I shall send to Cadiz as soon as I shall hear from you that men have been raised who are capable of taking these arms into their hands with any advantage to the cause.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st December, 1810.

‘ The detachment of the enemy's troops, whose advanced guard were engaged with General Silveira on the 14th November, passed to their left and appeared at Sabugal on the Upper Coa, on the 19th, from whence they moved on by Belmonte and Fundão, and by the two roads leading towards the Zezere, through Lower Beira. They arrived at Cardigos on the 25th; but I have since learned that they had returned again to Sobreira Formosa, and even farther back, towards Castello Branco. The ordenanza of Lower Beira have hung upon their rear in these movements, and have done them a good deal of mischief.

‘ This detachment consists of the troops which went out of Portugal with General Foy, who is gone to Paris; of the

troops belonging to the three corps in Portugal, which had been left in garrison at Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida ; of three or four battalions which had been detached from the 8th corps, by order of the Emperor, and placed under the command of General Seras for the purpose of operating upon the frontier ; and of the convalescents of the three corps, amounting to about 2400 men.

‘ It is difficult to ascertain the precise numbers of this reinforcement, but I should imagine that it does not exceed 8000 men.

‘ The troops composing the 9th corps, which I find are the battalions that, in my dispatch of the 18th July, I informed your Lordship were assembled at Nantes and in that neighborhood, have occupied the garrisons and stations in Castille, from which the troops that have lately entered Portugal have been drawn.

‘ I believe that these battalions of the 9th corps are composed of Germans, and I think it probable that there will be great disinclination to draw them into Portugal, on account of the desertion already experienced from the German troops, particularly on every occasion on which they have been near the British army.

‘ The enemy continue to hold their position at Santarem, which they have strengthened considerably. They have likewise fortified a post at Punhete, on the left of the Zezere, probably to cover the bridge over that river from any enterprises which might be attempted upon it by the garrison of Abrantes.

‘ They have reinforced their troops about Pernes and Alcanhede, on the right of the position of Santarem, and all our movements in that quarter appear to be viewed with great jealousy. Indeed, I believe that the whole army is concentrated in the neighborhood of Torres Novas and Golegão ; and that the 2d corps holds the position of Santarem ; and part of the 8th the posts on the right at Alcanhede and Pernes.

‘ The weather has continued to be very bad since the middle of November, and the cross roads are impassable for artillery and very difficult for infantry, and the rivulets much swollen. Under these circumstances it would be still

impossible to make any movement of importance upon the right flank of the enemy's position at Santarem, in the course of which some divisions of troops would not be insulated and exposed to be cut off. But the enemy having concentrated their army in the neighborhood of Torres Novas, &c., I do not propose to make any movement by which I shall incur the risk of involving the army in a general action, in ground less advantageous than that which I had fixed upon to bring the contest to that issue. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their situation only by the occurrence of some misfortune to the allied army; and I shall forward their views by placing the fate of the campaign on the result of a general action, on ground chosen by them instead of on that selected by me.

‘ I therefore propose to continue the operations of the light detachments on the flanks and rear of the enemy's army, and to confine them as much as possible; but to engage in no serious affair in this part of the country on ground on which the result can be at all doubtful.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 19th ultimo, from which I learn that there was reason to believe that the enemy meditated a serious attack upon the position of the allies; and that His Majesty's Minister and Lieut. General Graham had applied to General Campbell for the assistance of one battalion of infantry from Gibraltar. The preparations for this attack depending upon the removal of the boats lately arrived at Puerto S^{ta} Maria to the Trocadero, are not yet in sufficient forwardness to occasion any immediate apprehension; and in the meantime I shall be better enabled to form a judgment of the designs of the enemy in respect to this country.

‘ If, however, I should find that they continue, and make any progress in their preparations for the proposed attack of the position of the allies at Cadiz, I shall immediately detach a body of troops to that quarter.

‘ From all accounts which I receive from Castello Branco I learn that the guerrillas are very active, and have been very successful lately against the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d December, 1810.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to Government ; from which you will observe that I have received your letter of the 17th November, and that from General Graham of the same date.

‘ I am of opinion that the enemy is not in a state of preparation to make the supposed attack upon Puntales, and it is probable that they will not be in the requisite state of preparation for some time. In the interval I shall be better enabled to judge than I am at present of the enemy’s designs upon this country, and their means of carrying them into execution ; and if I should find that I can do it with safety, or if the enemy should get forward with their preparations for the attack of Puntales, so as to render it clear that they intend to attack that point, I shall send a body of British troops to Cadiz.

‘ I now write to Lieut. General Graham to beg that he will, for the present, detain at Cadiz any troops that Lieut. General Stuart may send from Sicily for this country.

‘ I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments ; and that after having been shut in for ten months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British Officers on the danger of omitting them.

‘ The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.

‘ I send you the *Flora* transport, with 10,000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements, &c.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th November and its enclosure. I think it probable that the enemy will experience great difficulty in making the preparations for the proposed attack upon Puntales, and in removing their boats and establishing them in the Trocadero; and in the interval it might be expected that the works between the Cortadura and Puntales will be completed.

‘ At all events, I shall be enabled to judge of the nature of the enemy’s designs on this country, and of their means of carrying them into execution; and if I should find that they get forward with their preparations for an attack upon you, or if they cannot collect the means of carrying on their attack here, I will send a body of British troops round to Cadiz.

‘ I think it is not impossible, in the existing situation of affairs in Sicily, that Lieut. General Sir John Stuart may detach the body of troops which he was directed to send to Portugal from Sicily; and if he should do so, and they should go to Gibraltar or Cadiz, I request you to detain them at Cadiz till you shall hear further from me.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate to me anything that may occur, or any intelligence which you may receive by Ayamonte, as well as by the usual sea conveyance by Lisbon.

‘ Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the accounts which I have sent him of the situation of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d December, 1810, 10 A.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 1st, and I am much concerned to hear of the serious indisposition of Lieut. General Hill, who I hope will soon recover. In the meantime I am convinced that the service will be well carried on by you; and I refer you to my letters to Lieut. General Hill for instructions, and if you should entertain any doubt upon any point I shall hear from you.

‘ The enemy’s force is concentrated a good deal about Golegão, Torres Novas, and Santarem, but they do not appear to me to be in a situation to attempt anything in any quarter; and I think that they are waiting for orders from Paris.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d December, 1810.

‘ I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry which has been held on a statement made by Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore on the conduct of Mr. —.

‘ This gentleman was represented to me, in the course of the summer, as having made a great exertion to supply the Officers and soldiers of the army with various articles of necessaries which they required; and as being likely, according to the appearance of the state of affairs at that moment, to incur very large losses.

‘ I was induced, therefore, on account of the very favorable opinion entertained of Mr. — by Colonel Pakenham, Sir W. Myers, and others, to give directions that assistance might be given to Mr. — to enable him to transport his stores to the army (at his own expense); and that if the Commissariat should want any of the articles of supply which he had brought out, they might be purchased from him rather than from other persons, provided he sold them of an equally good quality at an equally cheap rate.

‘ I observe, from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, that a construction has been given to those directions which they were never intended to bear. They were intended to be applied solely to those articles which Mr. — had then at Lisbon, of which it was my wish that he should have an opportunity of disposing, as it had been represented to me that he had been encouraged by different Officers of the army to bring them out.

‘ It has been understood, however, as it appears both by Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore and Mr. —, that these orders were intended to apply not only to what Mr. — had at the time landed at Lisbon, but to whatever goods of

any description he might hereafter import into Portugal : thus giving Mr. — a description of monopoly of the consumption of the British army ; and this gentleman has in fact taken advantage of this erroneous construction given to these orders, by importing wines and other articles, to which they were never intended to apply, and offering them for sale to the Commissariat.

‘ I now desire that it may be understood that these orders are entirely countermanded ; and I will have nothing to do with Mr. —.

‘ I beg also that you will inform Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore that I approve entirely of his having made the statement reporting the conduct of Mr. —, which has been the subject of inquiry.

‘ It is quite evident to me that Mr. — has taken advantage of the indulgence of importing goods duty free, afforded by the Portuguese Government to those who supply the British army with what they want, not for the purpose for which that indulgence was granted, viz., that the goods might be afforded at a cheaper rate to the Officers and soldiers of the army, but to increase his own profits nearly to the amount of the duties payable to Government, and to put more money into his own pocket.

‘ Not satisfied with this irregular profit, he has even gone further, and has derived a profit by selling to others the use of the indulgence to import duty free which had been granted to him.

‘ I have, however, regulated this matter in such a manner that it shall not be abused in future ; and I now communicate to the —th regiment my opinion that Mr. — may continue the trade of sutler to the army, if he thinks proper, but that some other person ought to be the Paymaster of that regiment.

‘ I observe that Mr. — has stated that he has a complaint to make of Mr. Deputy Commissary Dunmore ; and I request you to ascertain what that complaint is ; and if it is of a serious nature, and there should be cause for complaint, I shall have it inquired into.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.*
Commissary General.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley. "

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Cartaxo, 3d December, 1810.

' I delay to answer you about the ordnance till I shall receive Colonel Fletcher's report on the ground on the left of the Tagus. I am anxious to take an opportunity to look at that ground myself, which I think I could manage, and return here in the course of the night. It would be necessary, however, that the Prince's boat should be placed at Villa Franca for me; and I shall be very much obliged if you will let me know at what time it will be high water at Villa Nova, in the course of three or four days.

' It is desirable that the reason for placing the boat at Villa Franca should not be known in Lisbon.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

' WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Cartaxo, 4th December, 1810.

' I enclose a report from Captain Dickinson, who was employed by me to look for the pontoon bridge which you mentioned, in your letter of the 29th November, was over a creek above Villa Franca.

' I have ascertained that in all weathers infantry can march from Salvaterra across the Island of Lycceria to a place opposite to Alhandra. The infantry of General Hill's corps will march from Salvaterra across the Island of Lycceria to the south end of the island, at which place I shall be obliged to you if you will have boats to cross them over when I shall write to you for them.

' The cavalry, artillery, and the weighty part of the baggage will go to Aldea Galega, from whence they can be passed over.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

' WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' Cartaxo, 4th December, 1810, 11 A.M.

' I am much obliged to you for your two letters of the 3d. I can scarcely believe that General Gardanne's retreat

can have been occasioned by the circumstances to which it is attributed; at least, if it has, his conduct is very unlike what we have known and heard of French General Officers. I should think that, having been within two leagues of the bridge on the Zézere, he would, at least, have patrolled to that point, and have endeavored to ascertain the precise situation of affairs before he withdrew his reinforcement. I should therefore think it probable that he did communicate with the main body of the army, and, however extraordinary his movement and the mode of making it, that he made it by order.

‘ I beg that you will appoint an Officer to act in the Visconde de Lapa’s situation during his absence, if you can find one.

‘ There is nothing new on this side. Two packets have arrived from England, but not here yet. I enclose a letter from Colonel Peacocke, by which you will see that the King is better.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th December, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d instant, and I am much obliged to you for Mr. Bell’s paper, which proves in the clearest manner, that the Portuguese Government have received in money only a sum exceeding that to which they are entitled under His Majesty’s engagements by about 60,000*l.*; and, if the provisions, &c. given to them are charged, they will have received an excess of 544,000*l.* sterling, to which a further addition will be to be made of the pay to the regiment employed at Cadiz.’

‘ I think this statement ought to be brought under their consideration. I have directed Mr. Kennedy to continue his payments to the chest of the “aids” as far as may be in his power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th December, 1810.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will order the Prince’s boat to be at Villa Franca to-morrow morning at 11 instead of at Villa Nova; and I shall be able from thence to reach Almada, so as to be in time to see everything.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th December, 1810.

‘ I am anxious to go down the river to see the ground on the left of the Tagus from Almada; and I have settled to go down to-morrow morning, if circumstances should permit, and have requested the Admiral to send the Prince’s boat to Villa Franca for me.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let Colonel Fletcher know that I shall be at Almada to-morrow between 1 and 2, and that I shall be glad to meet him there. I shall also be much obliged to you if you will send over to Almada three or four horses, in order that I may reconnoitre the ground.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th December, 1810.

‘ I propose to go to Almada to-morrow, to look at the ground on the left of the Tagus: if circumstances should permit, and if you will give me leave, I will dine with you afterwards, previous to my return at night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th December, 1810.

‘ From your letter of the 3d, I am apprehensive that my address to the Prince Regent may have involved you in some unpleasant discussions in the Regency, but after what

had passed I could not avoid writing to the Prince, and it would not have been fair to transmit such a letter without sending it to the Government, that they might have an opportunity of justifying themselves.

‘ All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles :—

‘ First, that by my appointment of Marshal General of the Portuguese army, with the same powers as were vested in the late Duque de Alafoës, I hold the command of that army independent of the local government of Portugal.

‘ Secondly, that by the arrangement made by the Governors of the Kingdom with the King’s Government, when Sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the Commander in Chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force.

‘ Thirdly, that supposing that my appointment of Marshal General did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as Commander in Chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operations of the whole, under the arrangement above referred to, it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese Government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army, as well as those of the Portuguese army.

‘ Fourthly, it never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and undoubtedly His Majesty’s Government never intended to give over the British army to the Governors of this Kingdom to make ducks and drakes with.

‘ The Governors of the Kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures recommended by me and Marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of Principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

‘ If you think it proper, you may make this an official communication, and show it to the Governors of the Kingdom. At all events, it may be of use to you in the communication you may have upon this subject with the Regency.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Cartaxo, 7th December, 1810.

‘ I will dine with you on Monday next with great pleasure.

‘ In respect to your going to England, I wish you would wait till January, in order that we may see the result of General Foy’s journey to Paris, and its effect upon the state of affairs here, which we must soon know.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 7th December, 1810.

‘ I am aware that it is not, in general, advisable to take any notice of the falsehoods published by the French Government ; but having it in my power to give so complete a contradiction to the letter supposed to have been written from Viseu, by the Intendant General Lambert, on the 5th October, as published in the *Moniteur* ; and to show, not only that the contents of that letter are false, but that in fact such a letter could not have been written by Lambert, or any other French agent, or at any time after the 28th September, I trouble your Lordship upon the subject.

‘ The account by Massena himself of the battle of Busaco, which I transmitted to you on the 8th November, will show that M. Lambert could not have received from the French Commander in Chief the account which he is supposed to have forwarded ; and the enclosed memorandum of the operations of the different Portuguese detachments in Upper Beira, from 27th September to the 7th October, will show your Lordship that neither M. Lambert nor any other Frenchman, could have heard at Viseu what was passing at Coimbra on the first five days of October, or could have

written from Viseu after the 28th of September, or could have sent to the frontier after the 3d of October.

‘ I believe that M. Lambert did not enter Portugal till the 14th November, with Gardanne’s division, at which time he was made prisoner by General Silveira, in his attack upon the advanced guard of that division.

‘ I have also to mention that I have reason to believe that General Drouet, who is stated to have forwarded M. Lambert’s letter, and to have written himself upon the same subject from Valladolid on the 12th of October, did not arrive in that city till the 20th of October.

‘ These circumstances will tend to show to your Lordship the miserable expedients which the French Government adopt, and the falsehoods which they publish, to deceive the people of France and of the Continent on the real state of affairs in the Peninsula.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 7th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose a return of the number of men and horses required to complete the regiments of British cavalry in this country.

‘ As the appointments of the heavy cavalry are so much more weighty than those of the light dragoons, and the larger horses of the former are with difficulty kept in condition, it would have been desirable to have a larger proportion of the light dragoons, or hussars, with this army ; but as the Officers, the men, and their horses, are now accustomed to the food they receive, and to the climate, I do not recommend that the regiments should be changed, or that any additional regiments should be sent out, excepting possibly the remaining two squadrons of the 3d hussars, K.G.L., of which two squadrons are already at Cadiz.

‘ Your Lordship will observe that nearly 1000 horses are wanting to complete the several regiments to the number of men they now have, and 1460 to complete to their several establishments.

‘ I would recommend that no horses should be sent for

service to this country which will not be six years old in May; and that mares should be sent in preference to horses, as it has been found that they bear the work better than the horses.

‘ I also beg leave to recommend that about 50 or 60 horses or mares of a superior description should be purchased, at the price of 40*l.* or 50*l.* each, as a remount for the Officers of the cavalry, who cannot find horses in the Peninsula at present fit for this service, and would pay this price for these horses.

‘ As great difficulty has been experienced in making shoes and shoe nails for the horses of the cavalry by their farriers, particularly after the cavalry have been actively employed for any length of time, and many horses have been consequently lost, I recommend that 4000 sets of horse shoes, and a double proportion of horse shoe nails, should be sent to the Commissary General for the use of the cavalry, of the same description with those provided for the horses of the Royal Artillery.

‘ The regiments to which these shoes would be issued would of course pay for them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ CARTAXO, 8th December, 1810.

‘ The detachment of the enemy’s troops commanded by General Gardanne, which I reported to you in my last dispatch had returned to Sobreira Formosa, have continued their march to the frontier, and, by the last accounts, had entered Spain.

‘ I have not heard that this detachment had any communication with the enemy’s troops on the left of the Zézere, from whom they were distant about three leagues. I understand, that having lost some prisoners, taken by a patrolle and by a party of the ordenanza, which accompanied Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. Ponsonby on a reconnaissance from Abrantes to the river Codes, they made very particular inquiries respecting the position of Lieut. General Hill’s corps, and the means which the allies possessed of crossing the Tagus at Abrantes; and having commenced their march

from Cardigos towards the Codes in the morning, they retired about 11 with great precipitation, and continued their retreat in the same manner, till they reached the frontier. They were followed by the ordenanza, who did them much mischief on the march, and took much baggage from them. The enemy destroyed many horses and mules which could not keep up with them; and this march, if it was ordered by superior authority, and is connected with any other arrangement, had every appearance, and was attended by all the consequences, of a precipitate and forced retreat.

‘ No alteration of any importance has been made in the position of the enemy’s troops since I addressed your Lordship on the 1st instant, and I have received no accounts from Cadiz of a later date than the 19th November.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 8th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose some papers put into my hands by Mr. Kennedy. I was always certain of the result of the formation of these depôts of carts. They cannot require the number they seize by embargo, and keep at the depôts, to the great injury of the service.

‘ Mr. Kennedy states that we have not a single cart employed, and I know that there is not one with the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 8th December, 1810, 9 A.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 7th, 2 P.M.; and I am obliged to you for having turned your mind to the attack of the enemy on the left bank of the Zezere.

‘ I am afraid that I have already rendered the enemy’s retreat through Lower Beira more difficult and dangerous than I ought, considering, that without incurring the risk of great loss and possible failure, in a general attack upon his position, I cannot attempt to remove him from this country by main force.

‘ The destruction of the bridge of the Zezere will increase

the difficulties of a march which every view of military policy ought to induce me to wish that the enemy might attempt.

‘ But I have other objections to the plan besides the above stated, referable to its general policy. In the situation in which the enemy is placed at present I can do him no serious mischief on this side. It is impossible to attack the position of Santarem in front; and all movements on its right flank are, and have been, for the last three weeks, prevented by the state in which the rains have rendered the roads. The French know this as well as we do, and they scarcely observe those roads.

‘ This being the case, the enemy’s whole force, which is pretty well concentrated about Torres Novas, Golegão, &c., might be thrown across the Zezere upon your attacking corps. You have certainly a secure retreat upon Abrantes, and, I have no doubt but that you could effect your retreat across the Tagus. But if this retreat were pressed at all, (and if they were to throw anything across the Tagus below the Zezere, it must be pressed,) the moral effect upon the garrison of Abrantes might have for its consequence the loss of the place.

‘ You may depend upon it that this plan of attack upon the enemy’s post upon the Zezere has been adverted to and well considered by me, as well as other modes of annoying the enemy; and I have stated to you frankly the considerations which have induced me not to adopt it.

‘ In all cases of this kind we must consider not only the number of our troops, but their description, and the moral effect upon them of the result of any particular operation; and I assure you that I have no doubt that even the whole of General Hill’s corps would, under present circumstances, be unequal to the proposed task; that it would be obliged to make its retreat, without loss of time, across the Tagus, in order not to lose its communication with the army; and that the result of this retreat, the cause of which would neither be known nor felt by the troops in the garrison of Abrantes, would probably be the loss of that place.

‘ If there was time, I could state facts to you which would make this consequence as clear to you as it is to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘I have this day received your letter of the 25th November, informing me of your having detained at Cadiz five companies of the Chasseurs Britanniques, arrived from Sicily. You will have learned from mine of the 2d instant that you had thus anticipated the directions which it contained.

‘I find, from a letter from the Secretary of State, that positive orders have been transmitted to Sir John Stuart to send the troops from Sicily; and I beg you to detain them all at Cadiz.

‘Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you all the intelligence from hence.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Graham.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘I have received the directions of the Secretary of State to request that empty horse ships, for the conveyance of 500 horses, may be sent to Plymouth, as soon as may be convenient, together with such store ships and victuallers as may have discharged their cargoes, and are still in the Tagus.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the Agent of Transports to comply with these directions, and to send me a return of the vessels and their tonnage which he will send in consequence of them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘I have desired that every assistance may be given by the engineer at Alhandra to the Officer employed to take down the bridge from Villa Franca.

‘Besides the orders from Government respecting horse ships, and store ships, and victuallers, they have directed that some ships for the transport of infantry should be sent

to Plymouth. But before I request you to send them, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire the Agent to let me know how we stand in respect to these vessels. Some, I know, are gone for corn to Algiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘ The Secretary of State has consented to my request to be permitted to make an allowance to the Officers, petty officers, and seamen of the fleet under your command, employed at the telegraphs in the line of country which has been fortified; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know what allowance you think it proper should be made to them, from the period at which they went to the telegraphs.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘ As I was desirous of dispatching the mail yesterday at an early hour, I did not answer your letter when I received it.

‘ Our operations depend so much upon those of the enemy, that it is impossible for me to say at what period Officers might with propriety go to England; but I should think that the enemy are now waiting for the result of the report to the Emperor sent by General Foy, and that the orders from Paris will decide what they are to do, and whether I can give leave with propriety to anybody.

‘ I shall be very happy to attend to your wishes; but I would beg you to reflect whether, considering the situation in which you stand in the army, it is desirable that you should go home upon leave.

‘ Adverting to the number of General Officers senior to you in the army, it has not been an easy task to keep you in your command; and, if you should go, I fear that I should

not be able to appoint you to it again, or to one that would be so agreeable to you, or in which you could be so useful.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th November, by O’Lalor, who arrived this morning.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State, which contains all the news that I have.

‘ Lord Liverpool tells me that Sir John Stuart has been positively ordered to send the troops from Sicily to Portugal so that you may expect to be in strength again at Cadiz.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th December, 1810.

‘ The representation which I send herewith from Lord Aylmer, Lieut. Colonels De Lancey and Elley, will, I fear, not be attended to; but it is possible that the Commander in Chief may think it proper to confer the medal on those Officers.

‘ Some of the General Officers have applied to me to know whether, upon ordinary occasions, they might not wear the riband of the medal at the button hole, instead of round the neck. This would be a more convenient way of wearing it, and they would wear it consequently more frequently, which would be desirable; and I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether there is any objection to what is proposed.

‘ Our last accounts from England are of the 31st October. A vessel has come into Lisbon, bringing papers of the 8th; and it is inconceivable how anxious we are all to receive accounts of the good King’s health.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th December, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 10th instant; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will send forage on board the cavalry transports which will go to England.

‘ I think you might send 2000 tons of the 6000 tons destined for the Marques de la Romana, which quantity, together with the *Romulus*, and the two infantry transports you mention as having proceeded with the empty victuallers, will answer all their purposes in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th, and I assure you that I was much gratified by the perusal of Dr. Nogueira's papers. They contain a strong proof of his good sense, of the just view he has taken of the interests of his country, and of his attachment to his Prince.

‘ The Officers who have been sent back from England were stated to me to be persons who ought not to be allowed to remain in this country, and on that account I recommended that they should be sent away; and all that was required from the English Government was to allow them to remain in England during the existing crisis in Portugal. As, however, they have sent them back, it is a matter of indifference to me what becomes of them. The Portuguese Government will either allow them to land and employ them, or they will send them back again to England, or away, elsewhere, as they may think proper, as I consider that I have nothing to say to these persons, or to any subject of this description.

‘ I have given to the Marques de la Romana the letter I got from Azanza to Urquijo. I acknowledge that I wish that we had kept sacred the intercepted letters. As it is, however, these may have some effect.

‘ I rather believe that the signatures are not regularly official

‘Champagny’s ought to be—“Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Duc de, &c., &c., &c.” “Champagny.”

‘Maret’s ought to be—“Le Secrétaire d’Etat, Duc de, &c., &c., &c.” “H. B. Maret.”

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

Cartaxo, 13th December, 1810.

‘I enclose to you the letter which I have received from my brother, upon the proposal that the Marques de la Romana and his corps should go to Cadiz, and copies of my answers. Return these papers.

‘I have not communicated to the Marques your letter of the 12th, or the intelligence it contains; but I asked him this morning whether the Regency had ever entertained or expressed any disapprobation of his junction with us; and he told me that they had, on the contrary, expressed their entire approbation of it.

‘It is difficult to understand the Spaniards exactly, they are such a mixture of haughtiness and low intrigue. The Marques de la Romana and the Officers about him are, I believe, perfectly satisfied with their reception here, and the manner in which they have been treated. I have been very civil also to all the other Officers, as far as they have come within my reach; and they have been treated with great attention by all the General Officers of the army; and their men are as well, if not better off than our own. But I always doubt a Spaniard being satisfied with anything; and I should not be surprised if O’Donnell particularly, and possibly others, expressed dissatisfaction at being here.

‘However, from the enclosed letters, you will see that the motive for calling the Marques de la Romana is entirely different from what is supposed by the person who gave you the information; and I think it not unlikely that the dissatisfaction of the Government with the Marques’ conduct, and the intrigues of Officers and others against him, on account of his coming here, have been whispered about, in order to induce him more willingly to go to Cadiz.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 13th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d instant. There is no doubt but that the services of the corps of the Marques de la Romana can now be spared from Portugal; and as there is no longer any prospect that the British army will be under the necessity of embarking, the other reason which induced the Marques de la Romana to join this army with his troops, viz., that he might save those troops for Spain, no longer exists. But although there is no longer any necessity for the Marques de la Romana's continuance in Portugal, or being joined to this army, it is, in my opinion, essentially necessary that he and his army should remain in this part of the Peninsula.

‘ The Marques de la Romana is the only link by which I communicate with Spain at all. He is at the head of affairs in Estremadura, and he is in constant communication with persons of all descriptions in Castille and in the neighboring provinces, and is the principal promoter and encourager of the operations of the parties of guerrillas, by whom alone the war is carried on now in these parts of Spain.

‘ If the Marques de la Romana and his corps should be called to Cadiz, not only there will be an end to all my communications with Spain, and to the warfare of the guerrillas, but it must be expected that Badajoz will fall, and the province of Estremadura will submit to the enemy upon the first appearance of a second attack.

‘ Mendizabal, who now commands in that province under the Marques, is a valuable Officer. He will, I am convinced, do his duty in every situation in which he is placed; but a very erroneous estimate is formed of the services rendered by the Marques de la Romana, and of the abilities of Mendizabal, or of any of the Officers under the command of the Marques de la Romana, if it is supposed that he or any of them can at all supply his place.

‘ I have already informed you and General Graham, that if the positions of the allies on the Isla de Leon should be seriously threatened, I would send troops from hence to Cadiz; and I have requested General Graham to detain the troops on their passage from Sicily to this country; and I

have no hesitation in declaring that I should consider it less detrimental to the cause of the allies to detach from this army to Cadiz a force equal in number to the corps which the Marques de la Romana commands, and which is now joined to us, than that the Marques should leave this part of the Peninsula himself, with the troops which he commands.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have availed myself of the latitude afforded me by Don E. de Bardaxi’s note of the 2d instant, to prevail upon the Marques de la Romana to wait here for the answer to the representations which we now send to Cadiz, upon the orders which the Regency have transmitted to him.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 13th December, 1810.

‘ The Marques de la Romana has communicated to me a private and confidential note which he has received from Don E. de Bardaxi, from which it appears that the real motive for calling him and his corps to Cadiz is very different from that stated in the public notes.

‘ It appears to me that the Government are strengthening themselves against the Cortes, or a party in the Cortes. Bardaxi talks of his silencing “les brailleurs” by his presence, and of his preventing the mischief which it appears that some persons, ignorant of the public business and of the state of affairs, are disposed and have the power to do.

‘ I do not know whether I have a correct notion of Bardaxi’s letter to the Marques, but he entertains the same; and it is clear to both of us that the measure of calling him and his troops to Cadiz is founded upon domestic, political expediency, rather than upon military necessity.

‘ The Marques de la Romana therefore sends his confidential aide de camp, —, to Cadiz, who will deliver to you these letters, and who will inform himself of the real state of affairs, and bring back an answer without loss of time.

‘ It may be useful, however, to let you know that the Marques’ Officers and troops are like others of the same description. Although much attached to him personally, it must not be supposed that he could depend upon their im-

licit obedience in a contest with the people of Cadiz, much less with a popular assembly. If it is supposed that the Cortes are doing mischief (of which I acknowledge that I have long had no doubt, and I am convinced that they have done no good), the best mode of providing a remedy for that mischief is to keep such men as the Marques de la Romana and the Catalonian O'Donnell and their armies clear of the influence of that body, and of the intrigues which must always prevail more or less at the place in which they are assembled.

'At all events, I am of opinion that the Marques de la Romana and his troops can do no good in Cadiz, and that they may be entirely destroyed there, if they attempt to interfere with the Cortes; and that in the meantime the absence of the Marques de la Romana, and of his troops, from this part of the Peninsula, will be a fatal blow to the cause of the allies.

'Ever yours most affectionately,

'*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

'WELLINGTON.

'P.S. The Marques is anxious that Bardaxi should not know that I have seen his letter.

'W.'

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810, 4 p.m.

'I have received your note, containing the suggestion regarding the bridge of Abrantes. As the bridge is taken up, preparatory measures may as well be adopted to enable us to fit it at any other part of the river; but I have boats and materials for a bridge near Salvaterra, which I had intended to throw over the Zezere, and which might be used to cross General Hill's corps over the Tagus, below the Zezere, if expedient.

'I have no idea that the enemy will make any movement of importance till they shall receive orders from Paris. They are certainly not moving towards the Alva, and their cavalry have returned from the neighborhood of Coimbra. They are preparing themselves most on the side of the Zezere.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Major General*

the Hon. W. Stewart.'

'WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘No alteration has been made in the enemy’s position in front of this army since I had the honor of addressing you on the 8th instant, and all the deserters and prisoners continue to report the distress which the troops suffer.

‘The enemy detached a body of cavalry, consisting of four regiments, towards Coimbra; but finding that town occupied by General Bacellar, they have returned again to their station in the rear of the right of this army.

‘I am concerned to forward the enclosed report from Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, of the death of Captain Fenwick, the late Commandant of Obidos. During the last two months he had been engaged more than twenty times with the enemy’s foraging parties, and I have had several opportunities of reporting his success. Upon this last occasion he had made an attack upon, and had driven in, a party consisting of eighty grenadiers, in the neighborhood of , near Alcobaça, who had come there in search of provisions, having under his command a detachment of the same number of the militia of the garrison of Obidos, and was pursuing them when he was mortally wounded, and he died on the 10th. We have thus sustained a great loss; and he is lamented by all who had any knowledge of his gallantry and exertions.

‘It is generally reported that the battalions composing the 9th corps have marched towards Madrid, where preparations are making for the assembly of a large body of troops; but I have not yet received this report from those channels of intelligence in Castille on which I can rely. It is certain, however, that all these troops, as well as Gardanne’s detachment, have retired from the frontiers of Portugal.

‘The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are dated the 2d instant. The Chasseurs Britanniques had arrived there from Sicily, and had been detained there by Lieut. General Graham, by my desire.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch of the 24th September, by Colonel Downie of the Spanish service; and I wish to draw your Lordship’s attention to what has already passed respecting the legion to be raised by that gentleman.

‘In the course of the last year I had requested the Central Junta, through His Majesty’s Minister, to refrain from granting commissions to Officers in the service of His Majesty, or to British subjects serving in the army of the Prince Regent of Portugal, without previously consulting me.

‘The commission of Colonel was granted to Mr. Downie, and he was appointed to raise a legion in Estremadura, by the Central Junta, and confirmed by the late Regency; but I had no previous knowledge of this arrangement, and the first intelligence I received of it was from that gentleman himself, after he had received his commission, accompanied by a request that I would permit him to absent himself from his duty as an Assistant Commissary with this army, in order that he might perform his engagements to the Spanish Government.

‘I declined complying with this request, and referred Mr. Downie to the Treasury, and he went home the last summer upon leave of absence on account of his health; and is now come out with the letter from your Lordship of the 24th September, and a letter from the Commander in Chief, of the 24th November, directing me to give him the assistance of British Officers from this army to train and discipline his troops.

‘From the knowledge I have of Mr. Downie’s character and qualifications, I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish cause will derive advantage from his being employed to raise in Estremadura and command a legion, but my approbation of the measure of employing him goes no farther.

‘Although Mr. Downie has talents and spirit to qualify him for such an employment, it is not fit, in my opinion, to

place British Officers under his command; and so far to risk the character of the British army in this concern.

‘ There is no doubt but that the greatest benefit would be derived from the employment of British Officers with the Spanish troops; but this measure must be connected with others of reform of the Spanish military system: regular means must be adopted to feed, clothe, discipline, and pay the troops, or the efforts of these Officers must fail; at the same time that their characters, as well as that of the British army, and that of the person who should approve of their being thus employed, would suffer for their failure.

‘ I should besides think it proper that an Officer of the British army should be employed to command that portion of the Spanish army to which these British Officers should be attached.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, therefore, that I do not approve of employing British Officers with the legion to be raised in Estremadura by Colonel Downie; but even if I did approve of this measure, it would be totally out of my power to give him any assistance of this description from this army.

‘ I enclose a return of the number of Officers belonging to this army employed with the Portuguese troops; from which your Lordship will see that the Portuguese army has received but a very small proportion of assistance from other parts of the British army not employed here; and it is impossible to allow the Officers of the regiments in Portugal to quit their corps to go and serve in a legion to be raised in Spain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose a return of horse and infantry transports, and of victuallers, which has been sent to England in consequence of your Lordship’s orders of the 24th November.

‘ I have sent horse transports for about 530 horses, including the *Trafalgar* (N.E.), in case your Lordship should

think proper to send by this occasion a certain proportion of the remount horses for the cavalry; and, besides the 2500 tons of infantry transports (including the *Melonello* and *Langley*), the *Romulus* troop ship has been sent.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the report of two boards of survey on shoes, issued to the regiments of this army by the Commissariat, which were received from England.

‘ It is very desirable that the storekeepers in England should understand that there is no use in sending to this country any articles which are not of the best quality for service. They are of no use to the troops, are a useless expense to the public, and occasion a great disappointment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose two letters which have been written to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, respecting Lieut. L. Victor Künchler, a Swiss Officer in the service of France, who was taken prisoner in the spring of 1809, at Chaves in Portugal.

‘ Sir W. C. Beresford is desirous that this Officer should be exchanged, or should be allowed to go to France from England on his parole not to serve against the allies until exchanged; and I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will give directions that his parole may be taken, and that he may be sent to France accordingly, and that the parole may be sent to this country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose the weekly state of the 8th, and the weekly return of the sick to the 9th instant.

‘ I am concerned to add, that since this report has been made, an increased degree of sickness has appeared in the 3d batt. of the Royals, the 4th and 9th regiments, all of which had been in Walcheren. But I attribute the sickness of these regiments not to that cause alone, but to the irregularity of the soldiers; who, contrary to repeated orders, have burnt as firewood the doors and windows, and, in some instances, the roofs of the houses in which they have been cantoned; and they have been, consequently, exposed to the weather.

‘ The troops of the 5th division, to which these regiments belong, have been less exposed by their duty than any others in the army; and yet they are now the only division in which there is any appearance of sickness.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke, Commandant at Lisbon.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th December, 1810.

‘ I have this day written to the Commander in Chief to recommend that you should be appointed a Brigadier General in the Peninsula.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th December, 1810, 5 P. M.

‘ As the enemy have certainly gone out of Colonel Otway’s reach, it is desirable, with a view as well to the subsistence of his troops as that he may be nearer to you if wanted, that he should be drawn back again to the neighborhood of Chamusca. But as it would be desirable to conceal the movements of this brigade from the enemy, I recommend that they may be cantoned at a distance from the Tagus, unless you should require them on the river.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State.

‘ I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.

‘ I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people, who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.

‘ It appears to me that the production of a certificate from me, or Colonel Alava, or Colonel O’Lalor, that a man is employed as a muleteer with the British army, might exempt him from service as a soldier, without any great violation of principle or any inconvenience. I do not believe that the whole number of persons of this description exceeds 500; and of these many cannot be of the military ages.

‘ I hope some arrangement will be adopted upon this subject; and I can only say that if something is not done, and I am to be deprived of all those persons of this description who have until now been attached to this army, I shall be entirely crippled, and it will be a question whether we ought not to quit the Peninsula entirely. I doubt that even here we could exist one day without their assistance.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. It must be observed that the muleteers who will be obliged to quit the British army will not serve as soldiers. They will prefer to go into the districts occupied by the French, to carry on their trade as muleteers. ‘ W.’

*To his Excellency Licut. General Sir John Stuart, K.B.,
Count of Maida.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 17th December, 1810.

‘ Lord Liverpool has directed that tonnage should be sent from this country to Sicily, in order to bring to the Peninsula a detachment amounting to 2500 men; and I have accordingly requested Admiral Berkeley to send to Sicily vessels for that purpose. I imagine, however, that as it is desirable to detain in this part of the world as large a proportion of transport tonnage as may be practicable, the Admiral will either detain the transports which have brought the Chasseurs Britanniques to Cadiz, or if those transports should be found in a condition to return to Sicily, he will send with them additional tonnage for 1500 men; as it is supposed that those transports will be capable of bringing 1000 men.

‘ In case you should deem it inconsistent with the safety of the country, with the defence of which you are charged, to make this detachment from your force, I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that the vessels may return to the Tagus loaded with wheat or flour, or, if neither can be procured, corn of any other description.

‘ You will probably have received an account of the state of affairs in the Peninsula from Gibraltar and Cadiz. Affairs in this country remain nearly in the situation in which they were towards the end of last month. Massena still holds the position of Santarem with the left of his army, and he supports that post with the remainder of his troops.

‘ The detachment which attempted to penetrate Lower Beira in November retired into Spain with great precipitation, and suffered great loss in its retreat from the incessant attacks of the peasantry. I cannot understand for what reason it retired, as, when it turned, it was distant from the rear of the French army not more than three leagues, and there was nothing to prevent its junction.

‘ The French now occupy the right of the Tagus, from the junction of the Zezere to Santarem; they have their cavalry at Ourem, their head quarters at Torres Novas, and their hospitals at Thomar; and that is the whole of Portugal which they possess.

‘ Their loss has been immense since they have been in

this country; and it appears to me to be impossible that they should be able to effect their object without drawing into Portugal nearly the whole force which is employed in other parts of the Peninsula. They are much pressed for provisions, and I imagine that Massena maintains his position in this country only because the retreat into Spain is very difficult; and that it will have such an influence on the state of affairs in the Peninsula, that he does not choose to make it without having orders from the Emperor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir J. Stuart, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 17th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose you the copies of a correspondence which I have had with the Secretary of State and the Commander in Chief, relative to a plan for raising a legion in Estremadura, by Colonel Downie, who was appointed to perform this service.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th December, 1810.

‘ General Hamilton mentioned to me yesterday that the soldiers from Almeirim had been to some place in that neighborhood for bullocks for food, and that they had carried away all the bullocks the people had, and had besides plundered the house of silver forks and spoons.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let General Lumley know that I never allow the bullocks used for draft to be consumed for food; that I never allow the British soldiers to be sent out on service of this description, that is, to collect cattle for food, or indeed at all, because I know that they never go out of the sight of their Officers without committing an outrage of the description of that referred to; and that I request of him to endeavor to discover who the soldiers were who committed this outrage, and to collect the proofs against them, in order that I may have them brought to trial.

‘ I also request to draw the attention of Mr. Ogilvie to this subject, in order that he may take measures to preclude the necessity of resorting to the means above referred to, to supply General Lumley’s brigade with food.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th November (marked private and confidential), to the first part of which I do not conceive it necessary to make any reply.

‘ In respect to the latter part, I believe your object, as well as mine, is the same, viz., that the British Commissariat should be efficient. My opinion agrees entirely with yours respecting the expediency of preventing the offices in the Commissariat from becoming objects of parliamentary patronage; but I am apprehensive that the regulations which have been made are efficient for that purpose only, and will not give you a good Commissariat.

‘ I know from experience that the Officers who perform exceedingly well the duties of the lower ranks of the Commissariat are not of course, even after the experience of five years, equal to those of the higher ranks. A good clerk does not of course make a good Assistant Commissary; and upon this point I could beg to refer you to Mr. Murray for a few anecdotes of Mr. Assistant Commissary —, who was promoted because he was a good clerk.

‘ In my last letter I never intended to complain of the incapacity of any gentleman for the duty on which he was employed; but I do not know any of the higher ranks who have talents for the performance of the duty of the Commissary General.

‘ If it be true (and my experience teaches me that it is) that a gentleman in the lower ranks of the Commissariat, even after length of service, does not of course become qualified for the duties of the higher ranks, it follows that the regulation which requires that these gentlemen shall be promoted in their turns, according to a kind of regimental succession, after a certain number of years’ service, is not

the most likely to give the army an efficient Commissariat. It follows also that this regulation is likely to entail upon the public a large and useless expense, in proportion as it will be carried into execution for persons who will be useless in the higher ranks of the department to which they belong.

‘ I give you my opinion very freely upon your regulation, which, however defective, may, I admit, be necessary, in order to prevent the interference of members of parliament in the disposal of offices in the department.

‘ There is another point to which I would refer, and that is the degree of reward for service in the Commissariat. I do not think it fair to compare the reward of any rank in the Commissariat with the reward of the same amount to the Officers of the army. I am of opinion, first, that all the Officers of the British army are paid too little, and much less than the Officers of any other army in Europe, adverting to the mode of living in England, to the value of money, and to the reward for talents and exertions in other professions : but, secondly, Officers of the army have rank and other objects to look to, to which not only a Commissary cannot aspire, but from which he is precluded ; and indeed I might add that the prejudices of society against a Commissary almost prevent him from receiving the common respect due to the character of a gentleman.

‘ In estimating the length of time which a gentleman ought to serve in the lower ranks of the Commissariat in order to obtain pay, and eventually half pay, equal in amount to that received by certain ranks in the army, we should look a little to the difference of objects and to the difference in the situations of the Officers whose length of service and advantages we are comparing.

‘ However, my opinion being adverse to the regulation which requires a certain length of service for promotion in the Commissariat, and which places the Officers of the Commissariat in a list of succession to claim promotion by seniority, I only advert to this last point, to show you where, in my opinion, you have erred in principle in forming your plan.

‘ My own opinion is, that the Commissariat should be formed, in respect to promotion, on the principle of a civil rather than a military establishment ; that the pay and the

half pay of the different Officers in it should be increased in proportion to the number of years of their service ; and that none should be promoted who are not recommended for promotion by the Officers in command of the troops. These, being held tolerably severely responsible for the success of their operations, will of course take care not to recommend any for promotion who do not deserve it, and who will not be of service in the higher ranks. You will thus have efficient people in the higher ranks, and no expense will be incurred that is not necessary.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have omitted to thank you for your intention expressed in your letter to give me every assistance in your power, of which I assure you I am very sensible. ‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st December, 1810.

‘ I received your letter of the 4th two days ago.

‘ I did not know what to say about the reduction of the number of our transports in the Tagus: I have no apprehension that we shall be obliged to embark, and no idea that the enemy will for a length of time be in a situation to oblige us to think of such an operation ; but I cannot, as an Officer, be so certain of the course of events as to tell you that the transports may be withdrawn.

‘ It may be necessary to request your attention for a few moments to explain our situation in reference to that of the enemy, and the general state of affairs in the Peninsula as affecting this question. I have no doubt that the enemy is not, and does not consider himself, able to force the position of the allies in this country. Indeed, I believe I have the means of beating the force now opposed to me, in their own position, of course with the sacrifice of a certain loss of men.

‘ I think that the paper published in the *Moniteur* of the 23d November shows that our position in front of Lisbon is considered so strong, as that it ought not to be attacked in front ; and, from the perusal of that paper, I am of opinion that the enemy will endeavor to maintain a position in this country with the troops now in it, probably reinforced by

some of those now on the frontier, &c.; will endeavor to dislodge us by occupying the countries north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, and thus distress us for supplies. The accomplishment of this plan will require an enormous force and some length of time; but when I recollect that in the last year the whole of the north of Spain, and of Old Castille, were abandoned by the enemy, even before the battle of Talavera, I cannot doubt that they will abandon those countries likewise upon the existing emergency, which will give them a part of the force they require.

‘ I am also certain that, if the British army should not be obliged to evacuate Portugal, the French army must withdraw from Andalusia. I think it not improbable, therefore, that a large part of it, if not the whole of the French army in Andalusia, will be introduced into the southern parts of this kingdom.

‘ I do not despair of holding my ground against this accumulation of force, and I have taken measures to prevent the only inconvenience which it can produce, viz., a deficiency of supplies. But as these troops are all within a few marches of me, and an order from Paris would not only put them in motion, but they could be in this country almost before the transports could arrive in England, I cannot think it advisable, in the existing situation of affairs, to send them out of my reach.

‘ The question whether I should attack the enemy in the position which he now occupies has been well considered by me. I have a superior army, I think, by 10,000 men, or one sixth, including the Spaniards; and, notwithstanding some defects in its composition, I think I should succeed. But the loss must necessarily be very great in killed and wounded; and the necessity which would exist of exposing the troops to the weather for some days and nights would throw a great proportion of this convalescent army into the hospital.

‘ Then what is to be gained in this action, in which failure would be the loss of the whole cause? Nothing at present that I know of, excepting to relieve the northern provinces and Andalusia from the presence of the enemy; which relief it is probable that the course of events will bring about, without the risk and loss of an action.

‘ But there is another view of this question, which is a very serious one, and has made much impression upon my mind. If the northern provinces of Spain and Andalusia should be relieved from the pressure and presence of the enemy by the course of events, or by exertions in Portugal, what will the cause gain by this relief? In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon myself and General Cuesta not less than five corps d’armée, and the King’s guards and reserve, more than equal to a sixth corps; and that when the whole of Castille and the north of Spain was cleared of the enemy, not a man was put in the field by those provinces, nor even one raised!

‘ In this year I have had three corps d’armée, the most numerous and efficient in Spain, upon my hands for eight months. The kingdom of Galicia has been entirely free from the enemy, and Castille partially relieved. The Spanish army in Galicia have made no movement whatever, as General Mahy says, for want of great coats; but in fact, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, transport, discipline, and everything which can keep a body of men together in an operation. In Castille nothing has been done, excepting that the guerrillas have been more daring and successful in their robberies.

‘ The relief of Andalusia would, I fear, make no difference in the situation of affairs there. I do not think it quite certain that the enemy would be obliged to raise the siege of Cadiz, although it is probable that he would. But if the siege of Cadiz were not raised, the general cause would derive no advantage from the relief of Andalusia; and even if the raising the siege of Cadiz were the consequence of the relief of Andalusia, I doubt that there are means at Cadiz of putting into the field the troops now composing the garrison of that place, so as to render them a disposable force for the cause of the allies, or that any benefit would be derived from that event, excepting that it would place at the disposal of the allies the means which the enemy have collected for the siege of Cadiz, and retard, and probably prevent, the operation.

‘ Your Lordship will probably deem this a melancholy picture of prospects in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. This state of affairs in Spain is the result of some

defects in the national character, aggravated by the false principles on which all the affairs of that country have been conducted since it attempted to shake off the yoke of France. The Spaniards have consequently no army; no means of raising one; no authority to discipline an army if they could raise one; no means to arm, equip, clothe, or feed anything which could be collected under that name.

‘The war in the Peninsula, therefore, as far as the Spaniards are concerned in it, cannot take a regular shape. It must be confined to the operations of the guerrillas, upon which the calculations are very different from those which would be made in respect to the operations of a more regular force.

‘If all this be true, our business is not to fight the French army, which we certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but to give occupation to as large a portion of it as we can manage, and to leave the war in Spain to the guerrillas. As long as the French do not interfere with our supplies, or the resources of the Portuguese Government, or any point of our security, I think it very immaterial whether they are in Spain or Portugal. Indeed, adverting to the greater difficulties they have in subsisting in the latter country and in keeping up their communications, I believe it is more advantageous that they should be where they are. Their numbers are certainly diminishing daily, while they do us no mischief; on the contrary, we are nearer to our resources than ever we were, and they leave the whole of the north of Spain open to the operations of the guerrillas.

‘But if the army now in Portugal is to be assisted by other corps, operating north of the Douro and south of the Tagus, before I can have secured the supplies of provisions I require, I must then seek to dislodge them by more determined means than I have tried hitherto.

‘These means, God knows, may fail; or I may be prevented from trying them by the weather, or by other circumstances over which I can have no control. In all these cases it would be terrible not to have transports at hand, and I cannot advise that they should be sent away.

‘It is certainly astonishing that the enemy have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is an extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a

fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money, and having in our favor the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than two months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry only from the district which they now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But they take everything, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve.

‘ I have heard this day, but not from good authority, that Gardanne’s division had again crossed the Coa on the 14th, and had made a march towards Celorico on the 17th. My last letter from Silveira is of the 13th, and he does not mention the enemy being in any shape to make this movement. However, it is possible, and indeed probable, that some attempt will be made to communicate with Massena from the frontier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, and as there are still a large number of prisoners at Oporto who have been ordered to Lisbon, I am concerned to find that the Lords of the Admiralty object to their being sent to England.

‘ It will be necessary that they shall be removed from Lisbon, and I shall communicate with the Portuguese Government regarding the mode of disposing of them.

‘ Major General Sontag does not recollect the sums allowed at Walcheren to Officers and seamen employed at the telegraphs on that island; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what sum I shall allow to those employed with the army in Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Leith.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘I have received your letter of the 21st instant. I sincerely wish that the war was over, that I might take leave myself, and give leave to all those that are desirous of taking it. But as that is not the case, I have been obliged to regulate my own discretion, and to make rules by which I am guided in the grant of leaves of absence.

‘Those who are obliged to go for the recovery of their health are compelled to appear before a Medical Board, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will go through that ceremony, and I shall be happy to comply with your wishes.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Leith.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lord Mulgrave, Master General of the Ordnance.

MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘I received by the last post your letter of the 30th ultimo, and I am very much obliged to you for your attention to our wants. I sent some transports home for the horses about a fortnight ago.

‘Captain Chapman goes home by this occasion, and will make you acquainted with our situation. He is a very valuable Officer, and I shall regret the loss of his services much; but it was impossible to detain him any longer from the situation to which you had appointed him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lord Mulgrave.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘I have the honor to enclose some papers which I have received from Colonel Peacocke, regarding the murder of a Portuguese woman, by Michael Grace, private soldier in the —th regiment, which I request you to transmit to be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, and to request that they will let me know what they wish should be done with the prisoner.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter, and its enclosure, from Admiral Berkeley, relative to an expense incurred by Colonel Trant, the Governor of Oporto, in erecting a telegraph at that place to communicate with the shipping. I request you to lay these papers before the Portuguese Government, with my recommendation that this expense may be defrayed, and that Colonel Trant may be authorized to defray the expense of supplying with provisions, and of paying, the Officer and seamen attached to this telegraph.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 18th, 19th, and 20th, and I am obliged to you for the steps you have taken in respect to Signor Botelho. From the state of confusion, however, in which every department of the Portuguese Government is at present, I apprehend that we shall not be able to do anything with him here. Your copyist has copied the letters transmitted from Madrid badly, or I am so bad a Spaniard that I cannot understand their meaning. They were sent to you by your correspondent at Madrid; but where and from whom did he get these letters?

‘ The Commissary General will take and pay for the supplies contained in Mr. Wellesley’s list, transmitted in your letter of the 20th, and he will take and pay for any supplies which may be sent to Lisbon, which he may require for the use of the British army. But it is impossible for him to engage to pay for supplies ordered either for the Portuguese army or the people of Lisbon, to which I imagine that the letter from General Graham to you of the 8th instant refers. It appears to me, from all accounts, that the Portuguese Government are becoming daily more inefficient: adverting to the large sums of money which there are in the town of Lisbon, and to the means of all kinds which are collected there, it is shameful that the inhabitants of the town should continue to be in want. The harvest in Minho and Tras os

Montes has been most abundant, and the weather for the last three weeks has been most favorable for importations from thence. But I have not heard that any supplies have been imported.

‘ I request your attention to the publication in the *Moniteur* of the 23d November, as translated in the last newspapers, relative to affairs in this country, from which you will see what the designs of the enemy are. It appears to me that our position is considered invulnerable; but it is obvious that the enemy will endeavor to operate upon our supplies.

‘ The navigation of the harbour is secured: but have the Government taken any and what steps to draw supplies for the town and for the army from the northern or the southern provinces of the kingdom, in which there is abundance?

‘ If orders should be sent from Paris to raise the siege of Cadiz, or to march Mortier’s and Sebastiani’s corps into Alentejo, continuing the siege of Cadiz by the others, are the properties of individuals in the province of Alentejo secured by removal or by being buried? Have the provisions and means of transport been removed out of the reach of the enemy, or are they in readiness to be removed out of his reach upon the first alarm?

‘ In respect to the northern provinces, my opinion is that they are secure during the winter. But when a country, rich as Portugal is now in money and valuables, is invaded solely for the sake of plunder, the inhabitants should be warned to remove to a place of security, or bury their money and valuable property, in order that it may not fall into the hands of the enemy.

‘ I hear from Beresford melancholy accounts of the desperately reduced state of all the departments of the army, to which it appears that as little attention has been paid as to other objects. Indeed he informed me this morning, that the Portuguese Officers were paid only the British gratuity, which, if it be true regarding those corps which form the 30,000 men subsidized by Great Britain, is a breach of engagement with the British Government, as the pay of the Officers is estimated in the amount paid by Great Britain.

‘ In short, unless the Government will act upon a more vigorous system, and raise and realize a revenue from the

country, which I am convinced they may do, the cause is gone. It is useless to expect more money from England, as the desire of economy has overcome even the fears of the Ministers, and they have gone so far as to desire me to send home the transports in order to save money !

‘ They must levy the real tenth of all incomes, particularly mercantile incomes, and enforce the regulations of the customs, and punish dishonest Custom House officers, or they cannot go on. Pray inquire how much income tax Quintella, and Bandeira, and Sampayo, pay * !

‘ I think a tax upon male servants kept at Lisbon and Oporto, increasing in proportion to the numbers kept, levied in the way of our assessed taxes, would give them a good sum, provided it is really levied.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d December, 1810.

‘ The enemy still continue in their position at Santarem, in which no alteration of consequence has been made since I addressed your Lordship on the 15th instant. They continue to collect boats on the Zezere, over which river they have now either two or three bridges.

‘ The enemy have shown themselves on the Lower Coa, according to the last accounts from General Silveira, but not, in his opinion, in such force as to pass that river. The reports which I had received of the march of the troops of the 9th corps towards Madrid have not been confirmed.

‘ The last accounts which I have received from Cadiz are of the 8th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Fane.

‘ MY DEAR FANE,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d, and I am exceedingly concerned that you have suffered, and are still suffer-

* Three rich merchants of Lisbon.

ing so-much; but I hope that your voyage to England, with tranquillity and the society of your friends, will re-establish your health in a much shorter period of time than you expect.

‘ You may go to England; but I wish you would appear before a Medical Board, according to the order of the army, and you may stay for three months.

‘ I shall apply to the Admiral to give you a passage in a ship of war; but I shall be much obliged to you not to mention that I do so, as others will require that I should make the same application for them, although their cases, fortunately for them, are not of a nature to require this accommodation, which involves the public in a sort of expense; and the Admiralty are very particular in their inquiries respecting the causes for the application for a ship of war for a General Officer.

‘ I do not know what I shall do with your command during your absence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Fune.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Cartaxo, 23d December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th; and I now enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State.

‘ I have received a report that the troops on the Lower Coa have crossed that river; but I have no confirmation of it, although it must be expected that some attempt will be made from Castille to communicate with Massena; and as the troops fared so ill in their late attempt in Lower Beira, it is not improbable that they will try the valley of the Mondego. If the weather holds up, however, our situation on the right of that river will annoy them much.

‘ You will have seen the paper published in the *Moniteur* of the 23d November, which I think contains a hint of the intentions of the Emperor in respect to this country. Our position is evidently considered invulnerable; but they intend to endeavor to operate upon our supplies. They will probably, therefore, enter Estremadura and Alentejo from Andalusia, with Mortier’s corps and Sebastiani’s; and it is not impossible but that they may raise the siege of Cadiz.

In either case, what will, or rather, what can the Spanish Government do?

‘ Since April last I have had upon my hands the three strongest and most efficient corps d’armée in Spain. Galicia and Estremadura have been relieved entirely, and Castille partially; but these provinces have done nothing; and those more distant, in which there are no French troops, have made no exertion. I admit that none of these provinces could be expected to be in a situation to make any exertion in one, two, or three months after the enemy should have withdrawn from them, but they might in seven or eight months, during which they have been freed from the enemy, in which time we last year formed the Portuguese army.

‘ If Andalusia should be evacuated, and, besides the 9th, I should have the 4th and 5th corps upon me; and even if the siege of Cadiz should be raised; and, in addition to all, I should have the 1st corps upon me, what will the Spanish Government do? I am afraid, nothing! And this is the part of the subject which gives me the greatest concern, and really grieves me.

‘ I think I may be able to stand out against everything; but the people of England will never bear that the affairs of the people of Spain should have been so mismanaged as that, when seven parts out of nine of the French army, and those the most efficient, should have been brought into Portugal, the people of Spain should be able to do nothing for our relief. And yet I declare I believe they can do nothing for our relief!

‘ In order to show you how the Spanish armies are going on, I enclose you a report which Sir W. Beresford has received from General Madden, the Officer commanding the brigade of Portuguese cavalry in Estremadura. I am convinced that there is not one word in this letter that is not true. Yet these are the soldiers who are to beat the French out of the Peninsula!!!

‘ If you should make known the contents of this letter to anybody, do not allow it to be known that it came from Madden.

‘ There is no remedy for these evils, excepting a vigorous system of government, by which a revenue of some kind or other can be raised to pay and find resources for an army in

which discipline can be established, which this vigorous Government will maintain. It is nonsense to talk of rooting out the French, or of carrying on the war in any other manner. Indeed, if the destruction occasioned by the guerillas and by the Spanish armies, and the expense incurred by maintaining the French armies are calculated, it will be obvious that it will be much cheaper for the country to maintain 80,000 or 100,000 regular troops in the field; and if they had that number of troops, properly equipped, I have no doubt that the French would be obliged to quit the Peninsula.

‘ But the Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period. Their courage, and even their activity, is of a passive nature, and must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances, and is never a matter of choice nor of foresight.

‘ I shall speak to Romana about the arms which I have here; and will send you all that he does not think are required in this part of the Peninsula.

‘ I doubt that British Officers would be of much use in forming the Spanish troops, unless the persons in the supreme command of them were British Officers likewise. British Officers of inferior rank, to be of any use, would require the support of authority to enforce their discipline: they would also require the control of authority (and that of no ordinary kind) to keep themselves in order. We have both in Portugal; and, above all, we have pay and resources for the troops, and have formed an excellent army.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th November, conveying the copy of the decree of the Cortes of the 19th November, and of the letter which you had received of the same date from Don E. de Bardaxi.

‘ I request you to take an opportunity of assuring the Regency that I have perused their papers with the greatest satisfaction, and that nothing can be more gratifying to me

than to find that the Government and Cortes of Spain have approved of my conduct in the interesting cause in which we have been engaged.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 24th December, 1810.

‘ Having received the orders of the Secretary of State to fix the pay of the Officers, petty officers, and seamen employed at the military telegraphs near Lisbon, I have fixed upon the sum of 10s. per diem for the Lieutenants, 6s. per diem for the midshipmen, 1s. 6d. per diem for the petty officers, and 1s. per diem for the seamen ; and if the senior Officer will send an abstract for the whole number, made up for each month separately, from the period at which they were first employed to the end of this month, to my Military Secretary, I will sign a warrant for the whole amount, which he will receive from the Commissary General.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 24th December, 1810, 10 A. M.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday, and the papers contained in that which you wrote to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, at 4 P. M. yesterday. They write these reports at Abrantes in such a hand that it is difficult to make them out, and I shall be obliged to you to communicate this observation to Colonel Lobo.

‘ I have long considered the probability that the enemy might attempt to throw a bridge over the Tagus ; and the intention to make this attempt appears confirmed by the accounts which we have of the description of equipment that the troops have brought which have recently passed Coa.

‘ I do not think that, even with the addition of their reinforcements, the enemy will be in sufficient force to attempt to establish themselves on the other side of the Tagus,

unless they should be further reinforced by a corps from Estremadura, or should establish their line on the right bank of the Tagus, behind the Zezere, in which country they cannot subsist. However, it is as well to be prepared for all events. I do not think it probable that they entertain any intention of attacking Abrantes. They have no means of carrying on this operation, and they must retire behind the Zezere in order to attempt it.

‘ With all this, however, this great collection of boats at Punhete, and the further preparations which are making of the same description, look very like it.

‘ For the present, I concur in the manner you propose of strengthening Don Carlos de España’s post. But I think we ought to make other arrangements on the other side of the Tagus.

‘ First, Your troops should be rather more concentrated; that is, the Portuguese corps ought to be moved to their right, and nearer to the British.

‘ Secondly, The brigades at Chamusca, as well as the Portuguese brigades, which will be moved nearer to you, should be kept out of sight, so that you may move them without the enemy’s knowledge. In this case, it would be still necessary to keep your piquets, &c. upon the river, and some red coats in Chamusca, in order that the enemy might not perceive the alteration, which ought to be made in the morning before daylight. The brigade of Almeirim cannot be moved, I am afraid, without being perceived by the troops on the heights of Santarem.

‘ Thirdly, As the enemy have made the collection of boats on the Zezere, it would be advisable to have some artillery opposite to that point. Indeed, if the boats are within the range of field pieces, and any mischief can be done to them decidedly by the fire of field pieces, it is desirable that as much injury as possible should be done to them.

‘ Fourthly, The passage of the Tagus by the enemy must be resisted as far as may be practicable; and every effort made to prevent them from establishing themselves on the left of the Tagus.

‘ If they should pass in such force as that to attack them will be matter of risk, and it should be impossible to wait for

instructions from me, your retreat should be upon Salvaterra.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. You had better look out for cantonments at a little distance from the river ; and alter your position according to the directions in this letter as soon as you please, reporting the detail to the Quarter Master General.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 25th December, 1810.’

‘ From the accounts which I have received from the frontier, it appears that a reinforcement is on its march to join the enemy which is not inconsiderable in number ; and it is probable that they will soon join.

‘ I am doubtful whether, when this reinforcement joins, Massena will manœuvre upon our left, so as to oblige us to resume our position, which he will then attack ; or will endeavor to extend his own left into the Alentejo, so as to acquire for himself and deprive us of the resources of that province.

‘ Under these circumstances it is necessary that I should leave General Hill’s corps in Alentejo till the line of the enemy’s operations shall be decided ; and this corps is now disposed of to defend the passage of the Tagus, and it will not be easy to put it in motion, and get it into the lines as soon as might be wished.

‘ Under these circumstances I send orders by this post that the 2d batt. 88th regiment may be collected and sent to Loures, as soon as it can be relieved by one battalion of the marines ; and I should wish the other battalion of the marines to come up to Loures likewise.

‘ I have not yet received any official intimation from you respecting these marines ; but I understand that the marines of the squadron would form one battalion ; that which I shall wish should take the duty of Lisbon and the forts, particularly our works at S. Julian ; and that the marines lately arrived should form the other, which is the one I should wish to have at Loures.

‘ If I should order General Hill’s corps to cross the Tagus, the troops will march from Salvaterra, across the Island of Lycceria, and embark at N^a S^a de Conceição, to be landed on the right of the lines at Alhandra. When, therefore, I shall request you to send up the boats, it will be to N^a S^a de Conceição, and it is desirable that that point should be reconnaitred by one of the Officers of the navy.

‘ We have pulled down the walls, and laid open the road from Villa Franca to Alhandra to the fire of the gun boats, which still further strengthen that point.

‘ I shall order back again to Lisbon the boats and materials for the bridge, which it is very obvious we shall not now require immediately.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. General Hill’s infantry, the men’s camp kettles, and Officers’ canteens only, will cross by Lycceria; the cavalry, artillery, and baggage, by Aldea Galega.

‘ W.’

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 25th December, 1810, 11 A.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received a letter from General Silveira of the 19th, and from General Bacellar from Coimbra, of the 21st.

‘ It appears that the advanced guard of the enemy’s corps, which had crossed the Coa, entered Celorico on the 18th, in the evening. Silveira and all the troops in Upper Beira were hanging upon their flank; and I should suppose that their advance from thence had not been very rapid, as General Bacellar had not heard of their being in advance of Celorico. Silveira states this body to be Gardanne’s division, which he calls 9000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. I doubt their having that number of cavalry; and if they have 9000 infantry, there are more than Gardanne’s division.

‘ I have received accounts from Estremadura, that the French division which was at Llerena has retired towards Cordova; so that the design of crossing the Tagus will not be facilitated by any movement from that side at present.

‘ If you should deem it expedient to open a fire upon the

boats, you had better let it be from the three brigades at once, so as to settle the matter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 25th December, 1810, 3 P.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have received further intelligence of the enemy’s reinforcements, from which it is clear that the whole of the 9th corps are about to enter Portugal.

‘ I think it a matter of doubt whether the enemy will endeavor, when joined by this reinforcement, to force the position of the allies in front of Lisbon, or will endeavor to extend beyond the Tagus, so as to open the Alentejo to himself and deprive us of the resources of that province.

‘ This is very certain, however, that if the enemy should make an attempt upon the position of the allies, he will lose no time about it after the plan is formed. The position has been sufficiently reconnoitred, and the day after we shall have retired to it, we may expect that it will be attacked.

‘ I mention this, in order that you may bear it in mind in your arrangements for the defence of the Tagus. I think that for the present you had better leave Colonel Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese infantry at Salvaterra; General Lumley’s will of course stay at Almeirim, according to my letter of yesterday. You might bring the other brigade of Portuguese infantry nearer to yourself, with a view to the object referred to in my letter of yesterday, and your artillery.

‘ Any part of the corps which shall cross the Tagus will be ordered to march across the island of Lyceria from Salvaterra; and I request you to have the dyke roads on the island well ascertained and known to the leaders of the columns.

‘ The baggage (with the exception of soldiers’ camp kettles and Officers’ canteens), and the artillery and cavalry, will be ordered to Aldea Galega.

‘ I recommend to you to make some cover for your artillery on the ground opposite the mouth of the Zezere, in

order to give Don Carlos every advantage in defending it. It appears to me, also, that it would be desirable to bring near that point the whole of the 5th Caçadores, with the exception of one company, which would be sufficient to guard the boats on the river opposite Abrantes. The Officer to be left in command of this company, however, must be made to understand thoroughly what he has to do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Cartaxo, 25th December, 1810.

‘ I have received letters which leave no doubt in my mind that Drouet’s corps, as well as Gardanne’s division, are entering Portugal, and I think you had better come up as soon as you can.

‘ I do not think it quite clear whether the enemy will endeavor to extend beyond the Tagus, or to carry the position, when Drouet’s people come, which ought to be soon.

‘ This is very certain, that if they should attack the position, they will lose no time about it after they shall have once put themselves in motion, as the whole ground has been sufficiently reconnoitred, and must be well known.

‘ It is desirable, therefore, that the ordenanza and volunteer artillery and infantry, and the militia, should be warned to be in readiness to go back to their old stations at the shortest notice.

‘ I have sent to have the 2d battalion of your regiment, and one battalion of marines, brought to Loures, to be in readiness to occupy part of the space which must be left vacant by a part of Hill’s corps being on the left of the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are the President, on

the trial of Surgeon —, of the — batt. — regiment; and as I differ with the General Court Martial on the conclusions which they have drawn from the evidence which has been before them, and think that the case has not been sufficiently investigated in some points, I have to request that the Court will revise both their proceedings and their sentence.

‘ In respect to the proceedings, I observe that Germano Baretti states, that “ after he had been in the guard house a certain time, a grenadier of the regiment came to him from Surgeon —, telling him that if he chose to pay sixty dollars he might be set at liberty.”

‘ Private C—, of the — regiment, states that he was sent to Germano Baretti by Surgeon —, and it is desirable to ascertain by evidence whether Private C— is the grenadier referred to in Baretti’s evidence.

‘ I then observe in Surgeon —’s written defence, that he states, that “ considering the mare my property, a proposition was made that, on a deposit of sixty dollars, he (Baretti) should be at liberty.” Again, in another part of the statement before the Court, he says, “ I valued the mare at sixty dollars; and as she was likely to suit my purpose, and by putting the additional price which I was recommended to do, I was in hopes to get her back again.”

‘ In the *original* statement written to General Sontag on the 29th October, on which Surgeon — says, in his statement before the Court, he means to rest his defence, the words are, “ *I proposed to him (which I thought the proper mode of recovering the mare), that if he made a deposit of sixty dollars he might be at liberty.*”

‘ Adverting to these statements in the defence, which amount to an acknowledgment of the fact alleged in the second charge, to which Baretti gives positive evidence, it is desirable to question Private C— still further upon the nature of the communication he made to Baretti by desire of Surgeon —, if he should be the soldier who has carried on the communication between Surgeon — and Baretti.

‘ So far as to the proceedings: then, in respect to the sentence, I observe that the Court Martial have excused Surgeon — in the first charge, on the plea, first, that “ he acted under the conviction that Baretti had stolen the

mare;" and, secondly, that "he considered himself justified by the opinion given, and presence, of the Provost Marshal."

'I would beg to observe in respect to the first plea, that there is no ground in evidence for any belief that Germano Baretti had stolen the mare, which could have justified his detention by any authority whatever. Secondly, that if there had been any ground for such belief, Surgeon — was not justifiable in confining him in a military guard house, particularly as the magistrates of Torres Vedras were on the spot; and, at all events, without the orders of his superior Officers, likewise on the spot. I request the General Court Martial to consider what would be the situation of any Officer who should, on such grounds, have confined to a military guard house in Great Britain any one of His Majesty's subjects.

'I have to observe, in respect to the second plea, that the Officer styled "Provost Marshal" in the sentence of the Court is the Assistant Provost attached to the division, (whose evidence, by the bye, Surgeon — might have produced to the Court preferably to that of his trumpeter,) whose business it is to enforce the orders of the army, and preserve discipline among the soldiers and their followers, and not to administer justice between the Officers of the army and the inhabitants of the country, nor to act as counsel to the Officers of the army. The Assistant Provosts are not Commissioned Officers; and the General Court Martial will, by this part of their sentence, give them an authority in the concerns of the Officers of the army which they certainly do not otherwise possess.

'The revival of the proceedings which I have recommended on the second charge will throw more light upon it; but I wish to draw the attention of the Court particularly to the evidence of Baretti, and to the acknowledgment of Surgeon — in his defence as above quoted; and then I request them to consider whether it is probable that a man who must have known that justice would be done in his case, (as I believe all the natives of this country know, who have had any dealings with the British army,) would have offered sixty dollars to be released from the confinement in which he had been unjustly placed.

‘ Whatever may be the opinion of the General Court Martial on the question of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner of the crime stated in this charge, after the revision of the proceedings and a consideration of what I have stated in this letter, I would suggest to them that it is not an honorable transaction to take money from a supposed thief, even upon his own offer, in order to compromise a prosecution for a robbery, much less is it honorable to take more money than the article or animal stolen is worth; and that there is nothing in such a transaction which entitles Surgeon — to the distinction of an honorable acquittal.

‘ I request the Court to consider that Surgeon — confined Germano Baretti in the guard house for the purposes of justice, or to force him to pay a sum of money. If he confined him for the purposes of justice, he abandoned his purpose, and made a compromise with a supposed thief for the sum of sixty dollars, which is not an honorable transaction; and Surgeon — cannot be entitled to an honorable acquittal. If the Court conceived that he confined Germano Baretti to force him to pay a sum of money, the charge is proved, and the Court should sentence accordingly.

‘ It gives me much concern to differ with this General Court Martial; and, as several of the Officers composing it have but lately joined this army, I shall conclude this address by assuring them that I have no personal knowledge of Surgeon —; that I brought him to trial before a General Court Martial, as an act of duty, almost exclusively upon his own statement; and that, as far as he is concerned, I am indifferent as to the result.

‘ I have a feeling, however, for the honor of the army and for the character of the country for justice; and I hope that the members of this General Court Martial will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and character of the army, by marking their own disapprobation of the transaction which has been brought under their consideration.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. C. Colville.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General A. Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL, ‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from the Vicar of Alemquer, requesting to have the use of one church in Alemquer for divine service, with which request I wish you to comply ; at the same time it is advisable that the inhabitants of Alemquer should not *settle* themselves in the town yet.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
A. Campbell.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON, ‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 26th.

‘ You will have heard that a considerable reinforcement, it is said the 9th corps, is advancing by the road of the Ponte da Murcella. It is certain that the enemy will take a decided line one way or the other as soon as they join, which will be in a day or two.

‘ Under these circumstances, you will judge for yourself whether to go or to stay, without further reference to me, and will act accordingly. Let me know what you determine ; and at all events send up Elley.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th instant.

‘ I conceive it would be best not to land the seamen of the squadron, according to the wishes of the Admiralty ; but Major Williams’ battalion of marines had better proceed to Loures, and the other battalion do the duty of Lisbon and St. Julian. I have no doubt but that it will be found sufficient for the duties when Colonel Peacocke shall have diminished the guards, and shall have got the Portuguese troops

to take some of them. The troops should not have less than two nights in bed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 25th and 26th. I did not write to you yesterday, as there was nothing new, and I expected you in the evening.

‘ I now enclose a letter from Trant, stating the progress of the enemy, from which it appears that they will be about Thomar this day.

‘ There is a report from Abrantes of a detachment having marched from the Zezere towards Castello Branco.

‘ You will have heard that we have here the Officer who was sent by Massena. The principal thing he says is, that Massena will not attack us unless he receives a reinforcement of 30,000 men. I do not think the 9th corps, with Gardanne, can be more than 20,000.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter and its enclosures which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, of the Royal engineers, reporting the death of a carpenter employed on the public works near Mafra by an accident; and as the widow left by this man is entitled to a provision from the Portuguese Government, according to the rules of the service, as I am informed, I request you to lay these papers before the Secretary of State, that the provision to which she is entitled may be granted to her accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th December. I am convinced there is but one remedy for the inconveniences experienced respecting means of transport, and that is, that the old rule should be adopted of referring to the register, and that the magistrates should be obliged to do their duty, and punish the inhabitants who do not bring forward the means which are registered.

‘ The difference of the hire paid by us might be a reason why the Portuguese army should want means of transport, but can afford none why we should experience the same inconvenience; but the Government is the cause of this, as well as of every other failure; and the same inconveniences will continue as long as they continue to act upon the system of courting popularity.

‘ The list of imports into the port of Lisbon is the strongest proof which can be afforded of the truth of what I have stated, viz., that they have drawn almost no resource from the northern and southern provinces of the kingdom. They take willingly what you have got for them; but their own exertions have produced nothing.

‘ You are quite right in tracing all the failures of the Government to the want of money, which want could be supplied, I am convinced, by the means in their own power; but they will do nothing unless forced. I am very much dissatisfied with them; and unless they adopt a new system entirely, I shall state my opinion to our own Government that the war cannot be carried on as long as things remain as they are.

‘ The objection I have to the income tax is not that the rich merchants do not pay as much as they ought, according to the system, but that the system is so radically bad, that no person in Portugal pays one thousandth, instead of a tenth of his income. The tax is laid upon classes; that is to say, the incomes of the clergy, the nobility, merchants, lawyers, &c., are supposed to amount to certain gross sums, of which the Government require a tenth, which the several classes divide among themselves, the rate of income supposed, for no one class is equal to the real amount of the income of all the individuals; and then the people of Por-

tugal talk of paying a 10 per cent. income tax as we do ! Do they know that there is not an Officer of this army from whose pay the tenth part is not now subtracted for the state ? It is really too bad, and cannot be borne.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 28th December, 1810, 11 A.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of 4 P.M. yesterday. I desired Colonel Murray to write to you yesterday evening, to say that I wished General Lumley’s brigade to remain at Almeirim, or to be removed to Almeirim if it had marched from thence, and Colonel Campbell’s brigade of Portuguese infantry to Salvaterra, which disposition I beg may be carried into execution as soon as may be convenient, and if possible that the enemy may not observe it.

‘ Brig. General Fonseca’s brigade of Portuguese infantry may be cantoned at Chamusca, in the quarters occupied by Major General Lumley’s brigade ; and those for whom there may not be room at Chamusca may be at Almeirim.

‘ In respect to the disposition which you have detailed, it appears to me to answer well ; excepting that it would have been desirable to keep the British infantry on the left of the Spaniards, or lower down the Tagus than the junction of the Zezere, by which measure this part of the force would be more collected.

‘ I am concerned that you should conceive that I have directed you to keep in view objects “ in which you are almost sure of failing.” I am responsible, however, for these objects, and I hope they will not fail.

‘ By the accounts which I have of the enemy’s progress in the valley of the Mondego, he does not appear to me to move with great celerity. From the first accounts I thought it probable that the head of the column would be at Thomar yesterday. I do not think now it will be there till to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. W. Stewart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th December, 1810.

‘ I have considered the papers from Mr. — which you left with me yesterday, and I am of opinion that, as Commander of the British army, I ought not to object to allow a letter to be forwarded to the Commander in Chief of the French army, which has for its object the attainment of a commercial advantage for a British subject. If, therefore, Mr. — continues to desire that his letter should be sent to Massena, it shall go through our advanced posts.

‘ I think, however, that there are some points which are worthy of the further consideration of Mr. —.

‘ First, it is not clear to me that the troops under the command of Massena have prevented the passage of Mr. —’s sheep. He commands the army of Portugal, which consists exclusively of the troops now in Portugal, and none others. These cannot have stopped Mr. —’s sheep.

‘ Secondly, supposing Massena to be inclined to aid Mr. — in his speculations, he has not the power. His passport would not be regarded by the French Officers not under his command, much less by the Spanish guerrillas, and the Portuguese Commanders of militia and ordenanza. Indeed, I doubt if the troops in Massena’s own head quarters would allow a flock of Merinos to pass through them, although protected by his passport. These reasonings are founded upon the supposition that Massena would be inclined to attend to Mr. —’s application.

‘ But thirdly, advertng to the decrees, particularly those lately issued by Massena’s master against all English commerce, can it be believed that Massena would venture to facilitate the commerce of a British subject in an article so valuable as Merino sheep, upon which so much jealousy is already entertained in France?

‘ It may be said that all this may be true, and the only consequence of the application may be a refusal; but I would observe, that the failure of all advantage from the application being certain, it ought not to be made; and more particularly it ought not to be made and founded upon the documents which Mr. — has enclosed, the whole of which, with the application and the answer, will be published.

‘ In this view of the subject, it might become a question whether I ought to allow the papers to pass through my post. The application supposes the French armies to be in possession of a much larger proportion of Spain than I believe them to be; and we may depend upon it that the Spanish Government and people, and particularly the Cortes, who know that every sheep which is in the possession or power of the French is in their possession by robbery, or in their power by the effect of a usurpation, will not be pleased to see British subjects purchasing from their oppressors, and those who have robbed them of the animals which they value most, and thus furnishing the enemy with means, as far as they go, of carrying on the war.

‘ However, I waive this consideration as affecting my decision on Mr. ———’s application; but I think it well deserving his serious attention. I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate these opinions to Mr. ———.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th December, 1810.

‘ In consequence of your expressing in your last letter to me so anxious a desire that General Hill should relieve you in your command, and your apprehensions that the objects which I had in view might fail, I have requested Sir William Beresford to go over and take the command of the troops on the left of the Tagus, till General Hill’s health shall be sufficiently re-established to enable him to resume his command.

‘ I have heard no more from the Mondego or Alva of the progress of the enemy. The accounts which I had already received state that their advanced guard were at Maceira on the 22d, which is six leagues short of Moita, where Lobo’s correspondent informs him they were on the same night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th December, 1810.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 22d instant I have received reports that the enemy’s troops, which had retired from Lower Beira in the end of last and the beginning of this month, had crossed the Coa at Almeida on the 15th and 16th instant, and had moved into Upper Beira by the roads of Pinhel and Trancoso, and of Alverca and Celorico.

‘ I have not been able to ascertain exactly the strength of the body of troops which have entered by this frontier; but it is stated to be 16,000 or 17,000 men, and consists, I should imagine, not only of Gardanne’s division, but of some, if not the whole, of the troops of the 9th corps.

‘ By the last accounts I have of these troops, their advanced guard had arrived at Maccira, in the valley of the Mondego, on the 22d, and their progress had not been rapid. But if they have continued their march, they ought by this time to be in communication with the enemy’s posts in the neighborhood of Thomar.

‘ General Silveira had retired his division of troops to Moimenta da Beira; but he, General Miller, and Colonel Wilson, were expected to act across the Mondego upon the flanks and rear of the enemy’s troops, the whole of which, it appears, were marching on the left of that river.

‘ No alteration has been made in the position of the enemy’s troops in front of this army, excepting that a detachment of between 2000 and 3000, cavalry and infantry, had moved into Lower Beira across the Zezere, towards Castello Branco, probably with a view to gain intelligence.

‘ By accounts from Estremadura it appears that Generals Mendizabal and Ballesteros have had some success in their operations against a French division belonging to Mortier’s corps, which had been stationed at Llerena. They have obliged this division to retire to Guadalcanal with some loss.

‘ It appears that Massena has till this moment had no communication with France, or even with the frontier of Spain, excepting that sent by General Foy; and that he was ignorant of the march into Lower Beira of General Gardanne’s division in November. One of his aides de

camp has lately been taken in Lower Beira in the disguise of a peasant, having upon him a paper, of which I enclose the copy. This person reports that the army still consists of the number of men which I had supposed, viz., 50,000; but that they are distressed for provisions, and in want of shoes and of every article of equipment.

‘There has been lately no want of meat; but there had been no regular deliveries of bread to the soldiers since they entered Portugal. They received a certain quantity of the flour of Indian corn, or of Indian corn which they ground and made use of as they could. Their losses has been very severe, and they have still a very large number of sick.

‘When this person left Torres Novas on the 12th instant, he did not think it possible for them to remain in their position many days longer. The object of his mission was to urge forward the march of the reinforcements, which he said Massena expected would consist of the 9th and the 5th corps (Mortier’s), and of the division under the command of Gardanne. He understood, that unless the reinforcements amounted to 30,000 men, Massena would retire to the frontiers of Spain across the Zezere, and by the road of Castello Branco; and that for this purpose he had established his bridges upon the Zezere; but from what he stated of the wants of the French army, of pay and resources of every description, and from the opinion which he said was generally entertained by the General Officers, that to gain possession of Lisbon was an object worth the loss of half of their army, it appears they are reduced to those desperate circumstances, that there is no risk which they will not incur which affords any chance of attaining their object.

‘I have before informed your Lordship that it was my opinion that plunder was the original motive for the expedition into Portugal; and it is that for its continuance against every military principle, and at an immense sacrifice of men. Whatever may be Massena’s opinion of his chance of success in an attack upon the allied army, I am convinced he will make it if he receives the order from Paris, whatever may be the amount of the reinforcement which will be sent to him.

‘Under these circumstances, and having such an enemy

to contend with, and knowing as I do, that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of repairing any large losses I may sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by the most disastrous consequences to the cause of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which has hitherto saved all, and which I hope must end in the defeat of the enemy.

‘Parts of Portugal have suffered, and continue to suffer from the invasion; but their sufferings have been occasioned in a great degree, and have been aggravated in every case, by the neglect or delay to adopt measures which I had recommended; and, at all events, it is better that a part of the country should suffer than that the whole should be lost.

‘I believe that the people of Lisbon and the neighborhood have generally been supported by importations of provisions from foreign countries; and His Majesty’s Minister adopted measures some time ago, of which the effect must soon be felt, to secure large importations of provisions. The prices have been, and will probably continue to be high; but adverting to the large sums of money which the inhabitants of Lisbon have received, and are daily receiving for supplies, and for labor performed for the army, they are well able to pay these prices.

‘Upon the whole, I entertain no doubt of the final success of the measures which I am carrying on; and, at all events, I am certain that they are the only measures which can be entirely successful.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 29th December, 1810.

‘My dispatch of this day will give you nearly all the information I have. Since I wrote it, however, I have an account from my posts on the Tagus, that the enemy commenced another bridge on the Zezere, on the night of the 27th. It is possible that at that time they had not received the account of the march of the reinforcement, though not very probable.

‘ I am not quite sure that they are not going to retire ; but of this we may be certain, that they are going to do whatever has been ordered from Paris.

‘ I have heard from Madrid to-day, that General Foy had passed through that town on his way to Andalusia with orders for Soult. If this be true, it is probable that Mortier’s corps, or even more troops, are directed to co-operate with Massena. I do not mind even that reinforcement ; but as I believe you have some regiments of infantry in readiness to reinforce us, I think you will do well to send them out.

‘ If I should find that they retire, which must be decided now in a few days, I can send them or others back ; and I shall send home nearly all the transports.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 30th December, 1810.

‘ In consequence of Major General Stewart having repeated his anxiety that you should return to resume your command, and stated his opinion that certain objects which I had held out to his attention must fail, I have prevailed upon Sir W. C. Beresford to go over the Tagus and take charge of affairs there till you shall be sufficiently recovered to join the army.

‘ Although I am anxious that you should join again, I beg you will not think of moving until your health shall be firmly re-established ; as, however important it is in every view to have you back with your command, it is more important that you should be sufficiently well to remain when you do come.

‘ You will have heard that the enemy have got in a reinforcement, which I believe must have joined them. By the accounts which we got last night it would appear that this reinforcement consists of only one division of the 9th corps ; and if this be true, all other appearances look like a retreat. However, it is impossible to form any judgment of transactions which have been carried on with no fixed principle,

and are in the unnatural state in which the French are at present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 30th December, 1810.

‘ I enclose my dispatch written yesterday, which contains nearly all the news from hence.

‘ Since writing it I have heard further of the progress of the French reinforcements, which must have communicated with their posts on the 26th; yet strange to say, the prisoners taken yesterday know nothing of it.

‘ From what Silveira writes I should think that only one division had moved forward. If that be true, it is probable that the whole will retire.

‘ I hear from Madrid that General Foy passed through that city before the 16th, on his road to Andalusia, with orders to Soult.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General the Hon. C. Colville, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘ I have received your two letters of this day’s date, and I am very much concerned that I was out yesterday when you did me the favor to call.

‘ The proceedings of the General Court Martial on Private — of the — regiment have been sent to England to be laid before His Majesty, as it was necessary that his pleasure should be taken respecting the place to which — should be transported. I considered it most respectful to ask for his commands upon the sentence which had been passed upon him. I shall be obliged to you to let me know whether you wish that your letter respecting — should be transmitted to be laid before His Majesty.

‘ In respect to the sentence on the trial of Surgeon — I am concerned that I cannot concur in it, although I shall confirm it. Surgeon —’s own words in his statement to General Sontag, as well as in his defence, proved, in my opinion, the case of the prosecution on the second charge;

and I am further of opinion that if Private C—— had not been led in his examination by Surgeon ——, and if he had been asked whether he carried a message to Baretti, and what that message was, the result would have been the same, and would have equally supported the prosecution: as he was examined, Surgeon —— put the words of the answer with the question; for this reason I wished him to be examined by the Court. I do not think what Mr. Nelson said is at all material to the case.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General
the Hon. C. Colville.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘I have just received letters from Cadiz to the 23d, and I enclose the copy of a letter which the Admiral has received from Sir R. Keats, and a copy of one which Sir R. Keats has written to my brother, stating that troops had marched with Soult from the siege of Cadiz; so that I think it probable that we shall soon hear of their movements towards the frontiers of Portugal.

‘It is desirable that, as soon as you shall receive this letter, you should send directions to have all the *barcas* on the Guadiana secured on this side of the river, or probably destroyed, in order to force them at all events to go round by the bridge of Merida.

‘The prospect of the advance of a corps from the south into Alentejo is a new case in your situation on the left of the Tagus, upon which I will communicate to you my opinion.

‘You will have seen the description given of the boats collected in the Zezere, and the accounts of the manufacture of oars; from which it is obvious that they are intended for the passage of the Tagus.

‘I have nothing more from the Mondego or Alva; and it is very extraordinary that the prisoners taken on the 29th did not know of the arrival of the reinforcements, which must have been in communication on the 26th, and must have joined on the 27th.

‘The corps mentioned by Keats amounted, according to the last return I had of them, to 4480.

‘The provisioning of Abrantes will now be a most interesting point.

‘Pray write to Lisbon to have the utmost exertion made to supply workmen to complete our works on the left of the Tagus.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I find that the letter from Madrid, mentioning Foy’s journey, is dated the 16th, so that it is not impossible that he carried the orders to Soult. ‘W.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, and at the same time one from Mr. Wellesley of the 23d, conveying the intelligence that a detachment of the enemy’s troops, hitherto employed in the siege of Cadiz, had marched to the northward under Soult, probably to co-operate with Massena against the allies in Portugal. This intelligence receives corroboration from the accounts which we have received here of the passage of General Foy through Madrid before the 16th, from Paris, with orders for Soult.

‘Under these circumstances it is not probable that a serious attack will be immediately made upon Cadiz; and if you should be decidedly of opinion, from the intelligence received at Cadiz, that these troops and Mortier’s corps have marched into Portugal, I request you to have the Chasseurs Britanniques embarked in the ships which will sail from the Tagus at the same time with this letter, and send this regiment round to the Tagus. If, however, you should think it expedient to detain the Chasseurs Britanniques, I beg you to send back the ships.

‘I also request you will send on the troops expected from Sicily, if they should arrive at Cadiz.

‘It is desirable not to send the German deserters, who have been attached to the Chasseurs Britanniques.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘ I have received your letters of the 18th and 23d instant, and although I sent you yesterday all the intelligence I had to communicate, I do not delay sending you an answer to those letters by the ships which I send to Cadiz, eventually to bring away the Chasseurs Britanniques.

‘ The conduct of the Cortes, in respect to the late Regency, is shocking; and I much fear, from all that I see and hear, that unless I can defeat the enemy, and hold my ground in this country, the whole game in Spain is at an end.

‘ I have no doubt of the truth of the intelligence sent you by Admiral Keats, forwarded in your letter of the 23d; and I have written to General Graham, to request him to send round the Chasseurs Britanniques, and the remainder of the Sicilian reinforcement when it shall arrive, if he should believe it to be true.

‘ I have no intelligence from Silveira which can throw light upon the movements of the other troops.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th instant, in answer to which I have to inform you that, under the circumstances of the moment, there can exist no necessity for sending vessels to remove the troops from Cadiz.

‘ The information brought from Cadiz of the 23d instant shows that the Cortes have either repealed or modified their decree for the removal from Cadiz of the members of the late Regency; and so much dissatisfaction is not now felt upon the subject.

‘ It is desirable, however, that we should have the services of the Chasseurs Britanniques in this country from Cadiz; and I write by this opportunity to Lieut. General Graham, to request that this corps may be sent here, if he should believe that the troops in Andalusia have actually marched

for Portugal. You will be better informed than I can be whether Sir Richard Keats possesses the means of transporting this regiment; but if you should think he does not possess them, I request you to send to Cadiz troop ships of war, if there are any in the Tagus, if not, coppered transports, to convey 1000 men.

‘ If General Graham should not think proper to send this regiment, it is desirable that these ships should return to the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st December, 1810.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Campbell, which shows that before he had received my letter, containing the representation of the wish of the inhabitants of Alemquer, to have the use of one of their churches, which you had transmitted, he had already given them what they required, and they had used it.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th December. I have already had great difficulty in arranging the business of quartering the Officers of the army at Lisbon, and have given orders upon this subject in respect to that town and other parts of Portugal, of which I enclose copies. I cannot be certain that these orders have in every instance been obeyed; but it is difficult to have orders obeyed by the Officers which affect their own convenience, when the inhabitants of the towns do not attend to any regulations upon the same subject; and I receive innumerable complaints, particularly of the conduct of the inhabitants of Lisbon.

‘ In respect to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s regulations, they look very well upon paper, but who will attend to them? The Officers of the British army in England are not billeted upon private houses, but upon inns. There is not an inn in Portugal, in which an Officer could be billeted, and it would follow that, owing to the deficiency of inns, the Officers must go into the streets. The soldiers also, where there are no convents to cover them, must be exposed to the open air, because there are no public-houses in which they can be

billeted : but Dom Miguel Forjaz will probably have no objection to their being billeted where we like in the country, contrary to the proposed regulation and our own law, which is to be introduced here, provided Lisbon is not disturbed by either Officers or soldiers !

‘ I do not see what further steps I can take in the business ; and I only desire that when my order is disobeyed complaint may be made, stating the name of the person, and that the complainant may be prepared to prove his story before a Court Martial.

‘ I declare that I think it disgraceful to the Portuguese Government, and to the people of Lisbon in particular, that such a proposition should have been made as has come from Dom Miguel Forjaz. They have now part of one battalion in Lisbon, and some convalescents at Belem ; some of the Officers attached to whom must be lodged in the town. They have besides some sick and wounded Officers there, and occasionally a regiment passes a night or two in Lisbon, when it lands from England or from Cadiz. Are the people of Lisbon so inhospitable that the Officers of these corps must be put, on their landing, into cold, damp, and dark empty houses, without the chance of getting anything to eat ? Is there an inn or tavern at Lisbon to which an Officer can go in such circumstances ?

‘ But I forgot, the General Officers of the army, those upon the staff, the Officers of the Guards (for the others can but ill afford the expense), do occasionally go to Lisbon for a day or two for their amusement. Is Dom Miguel Forjaz serious in expressing a wish that Officers of this description should go into empty houses, or into the street ? Is this the mode in which the cause of Portugal is to be made popular in the British army ? Is every consideration to be sacrificed to the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon ? Are Officers of this class, am I and Marshal Beresford, to be provided with a lodging upon billet ; but the others who go there upon duty, and who can less afford, or bear the hardship, be put into the empty houses or into the street ? As for my part, I do not go often to Lisbon ; but if the rule is made for one class it must for all, and I will have no lodging upon billet any more than any other Officer of the army. The circumstances stated by Dom Miguel Forjaz, respecting

the mode of lodging the British Officers formerly, suit neither the circumstances of the army nor of the times. I declare that I have no patience with the constant efforts which I see made by the Government to indulge the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon, at the expense of every other consideration; and they prefer to have recourse to any expedients rather than oblige them to do what they dislike, which is, when they make a complaint of an Officer, to appear before a Court and prove it.

‘ You will have seen the intelligence contained in my brother’s letter of the 23d, respecting the breaking up of some battalions from the army of the siege of Cadiz. I am certain that we are about to have another grand advance of the enemy. The works on the left of the Tagus are not going on near so fast as they ought, for want of hands. Captain Goldfinch has lately had only 200 men instead of 4000. It is curious that, notwithstanding the people are said to be starving, and we are ready to give them work, and money and bread in payment, the Government and their Officers are unable to collect them for us !

‘ The French will be in Alentejo before those works will be prepared, and then there will be a fine breeze in Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier Don Miguel Alava.

‘ MON CHER DON MIGUEL,

‘ Cartaxo, ce 1 Janvier, 1811.

‘ Je vous suis bien obligé de vos deux lettres. Les affaires Espagnoles n’ont pas prospéré dernièrement; mais quand elles seraient au pire, il faut toujours espérer qu’elles deviendront meilleures.

‘ J’ai écrit au Général Virues pour lui dire ce qu’il faudrait faire pour ouvrir la communication entre Badajoz et Elvas. Il a au moins 10.000 hommes, dont 1500 de cavalerie; et si j’avais 10,000 Anglais ou Portugais disponibles au lieu de 10,000 Espagnols, je crois que Soult ne pourrait pas faire le siège de Badajoz. Mais on a si mal arrangé les troupes Espagnoles qu’on ne peut compter sur rien, et voilà la grande difficulté. En tout cas, je ne puis faire plus pour Badajoz que quand les renforts arriveront de l’Angleterre.

‘ J’ai écrit au Général Ballesteros pour lui dire le secret qu’on comptait faire une sortie de Cadiz le 28; et pour le prier de se porter sur Seville aussitôt que Gazan marcherait vers Cadiz, ce qu’il fera sûrement à la première alarme. Alors on détachera de la troupe de Badajoz, ou de Cadiz vers Seville; et si on fait l’un ou l’autre la cause y gagnera quelque chose.

‘ J’ai prié Ballesteros de ne pas se compromettre dans une mauvaise affaire; mais que si l’ennemi marchait vers Seville de Badajoz il devait repasser la Guadiana et joindre la troupe auprès d’Elvas, afin de faire relever le siège entièrement. Je ne sais pas si toute cette combinaison réussirait, mais c’est tout ce que je pourrai faire à présent.

‘ Toujours votre fidèle,

‘ *Brig. Don M. Alava.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st January, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of yesterday. There is really no reason for fagging Otway’s brigade of cavalry. A few videttes upon the river are all that can be required from him.

‘ Chamusca formerly held two British regiments of infantry. It has now one of British infantry, and I should think might hold the whole, or at all events a great part, of Fonseca’s Portuguese brigade. That part of Fonseca’s brigade which cannot be in Chamusca should be in the nearest place in which, down the river, it is possible to put them; and if they cannot be put elsewhere, they should be in Almeirim, and if there should not be room there, besides, for General Lumley’s brigade of British infantry, some of the regiments of this brigade should be moved lower down to Mugem or elsewhere.

‘ I see no objection to the occupation of Arripeado. It would be better if all the troops could be not only out of reach, but also out of sight from the right of the river; but as this cannot be, they must only occupy those points in which they can be cantoned with convenience, till the enemy shall oblige them to withdraw from them; but I should think they would have the worst of a system of annoyance to cantonments.

‘ I enclose a letter from Austin, and one which I have received this day from Stewart, and my answer. Nothing has come from Coimbra since you went away. The fourteen battalions must be Claparède’s division, and cannot be more than 8000 men, and the cavalry and artillery and gendarmes may be 500 or 600 more.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Return the enclosed letters.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st January, 1811.

‘ I enclose the letters just received from Bacellar. I keep that to D’Urban, as being of the same date and to the same purport with that to Lemos, and it will be useful to me as a memorandum.

‘ I likewise enclose Silveira’s letters of the 22d and 23d, enclosing a letter from Salamanca of the 14th. In this you will observe that three battalions of the 8th, 24th, and 45th, are stated to be at Salamanca on the 14th, whereas they are, in Wilson’s list, sent to Bacellar. The sentence, however, in the Spanish letter, may be construed as meaning that the two pieces of cannon which remain at Salamanca came from Valladolid with the 8th, 24th, and 45th regiments; and I think Wilson is not mistaken in his battalions, which are eleven of those of the 9th corps, and are in one division in my book.

‘ It is unlucky that our correspondents, when they state a circumstance one day, and find themselves mistaken in it the next, do not correct themselves and state their error; and owing to this omission our accounts are never consistent.

‘ Wilson talks, in his letter to Bacellar, of the 25th, of another division crossing the Alva higher up. In his letter to D’Urban of the 27th, he says only one division has crossed the Alva, and the others are following; and he talks of the division which has crossed, consisting of fourteen battalions, of which he has given Bacellar the list, whereas he has given Bacellar the list of only eleven. The other division of the 9th corps consists of fifteen battalions, of which I have not

got the account of the arrival in Castille of more than twelve. The halt of the 4000 men at Pinhel is a curious circumstance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. In Grant’s letter of the 27th, he says that the enemy’s division which left Celorico marched by Arganil and Goes ; and as Wilson mentions that ten battalions passed the Alva, and in his second letter talks of fourteen battalions, I am inclined to think that both divisions have come in, one of eleven, the other of fourteen battalions ; and that one has passed the Alva at Murcella, the other at Arganil ; and that the prisoners taken on the first day belonged to the first, and on the second day to the second. However, this depends upon the truth of Grant’s report.

‘ W.’

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st January, 1811.

‘ You were President of a General Court Martial, which tried a driver of the artillery, in the month of February last, for robbing a chapel. The sentence of the Court Martial was not put in orders ; and, as well as I recollect, I sent it for the confirmation of His Majesty ; but I have no document to show what I did with it. I shall know whether I sent it for His Majesty’s confirmation when I see what the sentence of the Court was ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavor to recollect it, and inform me of it. Lieut. Crampton was the Judge Advocate, and could possibly assist your memory.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday, and I acknowledge that I do not understand the object in view in bringing forward the papers of which you have enclosed copies.

‘ They are memorandums of arrangements between the Government and Beresford, when he assumed the command

of the Portuguese army ; and I doubt whether they are the whole that passed between the Government and Beresford upon that occasion ; and he is not here to give me the information. But the arrangement, or understanding, by which the general operations of both armies were placed in the hands of the British Commander in Chief was, I believe, made by the Secretary of State through His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon. I was so informed when I left England in April, 1809 ; and I think it certain that, when the King's Ministers sent a British General to take the command of the Portuguese army, they took care to stipulate for such an arrangement, as that there should be no difference between him and the Commander in Chief of the British army in the Peninsula. Beresford could not, of course, have made such a stipulation : it must have been made by some superior authority, and is merely referred to and acknowledged by him.

‘ In respect to me, I arrived in April, and was immediately appointed by the Government to be Marshal General of the army. This appointment was made partly by way of compliment to me, and partly, as I understood, to provide for my having the general control over the operations of both armies, without reference to the arrangement which had been made on that subject by the King's Government for their own Commander in Chief.

‘ I was afterwards appointed Marshal General of the army by the Prince Regent, with the same powers and privileges as the Duque de Alafoës ; and, indeed, it was intended by that appointment, which was the result of an intrigue (of the Principal Souza I believe), that I should conduct not only the general operations, but the detail of the Portuguese army ; and, upon conference with the Regency, I declined to do more than conduct the general operations, as connected with those of the British army ; and, by their desire, wrote them a letter in October, 1809, in which I recommended that the separate command of the Portuguese army should be continued to Beresford : so this question stands. I conduct the operations of the Portuguese army as Marshal General, without any reference to the Secretariat, and as Commander in Chief of the British army under the stipulation, which I believe was made by the British Government when they

allowed a British General to be appointed to the chief command of the Portuguese army.

‘ I agree with you in thinking that it is best not to give any answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note, at least till you shall be informed whether the stipulation, which I suppose, was really by the King’s Government. It certainly ought to have been made, otherwise the Commander in Chief of the King’s army could not be responsible for the operations, nor the King’s Government for anything more than the employment of an army in this country. But I think it as well to apprise you of these facts, and this reasoning, in case there should be any further discussion on this subject in the Regency.

‘ There is one point on which I think you are mistaken, and that is, my being a member of the Regency. You will not see my name in any commission of the Government, nor is there any appointment of the kind that I know of. The Government are only desired to consult me, and to act according to my opinion on all military and financial subjects, even when I am absent from Lisbon. But I do not conceive that I have any right to act or deliberate as a Regent. I refer you to the different *Carta Regia* upon this subject.

‘ The conduct of the Patriarch and of the Principal is very improper. I am convinced, from this conduct, as well as from other circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that these persons are endeavoring to form an Anti-English party; which affords another reason for removing the Principal from Lisbon.

‘ The accounts from Austin, of the 27th, confirm those from Cadiz of the 23d, of the assembly of a body of troops from Seville, and of the march of Soult from Cadiz. It is possible, however, that, as the accounts from Cadiz come by Faro, Austin may have received them from Cadiz likewise.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d January, 1811.

‘ The letters which I now send, including one from Silveira of the 24th December, would tend to show that the

2d division of the 9th corps had not yet come in: but it still appears that some troops passed by Arganil and Goes; and it is unfortunate that Colonel Wilson has not either explained or contradicted the report in his letter of the 25th, stating that the 2d division was passing the Alva higher up. The Marques de la Romana had yesterday a letter from Mendizabal, from Llerena, of the 26th, and one from the superintendent of the posts at Badajoz, of the 29th; neither of them mentioning the assembly of troops at Seville.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d January, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from the Marques de la Romana to Mendizabal, which it is desirable should be sent forward as soon as possible, by the shortest road, which appears to be direct from Abrantes. Will you be so kind as to forward it? It contains directions to him to be prepared to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to prevent the enemy from crossing the Guadiana if possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday’s date. I cannot find in my map the place mentioned by Dom Miguel Forjaz’s correspondent at Mourão, that of the assembly of the enemy’s army. But I thought it most probable that they would enter Alentejo by one of the lower fords or ferries of the Guadiana, and they might have assembled some troops in the neighborhood of Mourão.

‘ I am afraid that we shall be mistaken, if we reckon upon the French not quitting Andalusia on account of the operations of the Spaniards. They will carry on no operations, excepting by their guerrillas; and I am sorry to say that I observe, in several letters which the Marques de la Romana

has shown me lately, complaints of the conduct of the guerillas towards the inhabitants of the villages near which they happen to come.

‘ I enclose a letter from Austin of the 29th. The Marqucs has one of the 31st from Badajoz, which does not notice any assembly of troops at Badajoz.

‘ I have considered Lieut. Foster’s report as all that we have referable to the subject of the passage of the troops to Alhandra from the left bank of the Tagus. It is obvious that the road described by Lieut. Foster will not answer; nor will it answer to depend upon embarking the troops immediately below Salvaterra, where we have been coursing, to carry them to Lyceria, on account of the time that operation will take, which will not leave a sufficiency of daylight for the other operations which the troops will have to perform on the same day that they will leave Salvaterra. The next thing to do is to construct a bridge across the south bank of the Tagus, at Çamora Correa, and to make the troops cross there to the island of Lyceria. The troops at Salvaterra would then have to march nine miles to Çamora, and eight miles from thence to Alhandra. But in this movement they would have the rivers of Benavente and Çamora to cross, the former of which, in case of rain, is nearly impracticable, unless they go up to Caruxe. In case of such a fall of rain, I might want there two brigades on the right bank of the Tagus; but it is not very likely that I should require them on the left bank, at least in a great hurry, as the enemy would not be likely to make an attempt to pass at such a time, and if he did, the passage would be so difficult that but few men could pass at a time, and so large a body would not be required to oppose him. That, therefore, which I propose, and wish you to carry into execution, is first to order a bridge to be constructed from Çamora Correa to the island of Lyceria, and to have the dyke road marked from the bridge to N^a Senhora de Conceição. Secondly, to order Campbell’s brigade to Benavente and Çamora Correa; and if there should be any serious difficulty in crossing the river at Çamora Correa in heavy rains, the whole should be there. Thirdly, to distribute General Lumley’s brigade at the three places of Almeirim, Mugem, and Salvaterra, one battalion at each, with orders that as soon as the river at

Benavente begins to fill, the regiments at Salvaterra should cross to Benavente, and the others to close up to Salvaterra, and to be in readiness to follow.

‘ According to this disposition, I shall be sure of having Campbell’s brigade on the right of the Tagus the first day, and the other on the second day; while they will be nearly as conveniently situated for your purposes as they are at present, excepting in case of heavy rains, when you will not require them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d January, 1811.

‘ I have this day received your letter of the 1st instant.

‘ In respect to quartering the Officers at Lisbon, I recommended that the General Order should be either published or circulated there among the inhabitants, from which they will see the degree in which the Officers of the army are in their power; and that they should be informed that they must not refuse to receive an Officer who has a billet on their house, under pain of punishment by fine, to be really levied upon complaint of the Officer. They should also be encouraged to complain of any Officer who treats them ill, or who requires more from his landlord than the General Order entitles him to demand; but they must be prepared to substantiate their complaints by proof upon oath before a General Court Martial, otherwise I have it not in my power to give them redress. If all this be done, I shall draw the attention of the Officers again to the General Order upon this subject, and I shall desire the acting Quarter Master General at Lisbon to take care that every regiment which arrives gets a copy of them, and that every Officer who goes down from the army and obtains a billet shall read them upon receiving his billet.

‘ All this would answer anywhere but in Portugal. But here I know that the police will not levy the fines; that the landlords will make difficulties about receiving the Officers billeted upon them; that the Officers will commit outrages; and that there will be no want of complaints, but no names

will be mentioned, nor any descriptions given, nor any proofs adduced.

‘ I am glad to see that Government have drawn so much grain from Alentejo ; but I am very certain that they have not drawn from that province one third of what it can afford. The want of money, however, must have prevented them from drawing supplies both from the northern and southern provinces in the quantities which both could afford. But though the Government have not money to advance to purchase supplies for the consumption of the capital, there are persons there who have capitals which they would lay out in this manner, if the Government would encourage them. They might require our credit and influence to prevail upon persons of this description to embark in those speculations, with which I have always been willing to assist them as far as I have had anything to say to the subject. But since the Principal Souza has been in the Government there has been a coldness towards us, and a want of confidence in all their proceedings, which, if it continue, must end in the loss of the country.

‘ I observe that Dom Miguel Forjaz’s letters upon the removal of property to places of safety in Alentejo are dated, some of them, as far back as July, and others in September. These orders, and I fear those regarding the laborers on the left of the Tagus, are just so much waste paper.

‘ I never entertained a doubt that Dom Miguel Forjaz would make the best arrangement, and give all the necessary orders for the performance of any service : but there exists in the people of Portugal an unconquerable love of their ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy. Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the Government, see that the temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals themselves ; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial

to the state and himself, which will disturb his old habits ; and the Government will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to him and to the people : thus we shall go on to the end of time.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To P. Rawlings, Esq., Deputy Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d instant, and I have repeatedly told Mr. Kennedy, that if he would recommend that you should have leave of absence, I would grant it ; but, as he did not think proper to recommend that your application should be complied with, I desired that it might be referred to the Commissary in Chief.

‘ It is expected from every Officer at the head of an army, that he will oblige the Officers attached to the several departments to do their duty, and that he will not allow them to absent themselves excepting for sufficient cause. The public acknowledge no cause sufficient for the absence of any Officer from his duty, excepting health, which must be certified by the regular medical authorities.

‘ Besides this cause of absence, I have admitted of another in this army, which I believe never before was admitted in an army upon actual service, and for which I am scarcely justifiable ; and that is, business, the settlement of which requires the presence of the Officer in England, and is paramount to every other consideration in life.

‘ As the head of the Commissariat department in England is responsible that this army shall be well supplied with Officers to perform the duty, it is still more doubtful whether I am justifiable in allowing an Officer of the Commissariat to quit his duty on that plea, without the consent of the Commissary in Chief ; and it is certainly not justifiable without the consent of the Commissary General of this army. I must, therefore, refer you to Mr. Kennedy.

‘ I have thought proper to enter into this explanation upon this subject, which it appears to me that you have misunderstood ; and I assure you that I have no desire to apply this, or any other rule of the service, to your case, in a man-

ner different from that in which it is applied to the case of every other Officer in a similar situation in the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *P. Rawlings, Esq.,*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Deputy Commissary General.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 4th January, 1811,

10 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I enclose a letter from Sir William Erskine, enclosing one from Pack.

‘ I shall speak to the Commissary General regarding the assistance to be given to Pack; but I fear that we cannot supply mules to carry forage for the mules attached to his brigade, and they must supply themselves, or we must withdraw his brigade altogether nearer to the forage. Some of the dragoons of this army send three leagues for straw.

‘ The militia employed at work on our lines were to be paid two *vintems* per diem, according to the arrangement which you made when the works were begun; and I recollect perfectly to have given orders that the militia of Le Cor’s brigade, employed in the Alhandra district, should be paid for their work, (although it was strictly for their own defence, and contrary to rule to pay for it,) in consequence of the unfortunate situation of the country. These orders were given to Colonel Fletcher, who says he gave them, I suppose, to Captain Squire. But Captain Squire has gone with General Hill’s corps from the lines, in consequence of which this order has not been obeyed, and other irregularities have occurred. But I will have this matter set right.

‘ Colonel Oliver’s report is very clear, and there is no doubt that the road along the left bank of the Tagus should be put in repair, and those who put it in repair should be paid for their trouble. But I fear it will be going a little too far for me to pay for this work. Indeed, I do not know, that, in these days of economy, I shall not be brought over the coals for having paid for all works superintended by British engineers. There is a fund in all the districts in Portugal for works of this description, which the Government are now thinking of laying their hands upon, but which

might as well be applied to the purpose for which it was intended on this road.

‘ In respect to the use of the road, it appears to me very clear, that no repair we can give it will make it a practicable communication for our army in the heavy rains. If we are obliged to alter our position when these shall fall, the artillery, at least, must go from Almeirim to Caruxe, thence to Canha and Pegoës, for Aldea Galega, which road is not much about, for anything else, and they would not be longer on the road, which is what is required.

‘ I am very much afraid, after all, that it is quite impracticable to march troops across the island of Lyceria in the wet weather. The roads upon it were examined, and reported upon by Captain —, who is a very fine young man, educated at Wycombe, who was appointed to the staff of this army by the Commander in Chief, on account of the abilities he showed there. But he has no experience, and I can have no reliance upon his report; and I have sent over Scovell*, taking with him an English Officer from Campbell’s brigade, to examine the island, and decide whether it is practicable for infantry to march across it in wet weather from Camora Correa.

‘ I have letters from Cadiz to the 29th; the detachment had certainly marched from thence, but it was not known to what place. Some suppose towards Badajoz, others to attack Algeziras, against which place the French manifestly entertain some design.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Marshal

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th January, 1811.

‘ I am much concerned to have to report to your Highness the death of Colonel Horfe, of your Highness’s legion; and I request your Highness to recommend to His Majesty an Officer to succeed to his situation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Serene Highness*

the Duke of Brunswick.

‘ WELLINGTON.

* Major General Sir G. Scovell, K.C.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

$\frac{1}{2}$ past 11 A.M.

‘ I received in the night your letters of the 4th. I shall write to the Admiral to have four boats for the bridge over the creek at Aldea Galega, and I shall send over to ascertain the number and capacity of the boats for a bridge in charge of the Lieutenant at Salvaterra. It is impossible, however, to do business in this way.

‘ I have no objection to your bringing 12 pounders from Abrantes to the ground opposite Punhete, if you think any can be spared from that place. I think, however, that this is deserving of some further consideration.

‘ First, I observe that Captain Squire’s report on the relative state of things at Punhete is so far defective that he has not stated at what distance from the right bank of the river the enemy’s ground rises, and becomes superior to ours: I believe close to the bank.

‘ Secondly, What is our object in establishing a heavy battery on the ground opposite the Zezere?

‘ Unless we make it more formidable than I believe we have the means of making it, we shall not have it in our power to destroy the bridge and depôt of boats before the enemy will have it in their power to take them out of our reach. Then the question is, whether our 9 and 6 pounders are not guns of sufficient capacity to enable us to command, from the highest ground on the left bank, the communication from the Zezere to the Tagus? I think, from the account of the distances, the 9 pounders certainly would, and that the 6 pounders would be very formidable. I do not mean to say that the enemy might not, in dark nights, slip out of the Zezere into the Tagus with their boats; but they would equally effect this object in the night if we had guns of heavier metal in our batteries on the left bank; and we should be obliged to leave in our batteries the heavier guns, whereas the 9 pounders and 6 pounders could be moved with the troops.

‘ I therefore think that we should confine ourselves to commanding with our cannon the communication between the two rivers; and that if we attempt more, it should be by

a more powerful fire of artillery, which should be opened at once upon the bridge and boats, and continued as long as any of them swim or can be seen.

‘ I enclose a letter from Fririon, to which I purpose to send for answer that I shall make no arrangement for an exchange till that shall be carried into execution which was before made ; and that I have no prisoner of war by name Mascarenhas, but that a Portuguese of that name had been taken in the disguise of a Spanish peasant, having in his possession dispatches from the Prince of Essling to the Prince of Wagram. Before I send this answer, however, I wish to know from you in what manner, and where, Captain Pinto was taken.

‘ The packet is arrived, and Burgh is come up. He has brought papers to the 17th. The King was still very unwell, and the physicians were under examination before the two Houses of Parliament. Your letters are not come up yet ; but I think I shall detain this letter till they arrive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter dated the 3d ; and I now enclose a letter from Sir W. Beresford on the same subject.

‘ My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Souza ; and that they want to be able to show that they protested against our pretensions to command their army. I think also that the continued absence of the Bishop and Souza from the council is in consequence, or rather a branch, of this plot.

‘ The Bishop has, I understand, absented himself since the day on which it was agreed to new model and increase the taxes, and to introduce various economical reforms into the different departments of the Government. We may depend upon it that neither the one nor the other, however beneficial to the country, can be effected without creating much discontent, particularly among those who will be the

objects of the reforms, or from whose pockets the increased taxes will be taken. This discontent will spread to those who (although they may not feel the effects of these measures, excepting in the general good they will do) feel the distresses of the times, or pretend they suffer from the existing situation of affairs.

‘ The Bishop and Souza, and the anti-Anglican party, will take advantage of this discontent to point out their own differences with us upon military and other measures. They desire to prevent us from assuming the exclusive control over the national army; and their absence from the council, after they found that we were determined to increase the burthens of the people, and to dismiss the old servants of the Government: all this will go to the ruin of the country, I acknowledge; but what is there that ambition and folly will not meditate and undertake!

‘ Now, I recommend to you, first, to have a letter written to the Patriarch and the Principal, drawing their attention to the different orders from the Prince, directing improvements in the revenue and reforms in the expenditure, and pointing out the existing state of the finances, the large deficit, &c. &c., and informing them that the Regency were employed in deliberating upon the means of increasing the revenue and diminishing the expenditure, and inviting them, in the name of their colleagues, to assist in the deliberations upon these subjects.

‘ Secondly, advertng to the discontent which always follows reform of expenditure, I recommend to you to proceed with caution in the reform of the different juntas and boards. Let no man, or, at all events, a number of men, be discharged from the service without having some visible means of livelihood left. There, arc, I believe, some members of these juntas and boards who have fortunes besides their salaries, of which last they may be deprived, and still continue members of the junta. In the inferior departments of the Customs also, of which it may be necessary to discharge many officers, either the half or a third of their salary should be continued to those not otherwise provided for. If these measures are not adopted there will be serious discontent in Lisbon, which will be encouraged by these people;

and it will be worse than an additional 20,000 men to the enemy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Return Sir William Beresford’s letter, &c.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3d, in which you have transmitted the answer of the Secretary of the Government of Portugal to the communication made in my letter of the 22d December, regarding the murder of a woman by Michael Grace, a British soldier.

‘ I consider this soldier to be amenable to the laws and civil tribunals of this country for this offence; and I shall give orders that he may be delivered over to the civil power, as soon as the requisition may be made for him through you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, in which you have enclosed one from the Spanish Minister at Lisbon, upon the subject of Spanish subjects who may endeavor to avoid the military service, by seeking employment in the train of the British army. I have already had a correspondence with His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz upon this subject; and I enclose the copy of a letter which Don E. de Bardaxi wrote to him, which I conceive puts an end to this discussion, as far as those Spanish subjects are concerned who have employment in the train of this army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which General Stewart has received from Admiral Berkeley, regarding certain orders sent from

England, to prevent Officers of the army, or others (with the exception of Mr. Downie), from sending Merino sheep home in the transports which may be going to England. I do not believe that your Lordship has any knowledge of this order, and at all events of the exceptions of its provisions in favor of Mr. Downie only; and therefore I venture upon it. I can assure you that I have no Merino sheep, and do not intend to have any. I never had but one, which Lord Wellesley gave me at Cadiz, and took home for me; but there are several Officers of rank in this army who have got them, either for themselves or their friends, and it surely would not be desirable to prevent their sending home these sheep at their own expense, for food, &c., in the transports which may be going home from time to time on the public service.

‘ The opportunity of obliging persons of this description seldom occurs; and, from the various arrangements of the service which have been made within these few years, the Commander of the army abroad, however large the concern he has to manage, has it not in his power to gratify or oblige an Officer under his command. But it is quite new that he should be precluded, by orders from the Transport Board to an inferior Officer, from allowing the Officers of the army to send to England that which it is desirable should go to England, provided it can be sent with perfect convenience to the service; and that at the same time the Transport Board should give to one individual of this army the exclusive privilege of sending to England this same property.

‘ I endeavor, as much as possible, to carry on the service, notwithstanding the various and discordant authorities with which I am concerned; but I am convinced that your Lordship, and His Majesty’s Government, do not expect that I can continue to carry it on as it has been, if I am to be deprived of all the power of gratifying anybody; or that I can submit to allow any board to interfere with those powers, the means of gratifying the Officers of the army, which all my predecessors in command have enjoyed, and without which not one of them would have continued so long to carry on the business of the country.

‘ It may be a regulation of economy to make the Officers of the army pay freight for what they send home in the transports, although that regulation is quite new; but

surely there should be no exclusion of the property of those who are willing to pay the freight.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s duplicate of the 8th December, regarding the French prisoners in this country, and the directions which it contains will of course be attended to; but I am apprehensive that we shall experience much inconvenience in having so many prisoners to take care of, at the same time that we have other important objects to attend to.

‘ It is in vain to expect any assistance, either in money or otherwise, from the Portuguese Government, to provide for the removal of these prisoners, or for the care of them at Lisbon, or in any distant part of the world. That, as well as everything else, must fall upon me; and I must take the best care of them I can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th January, 1811.

‘ The reinforcements to the enemy’s army in this country, which, I informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 29th December, were on their march in the valley of the Mondego, arrived upon the Alva at Murcella on the 24th, which river they crossed by a ford on the following day, and continued their march to join the army.

‘ Colonel Wilson, who had retired from Espinhal and crossed the Mondego upon hearing of the advance of these troops, lest he should be involved in an unequal contest in front and rear at the same time, re-passed the Mondego on the 25th, and annoyed the enemy’s rear on his march of the 25th and 26th, from the Alva towards Espinhal. He took some prisoners, and cut off some of their small detachments, which fell into the hands of the ordenanza. He learnt from the prisoners that this force consisted of eleven battalions of

the 9th *corps d'armée*, which are the same that were assembled at Nantes during the summer.

‘I have not been able to ascertain whether more have joined them since in the division, which was followed by Colonel Wilson; but I believe, from all the intelligence, that these eleven battalions compose the whole reinforcement which has yet advanced, and that they are about 8000 men.

‘The division which had marched to Pinhel, and the advanced guard of which had been at Trancoso, when I last addressed your Lordship, was still at Pinhel on the 26th December, when I last heard from General Silveira, whose head quarters were at Torrinha. This division is either the 2d division of the 9th corps, or is the division of troops which marched to Cardigos and returned again in November, under General Gardanne.

‘I have letters from Cadiz of the 23d and 29th December, stating that Marshal Soult had marched from the army engaged in the operations against that place, with 4000 or 5000 men, on the 20th and 21st December; but I have not yet learnt the object of this march.

‘The accounts from the south of Portugal to the 29th, state that a considerable corps was assembling at Seville, in order to check the operations of General Ballesteros; while at Cadiz it is supposed that it is the intention of the enemy to make an attack upon and establish himself at Algeiras, and in the Sierra de Ronda, for which purpose Sebastiani's *corps d'armée* had been brought to the westward, and had taken the castle of Marvella. Generals Mendizabal and Ballesteros are still at Llerena and the neighborhood of Monasterio, and Girard's division of Mortier's corps at Guadalcanal.

‘No notice is taken of the supposed collection of troops at Seville, in the recent letters from these Officers, or from Badajoz. I think it probable, however, either that Soult has received orders, or is making preparations to carry into execution orders which he expects to receive, to march a considerable body of troops from Andalusia into Estremadura, and eventually Alentejo; and I am very apprehensive, not only that the Spanish troops in Estremadura will make no serious opposition to this movement, but that the siege of Cadiz will receive no interruption.

‘ I have requested Lieut. General Graham to send to the Tagus the Chasseurs Britanniques, and any other troops which may arrive from Sicily, if he should have reason to believe that Mortier’s corps, and the troops lately detached from the siege of Cadiz, have moved into Portugal; as although, from the state of the Spanish armies and military resources, and of the war in Andalusia, there is no reason to believe that any interruption will be given to the siege or blockade of Cadiz, in consequence of this large detachment from the enemy’s force in that part of Spain, it cannot be expected that the remainder of the force will be able to make any attack upon the positions of the allies.

‘ No material alteration has been made in the position of the enemy’s army since I addressed your Lordship last. The detachment which marched to Castello Branco returned immediately, and was sent either for the purpose of escorting a messenger, or to obtain intelligence.

‘ I have the honor to be. &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th January, 1811.

‘ I think you may discontinue the morning reports in this bad weather.

‘ I am very sorry you are obliged to send so far for forage, but we have consumed all upon the near part of the plain. I believe the Commissary General has made an arrangement for supplying forage here to the dragoons at Almosta and Atalaya, and probably some of the others.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. It is quite clear that it is impracticable to cross the island of Lyceria with troops in rainy weather, and we must depend upon crossing the Tagus or Aldea Galega alone.

‘ I find also that the causeway at Benavente is quite impracticable in rainy weather. The disposition which we must

make of Campbell's and Lumley's brigade is as follows:—Campbell's at Caruxe, and Lumley's at Mugem and Almeirim. But as the weather is now very bad, and as it is very obvious that the enemy is not now in a situation to attack us on any side, I think you will do well to delay making any movement of these troops, from the quarters which they now occupy, for the present.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford.

' WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

MY DEAR SIR,

' Cartaxo, 6th January, 1811.

' The examination which we have given to the island of Lyceria in these rains, and to the communication with that island from the left bank of the Tagus, either from Salvaterra, or Çamora Correa, or elsewhere, proves, in the clearest manner, that if we should be obliged to withdraw the troops from the left bank to the right bank in rainy weather, they cannot march across the island.

' We must therefore go to work by the ordinary road, in that case, of Aldea Galega. Of course the troops must embark at Aldea Galega, or more properly at the point of land at the entrance of the river, about four miles below Aldea Galega, at high water; and it would be very desirable if you could let me have some calculation of the tides at that point, so that I might time the marches of the troops accordingly, when I shall have to bring them across.

' I shall also be much obliged to you if you will let me know where the troops could with convenience be landed on the right bank, supposing them to embark at high water, or at any other time of tide you might think, at Aldea Galega, or at the point below Aldea Galega.

' The knowledge which you can give me on these points, and of the length of time which the passage will probably take, will enable me to form a disposition of the troops on the left of the Tagus, which, at the same time that it will secure objects there, will make it certain that I shall not want them in the lines, if the enemy should think of making another movement upon us.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. The Government and Marshal Beresford settled that the requisition for all ordnance and stores, required by Lieut. Colonel Fletcher, should be made by him upon General Rosa, who is responsible for their being supplied and probably equipped. I imagine that the seventeen guns are required in the works on the right of the Tagus, viz., ten at Enxara dos Cavalheiros, and seven at Mafra.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th January, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State. I entertain scarcely a doubt that Soult has either received or expects to receive orders to detach troops to the assistance of Massena. I see that the *Moniteur* mentions the 5th corps as under Massena’s orders. However, his first blow may be at Ronda.

‘ I believe there is no foundation for the report that it is Buonaparte’s intention to marry Ferdinand to an Austrian Princess; and the Cortes will do well not to pledge themselves on questions till they shall be regularly before them.

‘ Romana has communicated to me a horrible libel against him, written by a vagabond of the name of Calvo; and you can form no idea how much he is disturbed by this and other circumstances of the same kind, and disgusted with the violent proceedings of the Cortes. I have recommended him to prosecute Calvo for a libel, and, if he cannot obtain justice against him, to petition the Cortes for redress.

‘ You will see that the King was still unwell in the middle of last month. A vessel has arrived in the Tagus which left Cork on the 29th ultimo; and it is reported that she has brought an account that Perceval had proposed the establishment of a Regency, which should have limited powers only for six months, and that this proposition had been agreed to unanimously. I believe part of this story; but that part which refers to the unanimity of the proceedings is,

I am sure, not true, if *this* House is at all like what it was in our time.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Dr. Frank.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ *Calcutta, 7th January, 1811.*

‘ I have received your letter of this day’s date, and I had read one of the paragraphs to which you refer, as reflecting upon the medical department in this army, which was stated to be extracted from a letter from an Officer. This may be so; but I believe that no Officer of the army would write anything to his friends so false as the contents of that supposed letter.

‘ You have my opinion of your conduct, and of that of the medical department in general, in my letter to you of the 5th November, and in the letter written upon the occasion of forwarding to the — regiment the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the complaint of Lieut. —; and I do not think I could put my sense of your conduct in more favorable terms.

‘ I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject. Therefore I (who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice of them; and have never authorised any contradiction to be given, or any statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and the operations which I have directed.

‘ I admit, however, that others may entertain a different opinion of the effect of these libels, and that they may not have nerves or temper to hear or to see their conduct misrepresented and their actions vilified; and if you should not be convinced that these paragraphs have made no impression, and are not the representation of the public opinion in England, I have no objection to your making any use you think proper of this and my former letters; and you may be

assured that I shall be happy to avail myself of every opportunity of bearing testimony of the zeal, ability, and success with which the duties of the medical department of this army have been invariably carried on under your superintendence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Dr. Frank.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 7th January, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of yesterday which was written first. We understood that there was a bridge over the river at Caruxe. General Stewart had that point examined, and reported that a bridge could be constructed there, and Murray wrote to desire that the work might be done. However, I conclude that other works and the fine weather prevented it.

‘ I have now sent directions to the Officer who has the boats at Salvaterra to take them up at Caruxe, which is certainly the most important point of all; and I think it will be found that a bridge can be established there, which will secure your communication at all times.

‘ You did not send Patton’s letters. I fear that we can get no more guns, 12 pounders, from Rosa, unless indeed the Admiral’s suspicions induce him to produce them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON,

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 7th January, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A.M.

‘ I have received your second letter of yesterday, which was dispatched by the ordenanza at 4 P.M. It arrived here at about daylight this morning; but it is impossible to say that the delay in its arrival is to be attributed to those who carried it on the left of the Tagus. The other letter has not yet arrived.

‘ I recommend to you to make cover for guns in those situations opposite the mouth of the Zezere which are most

likely to command the communication between that river and the Tagus, into which you can move your 9 and 6 pounders, and even heavier guns hereafter if it should be necessary. This work should all be done at night; and if that be done, I do not think it will be necessary to adopt any measures to protect the working party, or eventually those who may make use of this cover, from the fire which the enemy may bring upon them from the other side. Indeed, if Captain Green is of opinion that we cannot, with our 9 pounders, affect the communications between the Zezere and the Tagus, from the ground on which I understand the cover is now making for the guns, we shall be *à fortiori* unable to command from a more retired situation the enemy's artillery, which must be a little retired from the mouth of the Zezere, and the bank of the Tagus, and the communication from the one river to the other.

‘ I recommend to you to persevere in making the cover, and put the 9 pounders in it, and let the enemy fire as much as they please; there is no occasion for our opening our fire till they commence their operations with their boats; and if the cover is well made and sufficient, I fancy they will then find it very difficult to prevent us by their fire from annoying them. I should think that the effects of the enemy's 8 and 4 pounders must have decided the question of the distance from our ground to the north of the Zezere; but the best eye for a distance that I know of is Fletcher's, and I shall send him over to you for a day. I shall also desire him to send to you some intrenching tools.

‘ I am concerned to hear that you have received any intelligence from England that is disagreeable to you.

‘ I enclose a letter from Blunt, and the answer which I have desired Murray to give to the two last paragraphs.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 8th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th instant.

‘ In respect to the garrisons of Peniche and Abrantes, nothing more can be done for them. Indeed I am not cer-

tain that too much in the way of regular troops has not been done for the latter; one regiment of militia, even a weak one, is full enough for the former at present; and if we continue to hold Obidos, and the remaining recruits will not allow of a detachment from Peniche for that purpose, we must only detach from the lines.

‘ It appears to me that we are drawing to that state in Portugal, that either an effort must be made by the Government for the support of their armies and establishments, or the British Government must withdraw from the contest; and I shall inform the Secretary of State of my opinion accordingly by the next packet.

‘ We have, or rather had, in Abrantes, 181,000 pounds of Indian corn, 158,000 of wheat meal, 47,000 of wheat, 4000 of English flour, and 1200 of biscuits, which altogether would make nearly 400,000 rations of bread. But this was on the 24th October. I write to Mr. Stuart, however, seriously upon this garrison.

‘ I send you Brito’s letter of this day, and a letter from Blunt. I do not know what to make of Blunt’s reports. In his letter of yesterday he said we had lost 500 bullocks, whereas the Commissary General receives some by that road every day, and the principal man was here yesterday, and declares they have not lost one.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. I enclose the last report of our magazine at Abrantes. The oats and barley should be struck out, as I have ordered those articles away. You see that they have already used our wheat meal.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Cartaxo, 8th January, 1811.

‘ I am concerned to learn from several quarters that you do not regain your strength so fast as you could wish, and therefore I suggest to you another change of air to Cintra, which is, I believe, a very healthy place. You may depend upon it that in such an attack as you have had there is nothing like complete and frequent change of air as a

remedy; and I strongly recommend this change for your consideration.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 8th January, 1811.

‘ I have, at different times, requested you to draw the attention of the Portuguese Government to the probability that the Alentejo might become the seat of war; which I have brought before them likewise in different letters which I have addressed to them. The intelligence received this morning of the advance of another division of Mortier’s corps d’armée, under the command of Mortier himself, by the high road from Seville into Estremadura, and of other measures adopted by the enemy at Seville, leave no doubt of the early invasion of Alentejo: which province, from the accounts which I have, I believe to be entirely unprepared for this event; notwithstanding the early and repeated warnings which have been given to the Government.

‘ First, I have to apprise you, that in Abrantes there were, two days ago, the means of making bread for the garrison for twenty-two days only, besides the stores belonging to the British army, part of which the garrison had already used. This is an object to which the attention of the Government has been repeatedly drawn, but in vain. It is true that stores of provisions have at different times been lodged in Abrantes; but the Government forget that unless they provide for the daily subsistence of their garrisons and troops, besides laying in magazines, the troops must draw their daily subsistence from the magazines, which are thus consumed; and then, when the communication with the country becomes difficult or precarious, the troops are in want, and must surrender.

‘ There is no reason why the grain of the Alentejo should not have been brought to Abrantes in sufficient quantities for the consumption of the garrison; and I doubt not that, although this has been neglected, we shall soon find that the enemy experience no want in that province.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to procure for me a decided answer, whether they will, or will

not, throw into Abrantes a sufficient quantity of grain or flour for the consumption of the garrison for a reasonable time; as upon this answer will depend the measures which I must take upon the subject.

‘Secondly, I am informed that the people are living, in the large towns in the Alentejo, as much at their ease as if the enemy were not within a thousand miles of them.

‘This being the case, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, the enemy will find in the towns of Estremoz, Evora, Beja, Alcacer do Sal, and others, great riches, and means of subsistence for a considerable length of time. He will treat these towns as he has others in Spain: the inhabitants will first be plundered by the soldiery; their provisions will then be taken from them for the use of the enemy’s army; and then they will be obliged to pay a heavy contribution in money and other valuable goods. These will be the consequences of neglecting to warn the people of their danger, and to force them to provide against it, by concealing and removing their valuable property, and being prepared to remove their persons; of concealing their danger from the people; and of indulging them in their habits of ease and blind security.

‘The success of the enemy’s objects in Portugal will also be promoted, so far as that he will have been enabled to raise contributions in this country, and to subsist for some additional time in the Portuguese territory.

‘Mr. Kennedy has communicated to me an application which you had forwarded to Mr. Dunmore, from the Conde de Redondo, for supplies of provisions and forage from the British magazines, for the Portuguese army, grounded upon a statement that the provisions expected to be imported by sea had not arrived. I observe that in a former paper forwarded to you by the Conde de Redondo, these same provisions now stated to be expected for the army were stated to be intended for the use of the inhabitants of the city; and he complains of the sum advanced for the purchase of those provisions being charged against the account of the subsidy.

‘I have always expressed and manifested a readiness to do everything in my power to assist the Portuguese Government and army; but when I see all the departments of the

army in distress ; when I know that the pay has not lately been regularly issued to the troops, but those in garrison are living upon the magazines, which ought to be kept in deposit for the period at which their communications with the country will be cut off ; that the hospitals are unprovided with necessaries ; and that the whole machine of the army is falling to pieces, for want of funds to keep it together ; I must consider the subject well, before I can venture to give His Majesty's stores, and the funds destined for the support of His Majesty's troops, to be disposed of by the Portuguese Government. I request you therefore to let me know whether the Government are proceeding seriously to meet the difficulties in which their country is placed, and to increase the resources of the kingdom, so as to render the revenue more nearly equal to the expenditure ; and to reform the prevailing abuses in all the departments of the state, so as still further to increase the resources ; and if the members are unanimous in this object, which has been so frequently recommended to their attention by the Prince Regent.

‘ If I should find them seriously disposed and unanimous in their endeavors to meet the crisis, which I have no doubt we can get over, I shall give them every assistance in my power. But if things are to go on as they have hitherto, the sooner the serious attention of the King's Government is drawn to the state of affairs here the better, and I shall consider it my duty to bring the subject before them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 9th January, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have just received your letter commenced the 7th and finished the 8th.

‘ The letter from La Romana is a production truly Spanish, and it is useless to remonstrate upon the subject, as you will get no horses out of Estremadura ; that is to say, they have no cavalry of their own, but want to take the horses they can find in the country, to give to fellows who pretend to be cavalry, and they object to the purchase of them by an ally

who furnishes them with the only cavalry they have. It will be impossible to convince them, either that they ought to allow of the purchase of the horses, or that they ought to give the Portuguese cavalry their proportion of the seizures, as they will never admit, even in reasoning, the truth of the fact that their cavalry is not worth one pin. I think, however, that you had better reply to Romana, that Madden's brigade are in want of horses, and that there is no mode of supplying them from this country, and that they must either purchase them, or receive their proportion of the produce of the requisition in Estremadura, or fall away to nothing.

'I am concerned to see the state of your depôts. We certainly cannot supply the Portuguese army. However, I have written to Mr. Stuart upon the subject.

'While writing the above, I have received your second letter of the 8th. Fletcher is not yet arrived. I recommended, some days ago, that the bridges of the Guadiana should be destroyed, which I hope will have been effected. If not, we shall certainly have the enemy in the Alentejo before long. But I should think it better not to send the regiment of militia, which we shall require in the lines on the left of the Tagus, back to Elvas. This regiment is now at Monte Mor ó Novo.

'Sir William Erskine, and our people on the left, think that the enemy are making some great movement either to their rear or to their right. I was yesterday beyond the bridge of Calhariz, and with our videttes on the high ground which overlooks Alcanhede, and I could perceive no alteration. I rather believe that the division of the 9th corps, which has joined, has moved to Leyria. The prisoners which have been taken of that corps have not yet come to head quarters, and I am not yet able to decide positively whether two divisions have entered. But Blunt, and Cocks, who is gone there, mention two divisions. I wish that Colonel Wilson had been a little more accurate in his inquiries and report on this subject.

'There is nothing from the north.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 9th January, 1811.

‘I enclose a letter from Dr. Frank, stating the number of men who will be to be embarked in the *Gorgon*, respecting whom the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon will communicate with the Agent for Transports.

‘I understand what you say in your letter of the 6th, respecting the ships which conveyed the Chasseurs Britanniques to Cadiz from Sicily, to be in reply to my letter to you of the 15th December.

‘The plot is thickening upon us here to such a degree, that I really think we ought not to send away any more of our transports.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Cartaxo, 10th January, 1811.

‘Fletcher arrived last night, and I am concerned to learn from him so bad an account of the Benavente river. I have, however, sent over De Lancey to ascertain the real state of the case, and whether a bridge can, or cannot, be thrown over it, and the passage be relied upon with certainty.

‘You will have seen Brito’s account of the 7th, and Austin’s of the 5th. It appears that the enemy think of the siege of Badajoz. I have seen a prisoner of the 9th corps; he belongs to one of the battalions with which Wilson was engaged. He says that his battalion is in the 2d division; that he has not seen the 1st division since both entered Spain, but he believes it marched five leagues to their left, when they approached Ponte da Murcella; that Gardanne and his troops were with his division, and he was in the advanced guard commanded by Gardanne; that the 3d division of the 9th corps are employed in keeping open the communication between Almeida and the army; that his division is at Leyria, and Gardanne with them; that they arrived there the 4th. Drouet is with his division.

‘Now what I believe is, that the eleven battalions of the 9th corps, mentioned by Wilson, and Gardanne’s division,

entered with Drouet, and these are what Wilson saw ; that the 2d division of the 9th corps are the people reported by Silveira to be at Pinhel on the 26th; and that the 3d division of the 9th corps, if it is in existence, is composed of battalions made up of companies belonging to different regiments filled with conscripts, of which I have the list, some stated to be in the rear guard de l'Armée d'Espagne.

Generals Nightingall, Houstoun, and Howard, are arrived from England, which they left on the 29th December. The King was then very ill. Parliament had decided by a majority of 279 to 169 to appoint the Prince of Wales Regent by bill, instead of by address; and the bill was to be brought in on Monday 31st. The restrictions upon the Regent were to be the same as in 1788, excepting that he was to have the power of rewarding naval and military services with the Peerage; and none of the restrictions were to last longer than one year. The Duke of York, and all the Royal Family, had agreed, on the 19th December, to a kind of remonstrance against imposing any restrictions on the Regent; and the Prince was excessively displeased with the plan. From all that I have heard of the composition of the majority of 279, I think it doubtful that the Ministry will be able to succeed in restraining the power of the Regent, and certain that the Ministry will be changed immediately.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 9th, and this morning two of the 10th. You see that the writer from St. Pedro do Sul talks of two divisions having entered by the road of the valley of the Mondego, and one entering by Trancoso and Viseu. It is strange that we get no further accounts from the north. It would be worth while to endeavor to send a letter to Wilson by Pedrogão and the Ponte de Cabril.

‘ I have requested the Marques de la Romana to order Mendizabal to defend the Guadiana as long as he can, and to make preparations for the destruction of the bridges at

Merida and Medellin, which orders have been received, and the preparations are made. If the French should cross the Guadiana above Badajoz, the troops under Ballesteros and Mendizabal are to retire towards the Sierra de San Mamed, leaving garrisons in the places in which it is necessary they should be, and operating upon the right flank of Mortier's march, while the garrisons will confine his left. If the French should cross the Guadiana below Badajoz, the Spanish troops will annoy their rear as much as possible, and they may be turned afterwards in any way that may be thought proper. General Madden's brigade must remain with them.

'I am aware that he is not in a very enviable situation. None of us who have anything to say to such troops can be very happy. But we cannot abandon the interests of the country, and we must make the best of the concern. Let General Madden act with confidence in himself and his troops, and with conciliation towards the Spanish Officers with whom he is concerned, and I will be answerable for all the consequences

'I have not a copy of your letter to me upon the subject of the new mode of clothing the Portuguese troops. But I rather think that the proposal was, that if the British Government gave the cloth and materials for the whole army, the Portuguese Government would pay the expense of making up; and that thus Great Britain would not pay more than for made clothing for 30,000 men. This proposal appears to have been accepted and acted upon. However, I may not have recollected your proposal correctly.

'After I wrote yesterday the packet arrived. The King was very ill before the 31st, but about that time was expected to be better. Croker writes from the House on the 30th, by the *Dottrell*, that he thought the Ministers would have had a majority of 20, Arbuthnot expected 40.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'WELLINGTON.

'P.S. 12 at Noon.—I have just received your letter of last night. Trant's communication is a very important one, and I should think they must be going by the valley of the Mondego.

'W.'

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, containing a request from the Portuguese Minister to have the use of the transports attached to the army for the removal of cattle and property from different parts of the country to the Tagus. I have no objection to this use of the transports; but it may be advisable that the Portuguese Government should be certain of having at the places to which they wish to have the transports sent, the articles, or animals which they wish to have conveyed, before they send the transports from the Tagus.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, and I conceive that no inconvenience can result from the embarkation of the seamen and marines belonging to the squadron, and from Admiral Sir Thomas Williams taking the cruise which is proposed. I shall be much obliged to you, if you will let me know whether the measure of detaching Sir Thomas Williams is determined upon, as in that case it will be necessary that I should order to Lisbon the battalion of marines which is at Loures.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant.

‘ I do not think that at present it is in our power to make use of the machines which have arrived by the *Dottrell*, as we have no posts on the Zezere above the enemy’s establishments; and I conclude that it will be impossible to get the

machines across the Tagus, and up the stream of the Zézere, so as to affect the enemy's boats.

'I shall have no difficulty in distributing among the enemy's troops the copies of the proposed convention for the exchange of prisoners.

'The Commissary General is at present at Lisbon, and will, I am certain, wait upon you whenever you think proper to call for his attendance. In respect to boats, however, I beg to refer you to my letter of the 25th October, for my opinion of the best mode of arranging the manner in which they should be procured, which mode is at present the law of the country.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Thomas Rowcroft, Esq.

'SIR,

'Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

'I received by the last post your letter of the 7th, and I am much obliged to you for the interest which you take in the concerns of this army and of the people of Portugal. Although economy in the use of grain and flour is desirable in every situation, I do not conceive that it is peculiarly necessary to this army or to the people of Lisbon.

'The troops have suffered no privations: I believe that no soldier has been unprovided with his regular rations since the army was in Spain in August, 1809; and as the communication with all parts of Portugal has been open, excepting by one road occupied by the enemy, there is no reason why either the troops or inhabitants of Lisbon should have suffered from want of food, excepting that, by the addition of the consumption of the French army from the resources of the country, and from the collection of so many additional mouths in the neighborhood of the capital the demand and consumption of grain and flour have been greater than usual.

'The measures adopted by the Portuguese Government had, however, in some degree provided for the additional demand; and I believe there has never been any want at Lisbon which had not been relieved by abundance as soon as the want had produced the effect of raising prices.

‘ You will observe that this state of things is very different from that which has been represented in the newspapers, which have undoubtedly been the cause that I have been honored with a letter from you. But the British public have been deceived on this, as well as on many other subjects relating to this country, by their newspapers. I am, however, much obliged to you for the interest you take in our concerns ; and I shall communicate your letter to the proper authorities, in order that advantage may be taken of the information it affords, if circumstances should change.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *T. Rowcroft, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, K.G.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 11th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Royal Highness’s letter of the 4th December by the last post ; and I have the honor to inform you that I had already consented, on the 25th December, to allow Major General Low to detach a number of Officers from the troops under his command, upon reading the communication of your Royal Highness’s wishes to Major General Low by Baron Decken.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *His Royal Highness
the Duke of Cambridge, K.G.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ You will have heard that the French crossed the Guadiana at Merida on the 8th ; and it appears to me that they must immediately undertake some operation or other. You will, however, judge for yourself on the propriety of going home.

‘ The first division of the 9th corps is still on the frontier, and it appears, by an intercepted letter, is ordered to Guarda.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General
Sir S. Cotton, Bart.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ You will see by Brito’s report of the 9th instant, that the French entered Merida at 6 in the evening of the 8th, notwithstanding the directions given to defend that point, and to destroy that bridge and that of Medellin over the Guadiana. It appears also, from the manner in which the enemy have conducted this operation, that their design is to give up all communication with Andalusia, and we must expect their immediate advance into Alentejo.

‘ My opinion is, that it will be necessary to leave a large part, if not the whole, of the troops now on the left of the Tagus in the Alentejo, at least till our works shall be in some greater degree of forwardness; and the measures I should wish you to pursue are generally to confine the enemy’s operations as much as you can, taking advantage for that purpose of the course of the different rivers which fall into the Tagus. The first of these is that which falls into the Tagus at Benavente; the second that which falls into the Tagus at Camora Correa; the third that which falls into the Tagus above Aldea Galega; then the line from Moita to Palmella; and lastly, that from Almada to Trafaria.

‘ If Mortier is as strong as Brito says he is, and there has been any previous concert between him and Massena, the best line for him to take would be from Arronches upon Estremoz, by which he would turn the heads of these rivers, and of all the positions which I have above pointed out, excepting that which is in front of Aldea Galega, and the others in rear of it; but I think his first object will be to communicate with Massena, and he will get within the Benavente river.

‘ Having thus given you a general idea of the operations which I should wish to have carried on on the left of the Tagus, the next thing to be considered is the detail of the mode of execution. My opinion is, that, if possible, without letting the enemy on the right of the Tagus know it, you ought to begin to lighten yourself on the right of the Benavente river. The cavalry might cross high up the river, either at Montargil or Caruxe; and I would retain no more

upon the Tagus than are necessary to keep up the appearance to the enemy, in such numbers as that they could be brought with facility over the bridge of Benavente. The artillery also, with the exception of one brigade, should be sent away; and I would also lighten the infantry, keeping no more than are necessary to continue to observe the river. Some English infantry must still, however, be left, otherwise they will discover immediately what is going forward.

‘ I should request you at once to withdraw to the left of the Benavente river, only that the consequence of that measure would be immediately that the enemy would cross and establish their bridge and communication with Mortier; and he would at once take the road which I have above pointed out, instead of that between the Benavente and the Tagus; and the enemy would thereby gain some valuable time.

‘ I propose to request the Admiral to send some boats up to Salvaterra, in order that you may embark your people there, and send them down to Foz, below the junction of the Benavente with the south branch of the Tagus, in case the Benavente should again overflow its banks. This measure, with the destruction of the passage at Mugem, which I recommend you to prepare, will secure the retreat of your rear guard at all times; and the Admiral’s boats will get down the south branch of the Tagus, after having performed this service, without difficulty.

‘ Under these circumstances, and having all these arrangements secured, you will probably look about you a little before you withdraw many of your troops from the Tagus; but having stated to you how important it is that the enemy should not communicate with Mortier till he shall be between the Benavente and the Tagus, I leave it to you when to move the whole, or any portion, of your troops.

‘ In respect to Abrantes, I have a letter from Mr. Stuart, stating provisions have been sent for that place, and money to buy provisions in the neighborhood. Seeing what we have got there of ours, it may be said that they have nearly enough, including their rice. However, you will decide this point; and if you wish that they should have more, and their own should not be arrived, order Mr. Ogilvie to send in whatever he can spare from the immediate consumption of the troops.

‘As you will of course withdraw with you the 5th Caçadores, it will be necessary that Lobo should take charge of the boats himself, and that they should be taken over to the right of the Tagus, and that he should be prepared to bring them.

‘The regiment of militia is at Monte Mor ó Novo. In case the rivers should fill again, the bridge on this side of Monte Mor ó Novo becomes an important object, and measures should be taken to destroy it. This regiment should be ordered to retire to Vendas Novas and Venda da Silveira, leaving a detachment in Monte Mor, which should destroy the bridge when it retires, if the river should not be fordable.

‘I have just received your letter of last night. Madden having retired into Portugal, and separated himself from the Spaniards, who, with the exception of Ballesteros, appear to have taken to their garrisons, it will be desirable that he should hang upon the enemy’s left with his brigade, keeping himself of course clear of all the rivers.

‘If from Arronches they go to Monforte and Estremoz, he must go by Villa Viçosa and Evora, and thence join your right either within the stream which runs under Monte Mor ó Novo, by Venda da Silveira, if the waters should be out, or by Alcacer do Sal, if they should not.

‘I have a letter from Downie from Merida on the morning of the 8th, in which he says that Mortier is not in great force. However, it is as well to be prepared for all events.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘P.S. Murray says that the Juiz de Fora, at Salvaterra, declares that when the causeway at Benavente is overflowed, as it was the other day, the communication between Salvaterra and Mugem is difficult. This, however, was not the case the other day, when Scovell was there; and the fact, if true, would tell both ways. You will have heard of poor Campbell’s death, and of Colman’s departure. Have you anybody whom you could send to one, at least, of these brigades? I think you will do well to destroy the bridge at Ponte de São.

‘W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

SIR,

Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ It would appear by the movements of the enemy in Estremadura, and by their having obtained possession of Merida, and the bridge of the Guadiana on the 8th instant, that it is the intention of the enemy to penetrate into Alentejo: and I judge, from other intelligence which I have received, that their principal effort will at present be made in that province.

‘ I have given directions to Marshal Sir William Beresford respecting the operations which he is to carry on, and to delay to withdraw from his present position on the left bank of the Tagus as long as may be practicable, with a view to prevent, till the last moment, the communication between the enemy’s troops advancing from Estremadura and those on the right bank of the Tagus.

‘ Experience, however, has shown us that the passage of the river Zatas, which runs into the south branch of the Tagus at Benavente, cannot be depended upon in the event of a heavy fall of rain, as that river overflows its banks, and the causeways leading to the bridge at Benavente become impassable. It is therefore desirable, and may enable Sir William Beresford to hold his ground on the Tagus for some time longer, that it should be made certain that he can pass from one side of the Zatas to the other; and the mode in which I would propose to insure this object for him is to place some boats upon the Tagus, immediately at Salvaterra, in which, in case the Zatas should have overflowed its banks and causeway, the troops might be embarked and carried to Foz, on the left bank of the southern branch of the Tagus, below the point where the Zatas falls into that river. These boats might afterwards proceed down that branch of the Tagus, even if the enemy should be in possession of the right bank of the northern branch of the river, which is not very probable.

‘ I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that boats for the transport of 2000 or 3000 men should be stationed, for the present, near Salvaterra.

‘ Adverting to the probability that the enemy will, in a

few days, be in the Alentejo, I recommend that the squadron under Sir Thomas Williams, if it should proceed to sea, should not consist of more than four sail.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Thomas Humphrey, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ I received, by the last post, your letter of the 26th December, in answer to which I have to inform you that if Mr. Pole will recommend your brother in law, Mr. Colman, to me, as a fit person to be appointed an ensign in the army, I will recommend him for an ensigncy when an opportunity shall offer; but I cannot venture to recommend that any person should be appointed an Officer of the army with whom I am not acquainted, or who is not recommended to me by an acquaintance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *T. Humphrey, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — — —, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ I received by the last post your letter of the 8th December. A gentleman with the qualifications which you state are possessed by Mr. — — would be an acquisition to the army, and I shall have great pleasure in recommending him to His Majesty, if Lord Fingall should recommend him to me. But I cannot venture to recommend any gentleman for a commission unless I shall be assured of his fitness for the station of an Officer, by a gentleman with whom I have the honor to be acquainted, or unless I should know him myself. It is not improbable that I may have had the satisfaction of being acquainted with you, but I hope that you will excuse me for saying that I have no recollection of my acquaintance with you; and that you will attribute this want of memory, upon this occasion, to the variety of employments in which I have been engaged, and to the number of persons I have seen and with whom I have been acquainted.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — — —, *Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th December; and the return showing the quantities of arms, accoutrements, and other warlike stores, distributed in Portugal and Spain during the year 1810, shall be sent by the next post.

‘ The 20,000 stands of arms, &c., sent to the Tagus in the *Sovereign* and *Flora* transports, have been disposed of as follows: 16,000 stands of arms, and corresponding equipments, have been sent to Cadiz, upon the requisition of His Majesty’s Minister there, to be disposed of to the Spanish armies on the eastern side of the Peninsula; and 4000 stands of arms, and corresponding equipments, have been kept in the Tagus, to be delivered, according to your Lordship’s directions, to the troops to be raised by Mr. Downie.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th January, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 5th instant, I have learnt that the detachment of the enemy’s troops which joined the army in the end of last month consisted of eleven battalions of the 9th corps, and of a body of troops which, under the command of General Gardanne, had before attempted to penetrate through Lower Beira. The whole are stated to be 8000 men by some of the Officers who saw them; but I should think that they must be more.

‘ The other division of the 9th corps had not passed the frontier when I last received accounts of them; but I learn from an intercepted letter from General Drouet to General Claparède that this division has been ordered to take a position at Guarda. Their advanced guard broke up from the neighborhood of Trancoso in the night of the 3d instant, and I have not yet heard where they have gone.

‘ There has been no alteration in the position of the enemy’s army since I last addressed you, excepting that General Drouet’s head quarters have been fixed at Leyria,

with the troops which joined with him. The enemy continue to construct boats in the Zézere, and have shown much jealousy of the measures adopted by our troops on the left of the Tagus to command by their fire the communication between the Zézere and the Tagus.

‘ In my last dispatch I apprised your Lordship of the collection of the enemy’s troops at Seville; and I have now to inform you, that Marshal Mortier arrived at Ronquillo with a division of the corps under his command on the 3d instant. He has since continued to advance into Estremadura, having formed a junction with the division which had been at Gualcanal under the command of General Girard; and I am concerned to add that I have just learnt that he obtained possession of Merida, and of the bridge over the Guadiana at that place, on the evening of the 8th instant, the Spanish troops having retired.

‘ My former dispatch will have informed your Lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed, at least for some days, before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry; and, from the line of operation which the enemy have adopted in Estremadura, I have no doubt that they intend to abandon the communication between the troops now on the Guadiana and those which will remain in Andalusia, and to penetrate into the Alentejo. They have left General Ballesteros’ division on their left flank, between Xerez de los Cavalleros and Olivença, with his communication open with Badajoz; and it is reported that Mortier’s corps is followed by other troops.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 31st December.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 13th January, 1811,
10 A.M.

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

I have just received your letter of the 12th, by the Conde de Lemaïres.

My opinion is that you cannot oppose the advance of Mortier and the passage of the enemy over the Tagus at the same time, even though Mortier's force should not be what Brito states it. We must look to get your corps across the Benavente river, which in my maps is called the Zatas, and which you call the Sor.

I do not see any occasion for being in a hurry with that operation unless Mortier is advancing; and I am convinced it will be effected without difficulty, if the waters should not be out. Even if they should be out I believe it might be effected.

If the bridge and causeway of Benavente should be impassable, it is not very probable that the passage of the Tagus will be very practicable. The strength of the current will be such that the enemy cannot depend upon getting their boats back to any particular point which they might fix upon: and forty boats containing forty men each are not an armament to be trusted on the left bank of the river without risk, unsupported by an early reinforcement.

I would observe, also, that, if the floods should render the causeway of Benavente impassable, it is probable that the stream at Mugem would be impassable also, supposing the causeway there to be destroyed; and the stream at Salvaterra would likewise be another obstacle, which would delay a superior enemy till the causeway at Benavente should become passable for your horses. Your horses and carriages alone are what it would be necessary to pass over this causeway, as your infantry would be embarked in the boats, or passed over the river at Caruxe or elsewhere.

I would also observe that, if the floods of the Benavente river should prevent you from passing the causeway, the same floods would prevent Mortier from crossing the river at Monte Mor ó Novo, the bridge there being destroyed supposing that he were to take the road by Estremoz instead of that by Portalegre, which is the most probable.

‘ From all this you will observe that my opinion is that there is no occasion to hurry your movement ; and as I believe that, if the enemy cannot pass the Tagus, or that they do not hear of Mortier for a few days, they must retire, I am anxious that you should make no movement which can discover to them any weakness on our part on the left of the Tagus. However, you are on the spot, and know best what you can do with your troops, and what roads, bridges, causeways, &c. will permit you to do ; and you may depend upon it, that I shall concur in the propriety of any step which you may take.

‘ I enclose letters from Blunt, received in the night. The detachment which he mentions is just one of plunder to Alfeisarão.

‘ General Campbell has mentioned to me Baron Eben’s wish to go into Upper Beira, to be employed in commanding the ordenanza. What do you say to it ?

‘ It appears by the Marques de la Romana’s account that the engineer did not destroy the bridge at Merida, for many reasons, every one of which ought to have induced him to destroy it.

‘ Mendizabal mentions that Madden quitted him in consequence of instructions from me which had never been communicated to him (the Marques). Madden says that he marched to Elvas with Mendizabal’s consent. It is very desirable to have this point clearly established, as we must not on any account lose our character for candor and fair dealing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 13th January, 1811,

2 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have perused, with attention, Bacellar’s and the other reports on the enemy’s proceedings in Beira Alta ; and, adverting to those proceedings, coupled with the orders to Claparède to take up his position at Guarda, given by Drouet after Drouet had had his interview with Massena ; and observing that, not-

withstanding their want of ammunition and stores, and their ignorance of Mortier's movements, they have left their ammunition upon the frontier, I am more than ever impressed with a notion that they directed Claparède to take the position at Guarda with a view to their own retreat by the valley of the Mondego. Under these circumstances I think it very desirable that you should conceal from them, as long as you can, any knowledge of Mortier's movements, which they might derive from yours; and I send this letter by Lord Clinton, to impress again upon you what I stated in my letter of this morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 13th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, and in reply to the assertion of the Government, that the scarcity in the fortress of Abrantes is to be attributed to the supplies furnished from those magazines to Don Carlos de España, I beg to assure you that they are misinformed. But if they have furnished supplies to Don Carlos de España, I conclude they have vouchers to show what quantities; and I believe it will be found that the quantities are trifling.

‘ At all events, if Don Carlos de España's troops had been supplied by the magazines of Abrantes, it was the duty of the *Junta de Fiveres*, who I conclude received returns of the consumption from those magazines, to replenish them in time.

‘ That is the neglect of duty of which I complain, and which, in the usual course, remains unpunished and even unnoticed.

‘ The danger which I have long foreseen, and of which I have frequently warned the Portuguese Government, is now approaching the province of Alentejo, and I am apprehensive that it is but little prepared for it.

‘ It is really impossible for me to send British Officers to perform the duties of the officers of the civil Government. All that I can do is to form the best military system I can,

for the defence of the country, with the means which are in my power, and to suggest to the Government those measures to be carried into execution by the civil authorities to correspond with the military operations, either in the way of supplying our own troops, or of withdrawing supplies from the grasp of the enemy, or of saving the persons and moveable and valuable property of the inhabitants of the country, whose safety would be exposed by the course of the operations. It rests with the civil Government to adopt or reject these suggestions, and to carry them into execution by their own Officers, if they adopt them.

‘ It is quite impossible for me to interfere in any manner in the execution of these measures, notwithstanding that the neglect of them must give me the greatest concern.

‘ The state of the military operations in Estremadura induces me again to request you to draw the attention of the Government to the want of workmen at the works on the left of the Tagus, so interesting at the present moment, particularly to the city of Lisbon, and so earnestly desired by the Government themselves. The number has never yet exceeded 800 men, and we could employ with advantage 4000.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 13th January, 1811.

‘ Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the accounts of the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ I think it probable that you will have ordered the Chasseurs Britanniques to the Tagus, from the accounts which you will probably have received of the enemy’s movements into Estremadura.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Lord Aylmer, who is an Assistant Adjutant General with this army, attached to the 1st division of infantry, under Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, in which he expresses a desire to be removed to Cadiz, in case of the departure of Lieut. Colonel Macdonald for England. I understand from Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby that he wishes to return to Portugal; and, if that

is the case, I assure you that you could not have an Officer at the head of the department of the Adjutant General at Cadiz more fit for the situation, and better calculated to give you satisfaction, than Lord Aylmer. I mention him to you at his desire, which he had already expressed to me when the troops were detached to Cadiz from this country in the month of February, 1809; and I am convinced that if you should think it proper to recommend that he should be sent to you, you will find him a most useful Staff Officer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 13th January, 1811.

‘ I enclose my report to the Secretary of State of yesterday.

‘ The conduct of the Spaniards in Estremadura surpasses everything they have yet done. They were particularly desired to defend the Guadiana and to destroy the bridges of Medellin and Merida, which orders they had received, and the engineer went to Merida to execute this work. Instead of executing it, he makes a report, stating objections to the measure, every word of which proves that it ought to be executed, and he refers for orders.

‘ Mendizabal, who is at Badajoz, does the same; and in the meantime the French, who were supposed by Mendizabal not to have advanced further than Zafra, drive the Spanish cavalry from Merida and obtain possession of the bridge!

‘ Be it remembered that 400 French infantry, in the year 1808, held this same post and bridge of Merida against the whole of Cuesta’s army for one month, in the summer when the Guadiana was fordable!

‘ I really believe that if they would have defended Merida and Medellin for a few days only, so as to impede for that period the passage of Mortier’s corps across the Guadiana, the French must have retired from this country: and I think that Claparède’s division has been ordered to Guarda to protect the movement by the valley of the Mondego.

‘ I send you by this occasion the ——— transport with 6000

stands of arms and sets of accoutrements. We shall now see whether *boasting* will relieve the siege of Cadiz.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. From the accounts which I have from England, I have no doubt but that the Regency is established by this time, and that the Ministry will be changed.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 14th January, 1811,

10 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night two letters from you of the 12th, and this morning three of the 13th. It would be convenient if you would either number your letters of each day, or date the hour at which you write them.

‘ I gave directions that Romana should have some shoes ; but I do not recollect saying that any were to be delivered at Chamusca. That is, I believe, an addition of Don Carlos. It is desirable that upon all these applications he should be referred to the Marques de la Romana.

‘ I will speak to Murray about your tracing. I must order a new General Court Martial on Lieut. —.

‘ Murray has just been here, and tells me that he sent after you, on the day you left this, a tracing of a large part of Alentejo, and that Waller and Doyle have got nearly all the rest.

‘ The shoes for Don Carlos were to have been delivered at Valada, but are not yet come up. You may give him the 450 pairs of shoes which are at Chamusca. If you have moved, the disposition by which you have moved, and that of your troops after moving, is as good as can be made ; but I think it most probable you will not have moved.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Half-past 11.—I have just received your letter of the 13th, written after the arrival of Lumières. You will have seen by Mendizabal’s letter to Don Carlos, that the French are occupied in the blockade of Olivença rather than

in passing the Guadiana; and this being case, I think it desirable that you should replace matters as they were, and even draw Campbell's and Lumley's brigade nearer to you. We must either do that, or determine to give up Alentejo.

'The Marques de la Romana sends an order to Don Carlos to march, as directed by Mendizabal, as soon as his troops shall be relieved in their station by some of those under your command. 'W.'

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

'SIR,

'Cartaxo, 14th January, 1811.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, and I beg to refer you to my letter of the 12th instant, for a statement of the nature of the difficulties in passing the Zatas in case that river should overflow its banks, and of the mode in which I propose to overcome those difficulties; that is, by embarking the troops in the boats in the Tagus at Salvaterra, and moving them down the southern branch of the Tagus, below the point of junction of the Zatas, and landing them on the left bank of the south branch of the Tagus. When the Zatas overflows its banks boats cannot be used upon it for the passage of troops, either in the way of bridge or to ferry them over.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Captain ———, H.M.S. ———.

'SIR,

'Cartaxo, 15th January, 1811.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter; and although it would give me great satisfaction to forward the objects of an Officer who I doubt not is deserving of every favor he solicits from the First Lord of the Admiralty, it would be most presumptuous in me to venture to recommend to Mr. Yorke the application of any gentleman with whom and with the nature of whose services I am entirely unacquainted.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Captain ———,
H.M.S. ———.*'

'WELLINGTON.

To Dr. Halliday.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I am highly flattered by your desire to write the history of the war in Portugal.

‘ The events in this country of the three last years are fit subjects for the historian, and, if well and truly related, may be deemed deserving the consideration of politicians and military men. But I am apprehensive that the time is not yet arrived in which either the facts themselves can be stated with accuracy or truth, or the motives for the different occurrences be stated.

‘ I feel that I could not give an answer to many of the questions which it is probable you would be desirous of asking, without disclosing facts, opinions, and reasonings, which are not yet before the public, and which could not be disclosed by me without a breach of confidence. I would therefore recommend to you to postpone the execution of your design to some future period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dr. Halliday.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th January, 1811.

‘ I received yesterday evening from Gordon your letter of yesterday: I now enclose some reports from Blunt. There is nothing new on this side, excepting that the beams of wood, which I desired Gordon to tell you had been brought down to the neighborhood of the causeway, have been made into *chevalets* to form bridges, in the most impudent manner, in the face of day under our own guns.

‘ You will see from Brito’s reports of the 12th, that the enemy are feeling about Badajoz, and are about establishing a communication by small posts with Seville. This does not look like entering Portugal in aid of Massena. I think that, if this is their line of operations, Madden’s brigade of cavalry should remain with Mendizabal, particularly as there is a misunderstanding respecting the separation of this brigade from the Spanish corps. I admit that it is a bad bargain for Madden, and everything that can may be

said against the Spaniards; but we must either cut them entirely, which is a point on which the British nation must decide, or we must give them this assistance.

‘ It is not impossible that, if the enemy should endeavor to force the passage of the Tagus, they will at the same time manœuvre upon our left flank, so as to endeavor to draw us from hence, and oblige us to resume our positions in the rear, with a view to make us withdraw the troops from the left bank of the Tagus. I do not mean to give up this position in a hurry; but even if I should withdraw to the lines, I do not propose to bring your troops, or any of them, to the right of the Tagus: we are so much narrowed at present that I think I shall be able to do without them; and, at all events, it would not answer to lose the Alentejo by a manœuvre of this description.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th January, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote my other letter I have seen the Marques de la Romana, who has shown me accounts from Estremadura, which tend to prove that Mortier, with about 14,300 infantry, and a large train of carriages, and his bridge, marched from Merida towards Minajadas, on the road to Truxillo and Almaraz, on the morning of the 9th. The cavalry belonging to this corps, and about 4000 infantry, I conclude, belonging to the troops still in Andalusia, made the show about Badajoz and Olivença referred to in Brito’s reports. There is the Alentejo once more in safety. Madden ought now certainly to rejoin Mendizabal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 15th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th. I do not think it quite fair in Dom Miguel Forjaz to conclude that the Officer employed on the works on the left of the Tagus has

all the assistance he requires, because he has not troubled Dom Miguel Forjaz with further applications for them. It might as well be supposed by a gentleman that his duns do not require payment, or rather that he has paid his duns, because they may have discontinued their visits for a day or two.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th January, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Mr. Kennedy about Mr. Ogilvie’s drafts.

‘ I return the letter from Santarem, which contains some curious intelligence; the writer must be a fellow of some sense. I likewise enclose a letter from Admiral Berkeley, which I beg you will return, respecting the collection of boats at Salvaterra for the use of your corps. My notion was that you should embark your infantry under Salvaterra, near where we used to kill our hares, and pass them down the south branch of the Tagus, below the junction of the Zatas, and then disembark them somewhere about Foz, on the left of the Zatas. This would have been necessary, even supposing that the causeways of the bridge of Benavente should have been in such a state as to enable the cavalry, the artillery, and the baggage to pass them. The Admiral, however, conceived that the matter might be done otherwise, and that the Lieutenants of the navy could, with flats, &c., make a bridge over the inundations of the Zatas. I repeated my former request to him, and this is his answer; and now I request you to send an Officer of the Staff to Salvaterra and Benavente, and ascertain what means there are really there, and give your own orders respecting them. I also think that it would be very desirable to have the causeways of the Benavente river marked with good posts, for I understand that if they had been so marked when the river lately overflowed its banks, the water was not so deep as that a horse could not pass the causeways, and a great danger consisted in the facility with which people could miss the causeway.

‘ Mortier’s march, which is I think confirmed by our not

hearing of his approach to Arronches, shows the nature of the attack which we may shortly expect. I calculate that he may be on the Zezere in the first days of February. I think it would be desirable to have notice sent round to the ordenanza, volunteers, and who are for duty in the lines, apprising them that they are likely to be called upon to be at their posts in a short time, and desiring that they may be ready to repair to them at a moment's warning. This general notice would probably be more effectual, and answer our purpose better than now to fix a particular distant day.

‘ There is nothing new on this side this morning. The enemy did not appear yesterday to be working at their *chevalets*, nor to have made any progress towards their completion since the day before. The orders to Claparède are now explained by Mortier's march.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th January, 1811.

‘ I have had some more conversation with Mr. Kennedy respecting the expediency of sending some transports to Oporto to bring down cattle. Mr. Kennedy considers it desirable that as many as thirty sail should be employed on this service, and, as we shall always have them within reach, I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that fifteen sail may go to Oporto every week for this purpose.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th January, 1811.

‘ You will have seen the accounts of Mortier's movements received from Brito, the truth of which is confirmed by the fact that we have not heard of his appearance on the frontier about Arronches.

‘ The passage of the Tagus by Mortier removes to a distant period, if not entirely, the danger of Alentejo; but it

shows clearly that we shall be attacked at an early period in our positions. I reckon that Mortier, supposing him to march by Almaraz, can be on the Zezere in the first days in February; and I think it probable that the battle for the possession of this country, and probably the fate of the Peninsula, will be fought in less than a month from this time.

‘ I wrote to Lord Liverpool, on the 29th of last month, to request him to send me out any troops that might be destined to reinforce this army; and I should think that they ought to arrive by the beginning of next month; but if the packet should not have sailed, I request you to mention to Lord Wellesley that I expect these reinforcements.

‘ My aide de camp, Major Gordon, was at Abrantes two or three days ago, and he says that the only apprehension they have there is of want of provisions: they already feel some distress, although the place is open; and Gordon says that the country abounds in corn, cattle, and provisions of all descriptions. There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the French, that ever existed: but there is an indolence and a want even of the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle all our calculations and efforts. You will scarcely believe that the troops which I now have in the Alentejo, in which province the French would find and seize resources for months, are supplied for one half of their consumption by the magazines on the right of the Tagus. The people will not sell us what they have, and what they have been repeatedly told will fall into the hands of the enemy, because they will not incur the risk of being obliged, at a later period of the year, to take the trouble of sending to Lisbon to replace for their own consumption that which might now be sold to us.

‘ In the same manner I might now collect at Elvas, from Estremadura, quantities of corn of all descriptions; but we cannot get in Alentejo (a country untouched) carriages for its conveyance to Lisbon, because the lower orders will not work for hire, and the magistrates will not take the trouble

of making them work. Can such a people be saved? Are they worth saving?

‘I propose to keep Beresford’s corps, or at all events a part of it, on the left of the Tagus as long as possible, in order, if I can, to save the Alentejo, though I shall not be surprised if the French were to make a great attempt to pass the Tagus before, or at the same time that they should attack us on the right of the river. The Government, therefore, should still persevere in their endeavors to prevail upon the inhabitants of the Alentejo to remove their property within the lines, and out of the enemy’s reach.

‘It is also very desirable that they should take measures to draw within the lines, on this side of the Tagus, all the inhabitants and their property. A proclamation is nothing: nobody obeys it; and there is nothing to enforce obedience to it. But persons should be sent into the different districts to apprise the people of their danger, and to urge them to remove from it. After all, however, it is very difficult to get them to move, or to send in their property, as they have no confidence in the Government; and they are as apprehensive that their cattle, &c. will fall into the hands of the Portuguese troops as they are that they will fall into the hands of the French.

‘I must add also that this difficulty was not in my way in Beira.

‘Another circumstance also, to which it is desirable that the attention of the Government should be drawn, is the necessity that the Lisbon militia, artillery, ordenanza, &c. should be prepared to resume their posts in the lines when I shall call for them. I have written to Beresford upon this subject; but it is desirable that the Government should likewise attend to it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 17th January, 1811.

‘I enclose two letters which Mr. Kennedy has put into my hands, on the subject of measures adopted under the authority of the Portuguese Government, by soldiers of the Portuguese marine, to seize boats.

‘ When the Portuguese Government made the law by which the boats in the Tagus were numbered and registered, and an Officer was appointed, under their authority, to superintend those boats in each part of the Tagus, to which law I refer you, I understood that the system of what is termed *embargo* was to cease, and that all applications for boats, when they could not be hired by private contract from the owners in sufficient numbers for the service, were to be made to the Officer employed to superintend those boats in each division of the river.

‘ I have directed the Commissary General of the British army to adhere to the system thus established by law in every instance; but if it is to be understood as being no longer in use, I beg that I may know it from authority, in order that I also may give orders to seize and embargo the boats which are necessary for the service of the British army.

‘ As, however, the system established by law has been found to answer perfectly, I would recommend that the law should not be altered, but that it should be enforced; and I profess my readiness to order the Commissary General to give every assistance to the Portuguese Commissariat in boats, if it should be found that the latter are in want of this description of conveyance, and that the British Commissary General has more than his due proportion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th January, 1811.

‘ I am just returned from Benavente with Fletcher, and I enclose a sketch of the causeway, &c. there: A is a causeway, over which there may be at the highest floods about one foot of water. The pavement on this part requires some repairs, particularly at its commencement near Salvaterra, and at the end near the bridge. The whole should be well staked out. After passing the bridge there are two roads; one leading to the right over the bridge of Benavente, the other an unfinished causeway. The first, marked C, has about three feet or three and a half feet water in the

highest floods. The pavement requires repairs, and the causeway to be staked out. The current on this part is very strong. The second, marked B, is never overflowed; but it is completed no further than the bank of the river.

‘Fletcher is of opinion that there will be no difficulty in laying a bridge of boats from the end of the causeway B to the point D, at the entrance of Benavente, nor in making a road from the bridge up into the town; the distance is 100 yards; and I write for boats, &c., for the purpose. I acknowledge, however, that I doubt the practicability of making this bridge: but of this I am very certain, that, if the bridge cannot be made, there can be no difficulty in making use of boats from the end of B to the point D, guiding them across the stream by the ropes to be passed over for the bridges, if it should not be practicable to complete the bridge.

‘Thus the difficulty of Benavente will be got over. Fletcher will meet Lieut. Foster at Benavente on the morning of the 20th, to give him the directions for this work, if you will send him there. It will be necessary, however, that the Juiz should be ordered, under pain of punishment for neglect, first, to put the causeways, A and C, in complete repair; secondly, to find men to cut wood to stake them out; thirdly, to find men with tools to make the road from D up into the town of Benavente, and to supply any materials that may be required to make a platform from the end of B to the boats, supposing one should be necessary.

‘I wish you would inquire from your friend at Santarem, whether the enemy have any boats in the little stream which runs into the Tagus immediately above the town, over which the road to Golegão passes.

‘I do not know what to make of the enemy’s movements in Estremadura. They first told us one story, then contradicted it, without stating on what grounds, and they have not told where the enemy is. Even Downie, who says he counted them, does not say where; so that all we know is that they are in possession of Merida since the 8th, that is ten days!!!

‘In respect to Madden, I think it would be best to join him again to the Spaniards, till they shall take to their gar-

risons; he must not shut himself up in a Spanish garrison positively.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th January, 1811.

‘ I received your letter of the 16th yesterday, by Mr. Brown; and I have been this day to Benavente, where I have seen the causeway. Lieut. Colonel Fletcher is of opinion that a bridge of boats can be thrown from the end of the unfinished causeway to Benavente, the distance being 100 yards. I doubt it; but at all events I am convinced that troops, &c. can pass there in boats, which can be guided across the stream by the ropes which will be laid for the bridge, even if it should be found impracticable to construct the bridge.

‘ There are materials at the mouth of the Benavente river for a bridge of 150 feet. This will require 300 feet; and it is very desirable that the remainder of the materials should be sent up. The number of boats required for the whole will be seventeen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th instant, to the greater part of which I shall give an answer at a future opportunity; but it is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese Government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meetings of the Regency.

‘ It appears that his Eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, “ which

were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom." It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly: they can scarcely be deemed of the nature of those of a ministerial council; but they are those of the persons whom His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his Kingdom, in the existing crisis of his affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his Eminence the Patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices ought to be made, provided the Kingdom could preserve its independence; and I think it most important that the British Government, and the Government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived if we have been hitherto mistaken.

‘His Eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of His Royal Highness’s armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the Kingdom; but I am apprehensive that the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this Kingdom in the year 1807; that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it, in 1808; and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the Kingdom, in 1809; and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces.

‘He forgets that it was stated to him, in the month of February, 1810, in presence of the Marquez d’Olhão, of Senhor Dom Miguel Forjaz, and of Senhor Dom João Antonio Salter de Mendouça, and of Marshal Sir William Beresford, that it was probable that the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success; and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighborhood of the capital only; and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him, which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the Kingdom; and that he expressed before these persons his high approbation of it.

‘If he recollected these circumstances, he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had

expressed his approbation, whose consequences he now disapproves.

‘ The Portuguese nation are involved in a war, not of aggression or even defence on their part, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system; for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems, in order to propitiate the enemy.

‘ The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant, whose Government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties. They chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his Eminence the Patriarch; and they called upon His Majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal (whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy), to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants.

‘ I shall not state the manner in which His Majesty has answered this call, nor enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army. Whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them: but when a nation have adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant, under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their Government act consistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, “ which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the Kingdom.” The Patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions, which have principally involved his country in this contest, when he talks of discontinuing it, because it has again, for the third time, been brought “ into the heart of the Kingdom.”

‘ Although the Patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing Government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this Kingdom would be made the seat of the war, which has since occurred, I admit that his Eminence,

or any of those members, may fairly disapprove of the operations of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal.

‘ I have pointed out to the Portuguese Government, in more than one dispatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy’s position in this country; and the probable success, not only to ourselves, but to our allies, of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description; and their army is at this moment more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered, and are continuing to suffer: but, without entering into discussions, which I wish to avoid upon this occasion, I repeat that, if my counsel had been followed, those sufferings would at least have been alleviated; and I observe that it is the first time that I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part, of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which has for its object the deliverance of the whole.

‘ The Patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system which I have followed; and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion; but this measure is entirely distinct from his refusal to concur in laying those burthens on the people, which are necessary to carry on and secure the objects of the war.

‘ It must be obvious to his Eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, that, unless a great effort is made by the Government to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure, all plans and systems of operations will be alike; for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment, although all the corps are concentrated in the neighborhood of their magazines, with means of transport easy by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions, because there is no money to defray the expenses of transport; and all the departments of the Por-

tuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure and to perform their duty. These deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army; and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds destined for the maintenance of the British army.

‘ It may likewise occur to his Eminence, that, in proportion as operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase; and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless indeed the course of those operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure.

‘ The objections, then, to adopt measures to improve the resources of the Government, go to decide the question whether the war shall be carried on, or not, in any manner.

‘ By desiring His Majesty and the Prince Regent to remove me from the command of their armies his Eminence would endeavor to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of his country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation.

‘ In my opinion, the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of His Majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war.

‘ At all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency; and that a copy of it may be forwarded to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in order that his Royal Highness may see that I have given his Eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives, either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes in respect to the independence of his country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Dr. Hulliday.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th instant; and I am much concerned that it is not in my power to remove you from the Portuguese service, to which you are now attached, in order to attach you to the British army; nor is it in my power to give you leave to absent yourself from your duties in the Portuguese army.

‘ I refer you to my last letter for my opinion on the other points to which yours relates.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dr. Hulliday.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Kemmis, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ I have perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which you are President, on the trial of Private ———, of the — regiment; and, as I do not agree in opinion with the Court that the prisoner ought to be acquitted, I request them to revise their sentence.

‘ There is no contradiction of the evidence which has been produced that this soldier quitted the company to which he belonged without leave. He may afterwards have been taken prisoner by the enemy; and it appears that he has been exchanged as a prisoner of war. The crime of which he has been guilty may not be deemed of the worst description, viz., desertion with an intention of joining the enemy; but in my opinion the evidence tends directly to prove that he was guilty of deserting, and the Court should find accordingly, and sentence such punishment as they may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Kemmis.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ The enemy moved about 3000 infantry, and eight or ten squadrons of cavalry, this day about noon, upon Rio Mayor, from whence our troops retired. I have not yet heard whether

they are gone back again; but I should not be surprised if this movement were followed by a general one in the morning, as I think they must have imagined that we had sent more troops to the left of the Tagus than we really have.

‘ Whatever movement I may make, I should wish you to continue in the position you now occupy till you shall hear further from me. I shall write again, as soon as I know what the enemy have done from Rio Mayor.

‘ Accounts from Estremadura are just as contradictory as usual. Romana, however, who is very ill, is alarmed for the safety of Olivença, and is about to send off the divisions of O’Donnell and Carrera. They will cross at Aldea Galega.

‘ I am very apprehensive that, after all, Badajoz is not supplied with provisions; and Mendizabal has desired Romana to send him 600,000 rations of biscuit. Mr. Kennedy is going to send him 100,000 rations; but Alava has proposed from the Marques that these 100,000 rations should be sent from Elvas, and that ours should go to Elvas. Can this be done? Can Elvas spare the 100,000 rations of biscuit, taking all the chances of the other not reaching the place?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I am not quite secure on the score of Bacellar’s movement of Wilson’s and Miller’s divisions. I think that, considering that part of Claparède’s division remained in the rear, and that in fact the French are very indifferent about their communication, it would have been better to have thrown those divisions in front of Claparède.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 17th I have to refer you to mine to the Secretary of State of this day, from which you will see how impossible it is for me to form any decisive opinion regarding the operations of the enemy from Estremadura. I can rely upon nothing from the Spaniards, and I therefore say decidedly, that the Alentejo ought to be put in a state to receive the enemy at a moment’s notice. The

sooner the inhabitants begin to move the less inconvenience they will experience in making the movement. As for putting cattle upon the island of Lyceria, I am perfectly aware that they can be drawn from thence when we please: but I know the inhabitants of Portugal better than Dom Miguel Forjaz. The moment the enemy appear on the left of the Tagus they will fly, and leave the cattle behind them. But they must do as they please.

‘ I have written you a letter upon the Bishop’s conduct in the Regency, which you will either produce or not, as you may think best. The utility of it will depend entirely upon the effect it is likely to have upon his mind: but I think it gets him into a dilemma which he will be glad to avoid by supporting in the Regency the measures necessary for carrying on the war.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to transmit a letter from Colonel Peacocke, with its enclosures, respecting the improper state in which some detachments have been sent from England, and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give such directions as may prevent the recurrence of such irregularities.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘ Since the enemy obtained possession of the bridge over the Guadiana at Merida, the accounts of their progress have been so various and contradictory that I am not enabled to form an opinion of their designs or numbers.

‘ It was first reported from Badajoz, from authority, that about 14,000 infantry, with a large convoy of carriages, &c., had marched on the 9th by the road of Miajadas towards the bridge of Almaraz; and I have since received a report

from the banks of the Elja, that the enemy's head quarters were at Cáceres, while other reports from Badajoz would tend to prove that the enemy's whole force, with the exception of a small body of cavalry, were still on the left bank of the Guadiana.

‘ When General Mendizabal retired across the Guadiana he threw a small corps of about 3000 infantry into Olivença, which place was but ill supplied with provisions and stores. A body of infantry, which has at times been stated to be 4000, and others 7000, with about 1500 cavalry, has blockaded Olivença; and I imagine that the consternation which prevails in all the towns in Estremadura, in consequence of this event, is the reason that no positive intelligence of the enemy's movements, or position, or numbers, can be promised.

‘ At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville General Ballesteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivença. General Mendizabal has consequently called for assistance from this quarter, and the Marques de la Romana immediately directed the troops under Don Carlos de España to march, for which General Mendizabal had made a requisition; and I imagine that the remainder of the Spanish corps hitherto attached to this army will likewise move in that direction.

‘ The circumstances which I have above related will show your Lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine, or regulate, operations with a corps so ill organized, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited, that the first intelligence which General Mendizabal received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either of retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency to detach General Ballesteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the

21st December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville.

‘There has been no alteration in the position of the enemy’s troops in front of this army.

‘I imagine that General Claparède has not received the orders from General Drouet to take up his position upon Guarda, of which I reported to your Lordship in my last dispatch that we had intercepted the duplicate. He attacked General Silveira with the advanced guard of his division near Trancoso, at the Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, and obliged him to retire with some loss. Lieut. Colonel M’Bean *, of the 24th regiment, was wounded in this affair. General Claparède attacked General Silveira again with the advanced guard of his division at Villa da Ponte on the 11th instant, and obliged him to retire, but without material loss, excepting that of Major Cooksey, of the 24th Portuguese regiment, who was unfortunately killed, and the Officer commanding the 1st brigade of militia, who was wounded.

‘General Bacellar, who commands in the north, has moved the divisions commanded by General Miller and Colonel Wilson upon the flank and rear of the enemy, which it is expected will check this movement, and oblige him to fall back again towards the frontier. A part of Claparède’s division was still at Pinhel.

‘I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from Marshal Beresford on these transactions.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 19th January, 1811.

‘I enclose the weekly state. My dispatch of this date will show you the situation of affairs. The Spaniards have outdone themselves even in their late transactions in Estremadura, and I expect to hear at every moment that they have lost their corps in Olivença. I shall send you the reasons stated for not breaking the bridge of Merida, if I

* Major General Sir William M’Bean, K.C.B.

can get the paper from *La Romana*. It is really worth preserving.

‘ I hope that you will have sent me the troops upon receiving my letter of the 29th December. I am sorry to give you bad accounts of the Brunswick Legion. They continue to desert in large numbers; and on the night before last fourteen deserted to go to the enemy; eleven were caught, one was shot while making the attempt, and only two got off. These were men who had only joined the army two days before. I find they were prisoners enlisted; but it is desirable not to have in this army enlisted deserters.

‘ I enclose a newspaper giving an account of our works, the number of guns, and men in each, and for what purpose constructed. Surely it must be admitted, that those who carry on operations against an enemy possessed of all the information which our newspapers give to the French do so under singular disadvantages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 20th January, 1811,

10 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received in the night your letter of yesterday. The French retired again from Rio Mayor yesterday evening, and our troops re-entered the place, and all is quiet this morning, at least as far as I have heard. Their force was strong, but only a reconnaitring party. Fletcher is gone over to meet Lieut. Foster.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.*

‘ P.S. I observe that Silveira attacked the enemy on the day M^r Bean was wounded, which I do not think was exactly conformable to instructions. Madame la Duchesse d’Abrantes’ letter is capital. I hope that she and the young one will arrive safe in France, to tell the story of her afflictions in Spain.

‘ W.’

MEMORANDUM.

To the Marques de la Romana.

‘ Cartaxo, 20th January, 1811.

‘ The situation of affairs in Estremadura becomes very critical and important, and will be doubly so if it be true that Badajoz is not supplied with provisions.

‘ It is very difficult, in consequence of the defective state of the information which we have received from Estremadura, to decide upon the positions which the enemy have occupied, or upon the plan of operations which ought to be adopted for the relief of Olivença.

‘ The Spanish Generals should bear in mind, however, that the last body of troops which their country possesses is that under the command of the Marques de la Romana, and that it should not be risked in operations of difficult or doubtful result. The relief of the battalions in Olivença is the first subject for consideration. If it be true, as has been stated, that the enemy have a considerable force on the right as well as on the left bank of the Guadiana, the operation to be performed becomes critical, and may involve not only the loss of the troops employed in it, but may have for its consequence the blockade of Badajoz itself.

‘ In order to put this possibility in a clearer light, I must observe that there is no passage now for the Spanish troops over the Guadiana, excepting Badajoz itself. If then the whole of the disposable force in Estremadura should be thrown over the Guadiana at Badajoz, and the enemy’s corps on the right of the Guadiana should take up a position on the high grounds between that place and the river Caya, not only Olivença would remain blockaded, if the measures for its relief should not succeed, but Badajoz also, with this additional inconvenience, that the number of mouths to feed in the place would be increased by the amount of the force which should have been employed to relieve Olivença, and which it is supposed, in the event of failure, would retire upon Badajoz.

The mode of proceeding which I would recommend, as a remedy for this inconvenience, would be, if possible, to attack the enemy’s troops on the right of the Guadiana, at the same time that an attempt should be made to relieve

Olivença. If they should be so weak as to be obliged to retire from the right bank, then the bridges of Merida and Medellin should be destroyed, as before recommended.

‘ If the Spanish force is not strong enough to attack the enemy on the right bank at the same time that an attempt is made to relieve Olivença, at all events the Ponte d’ Evora ought to be destroyed, and the heights should be occupied by a part of the garrison of Badajoz, which communicate with the fort of San Christoval, and run from Badajoz to Campo Mayor. These measures would delay the operations of the enemy, and would enable the relieving troops to return, and pass through Badajoz before the enemy could occupy his position, as supposed, between Badajoz and the Caya. But the relief of Olivença, and the operations to be carried on with a view to that measure, however important, are trifling in importance in comparison with the consideration of those which must be adopted for the safety of Badajoz itself, most particularly if that place is not supplied with provisions.

‘ If the enemy are in the force supposed, and propose to remain in Estremadura, these provisions must be drawn from Portugal; and, at all events, the Spanish army must keep up its communication with this.

‘ I would therefore recommend the following measures to the consideration of the Spanish General Officers.

‘ First, if possible, to get possession of the right bank of the Guadiana again, and to destroy the bridges of Merida and Medellin. If this measure answers no other purpose, it will gain time at all events, even if the bridges can be repaired; but if they cannot be repaired it will oblige the enemy to make use of his own bridge for the passage of the river, and will confine him to one passage only.

‘ Secondly, an intrenched camp should be marked out, and prepared for the disposable force of the Marques de la Romana’s army, on the heights between Badajoz and Campo Mayor, having its right upon San Christoval.

‘ Thirdly, General Ballesteros’ division ought again to be joined to the army of the Marques de la Romana.

‘ Fourthly, the boats for a bridge now at Badajoz ought to be sent to Elvas, in order to give the Marques de la Romana a facility of crossing the Guadiana under Juru-

menha, to give him a choice of attacking the enemy upon the left bank of the Guadiana, supposing that the enemy should fix their bridge below Badajoz, between that place and Elvas, and thus dislodge him from his intrenched position.

‘ All these measures are very simple and practicable if they are immediately commenced in earnest; but if this plan, or some other of this description, is not adopted at an early period, and it forms part of the enemy’s plan to blockade Badajoz with the force he now has in Estremadura, he will succeed in obtaining possession of the place, which has no chance of being preserved, unless Massena should be obliged to withdraw from his position in Portugal.

‘ *Marques de la Romana.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 20th January, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. They have settled their concerns finely in Estremadura; and no arrangement was ever more completely Spanish than to have sent between 2000 and 4000 of their best men into Olivença, a place without artillery, ammunition, or provisions, under circumstances in which it was impossible, if they should be attacked, that they could be relieved! Then, as usual, they halloo to the whole world for assistance, and abuse if it is not immediately given to them. Mendizabal has desired that I would place under his command all the troops in the garrisons on the frontier, and all the cavalry. The Marques de la Romana has indeed asked for the latter, which they would lose, and then abuse them.

‘ Don Carlos de España went some days ago to Campo Mayor, where he is by this time, upon Mendizabal’s requisition; and the Marques de la Romana, who is very ill, settled yesterday that the divisions of Carrera and O’Donnell, which are with this army, should cross the Tagus, and proceed to the relief of Olivença. However, it is nonsense to talk of these people as troops, or to reckon upon their operations in any manner whatever, excepting in defence of a strong post, from which they have no retreat. In this view the loss of their numbers is a serious one to me.

‘ You will observe the state of Olivença for want of provisions, and I am sadly afraid that Badajoz is not much better; for Mendizabal has applied to the Marques de la Romana for 600,000 rations of biscuit, in a letter received only yesterday. They have had the whole province of Estremadura open to them since the beginning of July; and it was particularly settled between the Marques de la Romana and me, not only that the abundant harvest of Estremadura should supply his garrisons, but that a large magazine should be formed for this army!!! To form these magazines, however, required arrangement, foresight, and activity; and there our allies invariably fail us. If it be true that there are no provisions in Badajoz, the French will undoubtedly get that place, if they only approach it; and then there will be a fine breeze! Mendizabal, &c., have sent us so many false reports, that I cannot make out what the French are doing.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Kemmis, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st January, 1811.

‘ I return the proceedings of the General Court Martial of which you are President, in order to have inserted in the proceedings my letter to you, directing the revisal of the sentence.

‘ This is usual upon all occasions; and I wish to show to those who will see the proceedings of this General Court Martial that I, at least, did my duty.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Kemmis.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 21st January, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

1 P.M.

‘ I have perused Madden’s letter; and I think there is only one part of it which ought to be given to the Marques de la Romana, viz., that part of it not marked by me. The other parts may be very true and correct accounts of the state of affairs in the Spanish army, indeed I am sure they

are true, but I do not think it would answer any good purpose to communicate General Madden's accounts to the Marques. However, I would not extract his letter without your consent, and therefore I return it to you.

' There is nothing new on this side, excepting that they say Junot was wounded at Rio Mayor on Saturday. Cocks has been very successful in taking prisoners of the 2d and 6th corps, near Alcobaça, in search of provisions, who say they have 150 boats at Punhete. They double the number every day.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' WELLINGTON.

' P.S. I enclose an anonymous letter, which ought to be directed to you instead of me. I have not read it.

' W.

To Major General Sir William Erskine, Bart.

' MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

' Cartaxo, 21st January, 1811.

' I am very sorry I did not see you this day, for I wanted to tell you how much I was satisfied with the mode in which you conducted our matters on Saturday at Rio Mayor. I thought it best, as I could not go out, to send you no orders.

' I hope to put you in orders for the command of the 5th division of infantry, if it should be agreeable to you; but, as that division is not at present actively employed, I should wish, if it is not disagreeable to you, that you should remain in your present situation, and will appoint General Howard* to command your brigade in the 1st division, which will still remain under your orders. Let me know if this will suit you.

' I am thinking of making an arrangement for holding Alcoentre, at least for a time, in case the enemy attempt anything on the left of our position.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Major General*

Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

' WELLINGTON.

* Lieut. General the Earl of Effingham, G.C.B.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st January, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which Lieut. Colonel Fletcher has just put into my hands. As it is quite impossible that all the details of boats upon the river Tagus can be carried on between you and me, it is very desirable that the river boats in the Tagus should be left under the authorities placed over them by the Portuguese Government, with whom the Commissary General and Quarter Master General can communicate; and that, when British boats are required for any service, I should have the honor of applying to you for them; and that you should give such orders for their being supplied as you may deem expedient.

‘ When a Lieutenant of the navy is employed to command or take charge of these boats, it is desirable that he should receive instructions to attend to the directions he may receive from me, or any Staff Officer acting under my orders; for it is obvious that much time must be lost if, after the necessity for a service occurs, I am to apply to you to issue orders to an Officer to perform it, which application would be made, as in this instance, many hours after the necessity would occur. Besides this inconvenience, it throws upon you and me the details of the service, into which we cannot enter without devoting to them time which might be better employed otherwise.

‘ In stating this, I do not mean to complain of Lieutenant —, or of any Officer of the navy, of whose zeal and anxiety to forward the service upon every occasion I cannot express my acknowledgment in too strong terms.

‘ I beg leave to draw your attention to the statement in Captain Squire’s letter, regarding the necessity of having English flat bottomed boats for the bridge at Benavente, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send up the number required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 21st January, 1811.

‘ By this time you will have received my letter on the Patriarch’s speech, about which you will do as you like. But I think it contains some truths which ought, in some manner or other, to be brought to the recollection of all the ruling authorities in Portugal; and it places the Patriarch’s conduct in such a light that he will tremble when he shall see the lamp post. However, you will judge of the necessity of bringing it forward, and of the time and manner of producing it, if produced at all.

‘ I must write to you, however, officially, in a very serious manner, upon answers lately received from Colonel Fava and from General Rosa, to requisitions for work to be done in their departments, in which they say they cannot perform the work till they shall know who is to pay for it. The work in Colonel Fava’s department was portable magazines for the redoubts in the lines, and that in General Rosa’s was made up ammunition for the same, for which Great Britain has supplied the powder.

‘ I believe that I have gone beyond my power in defraying all the expenses of constructing all the works, and also of improving the defences of Peniche; but it is really carrying matters too far, if Great Britain is not only to pay the expense of constructing the works for the defence of Portugal, but likewise the expense incurred by the ordinary establishments in the Portuguese arsenals and establishments, in arming the works after they are constructed. I shall be sorry to bring this question to a decision; but it may be depended upon that the British Government will fly off upon it.

‘ I think also (but that may be prejudice) that I see in these new claims, of Fava and Rosa, for payment for the work done by their departments respectively, that spirit of anti-Anglican party which I am convinced is encouraged at Lisbon. I am therefore desirous that these demands should be set aside by authority at once.

‘ I am so entirely of opinion that we can do nothing for this country, if the anti-Anglican party is not suppressed, that I shall recommend to Government either to suppress it,

and to have banished from Portugal all those concerned in it, or to withdraw their army. They now go so far with their demands as to call upon me for payment for the repair of roads, for which there are funds in all parts of Portugal. This was done yesterday at Benavente.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d January, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter, and its enclosure, from General Cole. I have sent the extract regarding the magazines at Villa Franca to Mr. Stuart, to be laid before the Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. There is nothing new here this day.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d January, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from the Commissary General, requesting that a supply of salt provisions, amounting to 30,000 pounds, should be landed, for the use of the army, from the transports in the Tagus; and I request you to give directions that this quantity of provisions may be landed from the several transports, in proportion to the number of troops each is calculated to carry.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d January, 1811.

‘ Since I had the honor of addressing you last night, on the subject of the boats at Benavente, I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant, upon the subject of the want of boats to transport the army under the Marques de la Romana to the left of the Tagus.

‘ I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 25th October, for the statement of the mode in which a transaction of

this kind is carried on in the army. This transaction has been carried on strictly according to that mode.

‘ When Mr. Dunmore found he could not procure a sufficient number of country boats for the required service he ought to have made his report; and to have suggested either to me, or to the Officer of the Quarter Master General’s department at Lisbon, if you are so kind as to allow that Officer to communicate with you upon the service, to request you to order the transport boats to supply the deficiency.

‘ This would have been the regular mode of proceeding, and Mr. Dunmore’s error shall be made known to him; but I am convinced he never intended to do anything disrespectful by you.

‘ I can have no knowledge of the verbal orders of the Minister in the War Department to the Officer in charge of the boats on the river, by the appointment of the Government. The Commissary General and his Officer have orders to apply to this Officer to supply boats when they cannot procure them by private contract; and the confusion, when there is any, arises from the Government omitting to enforce their own regulation, or, their Officers giving verbal orders contradictory to it.

‘ If the regulation should be altered, and I am told that we are either to seize boats when we want them, or that we are to apply at the Admiralty for the boats which we shall require for the ordinary service upon the river, I shall give directions that we should act accordingly; but, till the Government alter their law, it is impossible for me to act otherwise than as pointed out in my letter of the 26th October.

‘ The proceedings in regard to English boats, and all assistance required from the fleet, are entirely different. Application for these must be made to you by me, unless you should continue to allow the Officers of the Quarter Master General’s department to apply for them; and in that case it would be desirable that the Officers of the navy, employed in command or in charge of the boats, should have the instructions suggested in my letter of last night.

‘ I havethe honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d January, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose letters received from Colonel Fava and from Brig. General Rosa, to which I beg you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘ The former states that he has received the directions of the Governors of the Kingdom to ascertain who is to pay for certain work which he had been required by Colonel Fletcher, the Chief Engineer, to perform; and he intimates that, unless he should be paid for the work he had before performed of the same description for the service of the redoubts near Torres Vedras, he can do no more.

‘ Brig. General Rosa states, that he cannot make up the cartridges required for the works on the left of the Tagus for want of money.

‘ These works are intended for the defence of Lisbon; and I request that the Governors of the Kingdom will state, whether they propose that His Majesty should defray all the expense, not only of labor and materials in their construction, but likewise the expenses which may be incurred in the Portuguese arsenals and other establishments, in arming and equipping them.

‘ Having already incurred so large an expense on this account, the trifling expense of constructing these portable magazines in Colonel Fava’s establishment, and making up a few cartridges wanted from the arsenal, would not be worthy of consideration; but I object to the principle, that every effort is not to be made and every assistance given, by every Portuguese department, to carry on the operations of the war, and to the temper and mode in which these communications are made by order of the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘ I therefore request that this letter may be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, with a request that they will state, for His Majesty’s information, whether they do adopt the principle that no assistance is to be given by the Portuguese arsenals and other establishments, for the works going on in the neighborhood of Lisbon, without being paid for by His Majesty.

‘ I likewise enclose the extract of a letter from Colonel

Harvey, commanding a brigade of Portuguese infantry, to Major General Cole, on the subject of the deficiencies of the magazines at Villa Franca to supply the demands of the troops. I beg you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to this subject.

‘ There is no want of flour, or grain, or wheat, at Lisbon; the want consists in money to buy those articles, and in arrangement to convey them to the troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Monsieur Honoré Charlaro.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Au Quartier Général, ce 23 Janvier, 1811.

‘ J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 20 Janvier.

‘ J’ai toujours fait ce qui était en mon pouvoir pour adoucir le sort des prisonniers Français qui sont tombés dans mes mains, et j’en ai sauvé la vie à plusieurs: et je serais bien content s’il était en mon pouvoir de faire plus pour eux que je n’ai déjà fait. Mais ni les Généraux des armées Françaises, ni le Gouvernement Français, ne paraissent avoir le moindre désir ou d’adoucir le sort, ou de voir finir les malheurs, des prisonniers Français, soit en consentant à un cartel d’échange pour mettre un terme à leurs malheurs, soit en adoptant aucun autre arrangement.

‘ Il n’est pas juste donc d’attendre de moi que je ferai plus que je n’ai déjà fait pour les prisonniers, et que j’oublierai en faveur des prisonniers Français ce que je dois aux Officiers et soldats de l’armée Anglaise, et aux Officiers et marins de la marine Anglaise, qui languissent dans les prisons en France, tandis que le Gouvernement et les Généraux Français montrent une indifférence si décidée sur le sort de ceux de leur compatriotes qui sont dans nos mains.

‘ Je suis fâché que je ne peux pas prêter l’oreille à votre demande.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Monsieur Charlaro.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d instant, containing the copy of one from Dr. — of the 14th instant, with

charges against Mr. **** and Mr. ††††. It appears that these three gentlemen carried on a very active private correspondence in the course of the last summer, in which each of them appears to have delivered his opinion in very free terms of his neighbor. This conduct is very blameable, and these gentlemen might as well have spent their time in a manner more advantageous to the public.

‘ But, excepting for having written private letters at all on the characters of others, I do not see what crime Mr. **** and Mr. †††† have been guilty of; and I am apprehensive that if we were to begin to bring persons to trial for this crime, we ought not to stop at those gentlemen, nor even at Dr. —, but that too many have been guilty of this idle, foolish, and mischievous amusement.

‘ I do not think it proper to employ the time of the Officers of the army in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the nonsense which these letters contain, nor even whether Dr. — deserved the appellation of a Judas among the doctors attached to the Portuguese army, which has been applied to him; nor do I think it expedient to expose to the Portuguese army and to the world in Portugal, by such an investigation, the weakness and the little futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use to them, or to do credit to the British army and to their own country, must command the respect of the natives of this.

‘ In my opinion, these gentlemen should be desired to reconcile their differences, and to carry on the service together as men ought who make the good of the service their object. I am also of opinion that you should recommend to the Prince Regent to dismiss from his service the gentleman who does not attend to this admonition; and you may depend upon it, that I will take care not to admit such a fire-brand into the medical department attached to this army.

‘ Although I do not deem it expedient to assemble a General Court Martial for the investigation of these charges, I cannot pass them by without animadverting upon the presumption of Dr. —, in bringing as a charge against Mr. **** that he had not taken immediate steps to bring Dr. - - -’s conduct to an investigation for a supposed offence. Does Dr. — pretend to know all that passed between you and Mr. **** Does he pretend to know

whether you decided at all, or what your decision was, upon the expediency or necessity of an investigation into the conduct of Dr. ----? Does he propose to arraign your conduct, as well as that of Mr. * * * *, before a General Court Martial, because you might have deemed it inexpedient or unnecessary to investigate the conduct of Dr. ----? or does his rage for justice extend only to Mr. * * * *?

‘The want of recollection of these obvious considerations, which might have occurred to anybody, shows the spirit with which these charges have been formed, and how necessary it is that they should be crushed, if we do not wish to expose to the curiosity of the public in this country a scene of vindictive but childish slander, such as perhaps has never before come out before a General Court Martial. I return Dr. ———’s letter and his charges.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘You will be concerned at the unfortunate event which occurred this day in the death of the Marques de la Romana. It is very desirable that the account should be sent to Cadiz as soon as possible, and that a vessel should be sent there with the letters I have enclosed to Mr. Stuart.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘I am much concerned to inform you that the Marques de la Romana died this day. He was attacked some days ago with spasms in his chest, and he had since been very unwell; but I had seen him every day: and yesterday he was much better. This morning he was so well as to talk of coming out to see me; but he was attacked again with these spasms, and died at about 2 o’clock. His Secretary had left him, and had gone to Villa Franca, to receive him there to-morrow, when he intended to set out.

‘ Under existing circumstances, his loss is the greatest which the cause could sustain; and I do not know how we are to replace him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’ ;

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Be so kind as to forward the enclosed. I have applied to the Admiral for a vessel to go to Cadiz.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘ Before I can decide upon the note from Dom Miguel Forjaz of the 20th January, marked A, in your private letter of the 21st instant, it is desirable that I should know what the demand for the boats is; and I shall be obliged to you if you will request Dom Miguel Forjaz to send it to me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘ I have perused the note from Dom Miguel Forjaz of the 20th instant, marked C, in your private letter of the 21st January, regarding the employment of boats on the river Tagus.

‘ The object of the regulation of the Portuguese Government upon this subject, and that of every regulation which I have recommended, has been to put an end to the system of embargo; the literal meaning of which word is to press by military force any article or animal which is required by anybody who has the command of a military force, whether as a means of transport or as an article of use or consumption.

‘ I proposed, and it was made law, that every boat, as well as every carriage in the country should be numbered, and the owner’s name and place of abode, and the number of his boat and its capacity, should be registered; and that the boats in each particular part of each river in the country should be under the control of an Officer appointed by the Government to make and keep the registers; while the magistrates in their several villages were to make and keep

the registers of the carriages, and were to have the control over them. The consequence of this regulation was to be, that when boats were required for the military service, and could not be obtained by private contract, the Commissary, whether British or Portuguese, requiring them, was to apply to the person who kept the register and controlled the boats in the district, who was to issue his orders (not to embargo boats, but) to certain boat owners to attend for the service with their boats, under the penalties of the law for disobedience.

‘ Carriages were to be procured in the same manner.

‘ The British Commissariat have, I know, obeyed this law; and the way in which I know it is, that they have not the power of employing, and have not employed, one British soldier to embargo any article of any description. The Commissary General hires boats most commonly by private contract, and when more are required for the service than he can readily hire, he applies to the superintendent for his assistance to procure them.

‘ I doubt the truth of the fact that a soldier is placed in each boat in the employment of the Commissary General: but into this I will inquire. If there is any foundation for the assertion it is probable that he has been obliged to place a driver of the Commissariat in each boat which he has hired (which, after all, is perfectly harmless), in order to prevent the forcible embargo of the boats in his employment by the Officers of the Portuguese Government.

‘ But although, as I have above stated, the regulations which had for their objects the prevention of embargo (and which were suggested by me) have been rigidly observed by all the British authorities, the same unfortunate circumstances which prevent the execution of any of the many salutary laws of Portugal prevent the execution of this law by the Portuguese Officers.

‘ Boats are wanted for the service of the Portuguese army; but the Portuguese Commissary can get none by private contract, because the Portuguese Government never pay for the hire. Then the Portuguese Commissary applies to the Superintendent Major Pernet, who ought to issue his orders to certain owners of certain boats, stating their numbers, to attend the service.

‘ But these boat owners either refuse to attend or go out of the way, as they are well aware that they will never be paid ; and the penalty of the law is not put in force against them, or they very probably go and hire themselves in the service of the British army, where they know they will be paid.

‘ Major Pernet, the Superintendent, has then no resource but the old system of embargo ; and he seizes by military force every boat he can find to be employed, not for payment for the Portuguese army, but as long as the owners can be detained under a military guard.

‘ This is the history of the execution of this law and of the law respecting land transports, and this history will point out to you the real and principal cause of the confusion which as existed. It has been aggravated in some degree by the interference of the Portuguese Admiralty with the boats of the river, in a manner in which they were not authorised to interfere, in my opinion, under the law to which I have above referred. I have, however, written three letters, of which I enclose copies, to Admiral Berkeley upon this subject, on the 25th October, and 21st and 22d January, which I hope will settle that matter entirely.

‘ In order to remedy the inconveniences now felt under his law, Dom Miguel Forjaz, with his usual zeal and ingenuity, is prepared to suggest a new one.

‘ It is useless, however, to expect to be able to carry into execution any system of any description, for any branch of the service till the Government shall have provided resources to enable them to carry on the war, shall have introduced order and regularity into their affairs, and shall have determined to punish in the most exemplary manner all those who transgress or disobey the law.

‘ But before they carry this determination into execution, it is necessary to be just : it is necessary to put a stop to the system of violence, which unfortunately prevails under the authority of the Government, and to provide means of paying the poor man whose boat, whose cart, or whose mule is required for the public service, and whose time might otherwise be profitably employed.

‘ My own opinion is, that the existing law is the best and fairest that could be devised ; and I declare most solemnly

that I believe it has not in any one instance been infringed by the British Commissariat, and that we have practically got rid of the odious system of embargo. When it is considered that the British Commissary General feeds the Spanish army and the Portuguese militia in the lines, besides the whole British army, and that he affords not a little occasional assistance to the Portuguese regular troops, it may be doubted whether he employs more boats than are necessary to him. I shall, however, make inquiry upon this subject, and shall direct him to discharge from the service as many as can be spared.

‘I cannot conclude this subject without reflecting upon the practical proof, which this discussion affords, of the impracticability of carrying on the war elsewhere than in the heart of the kingdom. The records of Dom Miguel Forjaz’s office must contain many discussions on this same subject. When the army was on the Mondego the same difficulties occurred, the Portuguese troops were frequently in want, and the same discussions took place.

‘The troops are now upon the Tagus, with the supplies of the whole world open to them, and with water communication almost to their cantonments, and yet difficulties are experienced, and the Portuguese troops are not regularly supplied. It must occur to any man who has any knowledge of military affairs, that, till resources are found to defray the necessary expenses of the army, these difficulties must occur; and must increase in proportion as the troops are further removed from their magazines and from the convenience of water carriage.

‘I request that this letter and enclosures may be laid before the Governors of the Kingdom, as my answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

‘To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cartaxo, 23d January, 1811.

‘I am concerned to inform you that the Marques de la Romana died here this day. He was attacked some days ago with spasms in his chest, and he had since been very unwell. But I have seen him every day, and yesterday he

was much better: he was so well this morning as to talk of coming to see me, and he intended to set out for Lisbon on his return to Estremadura; and his Secretary had left him to prepare for his reception to-morrow at Villa Franca, and for his passage down the Tagus: but he was again attacked with spasms, and he died about 2 o'clock.

‘ His loss is irreparable: under existing circumstances I know not how he can be replaced; and we may expect that it will be followed by the fall of Badajoz.

‘ It will be necessary that the Regency should select a person as soon as possible, to take the command of the Marques de la Romana’s army; and I hope he will be one of a conciliating disposition.

‘ The French are still blockading Olivença. The divisions of the Spanish army that were here have marched; and I enclose the copy of a memorandum that I gave to the Marques de la Romana, which he forwarded to Mendizabal some days ago. If they are not too late, and will act according to the plan suggested in that memorandum, they will save the troops in Olivença and the place of Badajoz, and probably the cause. But I tremble for anything that depends upon Spanish exertions and foresight and Spanish prudence.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Duckworth.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811.

‘ I have observed, on perusing the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of Lieut. —, that it had been generally understood in the 48th regiment that Lieut. — had the means of being appointed to serve with the Portuguese army, by some interest or influence independent from that of the Commanding Officer of his regiment; I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you ever heard what that influence or interest was, or upon whom it was to operate.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Duckworth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811,
Half past 9 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letters of yesterday, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and this morning No. 5.

‘ We have heard of no movement by the enemy on this side. On the night of the 21st they threw up rockets, and showed blue lights at Pernes, Tremes, and Alorna, but I have not heard that any movement was made. It would appear, however, that they began to move the boats about the same time.

‘ A man of the poor Marques writes to him, I do not know from whence, on the 21st, that the troops at Thomar and Cabaços had moved to Pombal and Leyria ; but I do not think that great credit can be given to this statement. We should have heard it from other quarters.

‘ I think it probable that, finding your preparations to oppose their coming out of the Zezere were becoming very formidable, they have moved the boats to the other little streams, of which one comes out under Santarem, which can certainly carry boats ; another runs by Pernes, and comes out nearly opposite to Alpiaga ; and a third by Torres Novas, and comes out a little lower down than Chamusca : I cannot say whether these two last carry boats.

‘ Of the corps mentioned by your prisoners, the 76th regiment is in the 1st division, 6th corps. The battalions mentioned by the six prisoners are the eleven battalions of the 2d division of the 9th corps.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811,
11 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have read over Madden’s letter of the 21st. Notwithstanding that General Madden’s situation is not a very agreeable one, I think that he does not make the best of it, or rather that he makes the worst of it. We have the accounts of all his marches and countermarches since the 6th instant, and in my opinion it is not too much for his or any other horses. Whether they

might not as well have remained in their stables is another question, with which General Madden has nothing to do. Want of food for man and horse is indeed a good ground of complaint, and upon that subject I desire Alava to write to General Mendizabal.

‘ It is not true that there has been any alteration in the instructions or terms under which the Portuguese brigade of cavalry has been attached to the Spanish army; but I now desire Alava to let General Mendizabal know that I do make the following alterations:—

‘ First, that the men and horses are to receive their rations regularly, and that if they do not Brig. General Madden is to complain to General Mendizabal.

‘ Secondly, if the irregularity or deficiency should continue after the complaint made, General Madden is to withdraw the brigade to Elvas.

‘ General Madden is to understand, however, that it will be expected from him to prove that he has made the complaint, and has received no redress, and that the deficiency is one of so serious a nature as that its duration would go to the destruction of the horses.

‘ I must observe upon all this, that if nobody is to remain in a situation which he does not like, or is to do only what he likes, we have undertaken a task which is too great for us. But I declare that, notwithstanding all my practice, I have not health or spirits to go through all the difficulties of carrying on the service, crossed and thwarted as it is by the wants of the Portuguese and Spanish armies; the obstinacy with which they persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right or save them; and the difficulties thrown in the way by our own Government and Officers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811.

‘ Upon perusing the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which Major General the Hon. W. Lumley was President, I observed that Major General Houghton is considered and has acted as the Commanding Officer of the

garrison of Chamusca, without the command of the brigade of infantry placed under his orders by the General Order of the army; and that Colonel Inglis, of the 57th regiment, is considered and has acted as the Commanding Officer of the brigade of infantry which had been placed under the command of Major General Houghton by the General Order of the army.

‘The organization of this army has been formed upon certain principles of general convenience, as I believe you are aware, and it is desirable that it should not be altered upon light grounds, particularly without reference to head quarters.

‘Chamusca is one of the cantonments of the army. I do not know that, in any view of it, that town can be considered a garrison to require a Commanding Officer, who should be taken from the duties of the brigade placed under his command to exercise the duties of this new command. At all events, this arrangement should not have been made without reference to head quarters; and I beg that in future the troops may continue organized, and Officers may continue with the commands as ordered by the General Orders.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811.

‘Our conversations upon the state of affairs on the left of the Tagus before you went there will explain the reason for my writing you the enclosed letter, of which you will make such use as you may think proper. I have a Major General now to spare (——), whom I can send you, but I will not do it if you think it would be inconvenient to you to have —— superseded.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To General Mendizabal.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 24th January, 1811.

‘You will have been made acquainted with the irreparable loss sustained by the Spanish army, by your country, and

the world, by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana yesterday, after a short illness. I have lost a colleague, a friend, and an adviser, with whom I had lived on the happiest terms, of friendship, intimacy, and confidence; and I shall revere and regret his memory to the last moment of my existence. During his indisposition I had frequent conversations with him on the situation of affairs in Estremadura, and by his desire I put my opinions in writing in the form of a memorandum, in order to give him a more convenient opportunity of considering them. He transmitted this memorandum to you, and I earnestly recommend it to your attention.

‘Although we are both placed in an arduous situation, I have no doubt that, by prudent management and by a cordial union of views and actions, we shall extricate ourselves from all our difficulties; and you may depend upon my disposition to communicate with you with the same frankness and sincerity as I did with your respectable predecessor, and to give you such assistance as the means in my power will enable me to afford.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Mendizabal.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Le Cor.

‘MONSIEUR,

‘A Cartaxo, ce 25 Janvier, 1811.

‘Vous aurez eu les nouvelles de la mort du Marquis de la Romana, qui doit être enseveli à Lisbonne après demain. Je vous envoie l’ordre pour que le 12^e régiment marche à Lisbonne demain, pour assister à ses funérailles; et je vous prie de donner ordre à l’Officier qui commandera ce corps, qu’il fasse un rapport de son arrivée au Colonel Peacocke, le Commandant des troupes Anglaises à Lisbonne, et à Don Soares de Noronha. Le 12^e régiment retournera à Alhandra le 28.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘Au Colonel Le Cor.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 25th January, 1811.

‘You will have heard of the misfortune which has occurred by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana, after

a short illness. His body will leave this place for Lisbon this day, where it is to be interred: and I am desirous that every honor which it is in our power to pay should be paid to his remains.

‘ In order to enable you to carry my intentions into execution, in a manner suitable to the occasion, I have ordered to Lisbon the 2d batt. 88th regiment and the 12th Portuguese regiment; and you will take measures, immediately on the receipt of this letter, to have these troops properly quartered while they shall remain at Lisbon.

‘ You will then consult the Spanish Minister at Lisbon, regarding the time and mode in which he proposes to have the late Marques de la Romana buried; and you will dispose of the troops under your command on this occasion, in such a manner as will be most proper to mark the sincere respect and regard which we all feel for his memory, and to do him most honor.

‘ If there should be any cavalry in the depôt, who can attend upon this occasion, I beg that they may be brought out. I desire that all the Staff Officers will attend the funeral, and I hope that the Officers on leave at Lisbon will attend likewise. After the ceremony shall be concluded the troops above mentioned will return to their stations.

‘ I beg that you will communicate this letter to General Don Ant. Soares de Noronha, and inform him that the directions which it contains are understood as addressed to him, but are sent to you under the terms of my original instructions to you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 25th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st December, enclosing one from Mr. —, Paymaster of the — batt. — regiment, to the Secretary at War, which I return; and I beg to have the instructions of the Commander in Chief, regarding the mode in which I am to proceed in order to have Mr. —’s charges against Majors — and

——, and Captain ——, accurately defined, and afterwards investigated. If those against Major, now Lieut. Colonel ——, are to be investigated in this country, it will be necessary that Lieut. Colonel —— should be sent back here.

‘ My own opinion is, that there is not the smallest foundation for any of these charges, which are alleged to be founded upon the proceedings of two boards which have investigated the accounts of the — batt. of the — regiment, under orders from the War Office, which proceedings have been transmitted to the Secretary at War.

‘ From the perusal of these proceedings, and other circumstances, likewise known to the Secretary at War, the character of Mr. —— will appear in its true point of view; and the Commander in Chief will be able to judge whether it is expedient to place Officers in arrest, and to put them on their trial upon such vague charges, brought forward by a person of very doubtful character, and bankrupt in circumstances, as will appear by the investigation to which I have above referred.

‘ I would wish to draw the attention of the Commander in Chief to the extreme unfairness of receiving charges of this description against Officers, which are not transmitted through the regular prescribed channel. There was nothing to prevent Mr. —— from sending his complaint through the channel of his Commanding Officer, Lieut. Colonel ——, who, if he had thought proper, would have forwarded it to be laid before the Commander in Chief, with the replies and justification of the Officers accused: and probably the most convenient and fairest mode of proceeding with complaints of this description would be to send them back to the person who makes them, with directions to forward them in the prescribed channel.

‘ The complaint and justification would then come together before the Commander in Chief, who would be enabled to judge whether it was expedient to have a further investigation.

‘ As the complaint of Lieut. ——, and even parts of the enclosed letter, refer to acts of mine, it would be an invidious proceeding in me to bring these gentlemen to trial for a breach of the orders and regulations of the army; and I therefore do not propose to take any notice of their conduct,

leaving it to the Commander in Chief to decide what shall be done with these Officers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 25th January, 1811.

‘ I received your letters, 1, 2, 3, of yesterday, last night; and this morning that written at 8 P.M. We have reports of Junot’s death, but I do not give credit to them.

‘ I do not know what to do about your means of transport, or indeed about anything for the Portuguese army. The Government have not a shilling of money, and no credit; and although there are provisions in Lisbon now for a year, the Conde de Redondo cannot find out how to make biscuit, and wishes the Commissary General to supply him.

‘ Then the Bishop objects to increase the resources of the country; but I have written a letter upon that subject, which I hope will make that gentleman reflect upon his conduct. I have also had a discussion with Government and the Admiral about boats, I fear without much effect. The remedy for the evil, as it depends upon Government, is money, and that they cannot or will not procure.

‘ Within these last few days there has been some difficulty about boats, in consequence of the demand for them to pass over the Spanish army and all their baggage, which was aggravated by the Admiral’s interference, and the trouble and correspondence infinitely increased. Mr. Kennedy tells me, consequently, that he had not been able to get as many as he wanted in the last days. Indeed, when it is considered that, including the Spaniards and militia in the lines, he issued 70,000 rations daily, it is not astonishing that he should be pressed for means of transport. However, I will speak to him again on the subject. He has no land transport, or very little, excepting his Spanish mules, and those would not serve you.

‘ But it is useless to make any arrangement of this description till the Government shall have money. We should deprive ourselves of a permanent resource, to give it to you only for a day; as, without money, there is nothing we could

give you, whether boat, cart, or mule, that would not leave you as soon as the guard in charge should turn their eyes another way.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 25th January, 1811.

‘ I request you to represent to the Portuguese Government, that the regular Portuguese troops, stationed on this side of the river Tagus, are in the greatest distress for provisions of all descriptions.

‘ Some of them have not received any for two days ; others are plundering the country in the neighborhood of Torres Vedras for subsistence, and taking from the inhabitants the grain and cattle which, in the faith and hope of protection from military violence, they were driving within the line of the fortified positions.

‘ It will be necessary that immediate measures should be adopted to secure to the troops their regular subsistence, in their several cantonments ; otherwise I shall be obliged to order the Portuguese army to Lisbon, where alone it appears that the Portuguese establishments can supply them.

‘ The Government will see the consequences which must result from their omitting to adopt efficient measures to find resources for the supply of food and other necessities to their army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Don Carlos O'Donnell.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th instant ; and I enclose the copy of a letter of the 24th instant, which I wrote to General Mendizabal, which will apprise you of the misfortune which has recently happened in this town.

‘ The enemy having possession of Olivença, and General Mendizabal having desired that the divisions commanded by General Carrera and yourself, should halt in the situations

in which those orders should find you, I conceive that you cannot do better than halt.

‘ I should imagine, however, that those orders are given because General Mendizabal is uncertain respecting the plan and line of the enemy’s operations, whether it will be to enter Portugal by crossing the Guadiana below Jurumenha, or to attack Badajoz. In the former case, the halting of your divisions, and their eventual co-operation with the troops under my command, would be expedient. In the latter case, General Mendizabal may wish you to move with all celerity upon Elvas.

‘ That, therefore, which I would recommend to you is to put your divisions in such a situation as that you will be able to do either the one or the other, as may be necessary ; and, accordingly, that the division of Carrera should go to Monte Mor ó Novo, and that under your immediate command to Vendas Novas, in which cantonments each will be better accommodated.

‘ You will of course obey the orders you will receive from General Mendizabal ; but if you should find that the enemy crosses the Guadiana in force at or about Jurumenha, and you should think it necessary to retire, I request you to fall back gradually upon Aldea Galega, communicating with Marshal Beresford at Chamusca. I also recommend that you should communicate with General Leite at Elvas, and adopt every measure in your power to ascertain what is going on upon the Guadiana.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*

Don Carlos O'Donnell.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Cruikshank.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, which I answer by post, as I understand that the packet will not be in a state to sail for a day or two.

‘ Although we were deceived in the line of march stated to be followed by Mortier’s corps, when I last saw you, I do not conceive that it is still clear that those troops will not enter Portugal at an early period. They have taken Oli-

vença, and their next step will show what their design is. I cannot believe that, having 20,000 men upon the Guadiana, and from 7000 to 10,000 men upon the Coa and the sources of the Mondego, which the French can draw in, they mean to leave Massena where he is till death shall have swept away his whole army; and therefore my opinion is that they will attack us.

‘ However, you are as capable of forming an opinion upon this subject as I am; and as I have frequently told you, when an Officer in your situation tells me that he has business to settle in England of paramount importance to him, I cannot object to his going there, if he thinks proper; and you will therefore go, if you wish it, by the packet, and take Captain Cotton with you.

‘ I will just observe to you, however, that seven Generals have gone, or are going, home from this army, and that there is not now one remaining in it, who came out with the army, excepting General Alexander Campbell, who has been in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General R. Craufurd.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letters of yesterday, marked private, and Nos. 1 and 2. Perhaps I ought not to allow myself to feel the difficulties of our situation; but owing to the inertness of these miserable Governments, and the recent counteraction of that of Portugal, and the terribly deficient state of the Spanish military system, and the determination of our Government to give neither Spaniards nor Portuguese any extraordinary assistance, they are accumulating and increasing upon us so fast, that I cannot avoid feeling them; and seeing that, unless I can in some manner or other produce an alteration of system, the cause must be lost in our hands, notwithstanding our advantageous military situation.

‘ Although the habit in which I am of opening my mind to you, upon all occasions and subjects, in the freest and fullest manner, may induce me to express my apprehensions

in strong terms, you may depend upon it, not only that I am sensible of the real and cordial assistance which I have invariably received from you, but of the necessity that I should be informed in time of all the difficulties which occur, in order that we may apply a remedy to them. However, there is enough upon this subject for the present.

‘ I intend, if circumstances on this side permit, to go over to Almeirim to-morrow. I shall leave this after dark, and shall be there probably by 12 o’clock, and should be glad to meet you there at daylight. Send me word if you should not come, and I will send to you if I should not.

‘ Mr. Stuart tells me that they have accounts at Lisbon, by telegraph from Elvas, that the French took Olivença on the 24th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To the Marquis Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ Some time has elapsed since I have written to you; and as I know that you have full information of all that occurs here from my public and private letters to Lord Liverpool, I should not now trouble you with a letter, if the subject to which this letter relates did not appear to me to belong to your department, although its importance deserves the serious consideration of the whole Government.

‘ You will have had before you, from Mr. Stuart, accounts of the discussions which I have had with the Portuguese, ever since the change effected here by the exertion of —, in the Brazils. You will have seen the state of those discussions, detailed in my letter to the Prince Regent, of which I send the draft to Lord Liverpool. By the accounts that Mr. Stuart will send by the packet which takes this letter you will see the state in which these discussions are at present, and the degree of counteraction, and in some instances of opposition, which we meet with in every proposition that we make for improving the resources of the country, in order to enable it to carry on the war.

‘ Although the letter which I have written to the Prince Regent, and the line which I have taken in these discus-

sions, have been in the character of the Commander in Chief of the Portuguese army, it would have been desirable to me to know whether the King's Government approved of my entering into them at all, of the line I had taken, or of the conduct of the campaign which is the subject of them, and which is founded upon my understanding of the instructions from the King's Government. But the principal object to which I wish to draw your attention is the state of the pecuniary resources of the Government of Portugal, as they appear upon the face of what has lately passed in writing upon this subject. But this will not give you an accurate idea of the distress which all the departments of the army are in.

‘ In a letter received last night from Beresford, he tells me that “ their difficulties are increasing so fast, that matters are, in his opinion, coming to a crisis ; and he is in the greatest alarm about them. He is afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority is concerned.”

‘ Although there are, I understand, provisions in Lisbon in sufficient quantities to last the inhabitants and army for a year, about 12,000 or 14,000 Portuguese troops, which I have on the right of the Tagus, are literally starving. Even those in the cantonments on the Tagus cannot get bread, because the Government have not money to pay for the means of transport. The soldiers in the hospitals die, because the Government have not money to pay for the hospital necessaries for them ; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the details of the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine which we have put in motion.

‘ The Portuguese Government are deliberating upon the means of improving their resources, and I am convinced that a great deal will be done ; and a great deal more might be done if we could bring back the Governors to the state of temper in which they were before the recent changes.

‘ It is impossible to say how far the improvement of the resources of this country might go ; but my own opinion has always been, that if Great Britain should have taken this country up with a determination to carry her through the war, and to make the territory of Portugal the basis of all

the military operations of the Peninsula, according to this plan, we ought to have controlled actively all the departments of the state; to have carried their resources to the highest pitch; to have seen them honestly applied exclusively to the objects of the war; and to have made up the deficiency, whatever it might be.

‘ I think it probable that by this time our expense would not be equal to what we now pay in a subsidy, the amount of which has been calculated on erroneous principles, and occasions constant discussions and ill temper on the part of the Government. I am not certain that we might not yet bring matters to this state; but our influence in this country is not what it was in 1808, when I recommended this system to the Ministers of the day. It will be absolutely necessary, if we do not adopt this system, that we should adopt the other, and increase the subsidy to the real amount of the expense of 30,000 men, which we have engaged to maintain; and that the Prince Regent should mark his displeasure at the conduct of Principal Souza. Even these measures will, I fear, not do all that ought to be done in this country.

‘ Another object to which I wish to draw your attention is the state of the Spanish Government and army. I do not know what the agents of Government, in different parts of Spain, may represent to them; but I assure you that the Cortes have yet done nothing, either to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army. The distresses of the Spaniards are worse even than those of the Portuguese. The army of the poor Marques de la Romana has not a shilling, excepting what I give them; nor a magazine; nor an article of any description that is to keep them together, or to enable them to act as a military body. The operations of these troops are approaching to the Portuguese frontier; and I foresee what is going to happen, viz., a war between them and the inhabitants of Portugal for the provisions, clothes, doors and windows, and beams of the houses of the latter. This will be a new era in this extraordinary war. Then the corps of Mahy, in Galicia, either from similar deficiencies, or disinclination on the part of Mahy, does nothing.

‘ All this forms a subject for serious consideration. Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war upon the Peninsula, or is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the

expediency of making an effort to put in motion against the enemy the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not, I believe, allow of that active interference by us in their affairs which might effect an amelioration of their circumstances; but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing. Subsidy given, without stipulation for the performance of specific services, would, in my opinion, answer no purpose; but I am convinced that, in the next campaign, I may derive great assistance from General Mahy, as I should in this, if I could have put his troops in movement; and I am also convinced that I may derive great assistance from the corps of the Marques de la Romana, and shall prevent its being mischievous in the way which I have above pointed out, if I am allowed to assist it with provisions, and with money occasionally. But then I must have the power to tell the Spanish Government, that, unless these troops co-operate strictly with me, the assistance shall be withdrawn from them.

‘The amount of the expense of this assistance may be settled monthly, and may be in the form of a loan, to be repaid by drafts on the Government of Mexico, or in any other manner that Government may think proper.

‘Upon all this a question may be asked, viz., What good will it produce? I shall answer, for nothing but to maintain the war in the Peninsula.

‘I have seen too much of the troops of the Peninsula, even the Portuguese when not united with our own, to form any calculation of the effect of any operation of theirs. Even when the troops are encouraged and inclined to behave well, the impatience, inexperience, and unconquerable vanity of the Officers lead them into errors, as appear strongly in —’s recent operations, who, if he had obeyed his instructions and remained quiet, would have kept Claparède in check; but he chose to attack him, even with an inferior force, and was defeated; and Claparède was enabled to overrun Upper Beira, even to Lamego.

‘It may also be asked why we should spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or anything? The answer to this question is as long as what I have already written. The French army is certainly a wonderful ma-

chine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a Government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next, we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well as in rank as in education, as from the bad, and not as all other nations, and we in particular, do, from the bad only.

‘Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded upon the strength of the tyranny of the Government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

‘When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regulated plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labor, hardships, and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one half of those who take the field.

‘This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese; but I shall state the effect which, in my opinion, the attempt has had upon the Spaniards.

‘There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, among either Officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as indeed it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in the Spanish troops; and they have become odious to their country; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph’s Government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid and supported, if any service is expected from them; and at present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except by British assistance.

‘There is but little that is new in this letter ; but the subject to which it relates requires the early consideration, decision, and interference of the British Government, or the cause must suffer.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ Referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of the 27th October (marked K), regarding the promises of assistance which I am supposed to have made to the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, I enclose the copy of a letter from a late member of the Junta of Ciudad Rodrigo, written to Brig. General Don Miguel Alava, and which the latter has put into my hands, explaining the sense which the Governor and Junta entertained of what passed between them and me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th January, 1811.

‘ The enemy has continued the blockade of Olivença, and obtained possession of that place, either on the 22d or 23d instant. Notwithstanding the positive assertions that a large body had crossed the bridge of Merida on the 9th, and had proceeded as reported in my dispatch of the 19th, it does not appear that the French have yet had any large body on the right of the Guadiana. They have a train, six 24 pounders, and other ordnance of large calibre, and a large quantity of stores and carriages, on the left of the Guadiana ; but it is not yet considered decided that they propose to attack Badajoz.

‘ I am concerned to have to report to your Lordship that the Marques de la Romana died in this town on the 23d instant, after a short illness. His talents, his virtues, and his patriotism were well known to His Majesty’s Government. In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest

ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.

‘ Upon receiving accounts of the movements of the French troops in Estremadura, of the difficulties experienced in the relief of Olivença, and of the possibility that Badajoz might be attacked, he ordered the Spanish troops which had been joined to us to march towards the frontier, and they commenced their march on the 20th instant. General Mendizabal has since ordered them to halt on the road.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 19th instant I have received the detailed accounts of General Silveira’s affairs with the enemy in Upper Beira. In the affair at the Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, which was the most serious, and in which the greatest loss was sustained, the General attacked the French, and was repulsed. In the last affair, of the 11th instant, the French attacked General Silveira at Villa da Ponte, and he was obliged to retire upon Lamego. He was followed by the French division, and was obliged to evacuate Lamego, and to retire across the Douro on the 13th. General Bacellar then took up a position on the Pavia, on the enemy’s left flank, while Colonel Wilson was upon their rear at Castro d’Ayro; and General Silveira prevented them from crossing the Douro. These positions appear to have induced General Claparède to retire again, as I have heard from another channel of his arrival at Trancoso.

‘ The enemy have made no material alteration in their position in front of this army since I last addressed your Lordship. They appear still to entertain a great jealousy of all our movements on the left of the Tagus; and they have recently removed some of the boats which were in the Zezere. They detached a body of about 2000 men from the rear of their army into Lower Beira on the 22d instant, apparently to escort a courier towards the frontier.

‘ They drove our piquets through the town of Rio Mayor on the 19th instant with a strong body of cavalry and in-

fantry, but retired again immediately. It is reported that General Junot was wounded upon this occasion.

‘ Our light detachments, under Captain the Hon. C. Cocks, of the 16th, and others, still continue their operations with success and send in many prisoners.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 15th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th, and I see no reason why I should depart from the rule which I have laid down for myself in these cases. Officers (General Officers in particular) are the best judges of their own private concerns; and, although my own opinion is that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney, and that after all is not settled in this manner, I cannot refuse leave of absence to those who come to say that their business is of a nature that requires their personal superintendence. But entertaining these opinions, it is rather too much that I should not only give leave of absence, but approve of the absence of any, particularly a General Officer, from the army.

‘ It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that Officers should absent themselves as they do, each of them requiring, at the same time, that when it shall be convenient to return he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left the army. In the meantime, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is Colonel — a proper substitute for General Craufurd in the command of our advanced posts? or General — for Sir Stapleton Cotton in command of the cavalry?

‘ I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an Officer, but I cannot approve of it. I repeat that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do, and you have my leave to go to England if you think proper, as also Captain Cotton.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General
R. Craufurd.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I return Dom Miguel Forjaz’ letter. I likewise enclose a letter from Roche; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that he may receive his pay, and båt and forage, from Mr. Bell.

‘I do not exactly recollect the situation in which the boats are described to be in the enclosed paper, nor do I know the degree of reliance which can be placed upon the information. If the story is positively true, I should think that we have an opportunity of striking a blow which would relieve us from all anxiety respecting the Alentejo, and would give us a disposable force and the upper hand.

‘I do not think, however, that we can rely implicitly upon the information which we have received; and, at all events, some boats are still to be seen on the Zezere, by means of which enterprises may be attempted, which must be guarded against. But though we may not have information to enable you to use the whole, or the greater part, of your force in an enterprise upon the boats at Montalvão, I think that you might assist without much risk, and, according to what I understand of the enemy’s force on the left of the Zezere, with a prospect of success. I think that you might detach to Abrantes, in order to make an attempt on the boats at Montalvão, one brigade of British infantry, the Caçadores, one brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and two squadrons of the 13th, and a brigade of 6 pounders.’ This force would not be missed from your cantonments if you spread the rest a little; and it would effect the object, which is to burn the boats, unless the enemy have more troops on the left of the Zezere.

‘I wish you would turn the subject over in your mind; and, if you think that the enterprise has any prospect of success, you might attempt it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811, 10 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letters, Nos. 1 and 2, and lastly 3, of this day’s date; and I enclose Sir William Erskine’s report of this day’s date. The substance of it (for you will not be able to read it) is that he has heard that the enemy have weakened themselves along their front in that quarter, although their outposts are as usual, excepting that at Pero Filho (which I will look at in the morning); also that three prisoners of the Train state that they moved yesterday one half of the reserve artillery from Santarem to Punhete.

‘ I send you this intelligence without loss of time, as I see that Colonel Colborne suspects some movements. But I am inclined to think that the movements reported to Sir William are principally to look for provisions. You will have seen by Major Kitcher’s reports that they have resumed their position at Alcobaça. The gentleman who writes from Portalegre appears to be in a terrible alarm, equally with the students from Valencia de Alcantara and the Spanish cavalry.

‘ I think the French are going to make the siege of Badajoz, from present appearances.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that the *Sovereign* store ship may proceed to Cadiz, with directions to the Master to report his arrival there to His Majesty’s Minister with the Regency of Spain. This vessel is laden with 6000 stands of arms and accoutrements, and it is desirable that it should proceed with convoy. I enclose a letter for the Master, to be delivered to Mr. Wellesley.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d, and I have perused Mr. Salter’s paper on the revenue. I think the Portuguese Government are still looking to assistance from England, and I have written to the King’s Government strongly upon the subject in their favor.

‘ But I should deceive myself if I believed we should get anything, and then if I were to tell them we should. They must, therefore, look to their own resources. I shall not enter upon the political crisis now existing in England; but I believe you will agree with me that, if the change which is probable should be made, their chance is less than it was.

‘ It is quite nonsense their quarrelling with me, whether the system of operations I have followed was the best or not. I believe I am not only the best, but the only friend they have ever had, who has had the power of supporting them for a moment in England; and I now tell them that the only chance they have is to endeavor to bring their revenue equal to their expenses.

‘ It is ridiculous to talk of the efforts they have made. They have, hitherto, produced neither men in proportion to their population, nor money in proportion to their commerce and riches, nor by any means in proportion to their gains by the war. They talk of the war in their country: was Portugal ever involved seriously in any war without having it in the heart of the country? I think I can save them from their enemy, if they will make an exertion to maintain their army; but they are now come to that situation between the enemy, the people, and us, that they must decide either to raise an adequate revenue from the people, in earnest, or to give themselves over to the enemy.

‘ Now, upon this point, I can only tell them one thing; and that is, that although they may find causes for not levying a revenue upon the people to continue the contest against the enemy, the enemy will allow of none for not raising every shilling that can be drawn from the people, when they may come into possession. They should have thought of the miseries endured by the people, which they

describe so feelingly. before they commenced the war; though, by the bye, I would observe upon these miseries, that the enemy occupy only a part of one province, and that they had only passed through another: this is bad enough, God knows! but is better than that the whole should be in their possession, as it was, and as it will be, if a real effort is not made.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will mention these sentiments to Dom Miguel Forjaz and Salter, and others in the Regency, who are well inclined, but are not aware of their real situation, or exactly equal to surmount its difficulties.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3d instant, and I think you are mistaken respecting General Walker. He, as was always the practice with the General Officers employed on missions in Spain, was attached to the British army in the Peninsula; and on this ground the Officers whom I recommended claim their rank. However, the favor of the Commander in Chief is as good as their claim at any time.

‘ In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is that the Government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence? That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.

‘ The omission to provide for the families of soldiers operates particularly upon the recruiting in Ireland. It is the custom in Ireland for the lower orders to marry when very young, and it will be found that in the Irish militia nearly every soldier is married. But when they volunteer from the militia to the line they lose the provision for their families; the women, therefore, always object to the volun-

teering, and none but the worst members of society ever offer their services. 'This is one of the causes of the increase of desertion in the army on foreign service, and of the frequency and enormity of the crimes committed by the soldiers.

'Then what chance has the recruiting for the line in Ireland against the recruiting for the militia? 'There is not much difference in the amount of bounty, and the family of the soldier in the militia is provided for, while that of the soldier in the line starves! 'Who then but the worst member of society will become the soldier in the line?

'But it is said the state cannot afford the expense. In the first place, if the expense of double bounties is considered, the expense of bounties to deserters, and the enormous expense of bounties for substitutes, I doubt that the expense would be found to exceed that incurred at present. But why incur the expense for the families of militia men? Why not stop that expense for all soldiers enlisted in the militia after a certain time, and incur it for the regular army? Would not this saving go far to cover the expense to be incurred?

'But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. 'They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense.

'I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.

'Do you mean the postscript of your letter of the 3d as an answer to mine of the 1st December?

‘ I wish we had the reinforcements out here now. I think I should save Badajoz, at all events, and possibly entirely alter the state of the war in the Peninsula.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I am much annoyed by the General and other Officers of the army going home. They come to me to ask leave of absence, under pretence of business, which they say it is important to them to transact; and indeed I go so far as to make them declare that it is paramount to every other consideration in life. At the same time, I know that many of them have no business, and that there is no business which cannot be, and that every business is, transacted by instruction and power of attorney. But how is leave to be refused upon such an application?

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you, however, if you will tell any General Officer who may come out in future, to settle all his business before he comes out, for that he will get no leave to go home.

‘ The inconvenience of their going is terrible, and the detail it throws upon me greater than I can well manage; for I am first to instruct one, then a second, and afterwards, upon his return, the first again, upon every duty. At this moment we have seven General Officers gone or going home; and, excepting myself, there is not one in the country who came out with the army, excepting General Alexander Campbell, who was all last winter in England.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send to Cadiz the *Sovereign* store ship, the Master of which vessel will deliver you this letter. She is laden with 6000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition and stores.

‘ I have retained 4000 stands of arms and sets of accoutrements which were in her, and ammunition, to be delivered to the Spanish troops late under the command of the Marques

de la Romana, and nine pieces of ordnance and their stores, to be delivered to the guerillas in Castille.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 14th and 19th, and I now enclose the copy of my dispatch of the 26th to Government.

‘ The French are certainly in possession of Olivença, but we do not know yet on what terms, nor whether the garrison are prisoners of war or not.

‘ I have not heard from Carrera nor O'Donnell since Mendizabal had ordered them to halt.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ The Marques de la Romana was opened; and I enclose the copy of the report of the medical people on the cause of his death, from which it appears that it would have been impossible to have saved him.

‘ The first spasm he felt is supposed to have been the effort of the blood to circulate, when the artery was first stopped; the second effort burst the artery.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 28th January, 1811.

‘ As the packet does not sail till Wednesday morning, I write just to let you know that I have not yet heard of the movement of the enemy after he had obtained possession of Olivença.

‘ It is reported that Junot is dead, but I am not certain that it is true. The Chasseurs Britanniques are arrived, and, in a letter of the 19th, General Graham informs me they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz on this day. If this enterprize should succeed, or if the siege of Cadiz should be raised by other causes, and the greater part

of the British force at that place should be brought round here, I beg to have your Lordship's directions as soon as possible what I am to do with General Graham. He expresses an anxious desire to come here.

' I assure your Lordship, in answer to your official letter of the 31st December last, that my approbation of the plan of raising a legion in Estremadura by Colonel Downie went no farther than what the plan itself specified, and by no means to the employment of British Officers under Colonel Downie. I know that British Officers require the support of authority to enable them to be of any service with Spanish or Portuguese troops, and the control of authority, and that of no ordinary kind, to keep themselves in order and in a state of subordination. I know that Colonel Downie cannot, and I fear that neither Whittingham nor Roche can, ever have the authority requisite for either the one purpose or the other.

' I observe that — has made use of my name in a way in which he was not authorised to use it, and he has misled Government on this as well as other points. It is not true that there were either Officers or men for the legion waiting for arms and accoutrements. He has no men now, at least very few (not quite 300, who have been recruited since he arrived last in the Peninsula), and he had none when he made this report to Government.

' Believe me, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' Cartaxo, 29th January, 1811,
½ past 11 at noon.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD,

' Since I wrote last night, the prisoners of the Train mentioned by Sir William Erskine have been examined by the Adjutant General; and it appears that the artillery which they mention moved from Santarem on Sunday morning at 9 o'clock.

' Government are really in earnest in sending Officers to serve with the Spaniards under Colonel Downie; and they appear inclined to say that this measure is adopted in consequence of my approbation of it, notwithstanding my protest, which I showed you.

‘ I think it also certain that the people of Badajoz will be disinclined to defend the place, particularly when they shall hear of the death of the Marques de la Romana. Do you think the garrisons of Elvas, &c. are in that case sufficient? In my opinion they are: but if you should think they are not, order on the militia of Lagos to Elvas; though I should be sorry to part with that corps, as we shall require it in the lines on the left of the Tagus. I reckon that they have 7000 men, exclusive of the 5th regiment, and the Lagos militia, of which 1000 in Mourão, 600 in Jurumenha, will leave 5400 for Elvas and La Lippe, of which 400 might be in La Lippe. However, the returns which I have, and enclose, may include sick, of which there are always a good number in a Portuguese garrison.

‘ I enclose the statement of the expense of the arsenal for two years; but it has not been incurred exclusively on our account.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. The day is so dark, that I do not propose to go to Calhariz, at least till late in the afternoon. ‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ Cartaxo, 29th January, 1811:

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th instant, enclosing one of the 4th, from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, containing their Lordships’ “positive directions that you do not send another French prisoner to England on any consideration;” and of course I can make no request to have them sent home.

‘ When they shall accumulate to such numbers as that it will become inconvenient to guard them, we must only send them back again to the enemy. This event is not unlikely to occur, as not a day passes that some are not taken by the light detachments of the army.

‘ I am obliged to you for your intention of sending a large number of ships for cattle.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th January, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th. The Secretary of State has sent me also the orders respecting the French prisoners, upon which I have remonstrated, but have received no answer. In the meantime, I do not see any necessity for sending home immediately the 600 prisoners. The 30 Officers might go whenever you please.

‘ I believe that only one sail of the line returned to port of those which sailed from Toulon; at least it does not appear that they know at Cadiz that more had returned. I have settled Major Westropp’s bat and forage concerns for him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ P. S. Upon examining the Admiralty letter, enclosed in yours of the 28th, I find it is different from and much more positive than that which I had received.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 29th January, 1811.

‘ I think it very immaterial at what time the dispatch of Saturday goes to England; but there is in the bag a private letter from me to Lord Wellesley, detailing the state and distresses of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments, which it is desirable should go home soon. If, therefore, the Admiral can, without inconvenience, give a vessel to carry the mails, I think it desirable they should go.

‘ I have called for Mr. Dalrymple’s answer to the complaint against him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 30th January, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A.M.

‘ I was about to send you last night the enclosed from Sir William Erskine, and the accompanying plans, when I received your letter of 10 A.M. of yesterday.

‘ I agree entirely in opinion with you upon the enterprise which I had suggested. We are not sure that the boats have left the Zezere; and even if they have, the place where they are described to be is too near Punhete and the headquarters of Loison’s division to attempt an enterprise upon them with a small force. This plan must be given up for the present, therefore, and in the meantime this rain will settle the concern.

‘ I do not know what to make of these movements described by Sir William Erskine, unless they are movements for the purpose of looking for provisions, or to put a stop to sickness. Gordon had a long interview yesterday with Regnier’s aide de camp, who told him, among other things, that they had been very unhealthy, and that they made the troops move about and work, as a remedy, and, I suppose, to distract their attention from reflecting on their situation.

‘ I have a letter from Salamanca of the 13th. Foy arrived there on the 11th from Paris. At Salamanca they say that the *Moniteur* of the 20th contains decrees annexing the Spanish provinces north of the Ebro to France.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Mendizabal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 30th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 26th and 27th, and I assure you that I am not surprised that you feel the sorrow and regret which you so feelingly describe upon the loss which we have sustained.

‘ That to which we must now direct our attention is to save Badajoz; and it appears to me quite impossible that that place should fall, if the communication with the right of the Guadiana is kept open. The memorandum which was lately transmitted to you by the late Marques de la Romana had for its object the adoption of measures to keep open the communication with the right bank of the Guadiana; and if those measures, or others of the same description, are adopted, it will be impossible for the enemy, with the force he now has, or even one larger, to prevent that communication.

‘ When you sent orders on the 24th instant to General O’Donnell to halt wherever those orders might find him, it appeared to me probable that you were not certain that the enemy intended to attack Badajoz; and that you expected that he might cross the Guadiana below Jurumenha, and, by a rapid march upon Estremoz, cut off the communication between the right of this army and the troops under the command of General O’Donnell, if that General had continued his march towards Badajoz, according to the orders which he had received from the Marques de la Romana.

‘ But it being now obvious that the enemy intend to attempt the siege of Badajoz, it is clear that the plan which had been recommended, and adopted and ordered by the late Marques, ought to be carried into execution without delay*.

‘ Accordingly, I recommend to you to order the immediate advance of all the troops which were lately in this quarter, and which are now halted at Estremoz, Monte Mor ó Novo, and Vendas Novas. They might be cantoned in the first instance at Villa Boim, S^{ta} Olaya, and Campo Mayor, keeping the cavalry in their front, and from these cantonments they would be in a situation to join, and fall upon the enemy, who must be weak on the right of the Guadiana; and eventually to take up the position ordered by the late Marques de la Romana.

‘ Your Excellency will see the necessity that the troops in these cantonments should be very vigilant, particularly those in Campo Mayor. Their communication should be certain, in order that, in case a part should be attacked, the rest might go to their assistance without difficulty. It will also be necessary to have a constant communication with Jurumenha, and to know what passes on the left of the Guadiana.

‘ In answer to your Excellency’s letter of the 27th I have to express my concern that it is not in my power to detach any cavalry from this army. We have not more cavalry than are necessary for the duties of the army, and we have detached to the troops under your command the only cavalry which can be spared.

‘ I have less reluctance in declining to send more cavalry, as I observe that there is a large body of cavalry at present

* See this plan or memorandum, p. 163.

with the Spanish army, which, if managed with prudence and discretion, must be sufficient for all the objects in view.

‘ I propose to send a copy of this letter to General Carrera as my suggestions for his conduct, in case he should not be able to receive your Excellency’s directions upon the subject to which they relate. It is unfortunate that the Ponte d’Evora was not destroyed. The enemy would experience difficulty in repairing it, from the want of materials on the spot.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Mendizabal.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Don Martin de la Carrera.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 30th January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th instant, and I am much gratified by the polite expressions which it contains.

‘ I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to General Mendizabal, from whom you will receive orders, if the communication should be still open with Badajoz. If it should not, I recommend to you to carry into execution the measures suggested in the enclosed letter; and, when you shall arrive in the neighborhood of Elvas, you will have an opportunity of ascertaining the position and numbers of the enemy on the right of the Guadiana, and their means of reinforcing it; and you can attack the enemy, and re-establish the communication with the place, if you should be of opinion that you are likely to be successful.

‘ The British Commissary has orders to attend your troops as long as they shall be within the Portuguese frontier. I think it proper to mention to you, that if the enemy have taken a position on the Caya, between Badajoz and Elvas, you will attack that position with advantage, by advancing by the high road from Elvas towards Badajoz. The Caya must in that case be passed higher up, between Elvas and Campo Mayor.

‘ I earnestly recommend to you the greatest attention to preserve good order among your troops. There is no reason why they should plunder the country under existing circumstances; and the warfare between them and the Portuguese

peasantry, which will be the consequence of such conduct, will be the greatest misfortune that can happen to us.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Don Martin de la Carrera.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st January, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Blunt. I do not believe the intelligence which he mentions regarding the march of so large a body. There has been some movements certainly, but it has, according to all accounts, been the other way, that is, from the enemy’s right, instead of towards his right.

‘ You see how affairs stand on the frontier. Ballesteros defeated, the communication with Badajoz cut off, and what I apprehend is, the junction of Gazan’s corps with the troops before Cadiz, and the consequent repulse of the *sortie*. However, the *sortie* will have one good effect; it will make the French consider their situation a little before they involve themselves too much at the same time.

‘ I write to Ballesteros to apprise him of the probability that the troops in Cadiz will make a *sortie*, and that Gazan will have marched to the support of the besiegers, and to urge him to try his hand on Seville in that case. Then, to add to our bad news on this side, Tortosa surrendered almost before it was attacked! and Alava informs me that the whole of Peru is in a state of revolution.

‘ I have a letter from my brother of the 25th, in which he tells me that they were thinking at Cadiz of appointing me to be the Generalissimo of their troops. If they had made some arrangement with our Government a year and a half ago all would now have been well. I fear that it is now too late.

‘ I wrote to Carrera yesterday, to tell him that I thought he ought to move forward to the frontier with the Spanish troops under his command, to endeavor to open the communication with Badajoz. If he does no other good by this movement, he will at least oblige Soult to weaken himself on the left of the Guadiana, and no progress can be made in the siege. The communication between Badajoz and Elvas is now cut off by cavalry only. Since I wrote to Carrera I

find that General Virues, who is at Estremoz, commands, and I write to him this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Virues.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 31st January, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th January; and I beg to refer you to the letters which I wrote on the 25th instant to General O'Donnell, and yesterday to General Mendizabal and General Carrera, for my opinion on the measures to be adopted in the existing situation of affairs. As it appears by the accounts which I have received this morning, that the enemy have actually cut off the communication between Badajoz and Elvas, I recommend that you should now carry into execution the measures and make the marches suggested in those letters.

‘ I recommend to you, however, not to throw away any of your troops destined for operations in the field into Campo Mayor; but to occupy as your cantonments, in the first instance, Villa Boim, Barbacena, and S^{ta} Olaya, and take care to secure the bridge over the Caya between Elvas and Campo Mayor.

‘ Be assured, that the only mode by which the communication with Badajoz can be opened is by a direct movement upon the enemy's troops which are on the right of the Guadiana. This movement is perfectly safe if your numbers should be sufficient, as your rear and left flank will be covered by Elvas and Campo Mayor. The enemy will see with indifference all movements upon La Roca, which will have no effect whatever upon his situation, and these movements may expose your own troops.

‘ I am concerned that it is not in my power to detach troops to your assistance. You will observe that, except the cavalry, all those which you have under your command have been detached from this army, while the enemy in my front have received a reinforcement. If I were to weaken the corps under Marshal Beresford the enemy would have it in his power to cross the Tagus: the communication between you and me would then be cut off, and would not easily be

re-established; and your corps, and the troops which I should detach to you, would be exposed to loss.

‘I am concerned to learn from you that the places of Badajoz and Campo Mayor are ill supplied with provisions. I had hoped that, Estremadura having been free from the enemy since July last, measures had been adopted to remove the possibility of want: but, if we should be able to open the communication with these places, I should be glad to know whether any and what measures have been adopted to procure and throw a supply of provisions into them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General Virues.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To General Ballesteros.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 31st January, 1811.

‘You will have heard of the misfortune which has recently occurred in this town, by the unexpected death of the Marques de la Romana. I will not renew the distress you must have felt upon receiving this intelligence by enlarging upon the subject. His loss must be ever considered a misfortune of the greatest magnitude to the army under his command, to his country, and to all the friends of the cause in which we are engaged.

‘You will likewise have heard of the surrender of Olivença, and of the subsequent investment of Badajoz, of which place General Mendizabal has taken the command; and General O'Donnell having been removed to the army in Catalonia, the command of the troops which were lately joined with this army, and of the other Spanish troops not in the garrisons of Badajoz and Campo Mayor, has devolved upon General Virues. These troops are at present cantoned at Estremoz, Monte Mor ó Novo, and Vendas Novas, in Portugal; and I have recommended to General Virues to move forward to the neighborhood of Elvas, and to endeavor to open the communication with Badajoz by the right of the Guadiana. This measure, if it will have no other good effect, will oblige Marshal Soult to station more troops on the right of the Guadiana, and will weaken his means of carrying on the siege.

‘I have heard from Colonel Austin of your action with the enemy on the 25th instant, and of your subsequent

movement across the Guadiana. I have now to inform you, that it was intended to attack the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz from Cadiz and the Isla on the 28th instant. I request you to keep this intelligence secret. If this intention should be carried into execution, or if the enemy, which is probable, should gain intelligence of it, the troops with which you were engaged under Gazan will probably be drawn towards Cadiz. In that case, I recommend to you to recross the Guadiana, and move upon Seville.

‘ This movement of yours will most probably induce the enemy to weaken his corps before Badajoz, in order to detach to Seville; and, if that should be the case, I recommend to you to retire again across the Guadiana, not risking an action with the enemy, unless you should have some certain ground to hope for success; and to march to join the remainder of the Spanish army, which, by your junction and by the decrease of the enemy’s force engaged in the siege, will be in a situation entirely to relieve Badajoz.

‘ You will, I am convinced, excuse the liberty which I take in making these suggestions to you. But the affairs of your nation have become so critical, that it is necessary that every friend to the cause should co-operate in their re-establishment. I am apprehensive that you will have a difficult and tedious march along the right of the Guadiana, if you should attend to this suggestion, and should cross that river so low down as Mertola. But I am not certain that you will find the means of crossing that river higher up than Mertola, as, unfortunately, the bridge of boats was not removed from Badajoz, as recommended: and if you should attempt a march by the left of the Guadiana towards Badajoz, and should have no means of crossing, you will be involved in a situation of great difficulty. However, you must have more knowledge than I can have at this distance of the means of crossing the Guadiana.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Ballesteros.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Leite.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st February, 1811.

‘ Marshal Beresford has communicated to me your letter to him of the 27th January, in which you mention that you

had received one from Don Carlos de España, informing you of the probability that the Spanish troops will commit irregularities from the want of provisions. I herewith enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed upon this subject to General Virues; and I now request you to give no provisions whatever to the Spanish troops, and to inform me in case they should commit irregularities in the province of Alentejo. I request you, however, to give every assistance in your power to enable the British Commissary to purchase provisions for their supply.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Leite.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Virues.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency the extract of a letter which has been received by Marshal Beresford from General Leite, the Governor of the province of Alentejo and of Elvas, dated the 27th ultimo, in which that General states that Brig. Don Carlos de España has apprised him of the probability that the Spanish troops would commit irregularities on account of the want of provisions.

‘ This intimation from Don Carlos de España surprises me not a little, as your Excellency informed me, in a letter received yesterday, that the British Commissary at Estremoz had informed you that he had received directions to supply the Spanish troops with provisions.

‘ I have now to inform your Excellency, that I have given these directions to the British Commissary solely in order to prevent the irregularities on the part of the Spanish troops of which Don Carlos has given notice to General Leite, and the consequent retaliation on the part of the injured and plundered people of Portugal.

‘ I am in no manner whatever bound to give this assistance to the Spanish troops. And, in answer to the notification of Don Carlos de España to General Leite, I now apprise you, that if I shall receive any complaint of the irregularities committed by the Spanish troops in Portugal I shall withdraw the British Commissaries from them, and

discontinue all supplies and assistance, and I shall forward to the Spanish Government the complaints which such conduct will deserve.

‘ I know that the Spanish troops, like all others, are to be kept in order if their Officers choose it, when they are supplied with provisions ; and on this account, and on that of the evils which the cause, and your own country in particular, will suffer from these continued irregularities, I trust that you will excuse the freedom with which I have communicated to you my intentions.

‘ I have transmitted a copy of this letter to General Leite.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Virues.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st February, 1811.

‘ I received last night two letters from you of the 30th, and your letters, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, of the 31st.

‘ The sickness at Abrantes is very distressing. Would it not be desirable to put at the head of your convalescent depôt an English Officer of some rank, making all convalescent Officers at Lisbon do duty at the depôt under him, as I have arranged mine ? Mine is now in tolerable order ; and I am sure that the only mode of arranging yours is by entrusting an English Officer with the management of it.

‘ I write to General Leite, regarding the demand for provisions for General Virues, to desire him positively to give no provisions to the Spanish troops. The British Commissaries are employed to provision them ; and I shall send you my letters to be forwarded. Don Carlos de España has written to General Leite, only as an excuse beforehand for the outrages which will be committed by his troops.

‘ I think that you had better order the regiment of Lagos to Elvas, and we will take the regiment of Tavira for our purposes when it arrives. Urge Leite, however, to keep himself complete in ordenanza.

‘ There is nothing new on this side. The rivers are more swelled than I have yet seen them.’

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander
in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Major —, of the — regiment, in which he desires to have leave of absence on account of his private affairs.

‘ I have uniformly refused leave of absence to the Officers of the army, excepting for the recovery of their health, or for the arrangement of private affairs, the settlement of which should be stated to be paramount to every other consideration in life.

‘ The number of Officers who have applied and obtained leave on this plea lately is so considerable, that I have been obliged to decline giving leave to any one, and to refer their applications to the Commander in Chief. If his Excellency should think proper to grant the leave which they request, I hope that he will be so kind as to send Officers to the army to do their duty while absent; as the number of Officers present with the army is very much reduced, owing to those absent on leave on account of their health and private affairs, and employed with the Portuguese army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I return the paper you sent me last night, which is very interesting. It appears by Lumley’s account that there was some movement in Santarem the night before last and yesterday morning; but I have heard nothing of it on this side. I could not get over the rivers the day before yesterday to see how matters were behind the hills beyond the Rio Mayor river; but one camp was removed, which was on the left of Elder’s post; and it appeared to me that there were more people in the villages and quintas than there had been, and the piquets were in the same positions and as numerous as ever. There was a piquet on the ground which the camp had quitted.

‘ I enclose an anonymous letter from Coimbra. It goes

further than these productions do in general, for it names the witnesses to prove the facts stated.

‘ I think you must send the Lagos militia to Elvas, whether we get the Tavira militia or not. It would not answer to lose that place for want of numbers of men we know to be necessary to defend it. We can get men from the north, by sea probably, when the time comes when we shall want them in the lines.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ If the Admiral will show you the orders which he has received from England, you will see that they prohibit him from sending any more French prisoners to England, on any account whatever.

‘ I send Dom Miguel Forjaz’ representation on this subject to England.

‘ Unfortunately, answers and returns from the *Junta de Viveres* are not provisions! I have never yet made a complaint to the Portuguese Government that I did not receive in answer volumes of papers.

‘ If they mean to dispute the facts stated, by the Officers commanding the troops through me, by these returns, which do not bear upon the question at all, it is useless for me, and I shall discontinue, to give myself any further trouble about the matter. They might just as well pretend that the paper was provision as that it contained any reasonable answer to the complaints; and the framing and writing them only takes up the time of the clerks, and increases your trouble and mine.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Upon looking at Dom Miguel Forjaz’ note to you of the 29th January, upon the prisoners, I observe that he says that “*esta convencionado*” with me to remove the prisoners.

‘ I must contradict that assertion; and unless the note is

withdrawn and altered I shall not interfere with the business. I did say that I would send to England certain prisoners taken at Chaves in 1809, and they and many thousand others have been sent to England since that period. I have done this, as I have many other thankless offices for the Portuguese Government, out of pure good will, and have taken upon myself in this, as in many other matters, an authority which I did not possess, because I knew that they could neither defray the expense of maintaining nor of removing the prisoners.

‘ But I never entered into an agreement to send to England their prisoners. I could not enter into such an agreement without the authority of Government, and I have no such authority. In the present case, as I have above told you, it is positively forbidden to send any more home, and I shall not even apply to have them sent home, under the notion that any agreement exists. ‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I enclose an account of sums advanced and expenses incurred on account of the Spanish troops, under the late Marques de la Romana, by the Commissary General of this army, from the 25th November, 1810, to the 24th January, 1811, which I request you to lay before the Spanish Government, and to obtain payment of the same.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the drafts of the letters written by me to Generals Mendizabal, O'Donnell, Virues, Carrera, and Ballesteros, and copies of the letters received from those Officers respectively, which I request you to lay before the Spanish Government, as being the best mode of bringing under their view the situation of affairs on the frontiers of Estremadura, and the measures which I have recommended those Officers to adopt.

‘ I also request you to lay before them the memorandum

which I gave to the late Marques de la Romana on the —, transmitted in my letter of the 23d ultimo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ In obedience to your Lordship’s directions, in your dispatch of the 18th December, I have the honor to enclose a letter and returns from Brig. General Howorth, containing accounts of all the issues made to the Portuguese and Spanish troops in the year 1810; and a letter from Marshal Sir William Beresford of the 1st instant, containing an account of the issues of arms and stores; and an estimate of the probable demands for the year 1811.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I enclose two accounts of sums advanced, and expenses incurred by the Commissary General, on account of the troops under the late Marques de la Romana, to the 24th January last, which I have sent to His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz, with a request that he would obtain payment of them from the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ From the accounts which I have received from General Mendizabal, who commands in the province of Estremadura since the death of the Marques de la Romana, it appears that the garrison of Olivença, when it surrendered, was not pressed by want of any description. There were provisions in the town in sufficient quantities to last the garrison and inhabitants for some time; and only on the day previous to the surrender the Commanding Officer had written to

General Mendizabal, declaring his intention to hold out, and assuring him of the good disposition which prevailed among the inhabitants and troops. The surrender of this place, therefore, is unaccountable, excepting by attributing it to causes discreditable to the character of the Commanding Officer.

‘ Olivença had been dismantled; and, when occupied as a cantonment by the British army in 1809, there was a breach in the walls, and it was incapable of making any defence. Since that time the breach had been repaired, so as to secure the place against a *coup de main*; and I had frequently recommended to the late Marques de la Romana either to destroy the place effectually, or to garrison it sufficiently, and to provide it with the ordnance, and stores, and provisions necessary for its defence. He had latterly determined that the place should be destroyed; and he had given directions that the troops should be withdrawn which entered it on their retreat towards the Guadiana, on the recent advance of the enemy into Estremadura. It is unfortunate that these measures were not carried into execution, as I understand they were some of the best of the Spanish battalions; and the loss of their services at the present moment is a serious misfortune.

‘ In other respects, the possession of Olivença by the enemy, whether in a better or worse state of defence, is not a consideration of much importance.

‘ Since the enemy have obtained possession of this place, they have approached Badajoz in strength on the left of the Guadiana, but have had cavalry only on the right of that river. They have, however, with their cavalry, interrupted the communication between Elvas and Badajoz.

‘ I have recommended to General Virues, who commands the Spanish troops which were lately with this army and all those upon the frontier, to move forward to the neighborhood of Elvas, and to endeavor to re-establish the communication, if he should find himself sufficiently strong; and to carry into execution the plan for preserving the communication which I had recommended to the late Marques de la Romana, and which he had adopted and ordered to be executed.

‘ The various events of the war will have shown your Lord-

ship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged; but if the same number of troops of any other nation (10,000) were to be employed on this operation, I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajoz with the force which they have now employed on this service.

‘ General Ballesteros, who, I informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 19th ultimo, had been moved into the Condado de Niebla, by orders from the Spanish Government, was defeated on the 25th of January in an action fought at Castillejos.

‘ His troops retired in good order, however, and crossed the Guadiana into Algarve, at Alcoutim and Mertola. The Spanish General, Copons, who had commanded a detachment in the Condado de Niebla for some time, had been ordered, with his detachment, to Cadiz, and was embarked at Ayamonte in readiness to sail on the 26th, when the wind should become fair.

‘ Since I last addressed your Lordship I have received accounts that General Claparède had retired from Lamego on the 17th ultimo; and General Silveira crossed the Douro again, and occupied that city on the 20th ultimo. General Claparède had continued his retreat to Almeida; but he has since advanced again; and on the 28th of January, in the evening, his advanced guard arrived at Celorico. I have not yet learned whether he is about to approach the main body of the army, or to take the position upon Guarda in which, in my dispatch of the 12th ultimo, I informed your Lordship he had been directed to place himself.

‘ Within these few days the enemy have made several movements in the interior of the position which they occupy, but I have not yet discovered with what object. Their outposts, and the strength of the several corps which occupy the several points of their position, continue the same; and I should imagine that the movements which have been made are only those of relief. I receive accounts of the distress which they suffer from the want of provisions, and of their increasing difficulties in procuring any sustenance. They have certainly hitherto received none from Spain; and they

have no communication with the frontier, even for a courier, excepting when escorted by a large detachment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d February, 1811.

‘ I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley, in which he informs me that it is probable the Spanish Government will offer me the command of their armies, of which I apprise your Lordship by the earliest opportunity, in order that the King’s Government may take the subject into consideration. If such an arrangement had been made about a year and a half ago, and the Spanish Government had set seriously to work to find means to feed and pay their army, the cause would have been saved. Nay, I will go further, and say that the cause would have been saved without such an arrangement, if the battle of Ocaña had not been fought in November, 1809.

‘ It is impossible for me to say what will be the effect of such an arrangement now. It will certainly not answer any purpose whatever, excepting to throw upon me additional trouble, and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures are not taken to feed and pay the Spanish troops. If these measures are taken, some advantage would undoubtedly be derived to the cause, from combining in one system, at least, all the troops on this side of the Peninsula.

‘ I shall answer, if this offer should be made, that I cannot take upon me such a charge without the consent of His Majesty ; and that, at all events, I am convinced that no good can result from the arrangement, unless effectual measures should be adopted to feed, pay, clothe, and discipline the Spanish troops ; that I have been in the habit of constant communication with the General Officers commanding the Spanish troops, and have obtruded my opinions upon them occasionally ; that I shall continue to do so ; and that the offer which has been made to me of the command by the Government will probably give more weight to my recommendations than they have had hitherto ; but that the ac-

ceptance of the command must depend upon His Majesty's commands.

' This will leave the question open for the decision of Government ; and in the meantime I request to have, by return of post, your Lordship's direction what I shall do if this offer should be made.

' Believe me, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*'

' WELLINGTON.

CIRCULAR.

To the General Officers who have lately received the Medal.

' GENTLEMEN,

' Cartaxo, 3d February, 1811.

' Having made a reference to the Commander in Chief, respecting the mode in which the General Officers should wear the distinction with which His Majesty has recently honored them by his orders of the 30th September, I have received an answer from Lieut. Colonel Torrens, stating " that the General Officers should wear the riband of the medal at their button hole, the same as the Field Officers, in undress ; but when the medal is worn itself, it should be round the neck."

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The General Officers*

' WELLINGTON.

who have lately received the Medal.

To Brigadier Don Miguel Aluva.

' MON CHER DON MIGUEL,

' A Cartaxo, ce 3 Février, 1811.

' Je suis fâché de vous dire des vérités qui sont dures ; mais vous savez bien que c'est inutile de cacher la vérité ; et que si je ne fais pas savoir la vérité, le blâme des malheurs qui arrivent retombe sur moi.

' Pour la cavalerie, on m'a déjà presque perdu deux régimens ; et comment voulez vous que j'en envoie encore, pour être perdue de la même manière et pour ne rien faire ? Vos Officiers ne savent pas leur devoir, et ne veulent pas l'apprendre : ils détruisent tout et ne font pas de mal à l'ennemi. Si j'envoie 100 chevaux ils seront perdus, et ne tueront ni ne prendront un seul Français !

‘ J’ai de très mauvaises nouvelles de l’état des affaires de Badajoz. Ils n’ont pas un grain de provisions pour la troupe de la place; femmes, enfans, et réfugiés de toute espèce y sont restés. Si je trouve moyen de rouvrir la communication, il n’y a pas un sou pour acheter des provisions, ni autres moyens pour en procurer pour les jeter dans la place. Pauvre pays? Pauvre cause! Tous deux sont perdus par la faute et l’imprévoyance de ceux qui, sans moyens quelconques, se sont mis dans la tête de diriger les affaires, et qui n’ont jamais voulu écouter les conseils.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Brigadier Don Miguel Alava.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d February, 1811.

‘ I return Madden’s letter, which contains a curious statement, and affords but slender hopes of being able to effect anything for these miserable people.

‘ I have recommended Virues to move up to the neighborhood of Elvas direct, with his whole corps, and to attempt to re-open the communication with Badajoz if he should think his force sufficient.

‘ I enclose a letter from Blunt; likewise a most curious dispatch from Lord Liverpool. I believe they are gone mad. Some days ago they ordered Admiral Berkeley on no account whatever to send home any more prisoners; and he is this day ordered in the same terms not to send home any more deserters. This is the way we go on. They are sending me out between 5000 and 6000 men however.

‘ I went yesterday to look at the enemy’s position all along their front. There was no alteration since the last day I looked at them, excepting that I thought they had not so many guns on the great hill.

‘ There is a report here, from a priest come from Torres Novas, stating that a day or two ago a detachment of 6000 men marched for Almeida.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 2d instant, in which you have enclosed the copy of the letter from the Admiralty of the 14th January, prohibiting you from sending to England any deserters from the enemy’s army on any account whatever; and the copy of the letter from the Admiralty of the 16th January, announcing the intended departure of Sir Joseph Yorke, with a squadron having troops on board, and directing the arrangements to be made in consequence.

‘ I have directed Colonel Peacocke not to apply for passages for deserters in future, and I conclude that I shall receive directions from the Secretary of State in what manner I am to dispose of these people. Circumstances do not allow of my sending any troops to England at present; and I see no reason why Sir Joseph Yorke should not return to England, according to his orders, as soon as you please, after the troops shall be disembarked.

‘ I have received orders from the Secretary of State to send to Portsmouth cavalry transports for 600 horses, which may as well be sent under the convoy of Sir Joseph Yorke, if you should think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th instant.

‘ I think that if the Spanish Government had made the arrangement for the command of their armies eighteen months ago, which they now propose to make, the cause would have been safe; and I think much might be done yet to save it, if this arrangement were made, provided it is connected with others for disciplining, paying, feeding, and clothing the troops.

‘ If the offer should be made to me, I propose to answer that I cannot accept it without the consent of His Majesty; and that it is useless to expect any benefit from this or any

other arrangement of this description, unless connected with others to secure the object to which I have above referred ; that I have been constantly in the habit of communicating with the Officers in command of the different corps, with whom circumstances enabled me to communicate, and have given them my opinions on the plans which they ought to pursue ; that I shall continue this communication, and to recommend operations to them, to which recommendations I hope they will be induced to pay more attention than they have hitherto, when they find that the Government intended that I should command the army. I enclose in an official form the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish Officers since the death of the Marques de la Romana, which you will of course lay before the Spanish Government, and I should wish it to go to England.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. I have a miserable account of affairs from Badajoz. There is not a grain of provision in the public magazines : the town is full of women and children, and refugees of all descriptions, and nothing can be in a worse state than the public mind in that place. There is no chance I fear of ever opening a communication, excepting by British troops, and those I cannot send. Unfortunate cause ! how has it been frittered away !

‘ We have newspapers here to the 21st January. The King had been worse about the 15th, and was worse again on the 19th ; and I think the late bulletins are worded in an unusually cautious manner. The Regency Bill was to be sent to the Lords on the 23d, and I think would be passed on the 28th or 29th. I believe that the Ministry are to be changed immediately ; but I have had no letter which mentions the probability of such an occurrence.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 4th February, 1811,

10 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received your three letters of the 3d, 10 A.M., yesterday evening.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Taylor and Major Macgregor shall have

leave to go to England on the duty which you propose, whenever application shall be made for it.

‘Lieut. — did apply for the leave he informed you he had, and I desired Pakenham to tell him that his being suspended from rank and pay did not relieve him from the necessity of attending to all the rules and orders of the service, one of which was that his application must be made through the channel of his Commanding Officer. He is an impudent fellow. I do not know whether it is worth while to take any further notice of him. However, this shall be as you think best. Upon second thoughts, it would be better to notice his letter, and it shall be done officially.

‘I think it probable that the enemy are endeavoring to send some cavalry from Soult to Massena by some of the *barcas* on the Tagus. I should recommend you to put one of your brigades of cavalry on your right, some of them as far as Gavião; let them patrol occasionally up to Gafete, and observe what passes in that quarter.

‘I believe I told you that I had desired Virues to move to S^{ta} Olaya, Barbacena, and Villa Boim, which, with the cavalry at Elvas, ought to clear the right of the Guadiana entirely; but we can reckon upon nothing that the Spaniards undertake.

‘The red coats at Punhete are the Hanoverian Legion, in Loison’s division.

‘It would be very desirable to make some endeavor at Abrantes to prevent the enemy getting intelligence through that town. I should think that this might be effected. Nobody should be allowed to leave the town towards the evening whose business is not known. I am trying to stop their communication with Lisbon on this side, of which I fear they have had too much.

‘I send you two letters which I have received this morning by the *Shamrock*, which will show you how things are in England. I think that when the Regent is appointed the Ministers will resign, because it will be apparent that they do not possess his confidence. Return the letters.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d instant, enclosing a correspondence between Lieut. Colonel Arbuthnot and Lieut. —, of the — regiment, upon the wish of the latter Officer to have leave of absence. He had already applied to me for leave, and I referred him to the regular channel of his Commanding Officers.

‘ As I consider the opinion of a General Court Martial of the guilt of an Officer, and the sentence that he should be suspended from rank and pay, a disgrace from which the Officer can be relieved only by subsequent good conduct and attention to his duty, I should not have been unwilling, any more than yourself, to attend to the application of Lieut. — for leave of absence from his regiment during the period of his suspension from rank and pay, in order to alleviate the distress which every well constituted mind must naturally feel upon such an occasion.

‘ But when I observe, in Lieut. —’s letters to Colonel Arbuthnot * of the 26th January and 2d February, and that to the Adjutant General of the latter date, a disposition, unrestrained by what had recently passed, to repeat the offence which it had been the object of the sentence of the General Court Martial to punish, I cannot think Lieut. — is an Officer entitled to any indulgence or encouragement. Indeed, it would appear that the opinion of the General Court Martial of his guilt and their sentence is considered by him as no disgrace.

‘ A very trifling degree of education and practice will enable an Officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot and an inferior will be unwilling to bear. But this ability is a most dangerous qualification to the possessor, unless he has sense to guide his pen, and discretion to restrain him from the use of intemperate and improper language.

‘ As the sentence of the General Court Martial has not

* Major General Sir Robert Arbuthnot, K.C.B.

had the wished for effect upon Lieut. —, I hope that the refusal to grant him an indulgence, which probably would not have been refused if applied for in those terms of civility in which indulgences are usually asked, will correct a disposition in Lieut. — which can never tend to his advantage.

‘ He must remain at the head quarters of his regiment till the term of his suspension from rank and pay is concluded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the extract of a letter from Captain Tucker, commanding the detachments, complaining that Masters of transports in the Tagus are in the habit of receiving on board their ships deserters from the enemy, to which I request to draw your notice.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th February, 1811.

‘ I beg that you will see the Commanding Officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, regarding the recruits of that corps recently arrived from Gibraltar, and inquire from him what he proposes to do with them, and in what mode to clothe and equip them for the service.

‘ The Admiral has received an order not to send any more deserters to England, and you must not apply to him for passages for this description of men in future. I apprehend that this rule will apply to these recruits, as well as to deserters before enlistment, and therefore I believe these men must remain here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811.

‘Admiral Berkeley will have informed you of the expected arrival at Lisbon of a considerable body of troops, for whose reception I beg you will be prepared.

‘I beg you to have copies prepared of the several orders necessary for the immediate information of the General and other Officers, particularly those regarding quartering of the Officers and soldiers, to which I desire that particular attention may be paid.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Peacocke.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Supreme Junta of Aragon.

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving the letter from the Supreme Junta of Aragon, dated the 28th November, and I am highly flattered by the testimony of their approbation which it contains.

‘I sent some time ago to His Majesty’s Minister residing at Cadiz all the arms which His Majesty’s Government had sent to me for the use of the Spanish armies, in order that he might distribute them in such manner as might be most expedient to the troops on the eastern side of the Peninsula; and I have no doubt whatever but that he has attended to the wants of the army in Aragon: but I write to him upon the subject by this occasion.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Supreme Junta of Aragon.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brigadier Don Carlos de España.

‘MONSIEUR LE BRIGADIER,

‘A Cartaxo, ce 5 Février, 1811.

‘J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 1^r de ce mois. Le corps du feu Marquis de la Romana est déposé à Lisbonne jusqu’à ce que ses parens puissent décider où il sera enseveli; et s’ils décident qu’il sera enseveli à Majorque, on le fera passer dans cette île sans difficulté, et j’y donnerai toutes les facilités qui sont en mon pouvoir.

‘ Je vous suis bien obligé pour les lettres que vous m’avez envoyées.

‘ Toujours votre fidèle, &c.

‘ *Le Brigadier*

Don Carlos de España.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Virues.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d instant, and you will of course act as you have been directed to act by your Commanding Officer, General Mendizabal.

I cannot avoid drawing your attention again to the subject of the subsistence of your troops, and the irregularities which they commit. A heavy responsibility to your country hangs upon you, as I have no excuse for continuing to assist them with provisions if the irregularities which they commit are continued.

‘ I have besides to observe to you, that there are with the cavalry many horses unfit for service, as well as many Officers and men with the infantry who do not perform any duty. You should send all these horses and men to Alburquerque, or to Valencia de Alcantara, or to Alcantara, in order to relieve the Commissary attached to the active army from the necessity of finding subsistence for more than those who do duty.

‘ If this is not done the British Commissary will experience difficulty in procuring subsistence for your effective force.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Virues.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose the list received from Murray of his officers of guides, some of whom have been appointed *alferes*, and wish for promotion, and others wish for commissions.

‘ There is nothing new here. I desired Lord Fitzroy to send you the deposition of a deserter who was brought in yesterday. I do not think he knows anything positively himself. He was only told that some of the boats had gone

towards Santarem, and that a road was making for others to go up the river.

‘ I have not heard from Virues since I wrote to him to move forward. If he was now at Elvas he might clear the road to Badajoz with great ease.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811, noon.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received yours of the 4th, enclosing one from Leite. I enclose one open for your perusal to Virues, in which you will see what I say to him. Forward it to Elvas, near which place he will be.

‘ Tell Leite that every effort must be made to get provisions for our Commissary for these people. Tell him that he should endeavor to prevail upon the useless mouths to quit Elvas, and go to Lisbon, or Setuval, or into Algarve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Either take care of, or send to me, all Madden's letters respecting the treatment of his cavalry; for I see, as usual, they are going to lay upon me the fall of Badajoz, because I would not send them more cavalry to be lost.

‘ There is a report here that the King is so far recovered as to sign his name, and that there is consequently an end to the Regency arrangements.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Colonel Fletcher, on the distresses of the people employed in repairing the roads and bridge in the neighborhood of Benavente, from their not being paid for their work by the magistrates who employed them. As there are funds in all parts of Portugal for these works, I request you to apply to the Government to give directions that these people may be paid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Cartaxo, 6th February, 1811,

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A.M.

‘I enclose a note which Stuart has sent to me regarding one of your bridges, which it appears, in its present form, prevents the arrival of wood at Lisbon; and *the want of wood to bake biscuit is now the reason that the Portuguese troops can get no provisions!* It is like the house that Jack built. The want of money, I believe, is the foundation and cause of all the other wants. However, there can be no inconvenience in taking a boat or two out of the centre of the bridge complained of.

‘There is nothing new on this side.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 6th February, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th instant. Although Captain Tucker’s letter on the subject of the Masters of transports was written in general terms, I am not quite certain that he intended to make a general complaint of the Masters of transports, and particularly not even to hint that any encouragement of this conduct had been given by authority, or that in any instance the most cordial and ready assistance or redress had been refused by the Officers of the navy.

‘Although you are so kind as to permit the inferior Officers and departments of the army to communicate directly with you, in order to save the time which would elapse by their sending their applications here in the first instance, it would expose you to the inconvenience of too much detail, if every trifling application upon every subject not requiring immediate decision and action should be taken directly to you; and I am convinced that Captain Tucker adopted the channel in which he made his complaint of the Masters of transports, supposing that he intended to make it generally, only because he thought it most regular and most respectful to you.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. Do you wish that I should write to England respecting the prisoners?

‘ I send to Marshal Beresford the representation regarding the bridge over the stream on the left of the Tagus. It is one of his bridges that is alluded to.

‘ In respect to Brussini, I have no doubt whatever that he was guilty of buying barley from Quarter Master Connor, knowing it to be purloined. However, if it is wished to pardon him, I have no desire that he should be tried, notwithstanding that he and his wife, and all his servants, were perjured before the Court Martial.

‘ The Government act very foolishly in this transaction, if they have encouraged the application. The exemplary punishment of one receiver of stolen goods is better than the punishment of a hundred thieves.

‘ Notwithstanding the recent large importations of corn at Lisbon, it is very desirable that we should attend to this subject, and look forward to the constant and regular supply from abroad of this article, by importations into the Tagus, as, if we do not attend to it, nobody else will; and whatever may become of the enemy, it is very clear, not only that Lisbon can draw no supply from this part of the country this year, but that this part will require a supply from Lisbon.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will ascertain what is the usual consumption of the town; what supply of corn there is now in the river; and what the expectations are for the future, founded upon orders actually given, or money actually sent, or upon more loose and general grounds.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th February, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will draw the attention of the Government to the communication which I know is carried on between Lisbon and the enemy’s head

quarters at Torres Novas. The person who manages this concern for them is General Pamplona, and he corresponds with persons at Lisbon; and the Fidalgos, in the French party now at Torres Novas, likewise correspond with their friends and families. This correspondence has been carried on principally through the means of persons who go into the enemy's lines with coffee, sugar, &c., to sell, which goods they dispose of at large prices; and they generally carry a letter either to or fro. Then there are others employed purposely to carry on the correspondence, who are inhabitants of Torres Novas; but these have been so badly paid, and so ill treated, that they do not do the business with great alacrity, or with much regularity, and they seldom return the second time.

‘I have endeavored to put a stop to these operations, as well by means of the outposts of this army, as by giving the people in the villages on the several roads rewards for stopping all strangers passing through their villages, and all persons carrying on the trade which I have above described, whose goods are taken from them, and disposed of for the benefit of the discoverer. But much assistance may be given to our endeavors by the police of Lisbon; first, by their attending particularly to the persons related to, or connected in friendship with, Pamplona, or any of the Portuguese Fidalgos now at Torres Novas, and observing and obtaining an accurate description of the persons who go to them from the country; and, secondly, by observing particularly any persons at Lisbon from Torres Novas and Thomar, which are the only towns in which the inhabitants have stayed, and from whom the enemy could get this description of assistance.

‘It is astonishing how accurately informed we find the enemy of everything. The Marques de la Romana's death, the King's illness, and the prospect of the Regency, and the probable change of the Ministry, were well known to them; and these events were considered likely to be productive of great benefit to the French cause. They say they get the newspapers; but I rather doubted that, till I found out the traffic in sugar and coffee, &c. If they can get these articles, they can get not only newspapers, but anything else they please.

‘ It becomes more desirable every day to put a stop to this system of intelligence ; and I request you to draw the attention of the Government to the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Calvert, Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Cartaxo, 6th February, 1811.

‘ I believe that you have attended a good deal to the establishment of the Chaplains to the army, upon which I am now about to trouble you.

‘ Notwithstanding all that has been done upon the subject, with a view to making their situation such as to induce respectable persons to accept of them, I fear that they are not yet sufficiently advantageous to insure the object. I believe the income, while they are employed abroad, to be sufficiently good, but that of retired Chaplains, after service, is not ; and the period of service required of them is too long. You will observe that a man can scarcely be eligible to be an army Chaplain, till he is six or eight and twenty, after an expensive education ; and it can scarcely be said that the pay of a retired Chaplain, at thirty six years of age, is what a respectable person would have acquired if he had followed any other line of the clerical profession besides the army.

‘ In my opinion, the period of service ought to be reduced from ten to six years ; but they ought to be years of service, without leave of absence, excepting on account of health ; and the pay of the retired Chaplain ought to be augmented.

‘ My reason for making these suggestions is, that really we do not get respectable men for the service. I have one excellent young man in this army, Mr. Briscall*, who is attached to head quarters, who has never been one moment absent from his duty ; but I have not yet seen another who has not applied, and made a pitiable case for leave of absence immediately after his arrival ; and, excepting Mr.

* Mr. Briscall remained with the army till the end of the war. He was also with the army in the Low Countries and France from 1815 to 1818, and was afterwards curate at Strathfieldsaye.

Denis at Lisbon, who was absent all last year, I believe Mr. Briscall is the only Chaplain doing duty.

‘ I am very anxious upon this subject, not only from the desire which every man must have, that so many persons as there are in this army should have the advantage of religious instruction, but from a knowledge that it is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order.

‘ It has besides come to my knowledge that Methodism is spreading very fast in the army. There are two if not three, Methodist meetings in this town, of which one is in the Guards. The men meet in the evening, and sing psalms; and I believe a serjeant (Stephens) now and then gives them a sermon. Mr. Briscall has his eye upon these transactions, and would give me notice were they growing into anything which ought to be put a stop to: and the respectability of his character and conduct has given him an influence over these people which will prevent them from going wrong.

‘ These meetings likewise prevail in other parts of the army. In the 9th regiment there is one, at which two Officers attend, Lieut. — and Dr. —; and the Commanding Officer of the regiment has not yet been able to prevail upon them to discontinue this practice. Here, and in similar circumstances, we want the assistance of a respectable clergyman. By his personal influence and advice, and by that of true religion, he would moderate the zeal and enthusiasm of these gentlemen, and would prevent their meetings from being mischievous, if he did not prevail upon them to discontinue them entirely.

‘ This is the only mode in which, in my opinion, we can touch these meetings. The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read by one of their comrades, is, in the abstract, perfectly innocent; and it is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted; but it may become otherwise: and yet, till the abuse has made some progress, the Commanding Officer would have no knowledge of it, nor could he interfere. Even at last his interference must be guided by discretion, otherwise he will do more harm than good; and it can in no case be so effectual as that of a respectable clergyman.

‘I wish, therefore, you would turn your mind a little more to this subject, and arrange some plan by which the number of respectable and efficient clergymen with the army may be increased.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Calvert.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Cartaxo, 7th February, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th, 10 A.M., and 6th, 2 P.M. I think it would be desirable, when the weather becomes fair, to put one of your brigades of cavalry out of sight, either to the right or to the rear. This arrangement will give us the command of its movements if occasion should render it expedient, without giving the enemy a knowledge of what we are about, or a suspicion of the cause.

‘I have taken means to prevent the enemy from getting intelligence, which I hope will be effectual. They have certainly a knowledge of events, but I doubt their knowing as much as we suppose, even of that description; for instance, I do not believe they know that the Spanish troops have marched.

‘The passage at Abrantes must not be stopped of course; but nobody should be allowed to pass the river who is not going to the town; and the communication between the town and country should be rendered very difficult.

‘I shall speak to Murray about his officers of guides. I send a letter from Blunt.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘SIR, ‘Cartaxo, 8th February, 1811.

‘I have received your letter enclosing one from Colonel Head, of the 13th light dragoons, desiring to have my opinion upon a letter he has received from the Agents of the 13th light dragoons, notifying to him that General Craig had deputed Major General Bolton to act for him in all respects as if he were the Colonel of the regiment; and another letter from the Adjutant General to General Craig, announcing to him that the Commander in Chief would not

object to his "deputing the superintendence and management of the 13th light dragoons to Major General Bolton."

It is difficult for me to give my opinion upon these papers, which appear not exactly to correspond with each other. I imagine that that which the Commander in Chief has permitted should be deputed to Major General Bolton is the management of the clothing and saddling concerns of the regiment, although the letter from Messrs. Collyear's would show that the deputation went to all the duties of the Colonel.

However, all that Colonel Head is called upon to do is to send a monthly return to Major General Bolton, and to correspond with him upon any articles which he may require from the depôt of the regiment, which he might have been directed to do without reference to the more general deputation; and he must obey these orders, and refer to the Adjutant General for an explanation of the Commander in Chief's intentions in the letter from the Adjutant General of the 26th December.

Excepting upon the money and clothing concerns of the regiment, I believe it is not the regular practice that orders should be sent to a regiment either from the Horse Guards or the Colonel through the Agent.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Marshal

WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Cartaxo, 8th February, 1811.

I think that the disposition which you propose for the brigade of cavalry will answer very well.

Money is again the great want, in respect to means of transport for the Government. The six boats you refer to are part of the Admiral's concern, and were taken to make a bridge for us over the Zezere. As it does not appear very probable that we shall want boats for this purpose just at present, I write to the Admiral to beg that they may be all destroyed; but the Portuguese Government will not get one of them without money.

I wish that Grant had sent us the examination of some

of his prisoners, what regiments, and what battalions they belonged to, &c. This information would have been of use. All the battalions of the 70th (five) are with the army; but it appears from the papers that Lieut. Colonel Besson was an invalid; and I conclude the whole party are convalescents.

‘ Claparède appears at last to have taken up his position at Guarda, and I should not think it unlikely that they propose to ransack the Estrella pretty well.

‘ I wrote some days ago to Mr. Stuart upon the subject of the intelligence which the enemy get from Lisbon, to desire him to try whether the police of Lisbon could not do something to put a stop to or discover the channels of communication. It is certainly carried on under the superintendence of Pamplona; but there are inferior agents in it, whose names are as follows. There is a Portuguese Captain in the French service, who frequents Pedrogão with a patrol occasionally; and he communicates with Senhor Manoel Caetano, an attorney, or lounge, who resides in that place. This person corresponds with Lisbon, through Caldas, and he has a father, Joaquim Caetano, at Colombeira, near Caldas; this last I have taken measures to have seized. There is, besides, a Doctor Pindente at Torres Novas, in whose house Pamplona is said to live, who conducts the correspondence. I should think it would be possible either to communicate with Manoel Caetano and Pindente, and to make them spies for us, or at all events Grant might make some of his ordenanza go into Pedrogão, when the French are not there, and seize Caetano and his papers. I wish you would turn this subject over in your mind.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Murray does not wish to press Andrade upon you, although he says that he is a very clever fellow, who would be of use to you. He has left the guides. In respect to the promotion of the officers of the guides, I am afraid we shall lose them if they have no chance of promotion. However, you must stick to your rule, if you think that their service in the guides does not form a special case, and is not

likely to render them fit for service hereafter in the Portuguese army. 'W.'

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'SIR, 'Cartaxo, 8th February, 1811.
'I am concerned to inform you that the Portuguese troops on this side of the Tagus are again in want of provisions, and are coming upon the British magazines for supplies; which information I request you to lay before the Portuguese Government.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'C. Stuart, Esq.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'SIR, 'Cartaxo, 8th February, 1811.
'I enclose an extract of a letter, and its enclosures, which I have received from Major General Slade, regarding an inhabitant shot, apparently by accident, by a soldier of the 16th light dragoons, which I beg you to lay before the Government, with my request that they will let me know whether they wish that the man should be given up, to be brought to trial before the civil tribunal of the country.

'I also request to have their decision regarding Michael Grace, referred to in my letters to you of the 22d and 23d December last.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'C. Stuart, Esq.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Cartaxo, 8th February, 1811.
'In reference to my letter to you of the 6th, regarding the enemy's communication with Lisbon, I have since discovered that it is carried on with a man by the name of Pindento, who resides at Torres Novas, in whose house it is said that Pamplona is quartered. There are also two brothers by the name of Manoel and Joaquim Cactano concerned, one residing at Pedrogão, the other at Colombeira, near Caldas. He has been seized once, and the foolish Officer let him go; but I have directed that he may be seized again. It is

stated to me that correspondence goes through Caldas, thence over the Sierra either to Torres Novas or Pedrogão.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Don Juan de Castillo.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the satisfaction of receiving your letter of the 8th instant; and the horse of the late Marques de la Romana has been presented to me, which you have done me the honor to send me.

‘ I received this mark of your attention with sentiments which correspond with my regard and respect for the memory of his late master, whose irreparable loss to his country and the cause in which we are engaged every day’s experience gives us fresh cause to lament.

‘ I beg you to accept my thanks for your attention, and to

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Don Juan de Castillo.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811.

‘ It has been stated to me that some boats have got up the Tagus to Santarem, to which I acknowledge that I do not give credit; but as I have adopted measures to put a stop to the traffic in sugar, coffee, &c., and to the communication which was carried on by land, I think it not unlikely that a communication may be attempted by water.

‘ It is very difficult to prevent this communication by means of our posts, particularly on this side of the river; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will station a gun boat as high up as Mugem, on the other side, in order to prevent vessels getting up beyond the point at which the supplies for Chamusca are received.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th January, regarding our reinforcements, and the Generals who are to come with the troops.

‘ In respect to General Murray, I think him a very able Officer; and there is no man whose assistance I should have been more desirous of retaining than his, or of having upon any service, excepting in this country. You are aware that he is senior to Marshal Beresford, and that he left us on a question arising out of that seniority. The Commander in Chief’s decisions upon that subject have settled all questions that can arise; and I take care, and probably may be able to continue, to provide against their arising; and I have hitherto gone on perfectly well, without having to decide one question of rank between the two services.

‘ I attribute this good fortune as well to the temper of the army as to my own management; but if a General Officer, of the station and talents of General Murray, comes here, who appeared, when he was here before, disposed not to avoid these questions, but to bring them into discussion and decision unnecessarily, the difficulties of managing this intricate machine will be vastly increased; and I do not know whether the service and I shall not suffer more from this disposition than I should gain by the undoubted talents and zeal of General Murray. I would therefore prefer to pass *sub silentio* his desire to be employed here.

‘ General — is also a very able Officer, whose assistance would be very useful; but why is a man to volunteer his services in a situation in which he does not approve of what is going on? at the same time that he cannot, or will not, avoid acting with the army, as if it were necessary that he should produce an alteration of plan by his conduct and conversations, &c. &c. I have men enough of this description here already.

‘ I have ordered the riband to be worn by the General Officers according to your letter of the 18th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Torrens.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I wish to God the reinforcements were arrived. If I had had them here a week ago, I could have struck an important blow; and I hope it is not yet too late.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811,
10 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letter of yesterday.

‘ My letters from Silveira go to the 30th only, when he says that Clarapède’s division had all gone to Pinhel. The next accounts from Grant will show really what troops there are upon Guarda, and whether these are there in consequence of the orders of the 5th January, from Drouet, or are so far on their road on any other plan.

‘ How will Silveira stand without the 24th regiment? Would it not be possible to assemble either one battalion, or the half of each battalion, at Lamego or Oporto, as in a depôt, and get them set to rights, and then to bring them the clothing, &c., for those which will remain with Silveira, forward to his corps, when the whole would join with their equipments? I suggest this, because I fear that Silveira will become too weak for anything without this regiment, and that the militia would be disheartened by their absence. It will be very desirable in some mode or other to get the regiment into strength and condition by the opening of the fine weather; and probably the months of March and April would be as good a time for the whole to be in the rear as any other, if you think that necessary.

‘ In respect to the militia of Tavira, I do not see anything upon the frontier which should induce you to keep it in Algarve. It may be necessary to retain it in that province to quiet the apprehensions of the inhabitants; but the French will never attempt to cross the Guadiana lower down than Mertola; and if they do it will only be a plundering excursion, or to pass through it; and this regiment could not prevent either, or make its retreat towards us. On the other hand, we shall certainly want every man we can get together. In this view of the subject it has occurred to me that we might get 2000 militia from the Western Islands, upon an engagement to send them back. Do you think we could

get them? The greater number of this description of men we have, the greater number of the better description we should have to dispose of.

‘I enclose a letter upon the affairs in Asturias, which I beg you to return; likewise from our friend at Salamanca. You see that we are right about the reinforcements which came in with Drouet; and depend upon it that the French have no other troops on the frontier excepting Claparède’s division, and a few convalescents and Swiss.

‘I do not like the way they are settling their affairs at Badajoz. I desired them to clear the right of the Guadiana, and to break the bridges of Morida and of the Gevora, before they attempted to cross to the left. With their usual ignorance and presumption they have thrown their troops into Badajoz, without taking the previous steps to secure their retreat upon Elvas, if they should fail in beating off Mortier. If the French have force upon the left bank to drive in the cavalry, the whole will be shut up in Badajoz; and then Badajoz and the army of the left will be settled by the same blow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of articles of camp equipage required for the use of this army; and I shall be much obliged to your Lordship if you will give such directions as may ensure the arrival in Portugal of these articles at an early period.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Cartaxo, 9th February, 1811.

‘The enemy have continued in the neighborhood of Badajoz, and have broke ground before the place on the left of the Guadiana, and have thrown some shells into the town. The bad weather, however, has obliged them to draw in the

greatest part of their cavalry from the ground between Badajoz and Elvas; and the communication has been re-established.

‘ General Mendizabal sent orders to General Virues to advance, which measure I had before recommended to him; and General Mendizabal himself met the troops at Elvas on the morning of the 6th instant; they marched on and passed the Caya, and the infantry entered Badajoz, and the fort of San Christoval, on the right of the Guadiana, on the afternoon of the 6th. The French cavalry retired and passed the Gevora, and were pursued some distance by the Spanish cavalry, and the brigade of Portuguese cavalry, under Brig. General Madden, who took some cattle, baggage, &c. But the attack, if any was intended to be made upon the French troops on the left of the Guadiana, was deferred till the following day.

‘ General Mendizabal has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late Marques de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I do not believe that the strength of the enemy on either side of the Guadiana is accurately known; but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajoz; and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year.

‘ I have received from General Ballesteros a letter, dated the 27th January, from which it appears that his action of the 25th was very well contested; that the loss of the enemy, who were much superior in numbers, was 2000 men killed and wounded; and that the retreat of the Spanish detachment was made in good order.

‘ By the last accounts from the frontiers of Beira it appears that a part of Claparède’s division of the 9th corps was still upon Guarda on the 4th instant, with an advanced guard upon Belmonte. This was the position he was ordered to take on the 5th of January by General Drouet, referred to in my dispatch of the 12th ultimo.

‘ General Foy arrived at Salamanca from Paris, with letters from Massena, on the 13th January, and I imagine

that he yesterday reached the head quarters of the army. He had with him an escort of between 2000 and 3000 men.

‘ Colonel Grant, who commands the ordenanza in Lower Beira, had followed to the neighborhood of Sabugal the detachment which escorted the courier which marched from the Zezere on the 22d of January, and had taken much baggage from them and several prisoners. On his return he attacked General Foy’s escort, with a fresh detachment of ordenanza, at Enxabarda, at the entrance of the Estrada Nova; and I enclose his report of the 2d instant on this affair, and an extract of his report of the 4th instant to Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, and the Marshal’s letter to me.

‘ I hear from the enemy’s head quarters that they state they lost 500 men in this affair.

‘ There has been no movement of any importance in the enemy’s army since I addressed your Lordship on the 2d instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Houghton, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 10th February, 1811.

‘ I have received and perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial on the trial of John —, private soldier of the — light dragoons, which I return; and I request the General Court Martial to revise their sentence on this soldier, as I do not find that the Mutiny Act, to which I refer them, gives them the power of passing a sentence of transportation, as a felon, for life, upon any soldier, for any crime excepting desertion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Houghton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 10th February, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

11 A.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th. I have not heard one word from the Marquez de Tancos about his brother. The arrangement which he has directed was certainly not that agreed upon.

‘ I had intended to put the 88th into Mackinnon’s brigade, with the 1st battalion. But the *boys* must of course be kept in the rear. I see that Taylor is apprehensive of getting into the G. O.

‘ I am anxious to hear of the boat mentioned in your letter, No. 1, of yesterday.

‘ In respect to Colonel ———’s leave, I must mention to you that I have been obliged, in consequence of the numerous applications lately, to determine that I would give leave to no more, and that all must apply to the Commander in Chief: and I have written to the Commander in Chief, that if he gives leave to any Officer, he must send one out to do his duty in his absence: of course this does not apply to leave of absence for health; this must be granted, but on the usual certificate.

‘ The Spaniards have done exactly what I recommended them not to do, and have omitted that which I recommended them to do, and that has happened to them which I foretold. If the French have 2000 or 3000 infantry on the right of the Guadiana to support the cavalry, the army of the left and Badajoz will both be lost.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 10th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose two letters which I have received from Mr. Kennedy, in which he requests that six transports may be sent to Oporto, ten to Vigo, and eight to Coruña, every week, to bring cattle for the use of the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will make arrangements and give directions accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 10th February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose to you the copies of letters which I have received from Generals Mendizabal and Virues

since I wrote to you last, and the copy of a letter which I have written to General Virues. I likewise enclose reports of the 6th and 7th instant, which I have received from Elvas, of what is going on at Badajoz.

I beg of you to compare the actions of the Spanish army and their consequences with the memorandum* which I gave to the Marques de la Romana, of which I transmitted a copy in my letter of the 23d January, and with my repeated recommendations to General Mendizabal and General Virues since.

I do not believe that it is known what force of the enemy is on the right of the Guadiana; and it is impossible to form a judgment whether the troops can or cannot get back to Elvas. The communication between the two places was obviously cut off on the evening of the 7th, the whole Spanish army and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry being in Badajoz, from which place it was also obvious that they could not drive the enemy on the left side of the river, although the enemy had only 7000 or 8000 men before it, and they had not less than 16,000 men within the place.

After the perusal of these papers, you will perhaps think it unnecessary that I should give any reasons for not detaching cavalry to the assistance of General Mendizabal. I almost doubt whether I shall be justifiable in having left General Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry at his disposal, in the eye of all those who will judge of my conduct; but knowing the manner in which General Mendizabal was likely to use any cavalry which I might send him, from the accounts which I had received of his former operations, particularly with that arm, and with the experience which I have of the operations of the Spanish Officers, and the suspicions which it is obvious that I have entertained of what would be their conduct in this operation, from the memorandum above referred to, and the repeated warnings in my several letters to General Mendizabal and General Virues, I should have been quite unjustifiable if I had put more of the troops entrusted to my charge at their disposal.

I likewise enclose a letter from General Ballesteros, and its enclosure, which I received yesterday. The Spanish

* See this memorandum, p. 163.

Minister at Lisbon has a store there of articles of different descriptions for the equipment of the troops, and I have drawn his attention to the wants of General Ballesteros.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 10th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose a copy of my dispatch of yesterday.

‘ I am very much afraid that my next dispatch will bring you accounts of the surrender of Badajoz and of the army of the left! The presumption, the ignorance, and the misconduct of these people are really too bad. They have not done anything they were ordered to do, and have done exactly that against which they were warned.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 11th February, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

7 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 9th, No. 3, and another of the 9th and 10th.

‘ It is a matter of indifference to me whether Lieut. — has a copy of my letter or not *. If it is likely to lead to further litigation, it would be better not to send it to him, and to give that as a reason to receive no more letters from him.

‘ In respect to the 24th regiment, and affairs in general, I think we ought to put them in such a train as to have our force there complete by the opening of the fair season. That should be our object. As far as is consistent with this object, we ought to keep up not only the appearance but the real existence of a force in that quarter throughout the next two months. If, therefore, the 24th cannot be set to rights without going bodily to the rear, it should go to the rear. If it can, we should keep a part with Silveira, as I much fear that the militia will be off as soon as they find the 24th are going.

* See p. 230.

‘ You have had the offers of my Captains for the rank of Major, and you may take any that you please.

‘ All the reports look as if something was intended immediately. It would be very desirable to endeavor to find out if Foy brought with him any stores or ammunition, or anything to eat or drink.

‘ One of our patrols carried off a piquet in a fine style, without the loss of a man, the night before last, near Alcanhede. The Officer says they are in the greatest distress. He knew of Foy’s arrival ; but nothing more.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. We heard firing here yesterday, and I am inclined to believe that the reinforcements are arrived at Lisbon.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th February, 1811.

‘ I received yesterday evening your official letter of the 10th, regarding promotions, and two letters of the 11th.

‘ I have written frequently to the Portuguese Government lately about provisions for the troops on this side of the Tagus, and I shall write again this day. The cause of the state of deficiency is the old want of money to pay for carriage. There is plenty at Lisbon, nay, the Commissary General lately offered them a large quantity of wheat, which they refuse to accept ; and I have now ordered it to be sold in the market.

‘ In respect to the promotion of Officers, my own opinion is that you should avoid, if possible, to promote English Officers. Promote such of the Portuguese as you may think proper, and if you should find that that promotion will put such Officer over the head of an English Officer now his superior, that English Officer ought to be promoted likewise. But, without referring to the jealousies and discussions about rank which will be introduced into the army by these promotions, they will be otherwise extremely inconvenient.

‘ The situation of Baron Eben in the 6th division is now

very inconvenient. I cannot trust him with the command of the division, and in the existing dearth of General Officers of any experience or firmness, I cannot take from the division for other employments almost the only General Officer who does possess these qualities. In the same way Colonel Otway is a very clever, good Officer, but there can be no reason why he should be promoted, excepting in his turn, more particularly as he is thinking of going to England.

‘ Recollect that I cannot make an English Brigadier, and with every respect for these Officers, I do not know that I should like to trust them, as a matter of course, with the command of large bodies of troops which must devolve upon them. I have no objection to abide by all the consequences of their promotion when it comes to their turn, not that I would recommend you to introduce into the Portuguese service promotion by rotation. But, for instance, if you wish to promote Champelmond, I think that all the British Officers above Champelmond as Colonels ought to be Brigadiers also above him; but that the question of their promotion ought in every case to depend upon the necessity of promoting the Portuguese Officers below them, excepting in case of a very extraordinary nature, which has not yet occurred.

‘ I do not recollect the arms delivered to the Junta of Seville from the Portuguese stores; but, if you will send me the receipt, you shall have some of the arms I have in store for the Spaniards.

‘ Send Lieut. — and Lieut. — to their regiments. Signify to them that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has no further occasion for their services, and apprise me officially that you have done so, and I shall order them to join their regiments.

‘ I have great hopes that Badajoz will hold out. They have asked me for assistance, which, under existing circumstances, I cannot give to them; but if they do what I have advised them, it is quite impossible that the place should be taken or distressed for subsistence, even though Mortier’s corps should have double the force he has.

‘ It is impossible to say what the French are about. It is obvious, however, that as long as they have their troops ex-

tended in Lower Beira, and do not bring up Claparède, they do not mean to make any offensive movement.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th instant, and I entirely concur in all the reasoning which it contains. I have arranged with the Commissary General, 1st, that no cattle shall be purchased further north than Vigo; 2dly, that it shall be understood that the whole number of vessels that you can with convenience send for cattle shall go to Vigo; unless, 3dly, upon their passing Oporto, it shall be found convenient for them to go in there, in which case cattle will always be in readiness there to put on board them.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will desire your Secretary to give notice to the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon, whenever any vessels shall go upon this service.

‘ The Commissary General has frequently issued pork to the troops, and he proposes to continue and increase the issue of that description of meat as long as it will be practicable to procure it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 12th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Marshal Beresford, regarding the miserable wants of the troops, to which I beg you, in this manner, to draw the attention of the Government. I omit to bring it before them in an official form, because I am unwilling to have such an account of the state of things (however true) go home to England.

‘ According to the last returns, the Portuguese regular

army have not less than 9000 sick, upon a gross army of 43,000 or 44,000 men, being above one fifth of the whole; while the British have but little more than a tenth of their gross numbers not doing duty, notwithstanding that so many of the regiments have been in Walcheren, and have not yet recovered from the effects of the disorder contracted there. Of those not doing duty above half are not sick. This difference can be owing to one cause only, the want of food for the troops, and the want of funds to pay the expenses of taking care in the hospital of those who fall sick. If the Government will only look at this question coolly and deliberately, they will see the enormous loss they are suffering, and the enormous expense they are incurring, by the expense of the pay of these useless soldiers.

‘It is obvious, however, that, if this system continues much longer, the whole army will be sick, or must disband; and I hope that some efficient measures will be adopted to apply some remedy to it.

‘I have now before me the complaint of a Commanding Officer of a brigade near Torres Vedras, whose men, for four days, had received only half an allowance of bread and no meat. Surely means of transport are not required to carry meat to them.

‘Let me have the enclosed letter again.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Cartaxo, 13th February, 1811,

Noon.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘I have received your letter of the 11th, and five of the 12th. I shall inquire of the Commissary General respecting Colonel Ashworth’s complaint. I have perused General Madden’s letter, which I shall keep. If he finds it difficult to exercise a discretionary power given to him, to withdraw to Elvas in case he should not be supplied with provisions, when the circumstance has occurred on which he is to exercise his discretion, how much more difficult must it be for me to give him any orders, at this distance, which can be of any service to him, consistently with the notion of making use of his brigade at all.

‘The truth is, that General Madden, very naturally, does not like the service, and he makes the worst, instead of the best, of everything. He talks of his marches, when the total amount of them, to my knowledge, in the last month, that is, from the 9th January, does not amount to more than every regiment of cavalry in this army marches every three days for their forage; a circumstance which is certainly much complained of by the cavalry Officers; but they do it, notwithstanding. Then his want of forage ought not exactly to be attributed to General Mendizabal. If General Madden were to go out upon a service from Elvas with you or with me, I suppose he would carry with him, as other people do, two or three days’ corn, and probably one day’s, or at least half a day’s straw; and, being only three leagues from Elvas, if the desire to see the service out existed, it would not be impossible to get out provisions for the men and some fodder for the horses.

‘We must keep open the communication with Badajoz, or make up our minds to lose the place. We can keep open the communication with Badajoz only by having the troops, the cavalry in particular, supported by the infantry at no great distance from the Gevora, at those periods of the season when that river will be fordable; and the whole might be withdrawn when the rains will fall and the Gevora will rise. This is what I have proposed to Mendizabal, and to break the bridge of the Gevora, instead of filling it with rubbish; and to make an intrenched camp for the troops, to be occupied as the season will come about, on the high grounds between the Gevora, the Caya, and the Guadiana. This arrangement would at least give us time till the troops should arrive from England. But if, on the one hand, Mendizabal will not do what is recommended to him, and, on the other, the troops cannot stay out in the fair weather as well as the French troops, and cannot get their food at three leagues’ distance, and men in the situation of General Madden make difficulties instead of aiding the service, we can neither save this place nor anything else.

‘I admit that his situation is a most unpleasant one; but some of the complaints in his last letter are entirely without foundation, and others are to be attributed to himself. I also admit, that not only his situation is most unpleasant,

but that it cannot be very agreeable to be out much in this season; but if the service requires it we must all go out; and in this case the service certainly does require that he should be out, at least during the fair weather.

‘ They ought to line the parapet of the bridge with sand bags; and in my opinion they ought to make an emplacement for their field pieces on the right of the Guadiana, on the left and rear of this French battery and communication with it. They ought likewise to intrench the strip of ground between the place and the river, otherwise the French will make a rush along the rivers and destroy the bridge. If you should write to Madden, desire him to hint these objects to Mendizabal.

‘ The object of the French in this siege is obvious; it is to cut off the communication of the place with the right of the Guadiana; and it is equally ours to keep it open, in which, if we succeed, the place cannot fall.

‘ Do as you think best with the 24th regiment. It would be better to fix it at Oporto than at Braganza; but I should think that Lamego would be better than either.

‘ The Officers at the head of the several divisions of militia appear to have got into very good quarters; and they should only not disturb their troops unnecessarily, and set seriously to work to refit them.

‘ Would it not be possible to organize and put in activity the ordenanza along the Mondego and in the Serra d’Estrella?

‘ Upon comparing the intelligence from Santarem with that of Colborne, I am inclined to doubt that the French get much intelligence from our part of the country. The man at Santarem says that Soult and Mortier were to invest Badajoz on the 12th January, which they would have done if the Spaniards had not made them a present of 3000 men at Olivença, when they should come and take them; and this intelligence must certainly have been brought by Foy, and must have been the result of a communication from Soult of his designs. Then the Officer says they broke ground three days ago. In fact, they broke ground more than six days before he spoke. The paper from Santarem is a very curious document.

‘ It would be worth while to give General Lumley a cau-

tion respecting the plans against his post, mentioned in the intelligence of the 3d. I should think that he might repair that bridge over the Alpiaga, so as to make it passable at all times ; and it is hardly to be supposed that the overflow of the river can be such as to render the water on the road so deep as that the troops could not march upon it for the relief of the piquets, if the road were staked out. If this cannot be done, he should take care to get plenty of boats upon the Alpiaga, when he finds the river rising, so as to be able to support his piquets in time.

‘ I think it is very clear that the French were going till Foy came. It is not so clear that they will go now. Indeed they cannot go without reinforcing Mortier. A deserter of the 2d corps reports that five regiments of infantry, and all their cavalry, marched the day before yesterday to Torres Novas, on their march to Coimbra and Oporto.

‘ I was yesterday beyond the bridge of Calhariz, but saw no difference, excepting an infantry piquet instead of a vidette, on a height in front of Pero Filho. The intelligence respecting peace is curious. I am convinced that a proposal for peace will be made.

‘ Colonel Lobo has made an application to our Commissary at Abrantes for all he has ; and indeed there is not much remaining, as he has had it nearly all. But this application shows the result of the effort of Government to supply that place ; and, under these circumstances, it is desirable that we should consider what we shall do with it. Sooner or later the communication of the army with that place will certainly be cut off ; and if it be attacked, notwithstanding the advantages it possesses for defence, there can be no doubt but that it will be taken and the garrison lost. Under these circumstances, and adverting to the supplies, it becomes a question whether we ought not to make our arrangements to abandon the place, and withdraw the garrison at the time we shall be obliged to withdraw from our present position in communication with the place on the left of the Tagus. Turn this subject over in your mind, and let me have your opinion upon it. There is one thing to be done, which is, to provision the place ourselves ; but then the probable defence of it comes to be considered, and the loss of the garrison.

‘ I wish you would let me know whether the Government have really done anything to provision that place since my last remonstrance upon that subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 14th February, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Noon.

‘ I received yesterday evening your letter of 10 A.M. I am rather glad that Leite gave Mendizabal the tents, as it will probably induce the Spaniards to stay in their position. In respect to the powder, we have 5000 barrels at Lisbon, and I will give for Elvas whatever is required. I think it is probable that Mendizabal wants it for Badajoz; and if that be the case, I wish Leite to assist him, if he can do so without incurring the risk of leaving himself unprovided with a sufficient quantity. Not only I will replace what he may give, but I will pay the expense of sending it up to Elvas.

‘ I am anxious to hear the result of the enemy’s movement upon Montalvão.

‘ I send you the report of two deserters, who contradict one another most handsomely. I believe the infantry gentleman. I think it probable that the dismounted dragoons only have marched. Some of the others were certainly yesterday upon the outposts in front of Santarem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 14th February, 1811.

‘ Madame Mascarenhas and her daughter (not the handsome) have been here this morning, to talk to me of the fate of young Mascarenhas; and, although I told them that I could not interfere in any concern of the kind, I cannot resist stating to you my sense of the injustice which the Portuguese Government are about to commit.

‘ In the first place, I cannot get over my sense of the right which every subject of Portugal had to take which line

he pleased, under the proclamation of the Prince Regent when he withdrew from Portugal. In the next place, I must observe that, under the 18th article of the Convention, the safety of the persons who served the French is guaranteed to them on the very ground above stated, that the Prince had withdrawn himself from the country.

‘ I rather believe that Mr. Canning instructed Mr. Villiers not to interfere in obliging the Portuguese Government to execute any article of the Convention; but whether we interfere or not, I cannot but think that the Government will be guilty of a gross injustice and murder if they put this young man to death, upon the ground of his having served the French, these circumstances being before them.

‘ If they hang him at all, it should be as a spy; and I send you the draft of the answer which was sent by my directions to an application lately made by the French Commander in Chief to have him exchanged, in which answer I have laid the ground of his being hanged.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will bring this subject again under the consideration of the Government in a private form.

‘ I entirely agree with you as to what we ought to do for the Portuguese Government; and I enclose you the copy of a letter which I wrote some time ago to Lord Wellesley upon this subject, which you sent home for me, and which I beg of you to return.

‘ I shall speak to the Commissary General to see whether we can give the Portuguese Government any boats. As for carts, I believe we have none, or at all events very few. What they want is certainly money.

‘ They have done nothing, I believe, for Abrantes. The fact is, that their inferior agents of the Junta de Viveres deceive them. The Governor of Abrantes, having consumed about four fifths of our stores at Abrantes, has at last desired our Commissary there to make over to him the remainder of them in one lump; and the question of Abrantes is becoming so critical, that I am thinking of destroying the works which we have constructed at great expense, and of withdrawing the garrison for want of provisions to feed them. I must either do that, or send provisions to the place at the British expense. Then, in answer to my representations

upon this subject, they will give you a volume of papers which will not contain one word of truth. How can all this end? Will it bear one moment's discussion in England?

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 15th February, 1811,

10 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received your two letters of yesterday. I do not know what to say to Massena's remaining. The difficulty of remaining without supplies increases daily, as well as the expediency, or indeed almost necessity, that he should remain in order to support Soult's operations. If he should be obliged to go, he ought to detach to Soult a large force, otherwise Soult is gone. At present we can do nothing. Even if your force were sufficient, the roads are in such a state on this side that they cannot be worse.

‘ It is more than a month since the reinforcements were ordered from England in men of war, and it is most extraordinary that they are not yet arrived.

‘ I believe the destruction of General Madden's brigade is to be attributed in some degree to General Leite. General Miller is a great loss under present circumstances.

‘ In respect to Abrantes, I do not think we could expect that it could make a long defence; though, if it contained Spanish troops it would, and is admirably calculated for a very protracted defence.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not think bomb proof absolutely necessary for any place in this climate after the season of rains. The question is, whether it can be provisioned; and if it can, whether the garrison is employed as beneficially there as elsewhere. One hundred carts would go a long way, both in provisioning the garrison and in removing the sick; and I should think that the Government might continue to collect that number in Alentejo.

‘ If the post is to be abandoned, I would not abandon it till the moment at which it should be necessary to withdraw the troops from their present position on the left of the Tagus.

‘The Pardaleras is an outwork, or rather detached redoubt, of not very great importance, excepting on account of the command which the ground has which it occupies. After all, however, that command is not great, as well as I recollect it. I have a perfect recollection of the spot described by Mozinho, as that at which the enemy have fixed their *place d’armes*; and I was of opinion that it was so little defended by fire from any particular part of the fort, or work itself, that the enemy might commence his operations by lodging himself upon it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 15th February, 1811.

‘I have read Dr. Raymondo’s paper upon the finance, which, as far as it goes, is a very good one. I have no doubt that much may be done by exertion. In the customs, particularly, I know that frauds are committed to an immense amount. The misfortune is, that there is no exertion in these people. You will scarcely believe that, although Quintella might gain such immense sums of money by selling tobacco and soap to the troops, under his monopoly, in which I have promised to support him, he has not yet taken the trouble of sending his people to the different divisions of the army to conduct his business; and the troops are paying double the price for contraband articles.

‘I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy about the means of transport for the Portuguese Commissariat. Instead of 289, he has 140 boats; and he will direct that 49 should be made over to the Portuguese Commissariat. Be it recollected that he does not only supply the whole British army, which alone is nearly twice as strong as the Portuguese army in this part of the country, particularly in cavalry, but likewise all the Portuguese militia and ordenanza in the lines, which ought to be supplied by the Portuguese Government, and for supplying which I shall be hanged! He says he does not believe he has 30 bullock carts in the service, of which number 24 are employed by the engineers in the lines.

‘ Dom Miguel Forjaz cannot pronounce a more severe condemnation of the system on which the Government act than in the declaration that they cannot get the 130 carts which they require. Are there no laws? Cannot a man be punished for refusing to supply his cart and oxen for the public service, upon receiving the order of the magistrate to supply them? Are the Government to execute the laws? or are the laws made only to restrain the Government, and for the subjects to laugh at? The system of seeking popularity, to indulge the indolence of the people of Lisbon, will occasion the loss of the country.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter from Marshal Beresford, which shows how the fact really stands in respect to the provisioning of Abrantes. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to procure for me, without loss of time, an answer whether they will, or not, supply that place with provisions, for four months, and take measures to keep up that stock, in order that I may determine what I shall do with the garrison. We are coming to that crisis in the affairs of the Portuguese Government, that I fear I shall be inexcusable if I do not call the serious attention of the King’s Ministers to what is going on here, and ask for their orders upon the state of affairs.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Don Nicolas de Campo y Jacome.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘ I had last night the honor to receive your letter of the 12th instant, which contained the first intelligence I have received of your march. You will be so kind as to remain with your detachment at Aldea Galega till I shall hear from Colonel Downie for what object you are sent into this country.

‘ I have directed the Commissary General of the British army to supply your troops with provisions; and I beg you to understand that I hold you responsible for any disorders which they may commit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Don Nicolas de Campo y Jacome.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811,
11 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received one letter from you of the 14th, and three of the 15th.

‘ I shall write to Ballesteros upon the conduct of his troops, and I shall inform him that I propose sending a copy of my letter to be laid before the Spanish Government.

‘ The reports from Mozinho, which you send me, reach me sometimes two days, at others one day, before my own; and it is desirable that you should continue to send them.

‘ I send to you the memorandum which I gave to the Marques de la Romana before he died, from which you will see the measures which I had recommended to the Spanish Generals in respect to Badajoz.

‘ I think you had better order the Lagos regiment to fall back again upon Mont Mor ó Novo, as soon as the regiment of Tavira shall arrive at Elvas.

‘ I have not heard anything of the boat which came down on the night of the 14th; nor, indeed, has that which arrived at Lisbon been reported to me.

‘ I return the letter from Santarem, which is very interesting. I think it clear that this person knows exactly what the French generals know. They get all their information from the Portuguese Officers with whom he is in communication; and these Officers tell him all they know. If my notion is correct, it is very clear, from the perusal of this paper, that they have not so much information as we imagined. They do not yet know that the Spanish troops have marched, which is extraordinary. However, it is desirable that we should take pains to prevent them from getting any information; and with this view I have authorized Sir W. Erskine to collect and feed 200 ordenanza, to watch the different roads on our left, and to prevent all persons from passing on them; and I recommend something of the same kind to your attention in front of Abrantes and on the river above Abrantes.

‘ In consequence of information that I received, that a boat had gone up to Santarem (which, however, I do not believe), I requested the Admiral to place a boat on the

river, to examine all boats attempting to pass above the point at which the provision boats for the troops on the left of the river discharge their cargoes. The boats which have lately come down show that something more is necessary, and that we must have a boat constantly in the river as high up as possible; and I write to him for some gun boats for this service. This may interfere with your communication with our friend at Santarem, and if this should be the case you can arrange it with the Officer who will command the boats.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. I am thinking of going over the river to Almeirim to-morrow, and should be glad to meet you there. I propose to cross the Alpiaga as low down as I can, and to go along the Tagus, so that I should meet you about the battery. I shall send, if I should not be able to go; and if I do not send, I shall be at Almeirim between 1 and 2 o'clock.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 15th instant, and the intelligence which it contains, of which I have heard some part before.

‘ I write to Major Berkeley to desire him to go to Lisbon at the end of next week, and I beg leave most sincerely to congratulate you, and Lady Emily, upon the occasion which takes him there. I will send March down at the same time.

‘ In respect to your official letter on the subject of the bridges, I believe that the best mode of settling that concern would be, that the naval storekeeper should let me know what he supplies, and that I should then write and request you to give him authority to supply the articles mentioned in the list for the service of the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant, regarding gun boats up the Tagus; in answer to which I have to inform you that I think it would be very desirable to station two or three in an advanced station up the river.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘I enclose a letter from Marshal Beresford, containing an account of articles of provision received at Abrantes from Santa Marta. I beg you to return these papers.

‘I shall say no more about young Mascarenhas; they have my opinion upon their proceedings, and they will do as they please.

‘I have read the decrees marked A in your letter, which I am convinced will not answer. The *barqueiros* will desert from the Portuguese Government with their certificates; and, having the certificates, they will avoid any other service. I do not see what right the Portuguese Government have to legislate or regulate matters concerning our transports.

I am exceedingly hurt at the contents of Dom Miguel Forjaz’s note, marked B in your letter. It contains statements which are absolutely false, and attributes to me and the British Commissariat the distresses of the Portuguese army, which Dom Miguel Forjaz knows ought to be attributed to the want of arrangement by the *Junta de Vireres*, and to the want of money by the Government: and he also knows that if I had not relieved those distresses the army would have disbanded. In the present situation of affairs I shall give no answer to this note, as I could not answer it without detailing facts which, under existing circumstances, I do not think proper to detail officially. But I have done with the Portuguese army. They shall starve before they receive any further assistance from me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To General Ballesteros.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘I am concerned to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Excellency the enclosed letter, which has been sent to me, regarding the conduct of the troops under your command.

‘Whatever may be the military qualities of any body of troops, there is no doubt whatever, that if they commit disorders they are a curse instead of a benefit to the nation which they are employed to defend. In the cause in which we are engaged, above all others, it is incumbent upon us to show the people of the country the difference between the conduct of their defenders and of their oppressors; and we should take care to avoid doing them unnecessary injury, lest we should weaken their attachment to the cause and its defenders, and decrease their hatred of the enemy.

‘These motives, exclusive of those which have a reference to the discipline, subordination, and good order of the soldiers, which qualities are invariably deteriorated by their being permitted to commit disorders with impunity, should induce any Officer who is charged with the command of a body of troops to do everything in his power to repress and punish such acts as those complained of in the enclosed letter. I trust, therefore, that your Excellency will have adopted the measures which never fail to prevent the recurrence of similar disorders. Their repetition will lead to a contest between your troops and the inhabitants of the country, which will infallibly bring disgrace and disaster upon the cause in which we are engaged; and I have now to inform you, that I send copies of this letter, and the enclosed communication, to be laid before the Spanish Government, in order that the influence of their authority may be added to the reasoning and entreaties which this letter contains, to induce your Excellency to keep the troops under your command in order.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General Ballesteros.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship, on the 9th instant, I have received further details of the affairs at and near Badajoz, from which it appears that the Portuguese cavalry having been unsupported in their passage of the Gevora on the 6th instant, were obliged to retire across the Gevora, in which operation they sustained some loss. The whole of the cavalry and infantry were then drawn into the fort of Badajoz; and on the 7th instant they made a sortie upon the enemy, in which they succeeded in obtaining possession of one of the enemy’s batteries, but they were obliged to retire again; and unfortunately the guns in the battery were not spiked, or otherwise destroyed or injured.

‘ Their loss was not less than 85 Officers, and 500 soldiers killed and wounded, as I am informed, including the Brig. General Don Carlos de España among the latter.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Mallet, from whose report it appears that the Spanish troops behaved remarkably well upon this occasion.

‘ While the troops were in Badajoz the French cavalry again crossed the Gevora, and interrupted the communication between that place and Elvas and Campo Mayor. They came out of Badajoz on the morning of the 9th instant, and the French cavalry were obliged to retire across the Gevora. The troops have since taken up a position on the heights between the Caya, the Gevora, and the Guadiana, by which they will keep open the communication between Badajoz and the country on the right of the latter river.

‘ The enemy have continued the siege; and on the night of the 11th instant they attacked the redoubt of Pardaleras, which they carried; but they had not, on the 13th, been able to establish themselves within the redoubt, on account of the fire from the body of the place. They have likewise constructed a work on the left bank of the Guadiana, below the place, to fire upon the bridge of communication with the right bank; but the fire from this work had had but little effect.

‘ A great number of the inhabitants have taken advan-

tage of the communication being open to leave the place; and I understand that it is not ill supplied with provisions; and I believe that the enemy will find it difficult to take it with the means which he has employed in the operation.

‘ General Claparède’s division of the 9th corps was still upon Guarda on the 10th instant, when I last heard from that part of the country.

‘ Although I have observed and heard of various movements by the enemy in the interior of their position, I have not found upon the whole any material alteration; and I imagine that these movements have been made principally to endeavor to obtain subsistence. The difficulty in finding any increases daily; and the inhabitants of Torres Novas and Thomar, who alone had generally remained in their habitations upon the enemy’s invasion, are now coming to this part of the country, nearly starving.

‘ I have the pleasure to forward a report which I have received of the conduct of Cornet V. Strenuwitz, of the 1st hussars, who surprised a piquet of the enemy on the night of the 9th instant, with a small detachment of hussars, and brought in more prisoners than his detachment consisted of, without the loss of a man.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I enclose a return of the loss of the Portuguese cavalry in the affair at the bridge of the Gevora, on the 6th instant.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 16th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose the last weekly state, with the last return of the sick. I never saw an army so healthy as this. Indeed I may say that we have scarcely any sick, excepting in the Walcheren regiments. In these, however, there are very few; and I hope they will recover in this delightful climate.

‘ I have every reason to believe, both from observation and intelligence, that the enemy were on the move last week, and would have retired, had they not received Buonaparte’s orders by Foy to remain. They are now anxiously looking to the siege of Badajoz (of the course of which, however, they have no intelligence, excepting from Foy,

(that it was to be undertaken), and, strange to say, to peace. They have a report among them, that Foy states that the Emperor has declared that the political situation of the world is such that he thinks it will be possible to have a general peace, and this intelligence has delighted them. They know also from Foy the state of the King's health, and the consequent state of affairs in England.

‘ I wish that our reinforcements were here.

‘ I enclose a letter which the Commissary General has put into my hands. I hope that I have not been induced, by the encouragement I have received to act in the confidence that the King's Ministers would approve of the measures I should adopt, to make temporary appointments, required for the service, of gentlemen, to whom anybody in London can prevent, by his orders, their salaries from being paid. If this be the case, I am sincerely desirous that the King's Government would consider of the appointment of some other Officer to conduct their concerns in this country, as I am utterly incapable of managing them, if I am to be treated in such a manner.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Downie.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 17th February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from, and of my answer to, Don Nicolas de Campo y Jacome; and I beg to know for what purpose the troops in question are sent into this country. In future, when any troops are sent into Portugal from Estremadura, I request you to let me know it, in order that regular measures may be adopted for their subsistence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Downie.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 17th February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the correspondence which I have had with Generals Mendizabal and Virues since I addressed you on the 10th instant, which will show

you what has passed, and the state of affairs at Badajoz, according to the last accounts. I likewise enclose the report of the 12th and 13th, which I have received from Colonel Brito.

‘ It is now said that the enemy have no guns of a larger calibre than 12 pounders at Badajoz; but I am inclined to believe that they have 24 pounders, which they have not used, and will not use until they shall be in a situation to breach the wall of the place, as I believe they have but little ammunition. It appears that they first intended to frighten the inhabitants, and to induce them to force the surrender of the place; and it is obvious that their principal object is to interrupt the communication with the north bank of the Guadiana, in which they will not succeed, if General Mendizabal should have intrenched his camp.

‘ I have besides recommended to him, through Brig. Alava, to lay sand bags behind the parapet of the bridge, which will secure the communication by it, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy; and to construct a work for the heaviest of his field pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana, to fire across the river on the flank and rear of the enemy’s battery constructed against the bridge and the communication with that battery. I have likewise recommended to him other measures, with a view to the security of the bridge, to which there is a road from the enemy’s battery, between the body of the place and the river.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of a letter and its enclosure, which I have addressed to General Ballesteros, which I beg you to lay before the Spanish Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 17th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose the copy of my dispatch of yesterday.

‘ The accounts from Badajoz are better than I expected to send you. I believe they are getting into the right way, and I hope we shall save the place.

‘ I believe, indeed I may say I am almost certain, that the French were about to retire when Foy arrived with

the account that Soult was to attack Badajoz. However, if they do not bring up Claparède, the place will not fall.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Houghton, President of a General Court Martial.

‘ MY DEAR HOUGHTON,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th February, 1811.

‘ I have received the proceedings, and revised the sentence, of the General Court Martial of which you are President, on the trial of ————; and, as the difference of opinion between the Court and me turns entirely upon the powers which the law has given to the Court of passing such a sentence, I do not hesitate in requesting them again to reconsider their sentence, although I must admit that they are at least as likely as I am to have given the law its true construction.

‘ The General Court Martial will find, upon reference to the Mutiny Act, that there is no power given to them to sentence transportation, excepting under the 4th section of the Mutiny Act, only for the crime of desertion; and they will find that they have the power, under the 21st section of the Mutiny Act, to inflict corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb, on any soldier for immoralities, misbehavior, or neglect of duty.

‘ The 4th article of the 24th section of the Articles of War enables the General Court Martial to try offenders in foreign parts, for offences for which, if committed within His Majesty’s dominions, they must have been delivered to the civil magistrates, and would have been tried in the courts of common law, and to sentence of death if the Court should be of opinion that the nature and degree of the offence deserves that punishment, or “such other punishment” as the Court may award, according to the nature and degree of the offence.

‘ According to my view of this article, it does not convey to the Court the power of passing a sentence upon a criminal, which has not been given to the Court by the Articles of War, or Act of Parliament. Then comes the question, what power has been given to them by the Articles of War, or Act of Parliament, in respect to an immorality, not of the

nature and degree to deserve the sentence of death, under the 4th section of the 24th article of the Articles of War, not to sentence transportation, because under the Mutiny Act they have no power to sentence transportation, excepting for desertion, but to sentence corporal punishment not extending to life or limb? If the Court have the power of sentencing transportation for this immorality, they have the same power for any, and all, even of the most trifling nature; and you will see how far this undefined power would go. You will be the best judge whether the General Court Martial can reconsider their sentence, or whether the reasoning in this letter is likely to have any effect upon them. At all events I cannot confirm this sentence, with the opinions which I hold upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Houghton.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 18th February, 1811,
10 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have read Silveira’s letters and Bacellar’s reports. I think it would be desirable to send Silveira’s force avowedly into cantonments of refreshment. The others might remain, keeping a good look out on the valley of the Mondego, and endeavor to make a hit at any convoy that may attempt to get in.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I do not know whether you have received Silveira’s journal of his operations in January. I enclose it, lest you should not; and I am inclined to write to him, to tell him I approve of everything excepting his attack upon the enemy, if that opinion concurs with yours. Return the paper, for I have noticed it.

‘ I enclose two letters for Mendizabal, which I beg of you to forward. I also request you to write to Leite, to urge him to give every assistance to our Commissaries in obtaining provisions for these people. ‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th February, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give General O’Donnell a passage in any ship of war which you may be about to send Cadiz, as he has been serving with the Spanish troops joined to this army, and has recently been appointed second in command of the army in Catalonia, and he is desirous of proceeding to his station.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose the report of the Engineer Officer who was sent by Marshal Beresford to examine the repairs of the causeway of Benavente, from which it appears that the person who gave you the information regarding the nature of these repairs was mistaken.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 18th February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday. The note enclosed by Dom Miguel Forjaz contains just as fallacious a statement of the resources in Abrantes as all the others; but the whole case is now very clear. The truth, when laid before the Government is not to be acknowledged. On the contrary, falsehoods known to be such, are to be written in answer to those statements, in order to keep a colleague in good humor, in whose department the failure lies. The worst of all these discussions is that they will be made the groundwork of undoing all that we have been doing in this country.

‘ I have frequently considered the expediency of taking the Portuguese army entirely out of the hands of the Government, without taking the government itself. In the detail of this arrangement there would be hundreds of diffi-

culties which cannot be easily surmounted. The whole of our transport is conducted by Spaniards, not one of whom, I believe, would carry an ounce for the Portuguese troops ; and we could get no other means, excepting by the authority of Government, which must be exerted by us, or it will not be exerted at all. Depend upon it, that if we begin we must take the whole civil and military and financial government of the country into our own hands, and provide for the payment of the civil and judicial departments, as well as the military ; and then we can force the inferior magistrates to do their duty ; we can put the laws into execution, and can bring forward the resources of the country for its deliverance and defence.

‘ I have no doubt that this system, closely carried into execution upon an enlarged plan, would defray its own expense ; and that in a short time Great Britain would not have to spend so much for Portugal as at present. But I am apprehensive that the adoption of any system of this description, upon any but the most enlarged scale, or, in other words, to take upon ourselves the duties of any part of the executive government, without taking the whole, will only shift the blame from the Portuguese Government to ourselves, and involve our army and its departments in the consequences of the failures from which the Portuguese army alone now suffer.

‘ I have not much information of what is going on at Lisbon ; but, from what I have heard lately, I have no doubt of what I formerly wrote to you. Indeed it appears that both the Patriarch and the Principal are most indiscreet in their language and conduct upon this subject. I think also that they will be supported in the Brazils ; and I have no reason to believe that I shall be supported in England.

‘ I shall let you know the alterations which it would be expedient to make in the laws which you have sent me ; but it does not much signify what the law is, as nobody thinks of obeying it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above Mr. Kennedy has been with me, and has given me the enclosed paper, which I beg

you to return. When the articles of claim, not included, are included in the return, it will appear that, after deducting about 100,000*l.* received in January and February, 1811, the Portuguese Government have received, in 1810, very nearly double the amount of their subsidy!! This cannot go on. You should really bring the subject under the consideration of the King's Government.

‘ Mr. Kennedy has just told me that, on the 8th, the day on which Dom Miguel Forjaz asserts that there were 180 boats at Valada, there were 80, of which number he gave 14 of the largest to the Portuguese Commissary sent to ask for them! So much for the falsehood written to please the Conde de Redondo.

‘ Application is now made again by General Pack's brigade for provisions; but I shall certainly give them none.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 19th February, 1811,

10 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received yesterday evening your letters of the 13th, including that of 2 P. M. I also received one from Lumley, communicating the intelligence of the noise heard, and the lights seen, in Santarem, on the night of the 17th. It is obvious that they are making some movement, but it is not yet clear of what nature. We have observed no change on this side yet; but I shall go and look at all the points in the course of the morning.

‘ You did not send Grant's letter, only the extract. He appears to be going on capitally, and is likely to save some valuable property in the Estrella. I shall be much obliged to you if you will tell him how gratified I am upon reading the account of his operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I got yesterday the accounts of money, &c., received by the Portuguese Government since January, 1810; and it is 1,820,000*l.* sterling to the 14th of February, or, in other words, nearly double the subsidy, without including the pay

of the 24th regiment, the subsidiary beef, the food of the caçadores in the Light division, and, I believe, the stores at Abrantes, and other little articles, which will make up the two millions in one year and six weeks!!!

‘W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Cartaxo, 20th February, 1811.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A. M.

‘I received last night your letters of the 18th and 19th, 10 A. M.

‘I shall write to Silveira as you suggest.

‘There is positively no change along this front. I examined it accurately yesterday, and everything was in the same state. I still think, however, that Regnier’s corps is about to move from Santarem.

‘I have letters from Cadiz to the 6th. Nothing new.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 20th February, 1811.

‘I enclose a letter which I have received from Colonel Peacocke, regarding a soldier of the —— regiment, who is in confinement at Lisbon, having been now twenty three months in jail.

‘I perfectly recollect to have heard, when at Oporto in May, 1809, of the horrible and atrocious ingratitude of a British soldier, in having committed the act related by Colonel Peacocke; but I understood that the soldier had gone off with the French army.

‘I do not trouble you now upon this subject in order to justify this soldier, or to obtain any mitigation of any punishment he ought to receive, as no punishment can, in my opinion, be at all adequate to the offence he has committed; but to point out to you how very improper it is, and indeed unfriendly, and contrary to the principles of the alliance, that British subjects and soldiers, put in jail without notice to any Officer, should be detained in jail, as this man has been, for nearly two years, without any intimation being

given to anybody of his being in existence. In the same manner I found a soldier in jail last January, who had been there nearly eight months.

‘ I request you to draw the attention of the Government to this subject, and to know what has been done respecting the soldier of the — regiment, and what they propose to do with him.

‘ I am also anxious to have their answer respecting the cases of the two soldiers some time ago referred to them. Whatever may be the custom in Portugal, it is entirely inconsistent with any well regulated system of justice to delay the trial of those charged with the commission of crimes; and if I should not receive the answer in a week, I shall order — to be tried by a General Court Martial, and —, of the — light dragoons, to be relieved from his confinement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 20th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter from Beresford on the eternal subject of Abrantes, and a return of provisions in that place.

‘ I have considered the pecuniary account since I sent it to you, and I rather think, upon the whole, that it is not quite so bad as we at first supposed.

‘ The Treasury received, or were to receive, from Souza, the amount of the drafts for 200,000*l.*, given by Mr. Villiers. The 330,000*l.* and the 15,000*l.* on account of supplies ordered from England are in advance: but we shall have in our power the supplies for repayment; and either the Government will receive the money for the sale of the supplies, and can hand it over to us, or they will supply it to their own purposes, in which case we may stop the payment of the subsidy.

‘ After the striking out of the account of the payments since the 31st of December, the total charge to that day is 1,661,961*l.*, from which 545,000*l.*, above accounted for, being deducted, the balance will be 1,116,961*l.*; to this will be to be added about 100,000*l.* more, of which I will send you

the account in a few days ; so that we shall not have over-paid them much more than 250,000*l*. I think, therefore, that you need not be very uneasy upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 22d February, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

10 A.M.

‘ The *Denmark* is arrived with 150 men of the 51st regiment. The fleet sailed on the 9th.

‘ There is nothing new here excepting that Cornet Strenu-witz took, on the 19th, Clausel’s aide de camp and 22 men, and killed and wounded as many more. They had been lying in ambuscade for the patrols from Rio Mayor for some days : but he contrived to draw them to an ambuscade which he had laid, and took and destroyed the whole party, with the loss only of one horse wounded.

‘ Would it not be possible to undertake something against the five boats down the river? Lieut. Claxton, R.N., and two gun boats and some seamen, are just below Almeirim, and will assist either with his seamen or boats, if they can be got above Santarem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. I have a letter from Mendizabal, in which he does not mention the extent of his loss.

‘ W.’

To Colonel Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d February, 1811.

‘ Admiral Berkeley will deliver over to you a person whose name he has not stated, but who appears to have been employed in giving medical aid to the seamen of the transports. He was confined by Captain Tucker for tampering with some of the people of the transports, and endeavoring to prevail upon them to carry information to the French ; and Captain Tucker handed him over to the Admiral, as he belonged to the fleet.

‘ I request you to have an inquiry into the circumstances

which occasioned his confinement, and send the proceedings of the inquiry to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d February, 1811.

‘ I received your letter of the 19th yesterday. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give directions that the person mentioned by you may be delivered over to Colonel Peacocke; and I shall have an inquiry made into the circumstances for which he was detained, and will ascertain whether it is in my power to punish him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of stores, &c., required for the construction of bridges; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give directions that the different articles may be delivered on a requisition being made to that effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 22d February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st. I rather believe that you are mistaken respecting the 100,000*l.* you mention. The amount I sent you was of the sums paid to the clerk of the aids, &c., by the Commissariat, from which chest the Officers are paid. You cannot therefore have given the full sum which has been received by the chest to the Portuguese Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d instant. It is scarcely worth while to consider any paper coming from the Portuguese Government, after the avowal made by Dom Miguel Forjaz the other day.

‘ However, it is as well that they should know that there is no use in attempting to deceive themselves, or us, respecting the state of provisions in Abrantes; and that in a few days probably I shall be called upon to decide whether I shall keep the garrison in the place or not, and that I should decide according to the state of provisions in the place, and not upon false returns sent up by the *Junta de Viveres*, or notes written by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to please a colleague and to conceal the faults of the department under his charge. The Portuguese Ministers are seriously responsible to their country and to the world for the fate of this place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let Cornet Strenuwitz know how much I have been gratified by the accounts which I have received of his conduct in his two recent affairs with the enemy. I have not failed to report both in the most favorable terms to the King’s Government, the former last week, and the latter this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
Sir W. Erskine, Bart.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Half past 9 A. M.

‘ I received last night your two letters of the 22d. Campo Mayor is a place that could not stand a regular attack for half an hour. There was, when I knew it, no ordnance in it,

and I believe there is none, nor stores, in it at present. That which ought to be done is to secure it from a *coup de main*, and to oblige the enemy to break ground regularly before the place, if they want to have it; and that is the principle that I stated to Leite, at the time the Marques de la Romana wished to have the place, in a letter, of which I enclose you an extract, and of which I sent you an extract before.

‘ When Mendizabal was in his camp at San Christoval he withdrew the garrison from Campo Mayor, leaving only a few men to save it from a *coup de main*. In my opinion Campo Mayor ought never to have had more; but his ideas and mine may differ upon the number sufficient for that purpose, and there may be (although I believe there are not) ordnance and stores in the place, which ought not to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. There is also a considerable difference in the degree of danger to be apprehended from a *coup de main* on this place, now that Mendizabal has been defeated.

‘ It is difficult to know what to do in this case. Mendizabal will not put a single man into the place, and Leite cannot spare any, and cannot feed them if he could spare them. However, I have desired Alava to write to Mendizabal, to inform him that the preservation of Campo Mayor was an honorable engagement on the part of the Marques de la Romana, and that I beg him to put into the place 500 men upon whom he can depend. In the meantime Leite should put in it some ordenanza, to prevent its being surprised.

‘ In respect to your letter, No. 2, General Hill had authority to employ Officers to get intelligence for him, as we employ Ruman, and did employ Grant and others, and as he employed Lieut. Heathcote; and all these are paid, by warrants from me, three dollars per diem, while so employed. I do not recollect that Major White was so employed.

‘ I rather think that, however important his service was, it was strictly in execution of his duty as an Officer of cavalry at the head of a patrol, however small, and that it was of the same description as that recently rendered by Owen. If this is the case, he ought not to be paid. And I think it must have been the case, as, if I recollect rightly, I wrote, but if I did not, I desired Hill verbally, not to employ

Officers in the Portuguese service on these duties, which would take them away from the service with their own men.

‘ If, however, Major White has been employed on this description of extra duty, whether by General Hill or by you, he shall be paid as others have been; but I should think that this employment has neither lasted the time nor has been of that description to distinguish it from the duty on which Officers of cavalry are employed every day.

‘ I enclose you a letter that Mr. Stuart has sent me, which he has received from Lord Strangford, upon which I congratulate you.

‘ I likewise enclose, in case you should not have seen it, a copy of the recent Carta Regia to this Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. Brotherton, of the 14th, was employed alone in the Estrella and not paid. Badcock, of the same regiment, is now on the left of the army, either alone or with two men, and is not paid; and Cocks, Krauckenberg, and Cordemann, have been employed in the same manner, either alone or with small parties, and have never been paid.

‘ Return the enclosed letters.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d instant, regarding provender for the cattle coming from Vigo; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct the agent to supply them from the stores of hay on board the transports, and to state from time to time the quantity issued for this service, which will be replaced from the stores of the army. The Commissary General has written to Vigo to accelerate the purchase of cattle.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters (No. 2, of the 1st, private of the 5th, and separate of the 6th). I shall take measures to send Mr. Souper to Sicily immediately, according to Lord Forbes’ desire.

‘ I have not written to you lately, as I know my brother communicates to you all my letters to him, and you will readily believe that I have not too much time to write two letters upon the same subject, and containing the same information.

‘ In case your sortie should succeed (which will place the war on its legs again in the best manner), I have again written to Lord Liverpool to request that you might join this army. You shall know his answer as soon as I receive it. I shall be glad to hear from you respecting Lord Aylmer’s wish to go to Cadiz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose you copies of the correspondence which I have had with General Mendizabal up to this day, since I last addressed you, and copies of two letters of the 19th and 20th from Captain Mallet; and of two papers of intelligence of the 19th and 20th from Colonel Brito, which will inform you of the unfortunate defeat of the Spanish army upon the heights of San Christoval on the 19th instant, and its immediate consequences.

‘ This is the greatest misfortune which has fallen upon the allies since the battle of Ocaña, and in the existing state of the war more likely than that event to affect their interests vitally; and it was not to be expected.

‘ I could not imagine that an army having two rivers between it and the enemy, and knowing that the enemy was endeavoring to pass one of them, could have been surprised in a strong position; and actually nothing but the surprise could have enabled so inferior a force as that employed by the French upon this occasion to carry the heights of San

Christoval, the strength of which is well known, even though the recommendations to fortify them had not been attended to.

‘It is impossible to speculate upon the consequences of this misfortune upon the garrison of Badajoz; but you will observe that I have requested General Mendizabal to urge them to hold out to the last extremity.

‘I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from General Ballesteros, in answer to that which I addressed to him on the 16th February.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,

‘Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 4th February, and I can easily conceive your surprise and concern upon the recent transactions in Estremadura; but both will not be a little increased by the accounts which I forward this day.

‘I now enclose my dispatch to the Secretary of State of this day, giving an account of the defeat of the Spaniards at Badajoz; and I enclose for your private information copies of two letters from Madden, who, you will observe, is not better pleased with the Portuguese cavalry than he is with the Spanish troops. Few troops will bear a surprise and a general panic; and at all events young cavalry are much more easily affected by these circumstances, and the effect upon them is much more extensive and more sensibly felt by the whole army, than similar circumstances operating upon infantry in the same state of discipline. Their horses afford them means of flight, and when once cavalry lose their order it is impossible to restore it. For this reason I am always inclined to keep the cavalry out of action as long as possible.

‘The defeat of Mendizabal is the greatest misfortune, which was not previously expected, that has yet occurred to us. As soon as our reinforcements should arrive I intended to have detached a British force to Badajoz, with which the Spaniards would have been sufficient to have beaten Soult and raise the siege; which event, without exposing matters to a general action in a position chosen by the enemy, would

have had the most important consequences throughout the Peninsula. As it is, I cannot venture to detach a sufficient force to do the business alone, and I must try something else of greater risk and more doubtful result. In short, this defeat goes to the vitals of the cause, and it would certainly have been avoided if the Spaniards had been anything but Spaniards. But Mendizabal, knowing that the French force were preparing means to cross the Guadiana, was surprised in his camp, which he had neglected to fortify, although repeatedly advised to fortify it, and which he delayed to quit. If he had not been surprised, although he had not been intrenched; if he had been intrenched, and still had been surprised; or if he had withdrawn from the position, as he said he would, this misfortune could not have happened. I know the ground as well as I know my own room. It is really the strongest position in the country!

‘I have no objection to your making any use you please of the contents of my letters to you (the dispatches and their enclosures must of course go to England); but I recommend to you to avoid urging the Minister to communicate your notes to the Cortes. The Spanish Minister is not likely to notice this desire, but the opposition in England will. Recollect the breeze which there was upon this subject upon a similar demand from Chauvelin to Lord Grenville, when the war broke out in 1792. I imagine that the King’s Government never allow any reference to be made by foreign Ministers to any authority excepting the King.

‘We have no packet since the 21st January; but the *Denmark* is arrived, which left England (Torbay) on the 9th. It was then reported that the Regent had sent for Lord Grenville and Lord Grey; but that, finding the King was so much better, he had informed Mr. Perceval that he should not change the Ministry. This is the only report; but I think that if the Ministers find that they have not his confidence, they must quit their offices. It will not answer to have him running to the opposition upon every communication he receives from Ministers. This would be quite a new situation of affairs.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I am much concerned to have to inform you that the French attacked General Mendizabal on the 19th instant, in the position which he had taken on the heights of San Christoval, near Badajoz, and totally defeated him, having destroyed, taken, or dispersed the whole army, with the exception of 2000 infantry, who have been collected at Elvas, and Brig. General Madden’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 500 Spanish cavalry.

‘ The enemy had to cross the Guadiana and the Gevora; but surprised the Spanish army in their camp, which was standing, and is taken, with baggage and artillery.

‘ According to all accounts, the enemy had not more than 6000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. The Spanish army must have consisted of 10,000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, including the Portuguese brigade; and they were posted in one of the strongest positions in the country, with their right under the fort of San Christoval (one of the outworks of Badajoz), Campo Mayor in the rear of their left, and Elvas immediately in their rear.

‘ I had suggested to the late Marques de la Romana to occupy this position, which I had requested him, and have since repeatedly urged General Mendizabal, to intrench.

‘ This precaution was neglected; but still the position was of that description that it ought not to have been carried; and as long as it was held, it was impracticable for the enemy to obtain possession of Badajoz, or to interrupt the communication with that place.

‘ The enemy have not been able to establish themselves within the redoubt of Pardaleras since they carried it on the 11th instant, and have made no progress in the operations of the siege. Their position, however, on the right of the Guadiana, gives them great advantages, of which they well know how to avail themselves; and they actually commenced to intrench it on the evening of the day on which they obtained possession of it.

‘ Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I

acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army, and its probable consequence, the fall of Badajoz, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula; and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if this misfortune had not occurred.

‘ I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brig. General Madden did everything in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain; and Lieut. Colonel Brown was wounded, but not dangerously. This circumstance shows the effect of surprise and of general panic upon troops, as this brigade have, upon former occasions, behaved remarkably well.

‘ I am informed that there are 9000 good troops in Badajoz, some having retired into that fortress from the field of battle, and that the garrison is well supplied with provisions, which have been left there by the inhabitants, who quitted the place when the communication with it was recently opened.

‘ The works are still untouched, and the enemy’s fire has hitherto done but little damage to the town.

‘ General Claparède’s division of the 9th corps still continued upon Guarda, with their advanced guard at Belmonte, when I last heard from that part of the country. They had made an attempt to obtain possession of Covillão on the 12th, but were repulsed with some loss by Colonel Grant, who had occupied the town with a party of ordenanzas of Lower Beira.

‘ I enclose a letter from Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and a report from Lieut. Colonel Grant of this affair. From later reports I am apprehensive, however, that he has since been obliged to withdraw from thence.

‘ I likewise enclose reports from Major General Sir William Erskine, who commands the outposts on the left of the army, of the capture of General Clausel’s aide de camp, and a detachment of the enemy’s cavalry and infantry, on the 19th instant, by Cornet Strenuwitz, of the hussars, to whose conduct, in an enterprise of a similar nature, I drew your Lordship’s attention in my last dispatch.

‘ In this instance he has acquitted himself with great judgment and boldness.

‘ The operations of the guerrillas continue throughout the interior ; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing ; but I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one.

‘ Don Julian Sanchez, whom I have frequently mentioned to your Lordship, has recently captured a large convoy of biscuit on its march from Ledesma to Ciudad Rodrigo, which had come from Palencia ; and another party has recently done the enemy a considerable injury near the bridge of Arzobispo. It is said that General La Houssaye has been killed in an affair at that place.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of importance in front of this army since I addressed your Lordship on the 16th instant.

‘ A considerable quantity of baggage has been sent out of Santarem ; but I am inclined to believe that it belongs to sick Officers and soldiers who have been removed from thence to the rear of the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 23d February, 1811.

‘ I enclose a weekly state. We are becoming a more efficient and better army every day.

‘ If this misfortune had not happened at Badajoz I intended, as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, to detach a force to Badajoz, which, with the Spaniards, would have been sufficient to defeat Soult, and raise the siege of that place, if Massena had not called in Claparède’s division from Guarda.

‘ This operation would have put an end to all apprehension for the provinces south of the Tagus, and would probably have had more important consequences.

‘ As it is, I cannot venture to detach so many troops, even after the reinforcements shall arrive, as will be able to effect

the object above ; and if the weather should hold up a little, I must first try something else of greater extent, but more doubtful result.

‘ In short, this defeat is the greatest, and indeed the only, misfortune that has yet happened to us which was not expected ; and it ought not to have occurred.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1810.

The Notes to this Memorandum are in the Manuscript.

‘ 23d February, 1811.

‘ The last memorandum, on the operations of the British army in the Peninsula, ended with the breaking up of the British army from its position on the frontiers of Estremadura and Alentejo, and its march to a position in Upper Beira, between the Mondego and the Tagus, in the middle of December, 1809.

‘ The reasons for this movement were the following :—

‘ First, it was believed that the French were aware that, till they could dislodge the British army from Lisbon and the Tagus, they could not hope to make any successful invasion of Andalusia, or any progress in obtaining possession of that country. This belief was confirmed by their conduct after the battle of Ocaña, in the month of November. The events of that battle, and the state to which it reduced the Spanish army, afforded them the best opportunity of entering Andalusia unopposed, and of taking possession even of Cadiz itself ; but instead of pursuing their advantages, they turned their troops back immediately into Old Castille, and gave ground for belief that their line of operations would be in that quarter.

‘ Secondly, there was every reason to believe that large reinforcements would enter Spain during the winter, which might be thrown immediately upon the frontier of Portugal.

‘ Thirdly, the swelling of the rivers Tagus and Guadiana, which had occurred in some degree, had opposed a material obstacle to the advance of the French through Estremadura,

and the expected rains were likely to render the roads quite impracticable; which, added to the means of defence remaining in the province, under the Duque de Alburquerque, left it in a state of apparent safety from invasion.

‘The British army had completed its march by the 15th January, and had taken up its cantonments with their right at Guarda, their left extending towards the Douro, and the advanced posts on the Coa. The head quarters were placed at Viseu.

‘At this time the strength of the British army was 19,500 rank and file; 2800 of that number were cavalry, leaving 16,700 infantry, of which 800 were at Lisbon.

‘A division of infantry of 4400 men had been left on the Tagus at Abrantes, under the command of Lieut. General Hill, as the foundation of the corps to be formed under his command, to carry on operations on the frontiers of Alentejo and Estremadura, if, contrary to all appearances and expectation, the enemy should invade that part of the country*. With the exception of the hussars, the cavalry also were left upon the Tagus for the convenience of receiving forage, which we were informed that the province of Upper Beira could not supply.

‘The Portuguese army was at this time in a state not fit for service†, owing principally to the want of clothing, and those equipments which are necessary to all soldiers in a winter campaign. Their discipline, organization, and equipment had been in some degree thrown back by their operations in the preceding summer; and it was determined, if possible, not to move them from the cantonments which they occupied in the interior of the country till the last moment, in order to give them as much time to be formed and equipped as might be possible, while the British troops should occupy the frontiers.

‘The force and position of the allies at that time were as follows: about 24,000 men, which had been collected of the fugitives from the battle of Ocaña, were at La Carolina, occupying the principal passes of the Sierra Morena‡; about

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, 15th January, 1810.’

† ‘See letter of 4th January to Lord Liverpool, and letter to Mr. Frere, 30th January, enclosed to Lord Liverpool.’

‡ ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of December, 1809, and January, 1810.’

12,000 men, under the Duque de Alburquerque, were at Medellin, upon the Guadiana; and about 20,000 men*, which had been collected together after the Duque del Parque's action at Alba, were at San Martin de Trebejo, in the Sierra de Gata. There were 6000 or 8000 men, under General Mahy, at Astorga and Villa Franca, in Galicia; and there was a garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo. It had been repeatedly recommended to the Spanish Government to reinforce the corps under the Duque de Alburquerque. If this corps had been stronger, and the operations of the Spanish troops could have been reckoned upon, it could have defended the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and if the enemy, instead of attempting that operation, had pushed their whole force through La Mancha, as they afterwards did, this corps might have been thrown upon their right flank by the valley of the Guadiana. The enemy's force consisted of, and was disposed as follows: the corps of Sebastiani (the 4th), Victor (the 1st), and Mortier (the 5th), were disposed of about the Tagus and Madrid†; and Soult, the King's guards, and Dessolle's reserve, composed an army of about 65,000 men. Soult's corps was at Talavera de la Reyna and in that neighborhood, and consisted of about 12,000 men. Ney's corps (the 6th) was in Old Castille; and, by the time the British army arrived in Beira, it had been joined by the reinforcements, and consisted of 32,000 men‡; and towards the middle of the month of January, the Duc d'Abrantes, or the 8th corps, consisting of 27,000 men, also entered Spain§.

‘ Besides these corps, which are immediately the subject of this memorandum, there was the 2d corps, under Suchet, in Aragon, and the army of Catalonia, put under Augereau, and then under Macdonald, in Catalonia, which have been

* ‘ They were stated to be 20,000 men, but I doubt that they ever collected 15,000.’

† ‘ See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 14th, 21st, and 28th December, 1809, and 4th, 15th, 24th, and 31st January.’

‡ ‘ See letter of 21st February, to Lord Liverpool.’

§ ‘ We had no knowledge of the arrival of reinforcements till a later period; but see letter to Lord Liverpool, of 24th January, and to Mr. Frere, 30th January, that their arrival was suspected. It was supposed at that time that the enemy could bring together in Old Castille about 40,000 men, including Soult's corps from Talavera.’

engaged in the operations of the campaign against the Spanish armies of Valencia and Catalonia; but the operations are quite distinct from those which have been carried on on the western and southern side of the Peninsula, and they will not be noticed any further.

‘ The first operation which the enemy undertook, as soon as their reinforcements entered Spain, was to force the passes of the Sierra Morena *. After manœuvring for some days at the foot of the mountains they carried the passes almost without opposition on the part of the Spanish army, which retired in several directions. The greater part, under General Arceyza himself, retired to Jaen, and thence to Grenada, which towns they successively abandoned, and thence into Murcia; and this body has since formed the army of Murcia. A part retired into the Sierra de Ronda, and thence to Gibraltar, from whence it was removed to Cadiz; and a part, under the Visconde de Gand, retired to Seville, and thence into the Condado de Niebla, where it has since remained, under the command of General Copons; and one division, and the artillery, crossed the Guadalquivir at Seville, and went to Monasterio, in Estremadura; from whence the artillery was sent to Badajoz, and the troops went and embarked at Ayamonte.

‘ After passing the Sierra Morena the French pushed their left, the corps of Sebastiani, towards Jaen: and the 1st corps, with the King’s guards and reserve, went, under the King, to Seville and Cadiz. The Duque de Alburquerque, however, passed the Sierra Morena from his position on the Guadiana, by Guadalcanal, nearly at the same time with the French, and arrived at Xerez, and occupied the Isla de Leon, before the French approached the place.

‘ While these movements were making the Central Junta was dissolved. Previous to the dissolution of that body they had ordered the march of the corps under the command of the Duque del Parque from Castille into Estremadura; and, with the exception of 3000 men under General Carrera, it marched on the †. Nearly at the same

* ‘ See letter of 31st January, to Lord Liverpool.’

† ‘ The Duque del Parque stated that he should march on the 24th January. See letter, &c. to Mr. Frere, 30th January: but they did not march till later in the month and the beginning of February.’

time the Marques de la Romana was appointed to resume the command of this corps.

‘The wants and the situation of the Portuguese army at that period of time have been already pointed out. It would have been impossible to move them, without incurring the risk of rendering them useless during the campaign. Including the cavalry (with the exception of General Slade’s brigade, attached to General Hill’s corps), the whole British army that could be brought into operation on the frontiers of Castille, between the middle and end of January, was less than 15,000 men, to which the Portuguese army might have added 10,000 or 12,000 men, if it had been deemed expedient to draw these troops into the field at that time, notwithstanding the considerations above referred to.

‘Against this force was Ney’s corps at Salamanca; and Junot’s, or the 8th, was on its march within the Spanish frontier; and, at all events, it was known in the end of January that the effect had been produced in Andalusia, which it would have been the object of any diversion to prevent. The passes of the Sierra had been carried without opposition; the Spanish army had been dispersed; Seville, the seat of Government, with its arsenals and establishments, was in the possession of the French; and Cadiz itself was threatened. No operation, which should not have been performed by a most powerful and superior body of troops well supported, could have produced any diversion to avert the consequences of this state of things.

‘It was obvious that the French were in an error when they entered Andalusia. They should have begun by turning their great force against the English in Portugal, holding in check the Spanish force in Andalusia, as they had done in the preceding spring. Andalusia would then have fallen an easy conquest to them; but in the manner in which they have proceeded, they have been obliged to bring corps after corps out of Andalusia against Portugal; Cadiz, &c., have in the meantime become strengthened, as has Portugal; and it is doubtful whether they will ever obtain possession of either.

‘This view of the subject, and the knowledge that the cause would eventually be fought for in Portugal, and the

certainly that the enemy had the means of collecting a superior force to ours, even if he had not already been reinforced, prevented us from incurring any risk to create a diversion in January. Besides, the weather was such as to prevent all operations; and the suspicion which was always entertained that the reinforcements were within reach when the enemy made their movements to the southward, were the principal reasons.

‘ As soon as it was known in Portugal that the French had entered Andalusia, and that the Spanish Government desired to have assistance to defend Cadiz, the 79th, 87th, and 94th regiments, and two companies of artillery, were detached there in the beginning of February, under Major General Stewart, and the 20th Portuguese regiment. Nearly at the same time accounts were received that the 2d corps of the French army were entering Estremadura, in concert with, and supported by, the 5th corps (Mortier’s), from Andalusia. The 5th corps had left Seville on the 2d and 3d February, apparently to disperse a fugitive division of Arceyza’s army, which had crossed the Guadalquivir; but these retired towards Ayamonte, sending their artillery to Badajoz.

‘ It appears that the French Government had imagined that the invasion of Andalusia, the possession of Seville and its arsenals, &c., and the dissolution of the Central Junta, would be deemed misfortunes of such magnitude, as that all resistance would cease; and on the same day, the 12th of February, they summoned the places of Cadiz, Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Astorga.

‘ Immediately upon receiving information of the entry of the French into Estremadura, General Hill was put in motion on the 12th February, with his own British division; two brigades of Portuguese infantry, about 4000 strong, under Major General Hamilton; one brigade of British cavalry, about 1000, under Major General Slade; and 4th regiment of Portuguese cavalry; and one brigade of German, and two of Portuguese, artillery. This corps was ordered, in the first instance, to Portalegre; and General Hill was directed to co-operate with the Spanish troops lately under the command of the Duque del Parque, then supposed to have crossed the Tagus; and to prevent the enemy, if

possible, from carrying on any serious operation against Badajoz.

‘ The enemy retired from Badajoz when they heard of General Hill’s arrival at Portalegre. Ciudad Rodrigo was summoned by Marshal Ney with two divisions of his corps, and he retired again upon the Tormes, upon finding the advanced guard of the British army crossing the Coa* ; and Astorga was summoned by General Loison, with the third division of Ney’s corps, who remained in that neighborhood for some time. Loison was afterwards relieved by the 8th corps, under Junot ; and he approached nearer to Salamanca.

‘ From this time no movement of importance was made by either party, till towards the middle of March, when the French corps in Estremadura broke up, and Mortier marched to the southward ; and Regnier, with Soult’s corps, remained in the neighborhood of Merida.

‘ The allied British and Spanish troops on the frontiers of Portugal and Estremadura were then in some degree superior in numbers to the French corps remaining in Estremadura, and the question whether the latter should be attacked or not was then well considered. In the consideration of every question of this description there are certain topics which must be reviewed, and the following are of the number :

‘ First, the object in this case would have been, if possible, to cripple, or entirely destroy, the 2d corps of the army which remained in Estremadura ; but it is apprehended that this object would have been impracticable. Even supposing that General Hill’s and the Marques de la Romana’s corps joined had been deemed sufficiently strong to attempt to remove the 2d corps from its position on the Guadiana, they could not have prevented its retreat either to the Sierra Morena, or along the valley of the Guadiana to Ciudad Real, or between the Tagus and the Guadiana towards Arzobispo. The attack must have been made in one concentrated body, on one side or the other of the Guadiana ; and the allies would have been able only to choose which way the enemy should retreat, supposing them to have been able to force his retreat.

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 21st February.’

‘ Secondly, the means to effect this object consisted in about 12,000 men, cavalry and infantry, half British and half Portuguese, under General Hill, and about 10,000 Spanish troops, under the Marques de la Romana, whose corps had been much reduced by sickness and want; and General Carrera, with 3000 men, had remained in Old Castille. Against these the enemy had not less than 16,000 men; for the 2d corps, as well as the others, had received reinforcements.

‘ Thirdly, the risks to be incurred in this expedition consisted in the probability that the 2d corps would be joined by the 5th corps again, before any serious impression could have been made upon the 2d corps. The Marques de la Romana had at this time but little of any cavalry, and the Spanish cavalry is notoriously bad. The Portuguese cavalry was but newly formed; and the reliance in respect to that arm, in that open country, would have been upon the 1100 British cavalry. The 2d corps was always stronger in cavalry than the allies in Estremadura; but if the 2d corps had been rejoined by the 5th, not only would the enemy’s superiority in cavalry have been increased, but in infantry also; and the retreat of the allies to the strong places would have been hurried at least, if not difficult.

‘ Fourthly, the difficulties in the undertaking, besides those of the season, are of the same description with those which have attended, and invariably must attend, every operation which has been attempted in the Peninsula.

‘ There is an old military proverb respecting these operations which is strictly and invariably true, and that is, that “if they are attempted with small numbers they must fail; if with large, the army must starve.” The inhabitants of Spain and Portugal will not part with their provisions, even for money. There are no great markets for corn in any part of the Peninsula, excepting the seaports, and some of the very large and populous cities, and the inhabitants subsist generally upon stores formed in their own houses, or buried under ground; and if they are deprived of any considerable portion of their supply for the year, they must either starve or must go to seek for a fresh supply at a great distance, as no neighbor has any to sell. These circumstances account at the same time for the difficulties which

the allied armies experienced, while the enemy can subsist with facility. The force used by the allies to obtain subsistence from the country consists in the influence of the civil magistrates: that used by the French is terror. They force from the inhabitants, under pain of death, all that they have in their houses for the consumption of the year, without payment, and are indifferent respecting the consequences to the unfortunate people. The British armies cannot, and the natives will not, follow this example, although the latter go nearest to it. Still, however, no Spanish Officer could venture to carry his requisitions for provisions on any town much further than the influence of the civil magistrates would go to procure them; and the Spanish troops have always been in want, where the French armies have afterwards found subsistence. When the Marques de la Romana and his Officers were asked whether they would insure the subsistence of the troops upon this expedition, supposing it were undertaken, they answered that they could not; and indeed their own army was at this moment in the utmost distress in their cantonments, and literally perishing for want*.

‘ Upon the whole, then, comparing the only object which could be acquired by this expedition with the risk to be incurred, and the difficulty of the undertaking, it was thought best not to attempt it.

‘ The next event of any importance that occurred was in the commencement of April; the formal attack of Astorga by the 8th corps, under the Duc d’Abrantes. At this time the expediency of attempting a diversion in favor of the Spaniards, by making a forward movement into Castille, was again considered.

‘ In the end of March the British army in Portugal consisted of about 22,000 rank and file, of which 2733 were cavalry. Of the cavalry, 1072, and of the infantry, 5112, were with General Hill in Alentejo, and 400 men at Lisbon, leaving in Beira about 15,000 effective rank and file, cavalry and infantry.

‘ About this time the Portuguese army were becoming in a better state of equipment, and we might have drawn twelve

* * See the instruction from Lord Liverpool, of the 2d January, 1810, marked “ Secret.”

regiments of regular infantry, and four of chasseurs, making about 14,000 effective rank and file, to the army, exclusive of the Portuguese troops with General Hill. This would have made the allied army in Beira about 30,000 men.

‘ With this force we should have had to attack Marshal Ney at the head of his own corps, which was more numerous than ours* (infinitely superior in cavalry), in a strong position at Salamanca; having it in his power to draw towards him either the whole or any part of Junot’s corps, or of the body of troops under Kellermann in Old Castille, between the time at which he would have heard of our passing the Agueda and that of our arrival at Salamanca, supposing that he had ever allowed us to reach that place. It may be supposed that we might have drawn a part, if not the whole, of Hill’s corps into Beira for this operation†; but even with the whole of that corps we were not equal to the operation, and should not have succeeded in obliging the French to raise the siege of Astorga. But if the whole of that corps had been brought from the frontiers of Alentejo to those of Beira‡, the enemy would have entered the former province, and there was nothing between them and Lisbon§. To this add, that all the arguments respecting the difficulties for subsistence in the proposed expedition into Estremadura in March were stronger in respect to that in contemplation into Castille in the end of that month and beginning of April, and the weather rendered all operations at that time impracticable. Astorga fell on the 22d of April, the magazine having been kept in a church, and it blew up||. On the 24th the 3d division of Marshal Ney’s corps was put in motion from its cantonments towards Ciudad Rodrigo; and

* ‘ Ney’s corps, according to the returns, was 32,000 men.’

† ‘ Upon more than one occasion, after Mortier withdrew from Estremadura, General Hill was obliged to move to protect Badajoz, and the divisions of the Marques de la Romana’s troops, from the operations of Regnier’s corps. These movements invariably succeeded. See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 2d and 23d May.’

‡ ‘ If General Hill had been withdrawn, the Marques de la Romana would have been entirely destroyed.’

§ ‘ See the instructions, marked A, from Lord Liverpool, of the 27th February, 1810.’

|| ‘ It is ridiculous to talk of Astorga as a fortified place. It was a walled town, which, excepting in these times, could not have stood one day against a regular attack.’

it took up its ground on the 26th, and blockaded the place, on the right of the Agueda. On the same day the British advanced guard went to Gallegos, and the communication with the place was open from that time till the 10th of June*.

‘The British army in Beira was put in motion on the 26th of April, and their cantonments were closed up to the front. The head quarters were moved on that day to Celorico from Viseu. There is no doubt but that if the British army had been moved forward to the Agueda in the end of April, Loison’s division must have moved from its position in the neighborhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, or the whole of the 6th corps must have been brought up to its support. But the temporary removal of Loison’s division could not prevent the French from making the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, when the state of the weather and rivers would permit them. They had then 57,000 effective men in the 6th and 8th corps in Castille, besides the troops under Kellermann, and some under Serras; and if Loison had been obliged to retire by our troops, it would have only been for a time. Ciudad Rodrigo would have gained nothing by this retreat, for the communication with the town by the left of the Agueda was open as long as it could be under any circumstances†; while our troops would have suffered all the inconvenience and sickness which would have resulted from drawing them out of their cantonments before the rains were over. Ciudad Rodrigo could have been saved only by such a diversion on the part of General Mahy in Galicia, and of the inhabitants and guerrillas of Castille, when the French armies were drawn together for the siege, as should have obliged the French to detach troops to quell the insurrection, or to force Mahy to retreat again to his mountains, and thus render the besieging army of such a strength as that we might have ventured to attack it. But General Mahy made no movement; the inhabitants looked on with apathy, only abusing us that we did not involve ourselves in the same peril with Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘The British army in Portugal, on the 1st of June, con-

* ‘See letter to Lord Liverpool, of 11th July.’

† ‘We sent ammunition and stores into Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment; I believe as late as the 9th, or even the 10th of June, at night.’

sisted of 25,000 rank and file, of which number 3261 were cavalry; 5381 infantry, and 449 cavalry, were with General Hill; and about 2000 infantry were at Lisbon; leaving in Beira about 17,000 men, of which number about 14,000 were infantry. Of the 2000 men at Lisbon about 1500 belonged to the royals, the 9th and 38th regiments, which regiments had been in Walcheren, and it was not deemed expedient to move them from Lisbon till the season should have entirely settled; and they were not moved till the end of June.

‘The Portuguese army, on the 1st of June, consisted of 29,200 effective rank and file, cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Of this number about 1200 cavalry, and 5000 infantry, and 300 artillery, were with General Hill, leaving about 23,000 effective men. There were five regiments of infantry in garrisons, one at Cadiz, three regiments and two battalions of the Lusitanian legion unfit to be brought into the field; making, with the cavalry, also unfit, not less than 10,000 effective men, which would leave about 14,000 in Beira; making, in June, our army in Beira, including artillery, of about 32,000 effective men, which was the largest we were ever able to collect upon that frontier.

‘The three Walcheren regiments, the three inefficient regiments of Portuguese infantry, the two battalions of the Lusitanian legion, and three battalions of militia, and three brigades of Portuguese artillery, were collected as a reserve upon the Zezere in the beginning of July, under the command of General Leith; but these corps were not fit to be joined to the army till the end of September. I had sent Colonel M^cMahon’s brigade of infantry away from it in May, as being unfit.

‘On the 25th June the head quarters were removed to Almeida, in order to be nearer the scene of action; and on the 1st July they were moved to Alverca, as being more centrally situated in respect to our own troops. Everything was done which could enable the British army to save Ciudad Rodrigo, if it had been practicable; but it was impracticable to attempt it, unless it could be supposed that we should beat an army nearly double the strength of the allied army, having nearly four times the number of cavalry, in a country admirably adapted to the use of that arm. The place surrendered on the 11th July.

‘ After the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo the enemy’s movements were for some time uncertain, and we could not learn from them his intentions. We knew that Regnier had been ordered to cross the Tagus; and to manœuvre upon Alcantara, with a view to support the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. But he did not carry that measure into execution till about the 18th of July; and his movement was followed immediately by that of General Hill, who crossed the Tagus likewise at Villa Velha, and took up a position in Regnier’s front, in Lower Beira.

‘ At length, on the 24th of July, the enemy attacked General Craufurd’s division, near Almeida, with the whole of Ney’s corps, and obliged it to cross the Coa with some loss.

‘ It had been desirable to maintain our posts beyond the Coa as long as possible, as well to observe the movements of the enemy as to keep up the communication with Almeida; but it was not intended to fight an action beyond the Coa. It was necessary to withdraw the troops from the bridge of Almeida that night; and the enemy’s advanced guard passed it in the morning, and Almeida was invested.

‘ The enemy having passed the Coa in force, it was necessary to withdraw the division of infantry which was at Pinhel, which was liable to be attacked in front by the 8th corps, and on its flank by the 6th; and on the 26th the advanced guard was drawn back to Freixedas, and the army was concentrated between Guarda and Trancoso.

‘ The enemy’s designs were still uncertain. From the movements of the 2d and 8th corps, and from the delay to make any preparations for the siege of Almeida, and from the advanced state of the season *, it was thought most probable that he could not attempt that operation, but would advance into Portugal by the roads which lead through Lower Beira, forcing back General Hill’s corps, and turning the right of that under my command; or that he would fall with his concentrated force upon both the flanks and the centre of the corps under my command, and hurry them in their retreat, which must have been made by one road only. The infantry of the army was therefore thrown back one march into the valley of the Mondego, still keeping a division upon Guarda; and General Hill was ordered to Sar-

* ‘ See letters to Lord Liverpool in July and August.’

zedas, in Lower Beira; Colonel Le Cor's division of militia keeping the communication between General Hill and the army.

At length, on the 15th of August, the enemy's design to attack Almeida became manifest; and the army was concentrated again between Trancoso and Guarda; and the advanced guard was moved to Freixedas, as well to oblige the enemy to concentrate his army for the siege, and thus give scope and opportunity to the guerrillas and other troops in Spain to carry on their operations, as to be in a situation to take advantage of any opportunity which offered to strike a blow against the enemy.

The place surrendered on the 27th of August, owing to the magazine having been blown up; and on the 28th the infantry of the army was again thrown into the valley of the Mondego.

In order to render more clear the nature of these and the subsequent operations, it is necessary to point out that the two great entrances into Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro, are on different sides of the great range of mountains called the Estrella. The rivers Zezere and Mondego rise in the Estrella, and take their course on different sides of that mountain. The former runs a considerable distance to the southward and westward, and then to the southward, and falls into the Tagus at Punhete; the latter runs first to the northward as far as Celorico, where it turns to the westward and falls into the sea at Figueira. Guarda stands upon the eastern extremity of the Estrella, and there the mountain can be passed; and there is no road by which troops can pass the mountains from the valley of the Zezere and the valley of the Mondego, excepting nearly as far to the westward as the Ponte da Murcella, over the Alva. This river likewise rises in the Estrella, and runs in a north westerly direction into the Mondego, into which it falls about five leagues above Coimbra.

From this general description, it will be obvious that the British army could not be concentrated for any operation to the eastward of the Alva, without laying open to the enemy one of the great entrances into the country. General Hill's corps could not have joined that under my command, without passing by or to the eastward of Guarda. Regnier was

always in his front, and he might immediately have occupied the passes of Lower Beira; and then the safety of the army, and of the capital, would have depended upon the operations of the reserve on the Zezere.

‘ If the reserve had been joined to the army, it would not have been sufficiently strong to undertake any operation of importance; and any accident to General Hill, who was not so strong as Regnier, would have exposed all our interests to ruin. If we could have collected the reserve, which consisted of about 1500 British infantry and 4000 Portuguese troops, and General Hill’s corps of about 12,000 men, and the corps in Beira of about 32,000, making a total of less than 50,000 men, we should have had less by 7000 men than the 6th and 8th corps, without including Scras, Bonet, or Kellermann; and the 2d corps, consisting of 16,000 or 17,000, might either have been thrown upon us, or might have been moved through Lower Beira at once upon Lisbon, as there would have been nothing between them and Lisbon in the supposed case. It was therefore determined to observe the movements of the enemy, and to concentrate the army in the first favorable situation that should be found, after they should manifest their line of attack. If they had made their attack by two lines, most probably the army could not have been concentrated till it reached the neighborhood of Lisbon; but it was thought probable, from their movements, that they were to make it in one concentrated body by the valley of the Mondego, and measures were taken to concentrate the army on the Serra da Murcella, on the Alva.

‘ It was never imagined that they could make the march they did across the Mondego, through Upper Beira. The ground, however, on the north of the Mondego, was not unknown; and the measures which had been taken, with a view to the concentration of the British army on the Alva, facilitated the movement of the troops across the Mondego and their concentration on Busaco.

‘ On the 4th of September the head quarters, which had been moved to Celorico on the 28th of August, were moved to Gouveia, in consequence of the collection of the enemy’s force upon the Upper Coa and his movements towards Alverca. They remained there till the 16th, on which day

the heads of two corps (the 2d and 6th) of the enemy entered Celorico, and the third (the 8th) Trancoso; the former crossed the Mondego again to Fornos*. The army was then put in motion, and took up a position, and was concentrated upon the position of Busaco.

† The British army in Portugal, at the time of the battle of Busaco, consisted of 27,188 rank and file, of which number 2839 were cavalry: 2200 infantry were at Lisbon, 1900 of which just arrived: 1350 infantry were on their march to join, leaving in the battle not quite 24,000 men. The Portuguese army at the same time consisted of 26,800 effective rank and file of infantry, and 3375 cavalry. Of the infantry, 1350 were at Elvas, 1142 at Cadiz, and 563 at Abrantes; leaving 23,800 infantry in the battle. Of the cavalry, 500 were at Elvas, 600 at Badajoz, 500 north of the Douro, and 200 at Lisbon, leaving 1375 with the army; making a total of 25,175.

‡ The two armies, amounting to about 49,000 men, besides artillery, of which there were four brigades and two troops of British, and six brigades of Portuguese.

§ The French army consisted of eighty nine battalions of infantry, which, according to the latest returns, consisted of 56,000 men; fifty four squadrons of cavalry, of 8000 men; and about 6000 artillery. The whole army, including sappers, &c., was not less than 72,000 men.

¶ It would have been impossible to detach a corps from the army to occupy the Serra de Caramula after the action of the 27th September, when it was found that Colonel Trant had not arrived at Sardão. But that corps might have been hard pressed, and obliged to retreat, in which case it must have made its retreat upon Sardão and the north of Portugal†. It could not have rejoined the army; and its services would have been wanting in the fortified position near Lisbon. It was therefore determined to rely upon Colonel Trant to occupy the Serra de Caramula, whose line of operations and of retreat was to the northward. Nothing that could have been done (excepting to detach a large

* 'See letters to Lord Liverpool, of the 20th and 30th September.'

† 'This is the great difficulty in Portugal. The frontier is very long, and the country very narrow. The whole country is frontier; and every road in it leads to Lisbon.'

corps) could have prevented the French from throwing a large force into the Serra de Caramula. Even after their loss on the 27th, they had at least 12,000 or 14,000 men more than we had, and, good as our position was, theirs was equally good. When they took the road of the Serra de Caramula, therefore, there was nothing for it but to withdraw from Busaco.

‘ After quitting Busaco, there was no position which we could take up with advantage, in which we could be certain that we could prevent the enemy from getting to Lisbon before us, till we reached the fortified positions in front of that place, in which we arrived on the 8th of October; and we finally took up our ground on the 15th. Shortly after we arrived, the Marques de la Romana joined us with about 5000 effective rank and file.

‘ In the beginning of the month of November the British army in Portugal consisted of 29,497 rank and file, of which 2479 were cavalry; and 465 infantry were at Lisbon.

‘ The effectives of the Portuguese army consisted as follows: infantry 26,500, of which were at Elvas 1500, at Cadiz 1173, and at Abrantes 1500, leaving 22,400 with the army. The effective cavalry consisted of 2637, of which were at Elvas 163, Abrantes 76, in the north 130, and Estremadura 600*; leaving about 1500 cavalry with the army and at Lisbon; making the Portuguese army about 24,000 men. The British army was 29,000, and the Spanish army 5000, and the artillery made altogether about 60,000 men of the allies.

‘ The French army, at this time, could not have consisted of more than from 50,000 to 55,000 effective men. Their losses by death, desertion, and sickness, must have been considerable; but still they could not, in the beginning of November, be reduced lower than the numbers above stated.

‘ The question of attacking them was then well considered, and it was determined not to carry the measure into execution†. In fact, the chances of success were much against us.

* ‘ In these numbers the present fit for duty only are included. There were of course many cavalry detached from Elvas, Abrantes, and the head quarters of the corps in the north, but they had nothing to do with the operating army; and as the total of the fit for duty was 2637, they are accounted for accordingly.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 3d November, for the state of the different armies, and for the reasoning upon an attack.’

The enemy's force, but little inferior in numbers, was much superior in quality to a large part of ours. Their position, as is the case in all strong countries, was nearly as good as our own. We could not have used our artillery against it. We could not have attempted to turn it without laying open some of the roads to Lisbon, of which the enemy would infallibly have taken advantage. The French have shown, throughout the war in the Peninsula, but particularly in the last campaign in Portugal, that they invariably operate upon the flanks and rear, and communications of their enemy, never having any anxiety about their own; and in fact, till they have beaten their enemy in the field they never possess more than the ground they stand upon. This fact is proved in Portugal by their having lost their hospital and every thing belonging to it at Coimbra, only on the day their head quarters left that place; by the difficulty they have, and the constant losses they incur, in sending Officers and messengers *en courier*, and by their total want of intelligence.

‘ This system is the consequence of the mode in which they subsist their armies. The plunder everything they find in the country. Every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal, and vehicle of every description, is considered to belong of right, and without payment, to the French army; and they require a communication with their rear only for the purpose of conveying intelligence and receiving orders from the Emperor.

‘ Other armies cannot exist without a communication with their rear. The British army, in particular, must not lose its communication with its port of embarkation; and this is the principal cause of the great difficulties experienced in a contest with the French.

‘ On the 14th of November the French broke up from their position in front of the allies, with their right upon Sobral, and their left upon the Tagus, and retired by different routes to Santarem*. They here took a strong position, occupying the hill of Santarem with the 2d corps as the head of their cantonments, having the 8th corps to support it on its right; and the 6th corps, in a second line, at Torres Novas, Golegão, or towards the Zezere, over which river they had bridges; and they occupied Punhete as a *tête*

* ‘ See letter to Lord Liverpool, of 21st November.’

de pont. They were followed closely by the allied army; and from the intelligence received on the 17th from the left of the Tagus, of the movements of the enemy from Santarem, it was believed that the army was in full retreat; and that nothing remained at Santarem excepting, at the utmost, the 2d corps as a rear guard.

‘ The intelligence (which was received from Major General Fane) was confirmed by the probability that a retreat was the enemy’s intention. It was obvious that, as a military body, it was the measure which it was most expedient for them to adopt.

‘ By a retreat into Spain, they would, first, have been able to provide their army with plenty of food during the winter.

‘ Secondly, they would have been able to put them into good and quiet cantonments.

‘ Thirdly, they would have been able to provide their numerous sick with surgeons, medicines, &c., the whole of which they had lost.

‘ Fourthly, they would have been able to clothe and re-equip their troops with shoes, &c., which they required.

‘ Fifthly, they must have been perfectly aware that even should they be of insufficient strength to hope to make any impression upon the position of the allies in Portugal, they would experience no difficulty in regaining the position of Santarem from the frontier.

‘ And sixthly, they must have been aware that as long as they remained in the country, its cultivation would be impeded: and that by remaining they cut up by the roots the resources which were to enable them to attack the allies upon a future occasion.

‘ These reflections confirmed the intelligence which had been received, that the enemy were in full retreat; and it was believed that the only troops on Santarem were of the 2d corps.

‘ General Hill was therefore detached across the Tagus with the corps which had been under his command on the 18th, and head quarters were moved to Cartaxo*; and, on the 19th, when a sufficient body of troops to support the advanced guard had arrived, the orders were given, not, as is supposed, to attack the position of Santarem, but to cross

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 21st November.’

Rio Mayor river at different points, and attack the enemy's outposts upon it, to enable us to reconnoitre more closely the position of Santarem, and see whether it was practicable to attack the post, and what the enemy's real object was in maintaining himself there.

‘ Owing to a mistake of the road by a brigade of guns, the attack could not be made as was intended, and in fact ordered; and in the course of that night and the following morning so much rain had fallen as to render it impracticable to cross the Rio Mayor, or indeed scarcely to move the troops at all. We still, however, continued to work on with our troops on the right of the position of Santarem, on which side it appeared most practicable to approach it, till the 22d, when the enemy brought up troops of the 8th corps from their rear, and drove in our piquets beyond the bridge of Calhariz *.

‘ From this circumstance, and others of which we obtained a knowledge at about the same time, it was then obvious that they had their whole army between Santarem and the Zezere. The question of attacking the enemy on Santarem was then well considered; and the notion was relinquished, as the plan was impracticable at that moment, on account of the state of the roads and rivulets, as well as because it was obvious that the enemy had their whole army collected in certainly the strongest position in Portugal. We could not succeed without immense loss; and we could not make the attempt at that time without incurring the risk of having some of our detachments insulated and cut off from all communication with the others.

‘ About this time we heard of the movements of the enemy's reinforcements on the frontier; and General Silveira had, in November, been successful in an affair with an advanced guard which had been pushed across the Coa †.

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 24th November.’

† ‘ See letter to Lord Liverpool, of the 30th November.—When the disposition was formed for the defence of Portugal the troops of the line and British troops were brought to the most vulnerable points between the Douro and the Tagus, and to the south of the Tagus. The northern provinces were entrusted to the northern militia, about 15,000 in number, which were the best in Portugal; and they were divided into three divisions, one under General Silveira, another under General Miller, and a third under Colonel Trant, each division being aided by a body of regular cavalry and artillery; and the whole under the

This was the advanced guard of a division formed under General Gardanne, consisting of convalescents belonging to the three corps in Portugal, of 1500 men, which had been sent into Spain in October as an escort to General Foy; and of two or three battalions belonging to the 8th corps, which had been detached to General Scras by order of the Emperor, and were exclusive of the eighty nine battalions which entered Portugal. The whole were supposed to amount to 8000 men.

‘After the affair with Silveira the enemy retired across the Coa again, and went by the Upper Coa by Sabugal, and entered Portugal through Lower Beira, leaving the Estrella to the north on their right hand*. They advanced till they reached the Tagus, when they suddenly turned about, on the 25th November, and retired into Spain, more in the manner of the flight of a mob than of the march of troops. The ordenanza of Lower Beira followed them and did them much mischief; and they suffered much from the badness of the weather.

‘On the 13th of December a division of the 9th corps (which consisted of about twenty six battalions of infantry, and had entered Spain in September) broke up from Ciudad Rodrigo with this same division of Gardanne, in consequence of an order received from Paris, to make another attempt to enter Portugal. This division consisted of eleven battalions, and, with Gardanne’s, was supposed to be from 13,000 to 16,000 men: they must have been at least 10,000 men†. They reached the army about the 27th or 29th December, having been attacked by Colonel Wilson’s division of militia on their passage of the Alva, and suffered some loss. They brought no provisions or stores with them.

‘Since that period, and indeed ever since they took up the position of Santarem, the attention of the enemy has been principally devoted to discover the means of passing the Tagus; and they view our corps on the left of the

command of General Bacellar. When the enemy’s attack upon Portugal was decided between the Douro and the Tagus these corps all crossed the Douro, and have continued ever since on this side of that river, engaged in various operations on the enemy’s communications; but their principal object is to defend the northern provinces.’

* ‘See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of 8th December.’

† ‘See dispatches to Lord Liverpool, 15th, 21st, and 28th December.’

Tagus, which has continued there, with the utmost jealousy. The general report in their army, when they retired from Sobral, was, and my opinion is, that they intended immediately to cross the Tagus, and establish themselves in Alentejo, from which they were prevented by the passage of General Hill over that river on the 18th of November; and they are still prevented by the position of his corps, now under the command of Sir William Beresford, on the left of the Tagus.

‘ From this memorandum, which applies to events up to the close of the year 1810, it will appear that we had done everything in our power for the allies. Till lately, we have always been inferior in number, and infinitely inferior in description of troops to the enemy; and, adverting to the instructions which I received, and their spirit and meaning as explained by other letters, I do not think that I should have been justified in attempting more than I have done. Indeed, since the enemy have occupied the position of Santarem, it would have been impossible to attempt anything, owing to the bad state of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets by the rain.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

‘ NOTE.—When Regnier passed the Tagus in July, we were aware that Mortier would replace him in Estremadura; but the Marques de la Romana considered his corps to be sufficient not only to keep him in check, but to beat him out of the province. In this last expectation he was disappointed very much by the misconduct of his Officers; and a large part of his army was defeated by Mortier on the 11th of August*. The Marques, however, still continued to hold his ground; and a brigade of Portuguese dragoons soon joined him, which had been detached to reinforce him in cavalry from the reserve which I had formed on the Tagus†.

‘ After Mortier had defeated this corps he withdrew again into Andalusia, and the Marques de la Romana followed him, and had some successes against his small posts. Mortier then advanced again into Estremadura, and the Marques de la Romana retired; and on the 14th of Septem-

* ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 22d August.’

† ‘ See dispatch to Lord Liverpool, of the 11th August.’

ber the Portuguese cavalry defeated that of the enemy near Fuente de Cantos*.

‘The state of affairs in Portugal had induced the Marques de la Romana to turn his attention to this side at about this time; and he had determined to join the allied army with a part of his corps, leaving the divisions of Mendizabal and Ballesteros, and the cavalry, and all the garrisons, in Estremadura.

‘Mortier, upon hearing of the battle of Busaco, retired again into Andalusia on the 8th of October; and the Marques de la Romana was entirely at liberty to break up in Estremadura, and to join the allies without risk to the interests of that province.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Cartaxo, 24th February, 1811,
Half past 7 A.M.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘A deserter came in yesterday from Santarem, a Spanish creole, belonging to the marine, who has been attached to the 2d corps, which he joined about two months ago with Gardanne. He says that the enemy have in a wood, just above Santarem, two bridges, as he calls them; and another at Santarem, at which he says he had been employed at work. He could not speak any language very well, and I could not make him understand me; but I rather think that what he calls bridges are rafts. He also says that they have brought down from the Zezere six gun boats, in which they passed over to an island the other day 300 men, and brought away thirteen bullocks and some pigs. He, as all the deserters whom I have seen, who have been employed at work, says that they have not been badly off for meat, but that the bread is very bad, and that they do not get a quarter of a pound a day, but that they have plenty of vegetables.

‘I will send this fellow over to you, to point out where the rafts are, and the six boats, which I suppose they have armed; and I think it would be worth while to risk a few men to endeavor to bring them off or destroy them.

* ‘See dispatch of the 20th September.’

‘ This boat equipment at Santarem is certainly collected with a view to plunder. There are many cattle on Lumley’s plain below Almeirim, which must tempt them vastly ; and he should have strong piquets at the Quinta de Leite, &c. ; and Lieut. Claxton should watch the stream well at night.

‘ Clausel’s aide de camp is so badly wounded that I have not seen him ; but I understand that he swears he will not lie for anybody, and says that each regiment in the army has in its possession biscuit for at least three weeks, besides large magazines of grain ; that they had many sick about two months ago, but were becoming more healthy ; that the 9th corps consists of three divisions, or forty five battalions.

‘ I was going to Sobral to-day, to sleep at Alemquer to-night, but the day is so bad that I should only get wet and see nothing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I am going to Sobral, as the day appears better, and I shall be back to-morrow.

‘ W.’

To Captain the Hon. C. S. Cocks.

‘ MY DEAR COCKS,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811.

‘ I enclose you a letter which I have received from Lord Somers, and one for yourself, containing his desire that you should return to England.

‘ You must be as well aware as any impression of mine can make you, how severely we shall feel here the loss of your assistance and services ; and I am convinced that you will not desire to go if the occasion for your going is not of that urgent nature which would render your remaining any longer with us an injury to your family and yourself. I therefore leave it to you to determine what you will do ; and, although I have lately referred all applications for leave of absence to the Commander in Chief, I will give you leave if you wish it.

‘ If you do go, I only hope that you will return to us as soon as you can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain*

the Hon. C. S. Cocks.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have received the account of your last success, which is very satisfactory. ‘ W.’

To Don Martin de la Carrera.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this day’s date, to which I proceed to reply.

‘ It is desirable, nay necessary, that the army should be relieved as much as possible from the difficulty of providing for, and the trouble and difficulty of taking care of, the persons, as well Officers as soldiers, who can render no service, and the animals, as well sick and unserviceable horses of the cavalry, and mules of the same description of the artillery, and both belonging to Officers, &c.

‘ I have already stated, in my letter to General Virues of the 5th instant, that all persons, or animals, of this description, ought to be sent to Alburquerque, Valencia de Alcantara, and Alcantara, to be kept there till they are fit to serve, or till their services shall be called for; and I repeat this recommendation, as the condition on which alone I can venture to afford the assistance of my Government to the re-establishment of the fifth army.

‘ Accordingly, I request to have, 1st, a return, specifying the numbers of cavalry, men and horses, including Officers, and their horses belonging to the cavalry, in a state fit for service.

‘ Secondly, a return of the numbers of General and other Officers of the Staff, and their horses, in a state fit for service, and whose services are necessarily required with the army.

‘ Thirdly, a return of the number of Officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, with each regiment of infantry, fit for duty.

‘ Fourthly, a return of the number of pieces of cannon with the army, the number of mules or horses necessary, and in a state of condition, to draw the same; and the number of Officers, and their horses, non-commissioned officers, and privates required, and able to do duty with the artillery.

‘ Fifthly, a return of the number of animals belonging to the Real Hacienda, and the animals belonging to the bag-

gage of the army, which it may be necessary to retain with the army.

‘ I shall give directions that all these Officers, and soldiers, and animals, shall be regularly supplied with provisions, on condition that the others which are useless, and a burthen, shall be sent to the places which I have above pointed out, where they can recover, and from whence they can be brought as their services will be required.

‘ The troops cannot be in a better situation for their reorganization than Villa Viçosa, or Estremoz; and they should send the Real Hacienda, and the baggage, mentioned above in the fifth article, not immediately required for the use of the troops, or to aid in procuring them subsistence, to Monte Mor ó Novo. The artillery might, with advantage, be brought up to the same place.

‘ I shall give an order that 1000 stands of arms, and sets of accoutrements, shall at present be delivered to the Spanish Minister at Lisbon for the use of the fifth army, and 1000 pairs of shoes.

‘ In regard to clothing, I do not know that I have any at my disposal. I have it not in my power to make any advance of money to the fifth army. At all events, it would not be reasonable to require the same sum to pay the troops in their existing condition which they required when they were joined with this army. In respect to the Portuguese cavalry, the whole that remains of the army having now retired within the Portuguese territory, in order to collect and refit, it is necessary that that brigade should remain at my disposition, till some progress shall have been made in refitting the army, and some other arrangements shall have been made.

‘ I again call your attention, and that of General Mendizabal, to the situation of Campo Mayor, and request to know what quantity of ordnance, and stores, and of what calibre, are in that place. It is most important for Badajoz that the enemy should not obtain possession of Campo Mayor. It would give him all that he requires for the siege of Badajoz.

‘ I cannot conclude this letter without again endeavoring seriously to impress upon your mind the necessity of enforcing discipline among the Officers and soldiers of the army, and obliging them not to injure the property of the

inhabitants of the country. The most serious misfortunes will be the consequence of not attending to my repeated recommendations on this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Don Martin de la Carrera.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Junta of Estremadura.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, and I assure you that I am perfectly sensible of the importance to the cause of saving Badajoz. I am very desirous of having it in my power to contribute to the salvation of that place; and I shall not lose any opportunity of doing so of which the means at my disposal may enable me to avail myself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of Estremadura.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th instant. The former contains as many curious documents as any letter that I have ever seen. How little these people know of us, and how much less of the business of war, in which they are so desirous of meddling! The Bishop’s plan of caricaturing and libelling me is admirable.

‘ If Lord Wellesley chooses it, however, he may bring that gentleman to his senses, by insisting upon his giving a decided answer to my letter of the 18th January.

‘ In respect to the want of provisions at Abrantes, and other wants on which I write to you this day, I repeat what I told you on the 16th; and till Dom Miguel Forjaz contradicts, or recalls in an equally formal manner, the assertions in his note of the 14th, I shall give no assistance whatever to the Portuguese army from the stores of the British army, let the consequences be what they may. I am instructed by the Government to give no assistance of this description, and yet I have been in the habit of giving it daily; and, after all, I am to be held up to the world as the

cause of the failures of the Portuguese Government, and the consequent disbanding of the army, in libels, &c., founded upon notes acknowledged to contain falsehoods to please a colleague. Till these notes are recalled or contradicted I shall discontinue to give any assistance whatever.

‘Of course I concur in whatever has been done under your sanction to obtain the intelligence which you have sent me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I beg you to send the enclosed letter by the packet if it should not have sailed.

‘W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose you a report from Sir William Erskine, of the want of bread by the Portuguese brigade of infantry at Marmeleiro, under the command of Brig. General Pack, which I request you to lay before the Portuguese Government.

‘It was settled by Marshal Sir William Beresford that there should always be six days’ bread for the troops in their cantonments, especially those on the advanced post, as these are; but instead of that they have not one days’ bread, and in every week receive none for two or three days.

‘I have also a complaint from two companies of caçadores at Rio Mayor, who have received no bread for a week.

‘The Portuguese Government, however, will expect that these troops should march whenever an opportunity shall offer for them to make an exertion.

‘It is impossible for me to authorise the British Commissariat to hand over rice to the Portuguese Government. Rice is to be purchased for money, at a cheap rate, in the markets of Lisbon.

‘The British Commissariat can purchase what they require; and the Officers and soldiers of the British army have subscribed to purchase rice, with which they make soup, to deliver out in all their cantonments to the starving inhabitants who fly from that part of the country in which the enemy are stationed; and I should think that the Go-

vernment can experience no difficulty in procuring what they require of the same article for the use of their armies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 26th February, 1811,

Half past 8 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received yesterday, upon my return, your letter of the 23d, at night, and in the evening your letters of the 24th and 25th. I hope you received my letter of the 24th, enclosing one from Mendizabal about Campo Mayor.

‘ If you make a dash at the boats, I recommend, should it be made in the night, that the party should be small, not more than 50 or 60 men perhaps.

‘ I did not receive the second letter mentioned by Hardinge, containing the enclosures for Romana.

‘ The dragoon who brings the letters should have a cloth to roll them up in, as the cover is generally torn off them.

‘ I saw yesterday the Lusitanian legion, and the 8th regiment, and a brigade of 6 pounders in Campbell's division, and the two brigades of 3 pounders. There were about 2000 men under arms in the legion and the 8th regiment altogether. The legion marched better than I expected; but they did not stand very well under arms, and they are a miserable body of men. One third of them at least are too small and too weak to carry arms. The 8th are all boys without one exception; but they are very fine boys. They marched well, and stood tolerably well in the ranks. I cannot give my opinion upon the manœuvring of either, as my friend Campbell appears to have neglected that branch in the whole division; and I do not think that either English or Portuguese marched or formed according to principles. However, that will be remedied.

‘ The mules in all the brigades are in working condition, and that is all; by no means in the state in which they ought to have been, after so much rest, and at the commencement of a campaign. I observed that almost all the artillerymen wore mustachios, which I think is contrary to your orders.

‘ Whilst writing to you upon this subject, I may mention

that I have heard that the 12th regiment, at Alhandra, is in very bad order. I think it would be desirable that General Hamilton should go over for a day or two and take a look at them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I learn from England, by a letter of the 5th, that the Ministry are not to be changed. The King is better, and has in some degree recovered his sight. ‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th February, 1811.

‘ I received yesterday evening your two letters of the 26th. My opinion has always been, that the enemy construct works for the employment, as well as to afford conversation, to their troops. I believe their engineers, as well as ours, are always willing to construct a work which costs nothing but the labor of the soldiers.

‘ I will lend you transports for any purpose for which you may require them. You have only to state where you want to send them, and for how many.

‘ I enclose the duplicate of my letter of yesterday, which we fear the guide who carried it took to the enemy, as we have not heard of his taking it to Mugem.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I still send the duplicate, although I have reason to hope that the guide crossed at Valada. ‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 27th February, 1811.

‘ I always considered that, although we might have a claim to salvage for the British ships and cargoes saved at Oporto, we had none for the Danish ships. This was, however, merely a private opinion, in which I was very likely to be wrong; and I am glad to find that the Government have decided otherwise. I understand that the appeal on the salvage question was *decided* in our favor on the 26th January;

and I have been desired to send home lists of claimants, which I shall do immediately. I never had a doubt of the claim of yourself, the *Semiramis*, and *Nautilus*, to share in any benefit resulting from the capture of Oporto, and I understand from my letter that all the lawyers co-operated on the appeal.

‘ I enclose the only orders which I have received regarding prisoners or deserters by the last post. I never received those prohibiting their being sent home.

‘ It will give me great pleasure to see you and Sir Joseph Yorke, when he shall arrive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on James Gray, which I request you to peruse, and send me your opinion of him. I beg you to return the enclosed papers.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Cartaxo, 28th February, 1811.

‘ I received last night only yours dated the 26th and 27th A. M. I enclose the state of the 6th division, from which you will see how the corps stand.

‘ Stopford, Kemmis, and Peacocke are made Brigadier Generals, and all have brigades or commands already. I think, however, that I can remove —.

‘ Now that you have mentioned it, I believe I recollect that there was an old breeze between General — and —, when both were in the 82d. I am not astonished at it, as — was certainly the most inattentive regimental Officer that ever was seen; and I should doubt that attention to his duty was his style even as a General Officer.

‘ The best way of settling the communication is to arrange how long the dragoons shall be going each stage, and make the Officer at each stage mark the hours of arrival and departure; and then we shall see whether the delay, which is enormous (for I arrived here from where I left you in less than three hours), is to be attributed to the dragoons on this or the other side of the water, or to both, or to the seamen. Your letters scarcely ever arrive till 8 o’clock at night.

‘ The regulations about post horses are like everything else done by the Portuguese Government. They first make a regulation, and then complain that we break it; then I adopt measures to insure obedience to it; and at last it ends in nobody obeying it excepting the British army.

‘ — is as harsh about passports as he is about everything else, and never gives one; I scarcely ever give one; and nobody else has any to give. I believe, however, that Officers can get the post mules without posting orders, because the Government order in that respect is not obeyed; and besides, as you say, I believe that every clerk in office has the power of giving posting orders, about which we are so careful.

‘ There is nothing new here. I was yesterday beyond Calhariz. Everything is in the same state; but I thought I saw more soldiers walking about. The cavalry vidette was replaced upon the hill in front of Pero Filho.

‘ By the bye, Regnier’s aide de camp said yesterday that the man who deserted lately in a boat is a robber and a murderer. He is the Spanish creole whom I sent to you. He is at all events, a liar of the first magnitude. He told Lumley, it appears, that he was brought round from Cadiz to Figueira two months ago, with 5000 men!

‘ I found the road at Calhariz rather dryer yesterday than usual, notwithstanding the recent rains, but still difficult for carriages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received your letter of the 27th at night. Mr. Aylmer acted by the orders of the Commissary General, in carrying away the straw from the lower part of the left of the Tagus. However, as it is inconvenient to the troops there, I have given him directions to stop the removal of any more. I imagine, however, that there is now there more than you can consume. Mr. Kennedy is removing the straw from Benavente and that part of the river. I have received your letter of the 28th.

‘ If you think you have too many troops close to the river left, and more than is necessary, and that the number in that part will render it difficult to move without the enemy’s knowledge, you had better draw them in again; I should think, however, the frequent changes and reliefs of the troops thereabouts would have the effect of inducing the enemy to doubt whether there was any great change, even if they should perceive a diminution of numbers.

‘ I had yesterday a telegraph communication from Elvas, that the French made a brisk attack upon Badajoz, about half past 3; but I did not hear how it ended, or whether it was with cannon, or an assault. This morning I have no intelligence.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that an Officer, Licut. Burke*, 45th, has deserted to the enemy, and has arrived at Santarem.

‘ If the Officer who writes the enclosed will state what his rank is, you may desire Mr. Ogilvie to give him a month’s pay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. I am not certain that, if you make the attempt on the boats it would not be better to do it in a few smaller boats than in one large.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811.

‘ Colonel Peacocke has been desired to send James Gray on board the *Barfleur*, to be disposed of as you may think proper.

‘ Captain Cocks, of the 16th light dragoons, is going home; and, as I understand that you propose to send a ship of war with the mail on Sunday, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow him to have a passage in her.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

* This Officer was mad, and was left behind by Marshal Massena when he retreated.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 1st March, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 27th. I have perused the paper on the grain at Lisbon, &c. It is satisfactory as far as it goes; but there is one material omission in it, and that is, what measures have been taken, or are in contemplation to adopt, to secure the supply for the remainder of the year.

‘ You will observe that the ports of America will have been shut against us on the 1st of February. It is possible, nay, probable, that the grain for which you sent the 400,000*l.* may not have quitted the ports of America at that time, and it is at all events desirable not to neglect any means which can be adopted to secure so desirable an object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have lately received several anonymous letters, which I suspect have been written under the directions of the Principal, the Bishop, &c., and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me any papers you have in the handwriting of either of those persons or their secretaries, &c.

‘ W.’

To General Don Gabriel de Mendizabal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I had the honor of receiving this morning the letter of your Excellency, dated the 26th February, and General Leite has transmitted me a copy of that which you addressed to him on the —.

‘ When I addressed your Excellency on the 23d instant, my wish was to draw your attention to the serious consequences to the town of Badajoz of the probable loss of Campo Mayor, if that place should not be secure from an attack by *coup de main*; and I stated to you that the place had been delivered over to the late Marques de la Romana at his request, and under an honorable engagement to defend it. In your answer to me your Excellency has informed me that the place has already in it the number of men which I stated to be necessary for its defence against a *coup de main*, and in your letter to General Leite of the

—, you called upon him to assist in its defence, and for his opinion upon its defence; which opinion, by a reference to my letter, your Excellency will find you were requested to ask only after Badajoz should fall, whether it was expedient, or otherwise, still to retain possession of Campo Mayor. My opinion is, that at all events the place must be kept till Badajoz shall fall; and when Badajoz shall fall, it will become a question whether the garrison should be kept in Campo Mayor, upon which I requested your Excellency to consult the opinion of General Leite.

‘In respect to the statement in your Excellency’s letter of the 26th February, that there was already a garrison in Campo Mayor more numerous than that which I had stated to be necessary for its defence, I have to inform your Excellency that General Carrera informed me that there were in Campo Mayor 600 men, but 400 of them recruits without arms. I stated to your Excellency that 500 good infantry under a good Commanding Officer were necessary to preserve this place against an attack by *coup de main* by the enemy.

‘I have already informed your Excellency of my opinion of the importance of the preservation of Campo Mayor and Badajoz, and of the honorable engagement entered into by the Marques de la Romana, when he obtained possession of that place at his own desire. Your Excellency will decide immediately whether you will, or will not, perform that engagement in the manner pointed out in my letter of the 23d February, and will inform General Leite of your determination. If you should determine not to comply with the suggestions contained in that letter, I will then request you to deliver over the place to the charge of General Leite, as soon as he shall have troops prepared to take possession of Campo Mayor, according to instructions which will be sent to him.

‘I am concerned to learn that Badajoz is already distressed for provisions. I had understood from General Carrera that there were in Badajoz sufficient quantities of grain to last the garrison for six months, and meat to last the garrison for four months.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

Don Gabriel de Mendizabal.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and its enclosure from General Leite, which I return together with General Leite’s to you of the ——. I likewise enclose a letter to General Mendizabal, which I request you to peruse, and to forward open to General Leite, for his perusal.

‘ My own opinion of Campo Mayor is that neither the fort, nor what is called the citadel, can be defended against a regular attack. In its present state, (at least in the state in which it was in 1809,) the citadel could not be defended at all against an enemy in possession of the town, without material improvements, which there are not means or time to make. The plan proposed by General Leite therefore will not answer.

‘ When Campo Mayor was given over to the Marques de la Romana, it was particularly stated to him that it was desirable not to place in that garrison any ordnance, or stores, which could be used in the attack of Badajoz or Elvas. I am apprehensive, however, that this desire was not attended to, and that there are ordnance in the place, and stores, of which the enemy are in want for the attack of Badajoz. In this view, therefore, the preservation of the place is important to Badajoz.

‘ It is also important in another view, as, if the enemy have possession of Campo Mayor, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to make any movement across the Caya for the relief of Badajoz, particularly if that river should be full. I do not consider the place to be of any importance in respect to Elvas. If Badajoz should fall there will be no want of ordnance and stores for the attack of Elvas.

‘ Campo Mayor is beyond the Caya, and all movements for the relief of Elvas must be made within that river. It is not probable that a garrison of 500 men, which would keep the place against an attack by *coup de main*, would do much good to Elvas upon the enemy’s communications with Badajoz, from which they would be at some distance, if the Caya should not be full. Still, however, there is a considerable population at Campo Mayor, whom it is desirable

to save from the ravages of the enemy, and in this view it might be desirable to risk 500 men in Campo Mayor.

‘ It might also be desirable in another view, viz., in case the enemy, after having obtained possession of Badajoz, should be desirous of entering the Alentejo, without attacking Elvas. Campo Mayor would then stand upon his communications, and he must either break ground before the place, which would create an important delay, or he must incur all the inconvenience of leaving that place in our possession behind him. In these two views it might be desirable to risk the loss of 500 men, to save the place, or to delay the enemy.

‘ I request you to communicate these opinions to General Leite, and desire him to determine whether he will endeavor to save the place, according to his own view of his means. From the correspondence which has already taken place with the Spanish Generals, he will observe that there is but little chance that they will attempt to hold the place after Badajoz shall fall, and indeed it is doubtful whether General Mendizabal will put in it the garrison which I deem necessary to defend it against a *coup de main*, even till Badajoz shall fall. If General Leite should find that to be the case, he cannot in my opinion do better than to send to Campo Mayor the detachment he proposes of the Portalegre militia, sending out of the place all the Spaniards and their establishments. If he finds General Mendizabal determined to hold the place, as recommended by me, till Badajoz shall fall, but not disposed to hold it any longer, and if General Leite should wish to hold it any longer upon the grounds of the reasoning contained in this letter, it would then be desirable that he should send there the Portalegre militia immediately, and allow General Mendizabal to withdraw the Spanish troops and establishments by degrees.

‘ I agree in opinion with General Leite that it is not probable that the enemy will attack Marvão. At all events, 300 or 400 men are sufficient to defend that place against any attack; and he may safely send the remainder of the Portalegre militia to Campo Mayor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I return Leite’s letters upon Campo Mayor, and I enclose you an official letter upon that subject, which contains one for General Mendizabal. I have received one from him, in which, among other things, he now informs me, that Badajoz wants provisions; fortunately, however, I believe the fact to be, as before stated by General Mendizabal, that, having seized all the provisions in the houses of the inhabitants who had fled, the troops have enough to last for some months. Carrera so stated in an official letter I had from him the day before yesterday, when he was here. Badajoz was warmly engaged again yesterday morning.

‘ A brig arrived yesterday, which spoke with Sir Joseph Yorke off Cape Finisterre, and I expect he will arrive this day.

‘ The island of Mauritius is taken.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. The report from Badajoz of this morning is that there is a heavy fire there, and the defence very vigorous.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant. I beg you to advert to my letter to you on the subject of our taking charge of the Portuguese commissariat. I am apprehensive that it is impracticable to effect that object, without entering into all the details of the Government.

‘ I believe that the answer to my letters respecting the soldiers has been dictated by the Bishop and Principal, as it is not in the friendly terms in which those letters were written formerly.

‘ Upon the subject of the duties on our consumption, I request you to advert particularly to a memorandum which I sent Mr. Dunmore, through the Commissary General, some days ago.

‘ Believe me, &c.

C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant.

‘ There has been no demand from the Portuguese Government, that I have heard of, for the delivery of Michael Grace to the Portuguese authorities ; when that demand shall be made it will be complied with.

‘ You are the best judge of the propriety of any foreign Government passing a sentence upon one of His Majesty’s subjects, that he shall serve for five years on board His Majesty’s fleet.

‘ I conclude that the soldier of the 16th light dragoons is given over to me, to be dealt with as I may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to transmit, for your Lordship’s information, a return of supplies remaining in the British stores in Portugal on the 28th ultimo.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Earl of Liverpool.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I also enclose an estimate of the probable receipt and expenditure from 25th February to 24th March.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s dispatch, No. 7, of the 28th January, regarding prisoners of war.

‘ Admiral Berkeley had previously communicated to me the orders which he had received from the Admiralty, dated the 5th January, not to send any more French prisoners or deserters to England ; and I conceive that, till those orders are countermanded, the suggestions contained in Mr. Barrow’s letter to Colonel Bunbury, and those contained in former communications, are unnecessary, as of course the

Admiral will refuse to attend to any request from me to send home prisoners or deserters. Indeed it would be improper to make such a request, as long as the orders of the 5th January are in existence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 2d March, 1811.

‘ No event of importance has occurred since I addressed you on the 23d of February.

‘ The enemy have continued their operations against Badajoz, but without much effect; and the fire of the place is well kept up, and the garrison in good spirits.

‘ General Mendizabal is endeavoring to collect and reorganize his corps at Villa Viçosa, in Portugal.

‘ The enemy moved a large force, with cannon, upon Lieut. Colonel Grant, at Covilhão, on the 18th February; and he was obliged to withdraw the ordenanza from thence, and retire to Alpedrinha, where he was, according to the last accounts.

‘ The enemy have made no movement of any importance in front of this army.

‘ I am concerned to inform your Lordship that Lieut. Richard Burke, of the 45th regiment, deserted on the 23d of February, and went over to the enemy at Santarem. The 45th are stationed in the neighborhood of Alcoentre; and he must have crossed the Rio Mayor river within our posts at Rio Mayor, and must have joined the enemy by some of the roads which lead into the right of their position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

11 A.M.

‘ I received last night your letters of yesterday, Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

‘ I will speak to the Commissary General respecting the straw, and the Commissariat arrangement mentioned in

No. 3, upon both of which I will request him to write to Mr. Ogilvie.

‘ Our correspondent of Salamanca is certainly well informed of everything. I should think that Claparède has been very desirous of coming down from Guarda, at least if the climate is what it was last year.

‘ The desire of the Government to appoint Le Cor to the government of the Minho is consistent with their other recent proceedings, to form a separate Portuguese interest in this country. My opinion is that if we cannot get Massena out of his present situation, and alter the whole state of the war, Bessières will invade Tras os Montes and the Minho at an early period of the season; and I would depend upon Colonel Wilson in Minho much rather than upon Le Cor, who, as you observe, could not well be replaced where he is. But you will find that the Government will not yield this point, and I should not be surprised if the Bishop and Principal made their stand upon it.

‘ Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries at Lisbon, and has given Mr. Stuart some papers written by those personages, which tend to show their folly, equally with their mischievous dispositions. Among other plans they have one for libelling and caricaturing me in England! They complain that you and I have had hunting parties! and that I eat a good dinner at Oporto, instead of pursuing Soult!

‘ I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous letters to me are written by the Principal, and I suspect others by the Bishop. But this last is not quite so clear. These are men to govern a nation in difficult circumstances!

‘ There was a very brisk attack upon Badajoz yesterday; and I was apprehensive, by the last report in the evening, that the enemy had got into the covered way. But the report of this morning is that the place continues to defend itself, and that there was a heavy fire of musketry on the esplanade: so that the enemy are not in the covered way.

‘ I enclose letters from Blunt. It is almost useless to write to the Government upon any subject; they will not do what we desire them. Indeed I doubt if they can. Cocks has already informed me of this disorder at Caldas, and I have removed the dragoons from thence.

‘ You will also see another letter from Blunt, which Murray has, upon the subject of cattle seized by the 21st regiment, upon which I write to Mr. Stuart. But it is all useless. General Lumley appears to have been on the alert last night. What do you think of his alarm?’

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Colonel Ellis of the 23d regiment, and its enclosures, containing a request that sixty pieces of Russia duck, consigned to him from England for the use of the 23d regiment under his command, may be passed through the Custom house, duty free, which I beg to lay before the Governors of the Kingdom, with my request that this application may be complied with.

‘ I beg you to return the enclosures.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d instant. One of the anonymous letters to me is positively written by Principal Souza. Two others are, I think, written by the Bishop; but of this last I cannot be so certain, as his note to Baron Eben is written upon good paper, with a good pen; the letters written by the same person to me are upon bad brown paper, with a bad pen. The characters in both are very similar; and I have but little doubt that the letters are written by the Bishop. It would be very desirable to see more of his writing, if you can get some for me. If I can prove the fact clearly, I shall send the letters to the Prince Regent, that he may see what clever fellows the Governors of the Kingdom are.

‘ The British army are now nearly two months in arrears of the usual mode of payment, and I believe there is no money now in the military chest. I will, however, speak to

the Commissary General; but is it not desirable to come to a settlement with the Portuguese Government, at least up to the close of the last year?

‘ You do not mention the dates of the accounts from Sampayo from Alexandria.

‘ We must think of some means of getting more grain, otherwise this miserable people will starve.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I sent you, on the 25th August, a letter from Principal Souza to me, of the 15th August, which you never returned to me; but which would be likely to throw more light on the anonymous letter, and probably enable me to do with it what I wish.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I enclose the extract of a letter from Brig. General Blunt, containing a complaint of an Officer and party of the 21st regiment, for seizing and carrying off the cattle of the inhabitants.

‘ I have repeatedly represented to the Government the necessity of providing for the wants of their troops, if they intended that their discipline should be preserved, or that they should exist in the state of a military body at all.

‘ It is impossible to punish soldiers, who are left to starve, for outrages committed in order to procure food; and, at all events, no punishment, however severe, will have the desired effect of preventing the troops from seizing what they can get to satisfy their appetite, when neglected by those whose duty it is to supply their wants.

‘ There is certainly no want of cattle, but the Government will not adopt the measures to procure funds to purchase them; and the troops are left to plunder any property which may unfortunately fall in their way.

‘ I have also to mention that Sir William Erskine again, yesterday, reported to me the wants of General Pack's brigade, and their consequent sickness. This is the fifth day that they have been without bread.

‘ The season is now approaching, during which it may be expected that the roads will become practicable, and that the troops may move. Whatever the enemy may have done, it has never been possible to move either the Portuguese or British troops in Portugal without supplies of provisions; and of course it cannot be expected that any will be found in any part of the country under existing circumstances.

‘ I request the Government to advert seriously to this fact, and to turn their minds to measures which shall provide their operating troops at least with the supply of a few days.

‘ If any opportunity were now to offer, as it probably will soon, of making an advantageous movement, I declare that I do not know how I can move the Portuguese troops, as they are entirely destitute of all means of supply.

‘ This is a subject which must be brought under the consideration of the King’s Government. His Majesty supplies not only the pay, but money to pay for the provisions of 30,000 men; yet these men are not better provided than others, for the whole army is absolutely without food.

‘ I would also beg to observe, that in consequence of the want of food, and the want of means in the hospitals, the effective strength of the Portuguese army diminishes every month, while that of His Majesty’s troops increases.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I beg that you will draw the attention of the Government to a fact that has come to my knowledge, viz., that there is a very dangerous contagious fever among the inhabitants at Caldas, and suggest to them the expediency of sending medical aid to Caldas. It is desirable that, if the Government should determine to adopt any measure on this subject, no time should be lost.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter from Don Martin de la Carrera, and the answer to it, which will explain to you the state of the fifth Spanish army, and the measures to be adopted to collect and refit it.

‘ It is very desirable, on many accounts, that the Officer appointed to command this army should join it, and that the Government should make an exertion to send here some money for its use.

‘ I likewise enclose a correspondence which I have had with the Junta of Estremadura. I likewise enclose two letters which I have received from General Mendizabal, in answer to letters from me, of which I enclosed copies in my last dispatch.

‘ I beg you to observe that in the first the misfortune which occurred at Badajoz on the 19th instant is attributed to me, because I did not send cavalry to reinforce General Mendizabal. I believe it is more necessary for me to justify myself for having trusted General Madden’s brigade to the direction of General Mendizabal, than for having omitted to reinforce General Mendizabal with British cavalry.

‘ Till it can be shown that 10,000 Spanish infantry, and 1500 cavalry, with cannon, in a good position, having one flank resting upon the outworks of Badajoz, ought not to be expected to defend themselves against 4000 French infantry and 1800 cavalry, for that is the whole of the French force employed upon this occasion, this misfortune will not be attributed to me.

‘ The second letter is an answer to mine of the 23d, a copy of which went to you by the last post, relating to Campo Mayor; and I refer you to my answer to it, in which you will find an exposition of the want of candor of General Mendizabal, in assuring me that there was a garrison in Campo Mayor, more numerous than that which I had suggested should be left there, as in fact two thirds of them were recruits without arms.

‘ I also beg leave to refer you to General Mendizabal’s letter to General Leite, upon the subject of this fortress, which is referred to in my letter to General Mendizabal of yesterday.

‘ I have reason to believe that there is no want of provisions at Badajoz. It is certainly true that none had been provided ; but when the communication with the place was opened in the beginning of February, after the enemy had invested it, the inhabitants were obliged to quit the place ; and they left behind them their provisions, which have been seized for the troops. I understand that they had, as the inhabitants of the Peninsula in general have, a supply in their houses to last them for the year.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from General Ballesteros, giving an account of a success he has had against the enemy. I understand that General Ballesteros has since received orders to approach nearer to Cadiz.

‘ The enemy have continued their attack upon Badajoz, and commenced a heavy fire upon the place on the 28th instant.

‘ They have intrenched one battalion on the heights of San Christoval, and have some cavalry upon the Caya and upon the Gevora.

‘ They appear inclined to construct a bridge over the Guadiana, below Badajoz, and have commenced a *tête de pont*. They have got possession of some of the pontoons belonging to the bridge which was in Badajoz, and which were removing to Elvas, in consequence of my repeated suggestion, when the Spanish army was surprised and defeated. I was assured that these pontoons were destroyed ; but it now appears that the enemy have possession of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. -

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Cartaxo, 3d March, 1811.

‘ I enclose my dispatch of yesterday. We have a telegraph communication with Elvas ; and there has been hard fighting at Badajoz for the last three days. There was a heavy fire there this morning ; and it appears that the enemy had not yet established themselves on the glacis.

‘ Sir Joseph Yorke is not yet arrived, but he was spoken to off Cape Finisterre three days ago.

‘ Accounts had been received in England before he left it,

that the Island of Mauritius had surrendered, the inhabitants having refused to co-operate in its defence.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letters, Nos. 4 and 5, of the 2d, one of 10 A. M., and one of half past 2 P. M. of yesterday. Madden must act according to his former instructions, separate from the Spaniards, in case the French should enter the Alentejo. Otway must fall back upon you, losing no time if the enemy should take the Estremoz road, which he certainly will not.

‘ By the last telegraph of yesterday it appears that Badajoz had the best of it. The enemy’s fire had ceased, and the fort’s continued. I will order transports for your recruits; but if the intelligence of the enemy’s movements be true, I conclude that you would prefer that they should march.

‘ To whom is the Agent of Transports to communicate at Oporto? Would you wish the recruits to land at Peniche? Have they any Officer to take charge of them in the transports, or to draw their provisions for them?

‘ The regiments of Arganil, &c., had better be collected at Oporto, and we will eventually bring them down to the lines.

‘ I think it likely that the enemy are about some move; but we have so frequently been disappointed that it is impossible to be certain. There is no alteration whatever in front. I have the report of this morning, and I was yesterday evening on the left of Elder’s post. I am going to look at the 3d division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. The *Ethalion* is arrived, but the three deckers are supposed to be blown off by the easterly wind. It is now five days since they were spoken to. I understand that the ships are now off the bar.

‘ W.’

To Major General the Hon. W. Lumley.

‘ Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811,
Half past 6 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ I received your note of this morning. I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will let me know at an early hour to-morrow morning, if you should perceive any difference at Santarem in the course of this night or in the morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General
the Hon. W. Lumley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811,
6 A.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I received last night your letter of the 3d at night, and that of the 4th, 10 in the morning.

‘ I went to the front yesterday, after returning from the review, and I could perceive no difference, excepting that there were no howitzers in the work or in the low ground. There were two guns of small calibre in the work, and one in the fleche in the low ground. The other fleche was masked. I could not perceive any guns on the heights. Bushes had been laid to cover the stations which they had occupied, and I conclude that these have been removed. The outposts were the same; and I did not observe any other alteration on the great heights, excepting that all the people I saw were fully accoutred.

‘ I have not yet received the report of this morning; but I should think that the movement of the troops has not yet been made, at least generally. It is probable that the baggage, stores, and the heavier part of the artillery, have been sent off, but that the effective part of the army still remains.

‘ There was no alteration on the outposts on our left yesterday. I have, however, closed up Cole’s division to this place this morning; and I have ordered Sir William Erskine to Azambujeira, &c., in case matters should be found this morning in such a state as to render it expedient to make an attack upon the position.

‘ In respect to your corps, the former plan, in case of the

retreat of the enemy, was, that it should cross the Tagus at Abrantes, and annoy the enemy on his supposed march through Lower Beira. It is not probable that he is going that way.

‘ However, I think that if you find the movement in your front to be decided, you should detach a brigade of infantry, with some cavalry and artillery, to Abrantes, to obtain possession of the right bank of the Tagus as low as the Zezere; and then bring the bridge of Abrantes down, and place it upon the Tagus, in such a situation as will give us a short communication between the two corps. This will be an object, whatever may be the future line of our operations.

‘ The reinforcements have arrived, and we shall be able in a few days to attack the enemy if he retains this position, or possibly to attack him in any other which he may take; or, if he quits the Tagus, to detach sufficiently to Abrantes. The bridges at the places which I have pointed out will facilitate the execution of any measure which it may be expedient to adopt, if the enemy should retreat.

‘ The most efficient measure, if the enemy should retire from the Tagus with a view to take up another position in Portugal, would be to follow and attack him; but there are positions, for instance that on the Alva, which he might take, which it would be equally impossible to attack, as it has been hitherto that in which he is.

‘ In the meantime, we cannot rely upon Badajoz holding out, or that the besieging army will not receive another reinforcement; and I am therefore inclined to be of opinion that we ought to take advantage of the enemy’s quitting the Tagus to relieve that place, and set up again the army of the left. In this case also the bridge will be necessary.

‘ There is another inducement to adopt this last measure, which is, that the further the enemy goes back, the nearer he will be to Claparède, by the addition of whose force he will again counterbalance our reinforcement.

‘ The 9th and 21st were very weak yesterday, but in very good order, and they manœuvred and marched well. The artillery mules attached to the 3d division were not very good, nor in very good condition; scarcely so well as those I had seen at Quinta da Torre.

‘ Badajoz made two sorties yesterday, and, it is said, de-

stroyed a battery. The fire of the place was superior to that of the besiegers throughout the day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811,
12 at noon.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ All the accounts which I have received this morning tend to confirm the notion which I communicated to you this morning, that nothing had yet moved, except baggage and sick.

‘ The increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese army, and the certainty that when we move, the burthen of supplying their troops will fall upon us, or that the troops must starve, have induced me to turn my attention seriously to the mode of supplying them; and I enclose a memorandum which I have communicated to the Commissary General, with notes upon it, according to which I think the business can be done. Let me know whether you concur in this plan, and if you do I will have it laid before the Portuguese Government. I should have wished to include in this arrangement a plan for supplying the militia in the lines, which is an intolerable burthen upon us; but I fear that if the Portuguese Government undertake it, they will not feed them, and then we shall lose the services of all the militia and ordenanza.

‘ The complaint against the Portuguese hospitals and *depositos* continues to be general. Pack told me yesterday that when their men return to him, which is but seldom, they have neither arms, accoutrements, clothing, nor necessities, and are really worse than useless. General Picton says the same. Do your men carry to the hospitals with them a list of their necessities, &c.? and is a register kept at the hospital of what each brings? with what marks, &c. &c.? Is there an Officer responsible for the men’s things while they are in hospital, as our Purveyor is? All this is worthy of consideration, and requires regulation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. Return the enclosed papers.

‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to send to Oporto infantry transports to carry 800 men, in order to remove to Lisbon that number of recruits belonging to the Portuguese army who are at that place.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

‘I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from a correspondent at Santarem, stating the reasons given by two deserters from the Portuguese army for their desertion.

‘I beg you to draw the attention of the Government to this paper, and particularly to that part of it which relates to the satisfaction shown by the enemy upon any prospect of disunion among the allies.

‘The state of want in which the Portuguese troops are kept must occasion desertion, as well as other evils; and it is an extraordinary proof of the attachment of the Portuguese soldiers to their country that this crime has not been more frequent, considering the privations which they endure.

‘These privations, however, are thinning the ranks of the army in a lamentable degree; and in fact every soldier produced in the ranks costs as much as two. I yesterday inspected the 9th and 21st Portuguese regiments, and there were under arms only 1319 men, whereas the strength of these two regiments, by the last returns, was 2476. A few days ago I inspected the Lusitanian legion, and the two battalions produced only 1100 men: their strength, according to the last return, was 1765. The 8th regiment, in like manner, produced under arms only 856: their strength, according to the last return, was 1150.

‘From these circumstances the Government will see what an enormous expense is incurred for the small number of men produced in the field, owing to defective arrangements,

and their omission to adopt measures repeatedly recommended to their attention, and ordered by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to augment the resources of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

‘ The great inefficiency of the Portuguese Commissariat, and the increasing evils which are the consequence of it, have induced me to endeavor to discover some mode by which some assistance might be given to the Portuguese Government in this branch of their concerns; and, having consulted with Sir William Beresford and the Commissary General, I enclose a memorandum of an arrangement, according to which a large part of the Portuguese army will be fed by the British Commissariat, at the expense of the Portuguese Government; and it is to be hoped that, being relieved from the necessity of supplying so large a proportion of the operating army, the Portuguese Government will supply the remainder in an efficient and satisfactory manner.

‘ I beg you to let me know, as soon as possible, whether this plan will be adopted.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

‘ Cartaxo, 5th March, 1811.

‘ In order, if possible, to render the Portuguese army more efficient, and to provide more effectually for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops, it is proposed :

‘ First, that the British Commissariat shall supply with provisions the Portuguese troops serving in British divisions, that is to say, ‘Colonel Champelmond’s, Colonel Harvey’s, General Spry’s, Baron Eben’s, and General Colman’s brigades, besides the 1st and 3d caçadores in the Light division, which will be supplied as usual.

‘ Secondly, this arrangement will include the supply of provisions for the artillerymen, and forage for the mules attached to the brigades of Portuguese artillery serving with

these several divisions, and forage for the mules attached to the regiments for the carriage of baggage and musket ammunition; and it must be understood that these animals must go a reasonable distance to the magazines for their forage, in the same manner as those belonging to the British army.

‘ Thirdly, the ration for each Officer and soldier is to continue the same as it has been heretofore; that is to say, half a pound of meat, and wine, and a pound of biscuit, or a pound and a half of bread. The arrangement for beef issued to the Portuguese troops by the British Commissariat, made in May last *, is to continue as heretofore; and the troops are to receive in the whole either three quarters of a pound of meat, and wine or spirits, or a pound of meat without wine or spirits, for one quarter of a pound of which they are to be under stoppages, and for the whole of which the Portuguese Government are to pay the British Commissariat, as settled by that arrangement.

‘ Fourthly, the detail of the deliveries of the rations is to be made to the troops by the Portuguese Commissariat; and the British Commissariat with the several divisions will have nothing to do but to supply the Portuguese Commissary attached to the brigade in the division with the quantities of bread, meat, and forage, which he will require daily for the Portuguese troops, for which he will take the Portuguese Commissary’s receipts.

‘ Fifthly, the British Commissariat is to keep a separate account of the issues under the head of the arrangement of 1810, and arrangement of March, 1811, which he will forward on the 24th of every month to the Commissary General.

‘ Sixthly, the Portuguese Government are to pay for the supplies thus delivered to the Portuguese troops, according to the 6th article of the arrangement of June, 1809; that is to say, the full price which those articles will have cost the British Commissary General, with a reasonable addition for the expense of transport from the magazines, with the exception of beef issued under the arrangements of May, 1810, which is to be paid for at the rate then settled.

‘ Seventhly, it is to be clearly understood that the British

* See Vol. VI., pp. 89 and 118.

Commissariat have nothing to say to the replacing of mules lost or knocked up in the service of the artillery, or in the carriage of ammunition and baggage, or with any of the details of the Portuguese Commissariat, beyond the issue to the Portuguese Commissariat of the quantity of provisions and forage necessary for the consumption of the troops.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Cartaxo, 6th March, 1811,

5 A. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received an account from Lumley that the enemy have evacuated Santarem, and from our advanced posts that they have withdrawn from Ponte d’Asseca.

‘ I am just going up to Santarem, where I shall move head quarters this day. I shall desire Lumley to move the boats up, in order that we may communicate this way.

‘ The directions in my letter of yesterday are applicable to the state of affairs at present. Let us have the bridge down as soon as you can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Santarem, 6th March, 1811,

4 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I am just now returned from Pernes. All is clear on this side of that river, over which the enemy have destroyed both bridges, that at Pernes and that at Ponte Velha. The Light division is at the former, General Nightingall’s brigade at the latter, and the 1st, 4th, and 6th divisions either are or will be here this evening. Sir William Erskine is at Alcanhede, and will be at Torres Novas to-morrow. The 3d division is at Rio Mayor; but the 5th, and General Campbell’s brigade, do not move till to-morrow.

‘ I shall have head quarters to-morrow at Torres Novas, with the 1st division; the 4th and 6th will be on the right, either at or well on towards Golegão.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will send an express to General Leite, and desire him to tell the Governor of Bada-

joz by telegraph that he must hold out to the last extremity, that Massena has begun to retire, and that he may expect assistance as soon as it is in my power to give it him. Desire Leite to warn him to keep that communication secret.

‘ Castañõs is arrived at Lisbon.

‘ The expedition had sailed from Cadiz. I doubt their success.

‘ I cannot do more for you in the Commissariat way than I proposed to you. Mr. Kennedy and I considered the matter well; and the truth is, that our Spaniards would not attend your troops, and I should not like to undertake anything for the Portuguese Government that I could not perform. I know that we could not depend upon the Portuguese mules and carriages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811.

‘ I was out all day, or should have written to you.

‘ The enemy have quitted the Tagus and Zezere, and have burnt their boats, and retired to Thomar and Chão de Maçaens. Their movement to this last place, and the report of the country that they are going to Coimbra, induce me to defer moving the troops from Pernes and Alcanhede till I shall have ascertained their designs more clearly than I have as yet. Some of our people were near them this day, but they showed no signs of a desire to turn upon us. They were reported to be in strength.

‘ Two of Beresford’s brigades are on this side of the Tagus.

‘ You shall hear from me again in the morning, if I should learn anything in the night. In the meantime it is desirable that the troops of Pernes should be ready to march, and that the guns should be got over the river.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ P. S. Nightingall is at Atalaya; Sir William Erskine here.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811,

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

Half past 11 A.M.

‘It is said here that the French have taken the road of Chão de Maçaens and Coimbra, and that Massena went and slept at the former last night, and was to be at Pombal this day. I cannot believe these rascals, who appear very unwilling to give any intelligence.

‘If Coimbra was their object, the movement would have been shorter, more easy, and more easily concealed by a march direct from Santarem upon Porto de Moz and Leyria, although Captain Todd says that road is very bad. At all events Junot’s corps at Alcanhede might have moved that way, and yet all have come here.

‘I send the advanced guard on to Payalvo, at all events, from whence I shall get further intelligence.

‘The head quarters will be here this day, and the 1st division; the 4th and 6th at Golegão.

‘I should be very glad to see you if you could come over here.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘P.S. I have just received your letter of half past 6 A.M. Until I know where you will have the bridge it is difficult to point out where your troops should be; but I think if you can get one brigade over it, it should be at Tancos.

‘P.S. 6 P.M.—Since writing the above, I find that Massena slept at Chão de Maçaens last night; and there was, besides, some baggage there. They may still, however, be going there. Sir Brent has stopped at Pernes, and I shall halt him there to-morrow if the enemy’s line should not be clear.

‘W.’

To Major General Nightingall.

‘Torres Novas, 7th March, 1811,

‘MY DEAR NIGHTINGALL,

12 at noon.

‘The enemy have retired from hence, and I have ordered the Light division upon Lamaroza, and the cavalry to Pay-

alvo; and I wish you would move upon Atalaya, and communicate with the Light division.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Nightingall.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Send the enclosed over to Beresford.

‘ W.’

To General Bacellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

‘ I have to inform you that the enemy retired from their position at Santarem, &c., on the night of the 5th instant, and I have only this day been made certain that they were directing their march upon the Mondego with a view to cross that river, probably at Coimbra; and the report given out in this part of the country is, that they intend to endeavor to obtain possession of Oporto. I am following them closely with the allied army.

‘ I request you, however, to advert to your instructions, and to consider the safety of Oporto as the primary object of your attention.

‘ If you should find that the enemy turn towards Viseu, you will of course do everything in your power to annoy them in their march; but send your baggage, &c., across the Douro, and have all the means prepared of crossing over all your troops at Lamego; which troops I rely upon to defend the passage of the Douro against the enemy, as well at Oporto as at Lamego or elsewhere.

‘ I conclude that Colonel Trant will have retired from Coimbra upon the bridge of the Vouga, which he should destroy, and from thence upon Oporto.

‘ The enemy have no boats with them; and I hope to be able to press them so hard that they can get none in the Mondego. One of the first objects of your attention therefore should be to secure the boats in the Douro all on the right bank; also those at Aveiro and in the Vouga.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford not being with me, I send you this letter direct.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Sontag.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

‘ When I appointed you to command at Torres Vedras, I knew that I gave you charge of the most important point in our position ; and I have detained you there contrary to your inclination, because I conceived the public service still required your stay.

‘ As, however, the enemy have retired, and the war is now likely to assume a new shape, it is but justice to you to remove you to a situation of more activity, according to your desire ; and accordingly, when you shall be recovered (of which I hope soon to hear) I shall appoint you to one which I hope will be agreeable to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Sontag.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 6th, and I agree in opinion respecting sending the troop ships to Oporto. We must mind our hits at that place, however, for a short time, as we hear that the enemy talk of going there, which is scarcely possible ; but they are in such a state of distress, that it may be expected that they will try anything, however desperate. But I follow them closely ; and they will find it difficult to stop anywhere, for any purpose, till they shall draw near the frontier.

‘ I refer you to my letter to Mr. Stuart for the news.

‘ I shall write to my brother and Mr. Duff upon the subject to which you have referred.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811.

‘ Having been on horseback almost ever since the morning of the 6th, I have not been able to write to you.

‘ The French retired from their position on that morning, and they literally march night and day.

‘ I was misled by Trant’s letter of the 27th February, and by some information I received at Santarem, which the enemy’s movements aided a little; and I conceived that they were going to the frontier by the road of the Ponte da Murcella; but I think it certain now that they are going by Coimbra.

‘ We are close at their heels, and have taken some prisoners; and I mean to continue to press them so hard that they will not have time to do much harm, or, I hope, to undertake anything serious against the northern provinces.

‘ I detach a large force, under Sir William Beresford, for the assistance of Badajoz, which I propose to join as soon as I shall have settled matters on this side.

‘ It is fortunate for us that the French have retired; for I assure you that, upon inspection, I find that I did not form an erroneous opinion of the risk and difficulty of attacking their position. Indeed, if the rain which has fallen this day had fallen four days ago, we could not have followed them with our artillery through the country, even though unopposed. Theirs was sent off, excepting what they have destroyed, and a few light pieces which they kept in their position to the last moment.

‘ I have received your letters of the 6th. The returns from the Junta de Viveres are of the same description with all those received from them. There is not one line of truth in them. The Portuguese troops have not a particle of provisions, and I am obliged to supply them, which will, before long, bring us all to a stand still; and then the Government will cry out against me as usual.

‘ In respect to Stockler’s book, the best thing to do with it would be to publish, as a preface to it, Stockler’s adulatory address to Junot. This would settle him and his nonsense.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I have not time to write to England; and it would probably be as well to detain the packet.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811, 2 P.M.

‘ I think it almost certain, from the enemy’s movements, of which I have obtained a knowledge since I saw you, that they are going for Coimbra; but I learn here that they have destroyed many carriages, and much ammunition, and it is said even some guns; and I should therefore conclude that whatever their first step may be, their second will be towards the Spanish frontier.

‘ I have ordered General Cole, and the brigade of heavy cavalry, to halt here to-morrow; and I will see General Stewart, and ascertain whether it is desirable for him to halt likewise. You will lose no time by this halt, which will be of use to the men; and I conclude that the bridge of Tancos will not be ready till late to-morrow.

‘ Let me have the brigade of dragoons as soon as you can. I shall appoint General Long to command the cavalry with you. Colonel De Grey commands the brigade of heavy cavalry.

‘ I enclose a letter for Bacellar, of which I have sent copies in duplicate and triplicate to Lobo, to be sent to him through Colonel Grant, or by any other safe conveyance.

‘ I have not leisure now to write to you upon the other subject on which we spoke this morning; but I hope to be able to do so to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Thomar, 8th March, 1811,
Half past 7 P.M.

‘ I have just received your letter of 10 A.M.

‘ These demands from Badajoz, for which I am convinced the Governor has no want, have alarmed me much. Leite may send him powder if he wants it; but he should first point out to him the danger, that it may fall into the hands of the enemy, who wants it more; but no biscuit, for he

should tell him that I have desired him to give him none, as I learn he has plenty of corn; but he may send him artillerymen, if he has any to spare.

‘ Pray write to Leite to desire him to give every assistance to our Commissaries to complete our stores there. I ordered 50,000 rations of biscuit to be prepared there some time ago; and they can make these only at the rate of 2000 a day for want of his assistance. I mean to order the store to be trebled, besides large quantities of forage corn to be laid in, none of which can be done without his most active assistance.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Thomas, 9th March, 1811, 6 A.M.

‘ I have seen General Stewart this morning, and have desired him, if it is convenient to him, to stretch his division out towards Tancos, which he will do.

‘ You will send your own orders to General Cole’s division, and Colonel De Grey’s brigade of cavalry, both of which are here. The pontoons are ordered to Elvas, and Captain Mallet has been desired to look at the Guadiana below the junction of the Caya, to see whether there is any place at which, by the assistance of chevalets, a bridge might be thrown across the river. Murray seems to think there is.

‘ I think you should immediately put your corps in march upon Portalegre, and there collect it. In the meantime you might acquire information about fords, positions for bridges, &c. &c., and other information which it would be necessary for you to have. If I can find time, I will write your instructions this day. I have ordered an hospital to be prepared for you at Elvas.

‘ By Mendizabal’s letter, which the Colonel brought me, it appears that the place is still entire, and very capable of holding out. They do not want provisions, but they will want powder; and they say they want artillerymen; although a peasant who has come out says there are many people in the place capable of serving the artillery, who have not been called upon.

‘ I have ordered 500 barrels of powder to Elvas; and General Leite will judge whether he can give the assistance of artillerymen.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. Hawker had an affair with the enemy yesterday evening, in which he cut up a few and took nineteen prisoners.

‘ There is a supply of musket ammunition of ours at Elvas.

‘ I have desired Mendizabal to send to Portalegre, to meet you, any Officer who might have a knowledge of some convenient place for fixing a bridge on the Guadiana, first showing the place to Captain Mallet.

‘ Kennedy proposes to take from General Cole’s division, and Colonel De Grey’s cavalry, some of the provisions which they have brought here with them, and to supply them with similar quantities upon the Tagus. It would be convenient, therefore, if it should meet your other arrangements, that they should move to-morrow.

‘ The misery of the country will occasion some difficulty in re-establishing our communications. I have guides here who will carry my letters to opposite Punhete. Lobo should place a party at Punhete to carry yours here and mine to Abrantes. From Abrantes there will be no difficulty, I conclude. I have other arrangements in view upon this subject, on which I shall write hereafter.

‘ W.’

To General Don Gabriel de Mendizabal.

‘ SIR,

‘ Thomar, 9th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th instant; and I have to inform you that, the enemy having retired from the Tagus, I have ordered a large corps to proceed to the relief of Badajoz, which corps has already commenced its march. General Leite also has directions to give Badajoz assistance in powder.

‘ In case there should be any Officer in the Spanish army under your command who has a knowledge of the fords of the Guadiana, or of the places in which a bridge can be laid with the smallest means, I beg that you will send him to

Portalegre, to wait upon Marshal Sir William Beresford, and, in the meantime, to show Captain Mallet the place, in order that he may examine it.

‘The best situation would be between the junction of the Caya and Jurumenha. The want of the bridge will now be seriously felt; but I have ordered six boats from Lisbon.

‘It is scarcely necessary to recommend to your Excellency to keep secret as long as possible the arrival of this corps.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General

Don G. de Mendizabal.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘Perucha, 9th March, 1811, 8 P.M.

‘I am just come in from our advanced guard, and find the enemy’s whole army nearly formed in front of Pombal. I wish you would make your troops march to Cacharias early, and let them cook as soon as they arrive, and you shall hear from me early in the day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. General

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Perucha, 9th March, 1811, 8 P.M.

‘Our advanced guard found the whole army this day in front of Pombal, with the exception, I believe, of Regnier’s corps, which is at Ançião; whether offering battle, or waiting for an opportunity to cross the Mondego, I cannot tell. However, as it is desirable that in this case I should be a little stronger; and as Badajoz is certainly not pressed; and as, at all events, it would be desirable that you should not commence your operations there till the boats shall have arrived at Elvas, I have sent to Cole to desire that his division and the dragoons would march to-morrow morning to Cacharias: I shall then be as strong as the enemy, very nearly.

‘I wish that you would come here—bring horses with you, and nothing else. I think it not unlikely that we may settle our concerns on the 11th.

‘ You might put your troops in motion, not letting their rear pass farther than Abrantes, and come here yourself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. I understand that General Houghton’s brigade, and some Portuguese troops, remain at Thomar, and I think it desirable that they should stay there, at least to-morrow; and order accordingly, as I have called Campbell’s division off the Espinhal road.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Perucha, 10th March, 1811.

‘ The enemy still continue on their ground in front of Pombal, but not, I think, in the strength in which they were yesterday. They are still, however, very strong; and my own opinion is, that they will draw off the corps which they have there in the course of this night. If they do not, I propose to attack them there to-morrow. I think it most likely that they will go back as far as Condeixa, where they will collect their force with more ease than they can at Pombal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Seca, 14th March, 1811.

‘ The enemy retired from the position which they had occupied at Santarem and the neighborhood on the night of the 5th instant. I put the British army in motion to follow them on the morning of the 6th.

‘ Their first movements indicated an intention to collect a force at Thomar; and I therefore marched upon that town, on the 8th, a considerable body of troops, formed of a part of Marshal Sir William Beresford’s corps, under Major General the Hon. W. Stewart, which had crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, and afterwards the Zezere, and of the 4th and 6th, and part of the 1st, divisions of infantry, and two brigades of British cavalry.

‘ The enemy, however, continued his march towards the Mondego, having one corps, the 2d, on the road of Espinhal,

General Loison's division on the road of Ançião, and the remainder of the army towards Pombal. These last were followed, and never lost sight of, by the Light division, and the royal dragoons and 1st hussars, who took from them about 200 prisoners.

‘On the 9th, the enemy having collected in front of Pombal the 6th corps, with the exception of General Loison's division, the 8th corps, and the 9th corps, and General Montbrun's division of cavalry, the hussars, which, with the royal dragoons and Light division, were immediately in front of the enemy's lines, distinguished themselves in a charge which they made on this occasion, under the command of Colonel Arentschildt. A detachment of the 16th light dragoons, under Lieut. Weyland*, which had been in observation of the enemy near Leyria, made prisoners a detachment consisting of thirty dragoons on that morning, and had followed the enemy from Leyria, and arrived on the ground just in time to assist their friends, the hussars, in this charge.

‘I could not collect a sufficient body of troops to commence an operation upon the enemy till the 11th. On that day the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th, and the Light divisions of infantry, and General Pack's brigade, and all the British cavalry, joined upon the ground immediately in front of the enemy, who had commenced their retreat from their position during the night.

‘They were followed by the Light division, the hussars and royals, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, under the command of Major General Sir William Erskine and Major General Slade, and made an attempt to hold the antient castle of Pombal, from which they were driven; but the 6th corps, and General Montbrun's cavalry, which formed the rear guard, supported by the 8th corps, held the ground on the other side of the town, the troops not having arrived in time to complete the dispositions to attack them before it was dark. Upon this occasion Lieut. Colonel Elder's battalion of Portuguese caçadores distinguished themselves.

‘The enemy retired in the night; and on the 12th the 6th corps, with General Montbrun's cavalry, took up a strong position at the end of a defile, between Redinha and Pombal,

* Lieut.-Colonel Weyland, late M.P. for Oxfordshire.

with their right in a wood upon the Soure river, and their left extending towards the high ground above the river of Redinha. This town was in their rear.

‘ I attacked them in this position on the 12th, with the 3d and 4th divisions of infantry, and Brig. General Pack’s brigade, and the cavalry, the other troops being in reserve.

‘ The post in the wood upon their right was first forced by Sir William Erskine, with the Light division. We were then able to form the troops in the plain beyond the defile ; and the 3d division, under Major General Picton, were formed in two lines, in the skirts of the wood, upon the right ; the 4th division, under Major General Cole, in two lines, in the centre, having General Pack’s brigade supporting their right, and communicating with the 3d division ; and the Light division, in two lines, on the left. These troops were supported in the rear by the British cavalry ; and the 1st, 5th, and 6th divisions were in reserve.

‘ The troops were formed with great accuracy and celerity ; and Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer led the line against the enemy’s position on the heights, from which they were immediately driven, with the loss of many men killed and wounded, and some prisoners.

‘ Major General Sir William Erskine particularly mentioned the conduct of the 52d regiment, and Colonel Elder’s *caçadores*, in the attack of the wood ; and I must add that I have never seen the French infantry driven from a wood in a more gallant style.

‘ There was but one narrow bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Redinha river, over which our light troops passed with the enemy ; but as the enemy commanded these passages with cannon, some time elapsed before we could pass over a sufficient body of troops, and make a fresh disposition to attack the heights on which they had again taken post. The 3d division crossed, however, and manœuvred again upon the enemy’s left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the Light division, drove them upon their main body at Condeixa.

‘ The light infantry of General Picton’s division, under Colonel Williams, and the 4th *caçadores*, under Colonel de Regoa, were principally concerned in this operation.

‘ We found the whole army yesterday, with the exception

of the 2d corps, which was still at Espinhal, in a very strong position, at Condeixa; and I observed that they were sending off their baggage by the road of Ponte da Murcella. From this circumstance I concluded that Colonel Trant had not given up Coimbra, and that they had been so pressed in their retreat, that they had not been able to detach troops to force him from that place. I therefore marched the 3d division, under Major General Picton, through the mountains upon the enemy's left, towards the only road open for their retreat, which had the immediate effect of dislodging them from the strong position of Condeixa; and the enemy encamped last night at Casal Nova, in the mountains, about a league from Condeixa.

' We immediately communicated with Coimbra, and made prisoners a detachment of the enemy's cavalry which were upon the road. We found the 6th and 8th corps formed in a very strong position near Casal Nova, this morning, and the Light division attacked and drove in the outposts. But we could dislodge them from their positions only by movements on their flanks. Accordingly I moved the 4th division, under Major General Cole, upon Panella, in order to secure the passage of the river Dcixa and the communication with Espinhal, to which place Major General Nightingall had been in observation of the movements of the enemy's corps since the 10th; and the 3d division, under Major General Picton, moved immediately round the enemy's left; while the Light division, and Brig. General Pack's brigade, under Major General Sir W. Erskine, turned their right; and Major General Alexander Campbell, with the 6th division, supported the light troops, by which they were attacked in front. These troops were supported by the cavalry, and by the 1st and 5th divisions, and Colonel Ashworth's brigade in reserve. These movements obliged the enemy to abandon all the positions which they successively took in the mountains, and the corps d'armée composing the rear guard were flung back upon the main body, at Miranda de Corvo, upon the river Dcixa, with considerable loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

' In the operations of this day, the 43d, 52d, and 95th regiments, and 3d caçadores, under the command of Colonels Drummond and Beckwith, and Major Patrickson, Lieut. Colonel Ross, and Majors Gilmour and Stewart, and Lieut.

Colonel Elder, particularly distinguished themselves; as also the light infantry of General Picton's division, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, and the 4th caçadores, under Colonel de Regoa; and the troops of horse artillery under the command of Captains Ross and Bull.

'The result of these operations has been that we have saved Coimbra and Upper Beira from the enemy's ravages; we have opened the communications with the northern provinces; and we have obliged the enemy to take for their retreat the road by Ponte da Murcella, on which they may be annoyed by the militia acting in security upon their flank, while the allied army will press upon their rear.

'The whole country, however, affords many advantageous positions to a retreating army, of which the enemy have shown that they know how to avail themselves. They are retreating from the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by the operations of either one or two corps d'armée in the strong positions which the country affords; which corps d'armée are closely supported by the main body. Before they quitted their position they destroyed a part of their cannon and ammunition, and they have since blown up whatever the horses were unable to draw away. They have no provisions, excepting what they plunder on the spot, or, having plundered, what the soldiers carry on their backs, and live cattle.

'I am concerned to be obliged to add to this account, that their conduct throughout this retreat has been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the head quarters of some of the corps had been for four months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises of good treatment, to remain, they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed, on the night the enemy withdrew from their position, and they have since burnt every town and village through which they have passed. The convent of Alcobaca was burnt by order from the French head quarters. The bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leyria, in which General Drouet had had his head quarters, shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of the country of any class or description, who has had any dealing or communication with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it and to complain of them.

This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances have been fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French Commander in Chief, in which he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not come to make war upon them, but with a powerful army of 110,000 men to drive the English into the sea.

‘ It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country will teach the people of this and of other nations what value they ought to place on such promises and assurances; and that there is no security for life, or for anything which makes life valuable, excepting in decided resistance to the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to enclose returns of killed and wounded in the several affairs with the enemy since they commenced their retreat.

‘ I have received the most able and cordial assistance throughout these operations from Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, and Marshal Sir William Beresford, whom I had requested to cross the Tagus, and who has been with me since the 11th instant; from Major Generals Sir W. Erskine, Picton, Cole, Campbell; Major General Slade, and Major General the Hon. C. Colville, and the General and other Officers commanding brigades under their orders respectively. I am particularly indebted to the Quarter Master General, Colonel Murray, for the assistance I have received from him, and to the Deputy Adjutant General, Colonel the Hon. E. Pakenham; and the Officers of the Adjutant and Quarter Master General’s departments, as also those of my personal Staff, have given me every assistance in their power.

‘ I am sorry to inform your Lordship that Badajoz surrendered on the 11th instant. I have not yet received the particulars of this event, but I have no doubt of the fact.

‘ Since the enemy entered Estremadura, and has directed his efforts against that place, my attention has been drawn to the means of saving it; and Mr. Wellesley will have transmitted to England the copies of the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish Officers upon this subject.

‘ Before the unfortunate battle of the 19th February I had intended to reinforce the Spanish army with about 14,000 men from that under my command; and thus to

force the enemy to raise the siege, as soon as I should have been joined by the reinforcement which I expected would arrive in the Tagus by the end of January. I could not detach with safety till that reinforcement should arrive.

‘The battle of the 19th of February destroyed the Spanish troops upon whose assistance and co-operation I relied; and then it would have been impossible to detach a body of troops sufficient to effect the purpose, even after the arrival of the reinforcements, till the enemy should be removed from the Tagus. I had therefore determined to attack the enemy in his positions as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, if the weather should be such-as to render the roads at all passable.

‘The reinforcements arrived in the first days of March, but have not yet joined the army; and on the 5th, at night, the enemy withdrew from their positions.

‘On the 6th, General Leite, the governor of Elvas, began to inform the governor of Badajoz, by signal or otherwise that Massena had retired, and that he might expect assistance as soon as it was in my power to give it to him; and that he must hold out till the last extremity. I had made all the arrangements for detaching the force immediately upon the enemy’s quitting the Tagus and Zezere, and some of the troops actually marched from Thomar on the morning of the 9th; and others, that part of Sir William Beresford’s corps which had not crossed the Tagus, were put in motion; and their head has arrived within three marches of Elvas.

‘I received at Thomar, on the morning of the 9th, accounts of a most favorable nature from Badajoz, from which I was induced to believe, not only that the place was in no danger, but that it was in fact untouched; that its fire was superior to that of the enemy, and that it was in no want of provisions or ammunition, had sustained no loss, excepting that of the governor, Menacho, and was able and likely to hold out for a month. General Imaz, a person of equally good reputation, succeeded to the command; and the greatest confidence was reposed in him.

‘On the same afternoon of the 9th I was with the British advanced guard at Pombal, and saw in front of that town the collection of the enemy’s troops which I have above recited to your Lordship. It appeared to me then, that I must decide either to allow the enemy to retreat from Por-

tugal unmolested, by the road he should prefer, and expose Coimbra and Upper Beira to be ravaged; or that I must draw to the army some of the troops, cavalry particularly, which I had allotted for the expedition to Badajoz, and which still remained at Thomar. I accordingly called to the army the 4th division of infantry and a brigade of heavy cavalry, under the conviction that Badajoz would hold out for the time during which it should be necessary to employ them. Experience has shown me that I could not have done without these troops; and it is also very clear, that if I had left them behind, they could not have saved Badajoz, which place the governor surrendered on the day after he received my assurances that he should be relieved and my entreaty that he would hold out to the last moment.

‘It is useless to add any reflection to these facts. The Spanish nation have lost Tortosa, Olivença, and Badajoz, in the course of two months, without sufficient cause; and in the same period, Marshal Soult, with a corps never supposed to be more than 20,000 men, has taken, besides the last two places, or destroyed above 22,000 Spanish troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 12th; and as we have now opened the communication with the north, it is not necessary to send any more transports to Vigo. I have spoken to the Commissary General regarding the treatment of those recently arrived.

‘I refer you to my dispatch for the news.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘Believe me, &c.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘In consequence of directions which I have received from the Secretary of State, I have to request that you will send to Plymouth, as soon as may be convenient, horse transports to convey to this country 700 horses.

‘*Vice Admiral*

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘I enclose a paper of articles which ought to be prepared at Elvas for the bridge, which I ought to have given you two or three days ago; but it is not yet too late, I hope.

‘I likewise enclose a letter on the state of Campo Mayor. Collect your corps at Portalegre.

‘There is nothing new since you went. The enemy is in small force on the other side the bridge, which they have destroyed.

‘*Marshal* ‘Believe me, &c.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL, ‘A Louzão, ce 16 Mars, 1811.

‘J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre, et je vous suis bien obligé de la franchise dont vous me faites l’offre. Vous pouvez être sur que j’agirai de même envers vous, et que je vous ferai part de mes intentions et de mes opinions sans aucune réserve quand je croirai qu’elles pourront vous être utiles.

‘Vous recevrez d’Alava les nouvelles de ce côté ci. Aussitôt que j’ai eu rétabli la communication avec Coimbra et le nord du Portugal; j’ai mis en marche les troupes que j’avais empruntées, pendant un moment, du service de Badajoz; et le Maréchal Beresford sera demain à son quartier général de Chamusca, et tout son corps sur le Tage.

‘Si le malheureux gouverneur de Badajoz eut tenu la place comme je lui avais dit, nous avions beau jeu, nous aurions sauvé l’Espagne. Malheureusement, je n’avais jamais auparavant fait une promesse, et quand j’en ai fait une, on n’a pas voulu me croire. Mais la place est perdue, et il faut tacher de faire quelque autre chose.

‘Faites moi savoir, je vous en prie, combien de troupes disponibles il reste de l’armée Espagnole, et vos opinions sur ce que nous devons entreprendre. Le Maréchal Beresford a près de 22,000 hommes, dont plus de 2000 sont de cavalerie, non compris la brigade à Elvas. Je compte aller de ce côté là moi-même, aussitôt que j’aurai tout à fait arrangé les affaires de ce côté ci.

‘J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘*Le Capitaine Général*
Don F. X. Castaños.

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, on a complaint said by Dom Miguel Forjaz to be made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra; which complaint you will observe refers not to the conduct of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments Nos. 4 and 10.

‘ In respect to the charge of cutting barren wood in the royal parks for firewood, I have to reply that I suppose His Royal Highness does not propose that His Majesty’s troops shall want firewood in Portugal. It is reasonable that His Royal Highness, as well as other proprietors, should be paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes; but either the troops must be allowed to cut firewood, paying for the same, wherever the defence of His Royal Highness’ dominions renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they must be removed to the places where they can cut firewood, by which His Royal Highness’ interests must suffer.

‘ I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the Government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation.

‘ Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual of this country, be his crimes what they may.

‘ If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have besides recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home, and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese Government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bravery in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to

draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ When the enemy recently retired from their positions on the Rio Mayor river I had the bridge of Abrantes taken up, and brought down to Tancos, and there established, in order to keep up the communication between the corps of the army on the left and on the right bank of the Tagus. It is expedient, for many reasons, that this bridge should be taken again to its old station at Abrantes ; but, before that is done, it will be necessary to have a new bridge over the Zezere at Punhete.

‘ As I do not exactly understand in whose department the recent regulation on the subject of boats has placed the boats for the construction of bridges, I request you to apply to the Government to order a bridge to be laid over the Zezere by the proper authority. When that is done, the bridge now at Tancos may be removed to Abrantes.

‘ I also request you to inform the Government that the bridges laid over the different streams on the left of the Tagus, for the communication of the troops stationed on the left bank of that river, may be removed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, containing a complaint of the Conde de Castello Melhor, that olive trees are cut on his estate near Bucellas, for the purpose of making abbatis.

‘ I beg that the Government will be pleased to determine :

‘ First, whether the works which have once saved Lisbon shall be rendered as complete as they can be made before the enemy may approach them again, or whether we are to wait till the last moment to complete what may be done beforehand.

‘ Secondly, that they will determine whether any, and what, sums of money shall be paid to individuals for the damage done to their property by these works ; and

‘ Thirdly, that they will order payment to be made to all the individuals in this situation, as well as to the Conde de Castello Melhor.

‘ Considering that this gentleman is a man of high family, who it is supposed will save his property from robbery and confiscation, and his person from slavery, and his family from violation and outrage, by the measures adopted for the salvation of the country, it might have been expected that he would not have been the first to demand from the Government payment for the damage which those measures do to him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I return Stockler’s paper, which I have not had leisure to read.

‘ The Government may publish any nonsense they please. It is entirely a matter of indifference to me ; but I think they had better take care how they endeavor to set the people of the country against those who have saved them. They are much mistaken if they think they can do me any harm by such nonsense, or that they can themselves stand for a moment after they shall have convinced the people that the English, and I in particular, have not done my best for them. You know best whether these opinions can be brought forth. I am entirely indifferent whether they can or not, or what becomes of Stockler and his book.

‘ You will see in my dispatch the state of affairs here. If the governor of Badajoz had not sold the place, the Peninsula would have been safe.

‘ The Government having first starved their troops on the Rio Mayor river, and then sent to Villa Franca above 200,000 rations after they had marched, and when they had no means, and knew that the troops had none, of moving forward anything, is exactly like everything else they have done.

‘ The sending provisions to the Mondego is right ; but I will lay a wager that half of it will be bread, not biscuit.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the report of a Board of Survey on horses recently arrived in Portugal for the regiments of dragoons serving in this country, to which I beg you to draw the notice of the Commander in Chief.

‘ I am convinced that it was never the intention of his Excellency, or of Government, that the Commanding Officers of regiments on the same service should have taken advantage of the order to send drafts of five and six year old horses to the regiments in this country, in order to get rid of the old and unserviceable horses in their regiments.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Sir D. Dundas, Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I beg leave to transmit, for your information, extracts of two dispatches to the Earl of Liverpool, detailing the operations of the army since the retreat of the enemy from their positions on the Rio Mayor river ; and I have much pleasure in acquainting you that I am highly satisfied with the conduct of the troops upon these occasions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Sir D. Dundas,
Commander in Chief.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marquis Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR WELLESLEY,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I refer you to my dispatches to Lord Liverpool of the 14th and this day for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ If it had not been for the treachery of the governor of Badajoz, Spain would have been out of the fire, notwithstanding former treachery, blunders, and cowardice.

‘ The siege of Cadiz would certainly have been raised if

Graham had not already succeeded in that object. As it is, I am doubtful whether I shall be able to do more than protect the Alentejo; but I will do all I can.

‘Something, however, must be done to obtain funds for these Governments. We are brought up at every turn for want of money, and I am really at a loss what to do with them.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*Marquis Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Nobody entertains a doubt that Imaz sold Badajoz. He appears to have surrendered as soon as he could after he knew that relief was coming to him, lest his garrison should prevent the surrender when they should be certain of the truth of the intelligence of Massena’s retreat.

‘W.’

To the Right Hon. Lady Sarah Napier.

‘MY DEAR MADAM,

‘Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘I am sorry to have to inform you that your two sons were again wounded in an action with the enemy the day before yesterday, but neither of them, I hope, seriously. William is wounded in the back, and this is supposed to be only a flesh wound; George in the right arm, which is broken. Both are doing remarkably well, and will, I hope, soon recover to return to their duty.

‘Your Ladyship has so often received accounts of the same description with that which I am now writing to you, and your feelings upon the subject are so just and proper, that it is needless for me to trouble you further. Your sons are brave fellows, and an honor to the army; and I hope that God will preserve them to you and their country.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon.
Lady S. Napier.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘In consequence of the directions contained in your Lordship’s dispatch of the 30th January (No. 8), I have requested Admiral Berkeley to send to England horse trans-

ports for the conveyance to this country of 700 horses of the 11th light dragoons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that, as soon as I opened the communication with Coimbra on the 13th instant, I ordered off the troops destined to relieve Badajoz, some of which commenced their march on that evening.

‘ I heard of the fall of Badajoz in the night of the 13th and 14th; Major General Cole’s division was moved on Espinal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alentejo; and it marched in that direction yesterday. We shall have in that province nearly 22,000 men, of which nearly 2200 will be cavalry. Marshal Sir William Beresford has returned to take the command there; and I propose to proceed to that quarter myself, as soon as I shall have brought the operations on this side to a close.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 16th of February, regarding publications in the newspapers, I assure you that I did not mean to say that the information in the newspapers, to which I referred, was received either from your Lordship’s office or from that of the Commander in Chief; for I know that neither have the information, at least from me. But I wished to point out to you under what disadvantages we carried on our operations. Foy brought from Paris not only the paper containing that information, but copies of all my dispatches; from which Massena knew all that I had intended to do in November against his positions, and he knew accurately every inch of mine, by how many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be very right to give the British public this information; but if they choose to have it, they ought to know the price they pay for it, and the advantages it gives to the enemy in all their operations.

‘ I am sure your Lordship does not expect that I, or any other Officer in command of a British army, can pretend to prevent the correspondence of the Officers with their friends. It could not be done if attempted, and the attempt would be considered an endeavor by an individual to deprive the British public of intelligence, of which the Government and Parliament do not choose to deprive them. I have done everything in my power by way of remonstrance, and have been very handsomely abused for it ; but I cannot think of preventing Officers from writing to their friends. This intelligence must certainly have gone from some Officer of this army, by whom it was confidentially communicated to his friends in England ; and I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with a plan.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that Lieut. Richard Burke, of the 45th regiment, who I reported to your Lordship on the 2d instant had deserted to the enemy, rejoined the army on the 8th instant between Torres Novas and Thomar, declaring that he had been taken prisoner.

‘ I have, however, placed him in close arrest, and propose to bring him to trial before a General Court Martial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Louzão, 16th March, 1811.

‘ Major General Cole joined Major General Nightingall at Espinhal on the afternoon of the 13th ; and this movement, by which the Deixa was passed, and which gave us the power of turning the strong position of Miranda de Corvo, induced the enemy to abandon it on that night. They destroyed at this place a great number of carriages, and burned and otherwise destroyed, or consumed, the ammunition which they had carried ; they likewise burned much of their baggage ; and the road throughout the march from

Miranda is strewed with the carcasses of men and animals, and destroyed carriages and baggage.

‘ We found the enemy’s whole army yesterday in a very strong position on the Ceira, having one corps as an advanced guard in front of Foz d’Arouce, on this side of the river.

‘ I immediately made arrangements to drive in the advanced guard, preparatory to the movements which it might be expedient to make to cross the Ceira this morning.

‘ Brig. General Pack’s brigade had been detached in the morning through the mountains to the left, as well to turn the enemy in his position at Miranda de Corvo as in view to any others they might take up on this side of the Ceira. The Light division, under Major General Sir William Erskine, was ordered to possess some heights immediately above Foz d’Arouce, while Major General Picton’s division was moved along the great road to attack the left of the enemy’s position and of the village.

‘ The 6th division, under Major General Campbell, and the hussars and 16th dragoons, supported the Light division; and the 1st division, and the 14th, and royal dragoons, the 3d.

‘ These movements succeeded in forcing the enemy to abandon his strong positions on this side of the Ceira with considerable loss. The Colonel of the 39th regiment was made prisoner.

‘ The light troops of General Picton’s division under Colonel Williams, and those of General Nightingall’s brigade were principally engaged on the right; and the 95th regiment in front of the Light division. The troops behaved in the most gallant manner. The horse artillery likewise, under Captains Ross and Bull, distinguished themselves upon this occasion.

‘ The troops took much baggage and some ammunition carriages in Foz d’Arouce.

‘ I had been prevented from moving till a late hour in the morning by the fog; and it was dark by the time we gained possession of the last position of the enemy’s advanced guard.

‘ In the night the enemy destroyed the bridge on the Ceira, and retreated, leaving a small rear guard on the river.

‘ The destruction of the bridge at Foz d’Arouce, the fatigue which the troops have undergone for several days, and the want of supplies, have induced me to halt the army this day.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford and I had repeatedly urged the Governors of the Kingdom to adopt measures to supply the troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; which representations were not attended to; and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions, nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and it is literally true, that General Pack’s brigade, and Colonel Ashworth’s, had nothing to eat for four days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

‘ I was obliged either to direct the British Commissary General to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them perish for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 14th instant I have heard further particulars respecting the surrender of Badajoz. It appears that, on the 9th, the enemy had made a breach in the place about eighteen feet wide, but which was by no means practicable. On the same day the Governor acknowledged by signal the receipt of the message which I had sent him; on the 10th he suspended hostilities, and on the 11th surrendered the place, the garrison being prisoners of war, and marching out with the honors of war, to the number of 9000, to an army which at the period of the surrender amounted only to 9600 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. The garrison wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.

‘ In my letter of the 6th I had desired the Governor of Elvas, to urge the Governor of Badajoz to keep secret the intelligence of Massena’s retreat, lest, by means of deserters it should reach the enemy, whom I was in hopes that I should have found engaged in this siege. But he published the intelligence as soon as he received it, stating at the same time that he did not believe it. He likewise communicated it to the French General.

‘ Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy have turned their attention to Campo Mayor, and have moved in that direction.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

The Earl of Liverpool.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Pombeiro, on the Alva,

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

18th March, 1811, 4 P.M.

‘ I have just received yours of the 17th. You had better lose no time in moving up to Portalegre, and attack Soult, if you can, at Campo Mayor. I will come to you if I can ; but if I cannot, do not wait for me. Get Castaños to join you, from Estremoz, with any Spanish troops he can bring with him. You must be two days marching from Portalegre to Campo Mayor, I believe.

‘ The enemy had, this morning, Ney’s corps *en position* behind Ponte da Murcella : we moved three divisions on Pombeiro, and this put them all in a bustle. They have assembled a large force upon the Serra de Moita, brought back from the rear, and Ney is now moving off towards the same point.

‘ I enclose a letter from Austin. The intelligence it contains will make Soult look about him a little.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. Graham has stopped the Sicilian troops, nearly 3000. He had 4000, so that he has still nearly 6000. Victor, it is said, only 8000 infantry.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Pombeiro, 18th March, 1811.

‘ I am concerned to be under the necessity of troubling you again upon the old subject, the subsistence of the Portuguese troops.

‘ When I lately proposed an arrangement, with a view to facilitate their means of subsistence, I particularly specified that these troops, not serving in the same divisions with British troops, should be really fed by the Portuguese Government. There are two brigades of infantry and one of

cavalry with this part of the army in that situation, viz., Brig. General Pack's and Colonel Ashworth's of infantry, and the Visconde de Barbacena's of cavalry, none of whom have received any provisions since the troops marched from the Rio Mayor river, excepting what have been issued to them by the British Commissary General, and the consequence has been, that the army has been obliged to halt; and I am unable to carry into execution the arrangement which I lately proposed.

' It is useless to propose any arrangement for this or any other purpose, if the Portuguese Government will execute nothing.

' I repeat, that matters cannot go on as they are; there must be a radical change in the whole of the system of the Government, in respect to the resources for carrying on the war, or I shall recommend to His Majesty's Government to withdraw his army.

' It is a favorite notion with some members of the Government, that the Portuguese troops can do with very little or no food. Among other good qualities, they possess that of being patient under privations in an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labor of soldiers without food. Three of General Pack's brigade died of famine yesterday on their march, and above one hundred and fifty have fallen out from weakness, many of whom must have died from the same cause.

' The Government neglected both establishments and troops when they were on the Rio Mayor river, and neither are in the state in which they ought to be at the commencement of a campaign. The mules of the artillery are unable to draw the guns for want of food, for any length of time; the baggage mules of the army are nearly all dead of famine; and the drivers have neither been paid nor fed.

' This is the state of the army at the commencement of the campaign: and I see clearly that, unless the Government should change their system, no remedy will be applied, and the whole burthen of defending this country will fall upon Great Britain.

' I have this day told General Pack and Colonel Ashworth that, if they cannot procure food for their troops with the army, they must go to Coimbra, or elsewhere where

they can, as I cannot bear to see and hear of brave soldiers dying for want of common care.

‘ One consequence, therefore, of omitting to feed the troops, will be to throw us again upon the defensive in this part of the country ; another consequence, also, which I seriously apprehend, is, that the British Officers serving with the Portuguese troops will resign their situations : one of them spoke to me seriously upon the subject of the state of the troops this day, and declared his intention to resign if a remedy was not applied.

‘ I beg you to lay this letter before the Portuguese Government, and to forward it to be laid before His Royal Highness the Regent, and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811, 9 A. M.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 17th. Mine of the 18th, of which I send you a duplicate, will have removed the doubt which you have entertained whether you should attack Soult. I send you likewise by this opportunity a report on the frontier of the Alentejo, likewise a map of the frontier, which will, I believe, be of more use to you, both of which I beg you to return.

‘ I believe you should manoeuvre upon Soult’s right, throwing your own left towards the Gevora. The country is hilly on the left from Arronches towards Campo Mayor. The Caya is fordable, I believe, everywhere for infantry ; but as well as I recollect, the bottom is of a description to allow of the passage of horses and carriages only in a few places. There are fords, as well as a bridge at Arronches. The Caya, it is said, gives a good position for a defensive for the Alentejo about Arronches ; but I had not time when I was there to examine it.

‘ The character of Soult’s operations, I think, is to detach a good deal. I recommend to you to keep your troops very much *en masse*. I have always considered the cavalry to be the most delicate arm that we possess. We have few Officers who have practical knowledge of the mode of using

it, or who have ever seen more than two regiments together; and all our troops, cavalry as well as infantry, are a little inclined to get out of order in battle. To these circumstances add, that the defeat of, or any great loss sustained by, our cavalry, in these open grounds, would be a misfortune amounting almost to a defeat of the whole; and you will see the necessity of keeping the cavalry as much as possible *en masse*, and in reserve, to be thrown in at the moment when an opportunity may offer of striking a decisive blow.

‘ If Soult goes to the south of the Guadiana, which I think likely, lay down your bridge, and make a *tête de pont* opposite Jurumenha; and in the first instance invest Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana, doing the same with cavalry only, or Spanish troops, or militia, on the right. You might also make the Spaniards seize the bridges of Merida and Medellin.

‘ The French retired from Moita to beyond Galizes the night before last and yesterday. We took yesterday three Officers and 600 prisoners. Our divisions and their baggage make their marches (however short) so very ill, that I am obliged to halt the greatest part of the army again to-day. However, I have now begun a new system with them, which is, to state in the orders at what hour each is to start and is to arrive at each place. By degrees I shall bring them to some system.

‘ I am afraid that I shall be obliged to throw into some valley all the Portuguese artillery, as the mules are so much reduced as to be quite incapable of moving the guns, and we must endeavor to put some flesh on their bones. This is really too bad.

‘ I request you to order all the Lisbon militia in the lines, and all the ordenanza, artillery, &c., to their homes, desiring, however, that they will be ready to return at the shortest notice. The regiments of Covilhão, Castello Branco, and Idanha, which you mention in your letter of the 17th, might also march into Lower Beira, either to act as a military body or to return to their homes for the present, as circumstances might render necessary. But in either case it will be necessary that the Government should provide for them on the march, as I neither can nor will; and if no provision should be made for them they must starve. The regiments

of Torres Vedras, Santarem, Leyria, and Thomar might go to their homes, or at all events to the chief towns of their districts, and be in readiness to march again at the shortest notice: the regiment of Setuval to Palmella, and the regiment of Viseu to Viseu, to remain embodied or not, according to circumstances, when they shall arrive there. I shall desire the Commissary General to give each man three days' provisions when they march. Let me have the routes of each regiment, that I may know where to send orders to them.

' When I shall have got Massena to the Coa I shall send the northern militia across the Douro. They may at least go each of them to their stations, if they may not be disembodied. In respect to Le Cor, he is now in command of Coleman's brigade, and I should think will not like to give up that command. However, I will send for him and speak to him. Do you mean to remove Grant, or that Le Cor should supersede him?

' I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Stuart about the bridges, which will, I conclude, settle everything upon that subject. Pray keep an eye on the provisions in Abrantes. Remember that there is a store of musket ammunition in Abrantes, and another in Elvas. I have ordered the hospital equipment to halt at Estremoz till you shall order it forward. The bridge was to be at Elvas on the 20th.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal*

' WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' P. S. Order all the militia to complete their numbers, and the requisition to be made to complete the regiments of the line.

' W.'

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

' Arganil, 20th March, 1811,

Half past 1 P.M.

' MY DEAR SPENCER,

' I have received your letter of this day, and have issued an order on the subject it relates to. We certainly want a little practice in marching in large bodies, as at present no calculation can be made of the arrival of any troops at their station, much less of their baggage.

' The order for the march yesterday was sent by Reynett,

who reported that he had delivered it at 20 minutes past 11; the whole distance to be marched was not five miles, and yet the head of the column did not reach its ground till sunset. Seeing how late it was before the head had arrived at the turn of the road, I desired Murray to request you to halt any that had not crossed the river on this side of it. I conclude this order has miscarried, although it was sent from hence some time before sunset. In future I propose to order the period of departure and arrival of each division of the army, by which means I shall know exactly how all stands, and by degrees the troops will become more accustomed to march in large bodies on the same road.

‘ I am concerned to hear you are badly off for provisions. I think we shall have a large supply of all kinds up this evening; if we have not, however inconvenient and disadvantageous it is to halt again, I shall send an order to countermand the march to-morrow, as it will not do to destroy the troops. We took a great number of prisoners yesterday; I have not heard of what has happened this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain Knox, H.M.S. St. Fiorenzo, off Oporto.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I have received information from Admiral Berkeley, that you had been ordered to Oporto, in order to take to Lisbon by sea certain Portuguese recruits which are at the former place. As, from the recent alteration of circumstances in this part of the country, it is no longer necessary that these recruits should go by sea, I request you to proceed to carry into execution any further orders which you may have received from Admiral Berkeley.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Knox,*
H.M.S. St. Fiorenzo.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th, and am obliged to you for the intelligence which it contains.

‘ I have no doubt but that General Graham has detained the Sicilian regiments.

‘ I have written to Captain Knox to request him to proceed to carry into execution your ulterior orders, as the recruits, &c., may as well march.

‘ We are going on well. We took 600 prisoners yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Dr. Frank, relative to the inconvenience which is experienced by the medical department in sending home the invalids of the army, in consequence of their receiving notice of the sailing of the ships at but a late period previous to their sailing.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of Transports to give notice, from time to time, to the Assistant Quarter Master General, of the intention that the transports should sail, for the information of all departments concerned, as soon as you shall have determined that they shall go.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I have given directions to the Assistant Quarter Master General at Lisbon to apply to you, from time to time, for vessels to convey from the Tagus to Figueira such detachments of recruits, or recovered men, as there may be at Lisbon for the regiments in this part of the army; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will attend to his requests upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I received the orders of Government, some time ago, to send home to England the largest proportion of the transports attached to the army, as soon as affairs in this country should be in such a situation as no longer to require them.

‘ I have this day given directions that the baggage of each division of infantry, and of the cavalry, respectively, may be removed into one transport, which ought to be sufficient to contain it; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct the Agent of Transports to concert matters with the Assistant Quarter Master General for that object.

‘ It is my opinion also that, besides the ships of war fitted for the conveyance of troops, we ought to detain in the Tagus coppered transports for the conveyance of 3000 infantry, the best of the horse transports for the conveyance of 300 cavalry, all the hospital ships, and the baggage ships above referred to; and I beg you to send all the remainder to England as soon as it may be convenient to you.

‘ Besides these ships, there are others in the Tagus containing ordnance and military stores, respecting which I will make an arrangement as soon as I shall have got, from the Commanding Officer of the artillery, an exact return of them.

‘ I think it proper also at this moment to communicate to you my opinion that the circumstances of the army no longer require the assistance of the squadron which arrived under Sir Thomas Williams.

‘ It is desirable, however, that the battalion of marines which arrived in the *Abercrombie* should still continue at Lisbon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ In order to get rid of at least twenty five vessels, I propose to disembark the ordnance stores (with the exception

of the battering train and its stores) and to place them all at St. Julian. I have fixed upon that place for them, as I propose to make it our ordnance depôt, where I shall keep everything belonging to that department. My reason for this arrangement is, that in case it should be necessary or desirable, at any time, and for any reason, to embark our stores, I am desirous of avoiding coming to blows with the people of Lisbon. This I should not otherwise avoid, as since the formation of the last Government some members of it have taken pains to inflame the minds of the people against us, by libels and other means; and I should not now think anything safe in Lisbon, in case the British Government should think it proper, or advisable, to withdraw their army.

‘ In order to facilitate the embarkation or disembarkation of stores at Fort St. Julian I have ordered Colonel Fletcher to construct four jetties in that bay, on piles; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will give your opinion to the Officer of engineers ordered to construct them as to the best place for them. He is directed to wait upon you.

‘ I keep the battering train on board, because, whenever we may want it, it will be convenient to transport it part of the way by sea, and the trouble and inconvenience of embarking and disembarking it would be very great, and the expense of its tonnage is not very great.

‘ I shall write to you officially respecting the ordnance store ships, as soon as General Howorth shall have got his stores out of them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, and its enclosure, just received from General Mendizabal, which contains the Governor Imaz’ account of the state of affairs at Badajoz on the 8th instant, and the capitulation of the 10th. I beg you to observe that he does not complain of the situation of the place on the 8th: on the 9th he acknowledged the receipt of my message to him: and on the 10th he capitulated!

‘I shall hereafter address you on that part of General Mendizabal’s letter which relates to Campo Mayor.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘SIR,

‘Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copies of my dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 14th and 16th instant, as the best mode of making you acquainted with the situation of affairs in this quarter since I addressed you on the 3d instant.

‘I likewise enclose a letter which I received on the morning of the 9th instant from General Mendizabal, and its answer; and I enclose copies of letters received from General Leite, and reports from Colonel Brito de Mozinho on the state of Badajoz before, and at the time, the place surrendered, and the account of occurrences at that time, from all which the Government will judge of the conduct of General Imaz.

‘However unfortunate the Spanish armies have been in the field, the defences which they have made of several places were calculated to inspire confidence in the exertions of the troops at Badajoz; particularly considering their numbers relatively with those of the enemy; the little progress made by the enemy in making a practicable breach; that they had plenty of provisions and ammunition; their cannon still mounted on the works; and, above all, that they were certain of being relieved. This confidence has, however, been disappointed; and this place, the third so surrendered in two months, has been surrendered without sufficient cause.

‘It is useless now to speculate upon the consequences which would have resulted from a more determined and protracted resistance at Badajoz. Sir William Beresford is at Portalegre, and his troops will be collected there on the 22d. Soult cannot remain north of the Guadiana, even under existing circumstances. If Badajoz were still in the possession of the allies, we might expect to free from the enemy not only Estremadura, but Andalusia.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from General Ballesteros, in answer to one which I before transmitted to you. I propose to give no reply to this letter; nor do I propose to take any steps to have the person punished who is supposed to have made an unfounded complaint against General Ballesteros and his troops. The rule according to which I have always proceeded is to encourage complaint, and in my opinion the complaints in question are not without foundation.

‘ Those who know the Spanish soldiers are aware that it is not a novel crime to plunder a magazine, even though destined for their own consumption; and as I am aware that the Capitão Mor had no troops under his orders to place as guards over the magazines, I cannot conceive that he is to blame for not having them guarded.

‘ I do not know whether the Spanish Government, or any other authority, have the power of inducing General Ballesteros to keep his troops in order. If they have, it is desirable that they should exert it, if those troops are again to retreat into Portugal; otherwise I am apprehensive that they will obtain but little subsistence, and that they will find the people of Portugal to be an enemy even more formidable than that one which will have obliged them to retire from their own country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Arganil, 20th March, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I have received yours of the 23d February; and I now send you copies of my dispatches to Government, &c., which will show you how things stand here.

‘ If Imaz had not sold Badajoz, I think the Peninsula would have been safe. I should have relieved the south of Spain at all events, and the war would have been placed on a new footing. I am not certain that I shall not be able to do something of the kind even now; but I wait to decide what plan I shall adopt till I shall hear the result of General Graham’s operations against Victor.

‘ All is going on well here. We took 600 prisoners yesterday.

‘ The French are in a bad way. They suffered much in the last attack we made upon them on the 15th; and I am told are much annoyed at having their advanced guard beat in, almost within musket shot of their whole army.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Show the dispatches, &c., to General Graham.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

‘ The enemy suffered much more in the affair of the 15th than I was aware of when I addressed you on the 16th instant. The firing was not over till dark; and it appears that great numbers were drowned in attempting to ford the Ceira.

‘ The enemy withdrew his rear guard from that river in the course of the 16th, and we crossed it on the 17th, and had our posts on the Serra da Murcella; the enemy’s army being in a strong position on the right of the Alva. They moved a part of their army on that night, but still maintained their position on the Alva, of which river they destroyed the bridges. We turned their left by the Serra de S^{ta} Quitéria, with the 1st, 3d, and 5th divisions, on the 18th, while the Light division and the 6th manœuvred in their front from the Serra da Murcella. These movements induced the enemy to bring back to the Serra da Moita the troops which had marched the preceding night, at the same time that they withdrew their corps from the Alva; and in the evening their whole army were assembled upon Moita; and the advanced posts of our right were near Arganil, those of our left across the Alva.

‘ The enemy retired from the position of Moita in the night of the 18th, and have continued their retreat with the utmost rapidity ever since: I imagine their rear guard will be at Celorico this day. We assembled the army upon the Serra da Moita on the 19th, and our advanced posts are this

day beyond Pinhanços. The militia, under Colonels Wilson and Trant, are at Fornos. We have taken great numbers of prisoners, and the enemy have continued to destroy their carriages and their cannon, and whatever would impede their progress. As the greatest number of the prisoners taken on the 19th had been sent out on foraging parties towards the Mondego, and had been ordered to return to the position on the Alva, I conclude that the enemy had intended to remain in it for some days.

‘ Since I wrote last to your Lordship I have received letters from General Mendizabal and others, on the fall of Badajoz. The Governor wrote on the 8th to the Spanish Minister at War, and did not express any apprehension that the place was in danger. He stated that the fire of the place was well kept up, and that one out of six battering guns the enemy had had been dismounted on that day. On the 9th he acknowledged to General Leite the receipt of my message. There was no firing on that day till the evening; and on the 10th, instead of the 11th, as I had supposed, the place capitulated.

‘ The 8th article of the Capitulation stipulates that the fort of San Christoval and the *tête de pont*, being on the right of the Guadiana, should be given up to the enemy as soon as they should take possession of those works; and this article serves to show the spirit in which the capitulation was made.

‘ Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy, on the 14th, moved towards Campo Mayor, and have commenced and broken ground before that place. It had been given over to the charge of the late Marques de la Romana, at his request, last year. But lately the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honorable engagement to defend the place into which the Marques entered when it was delivered over to his charge.

‘ A Portuguese garrison was, however, thrown into it; and although it is a place of no strength, I am in hopes that it will hold out till Marshal Beresford shall relieve it. His troops will be collected at Portalegre to-morrow.

‘ I have received no letters from Cadiz since the 27th of

last month, at which time General Graham had sailed upon an expedition which had for its object to attack the enemy's corps which remained before Cadiz.

'I have received reports that the expedition had so far answered, that, on the 3d, the communication between the allied troops in the field and the Isla de Leon, by S^a Petri, had been opened, and that General Zayas had joined the former with a detachment from Cadiz. I have also heard that one of the enemy's posts, at or near Chiclana, was attacked on the 4th or 5th, and carried, with some loss on our side, principally of British and Portuguese troops; and that General Rufin and five pieces of cannon were taken.

'I believe also, from the same reports, that the troops for which I had sent vessels to Sicily had arrived at Tarifa, and had been landed by General Graham since the action of the 4th or 5th.

'As General Graham reports direct to your Lordship you will of course receive the details from him; but as the winds which have probably prevented my hearing from him may likewise prevent his dispatches from reaching your Lordship, I think it proper to communicate to you the reports which I have received, which I believe to be founded on fact.

'Soult has gone to Seville since the fall of Badajoz; and it is reported that about 3000 French troops had been seen on their march through Barcarrota to the southward.

'Your Lordship will probably have seen the Imperial Decree, appointing Marshal Bessières to command in the 6th Government of Spain, which includes with Castille all the northern provinces. The troops allotted to this General are not a very efficient body, or at all disposable, with the exception of the Imperial Guard, a detachment of which has been in Spain for more than a year, probably to be in readiness to attend the Emperor, if it should suit his purpose to visit the Peninsula.

'I am informed, however, that Marshal Bessières has collected at Zamora about 7000 men, composed principally of the Imperial Guard and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castille. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, 16,000 men, under General Mahy; but from all that I hear I am apprehensive

that that General will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

‘ I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the necessity of removing the French prisoners from Lisbon and Oporto. There are now some thousands at those places, particularly at the former; and it is inconvenient and difficult to guard them, and to feed them very expensive. I therefore recommend that they should be removed to England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Oliveira do Hospital, 21st March, 1811.

‘ As, from the present state of the contest in the Peninsula, I consider it very improbable that the British army can be under the necessity of embarking, I have thought it proper, in obedience to your Lordship’s former orders, to request Admiral Berkeley to send to England all the transports and other vessels attached to the army, with the exception of the troop ships of war, and coppered transport tonnage sufficient to contain 3000 men, and horse transports for 300 horses; and a certain number of vessels to contain the regimental baggage of the regiments which I propose should be kept afloat.

‘ The ordnance store ships will not go for some time, as it will be necessary to land the ordnance stores. I also propose to retain about 2500 tons of ordnance transports to keep afloat the battering train.

‘ I have not yet fixed upon any regiments to be sent back to England in consequence of the enemy’s retreat; and I beg to know from your Lordship, whether you still desire that the force here should be reduced, and to what extent.

‘ I have also apprised the Admiral of my opinion, that the

squadron which came to the Tagus, under Sir Thomas Williams, may be allowed to return to England.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Bacellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oliveira do Hospital, 22d March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 21st.

‘ The advanced guard of the British army will be this day between Sampayo and Celorico, and I imagine that the enemy will have passed Celorico. I beg you to direct Colonel Wilson’s advanced posts to communicate with those of the army.

‘ I have been obliged to halt the army this day to wait for supplies of provisions which they had outmarched; but I hope to be able to move the whole to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Oliveira do Hospital, 22d March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th, relative to requisitions on the country in the neighborhood of Santarem and Valada for carriages and grain, &c., for the British troops; in answer to which I have to inform you, that the British troops have not had a carriage, or any provisions, from that part of the country for many months past. I recommend to the Government to adopt some effectual measures to prevent the possibility, or necessity, of these requisitions for the service of the Portuguese troops.

‘ In answer to your other letter of the 16th instant, containing a complaint against Captain —— of the Engineers, I have to inform you that I have referred it to the chief engineer, and I shall decide upon the subject as soon as I shall receive his answer to my reference.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

and more expensive than any that has been here since, and attended by an equal fleet of transports; but it began to arrive only in August, and the expense incurred was in the last five months of the year. Many of those expenses, viz., two months' advanced pay to the troops, &c., debts left unpaid in Spain and Portugal, were not paid in the Peninsula, or if paid in the Peninsula, not within the period of the account.

' Now, in order to show a fair comparison between the years 1808 and 1810, the charges of the same troops which were in the Peninsula in the latter end of 1808, for the seven first months of the year, should be added to the 2,778,000*l.*, and I believe it would be found that the amount would not be much less than the six millions, which is the stated amount of the expense of 1810.

' During a great part of 1809 no subsidy was paid to the Portuguese Government, and the total amount of the subsidy was not half what has been paid in 1810.

' The British army also, for more than half the year, did not consist of 20,000 men; but if to the 2,639,000*l.* are to be added the expenses of the troops in America, in Walcheren, &c. &c., which joined the army in Portugal, and swelled the expense here in 1810, it will be found that their expense would not fall far short of six millions sterling.

' In my opinion, Government are not aware, and have it not in their power at present to form an opinion, of the exact expense of the war in the Peninsula. The first step to ascertain it would be to analyse the charge, and then to see what the same army would cost them elsewhere, at home for instance; for I suppose that if the army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula, it will not be disbanded.

' I conclude that the amount of six millions is made up from the payments at the Treasury on account of the Commissary General, and the payments on account of Mr. Stuart's drafts for the Portuguese Government; but if these sums are analysed, there will be found one million in round numbers for the Portuguese subsidy; 200,000*l.* advanced to the Portuguese Government, and repaid to the Treasury by the Portuguese Ambassador; 300,000*l.* advanced to purchase provisions in Ireland, to be repaid in this year's subsidy; 400,000*l.* advanced to buy provisions in America, for

the repayment of which the provisions themselves will provide; making nearly two millions, of which one million either has been or will be repaid this year.

‘Then it has cost one million, or 20 per cent. nearly, to find specie for the army.

‘Let us now see, generally, what this army would cost in England.

‘The advances in Portugal only have been lately 80,000*l.* per mensem: they will now be 100,000*l.* per mensem. If the army was in England, the advances would be nearly double: at all events for the army now in the Peninsula, they would amount to 2,000,000*l.* per annum, without beer money, marching money, barrack allowances, forage for the cavalry, ordnance expenses, hospitals, &c. &c., all of which are covered by the amount of the six millions.

‘I request your Lordship, then, just to consider what is the real amount of the late expense incurred by your operations in the Peninsula.

‘The heavy expense of the army, and one which is peculiar to a British army, is the transports, and to that I have nearly put an end; but I would observe, that of late years the Government have seldom been without tonnage in their service for their whole disposable force; and it is not taking a just view of the subject to say that the army in Portugal, in 1810, cost a large sum in transports, when the same regiments had probably the same transports in their suite in 1808 in Sweden, and in 1809 in America or Walcheren.

‘In the sum of three millions stated for transports and stores sent out in kind, I imagine about half would be for transports, the other half for stores. Were no stores sent out to Portugal or Spain in 1808 or 1809? But there is another question upon these stores, which I admit are to be considered as part of the expense of the army, and that is, What is the value of the remains at the present moment? If it be true, as it is, that we have three months’ supply for this army of many articles now in store, which were sent from England in 1810, it is not a true calculation to state that the stores consumed in 1810 cost 1,500,000*l.*

‘The establishments of the country are certainly enormous and very expensive, let them be used where they may; but I deny that the use of them is more expensive in the Peninsula

than elsewhere, or that because six millions have been spent in the Peninsula in 1810, it follows that the whole scale of expense of the empire has been increased to that amount in that year beyond the former years, in any other way, or to any greater amount, than by the expense of the Portuguese subsidy; the expense of having troops in the field abroad, instead of in quarters at home; the expense of procuring specie; and the additional price of some articles of consumption purchased in the Peninsula, which, in all, I do not calculate for the whole Peninsula at more than three millions sterling.

‘ In respect to the transports, there is another view of the subject, which would show that a stronger army would be a saving of expense. If I had had 10,000 men more in 1810, I would not have kept the transports; and I send them away now, because I think that the events of the campaign have brought the enemy to such a situation that the necessity for an embarkation is very remote. The transports (if not kept in Government pay after being sent away from the Tagus) would cost much more than 10,000 additional troops to this army; and much more than the difference of expense in the employment of 10,000 additional troops here, instead of keeping them at Cadiz, in Sicily, or Gibraltar, or at home.

‘ My opinion has invariably been, that it was the interest of Great Britain to employ in Portugal the largest army that could be spared from other services; and that no more than 2000 or 2500 men ought to have been stationed at Cadiz, which would not have cost a shilling more than their pay. The expense at Cadiz, which I imagine will amount to no trifle, out of the six or nine millions, has been, in my opinion, entirely thrown away, equally with the services of the troops, which would have made a great difference here early in the last summer.

‘ In respect to offensive or defensive operations here, if they are left to me, I shall carry on either the one or the other, according to the means in my power, compared at the time with those of the enemy, and bearing in mind always your Lordship’s instructions of the 27th February, 1810, marked A.

‘ I would recommend to Government to increase the force here as much as possible, putting down the establishments

elsewhere, and of course decreasing the expense in those parts of the empire from which they draw the troops. By this measure they will put it in the power of the Officer here to avail himself of every opportunity, they will be sure of holding this country as long as they please, and they will save the whole expense of transports.

‘ I shall be sorry if Government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French Government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French Government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty’s dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest ; then would His Majesty’s subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge ; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor in the scene ; and I only hope that the King’s Government will consider well what I have above stated to your Lordship ; will ascertain as nearly as is in their power the actual expense of employing a certain number of men in this country beyond that of employing them at home or elsewhere ; and will keep up their force here on such a footing as will at all events secure their possession without keeping the transports, if it does not enable their Commander to take advantage of events, and assume the offensive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Sth Marinha, 23d March, 1811.

‘ I assure you that the departure of the General Officers from the army was as much against my inclination as their arrival in England was injurious to the public interests. I

did everything in my power to prevail upon them not to go, but in vain; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them has been, that in the late operations I have been obliged to be General of Cavalry, and of the advanced guard, and the leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day.

‘I have requested Colonel Torrens not to allow any General Officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘*S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.*

‘The French retired from Celorico yesterday, and they appear to intend to take up a line on the Coa. Their left has gone by Guarda, apparently for Sabugal.

‘I enclose Graham’s dispatches* on his action.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

* ‘*Lieut. General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.*

‘MY LORD,

‘*Isla de Leon, 6th March, 1811.*

‘Captain Hope, my first aide de camp, will have the honor of delivering this dispatch, to inform your Lordship of the glorious issue of an action fought yesterday by the division under my command, against the army commanded by Marshal Victor, composed of the two divisions, Rufin’s and Laval’s.

‘The circumstances were such as compelled me to attack this very superior force. In order as well to explain to your Lordship the circumstances of peculiar disadvantage under which the action was begun, as to justify myself from the imputation of rashness in the attempt, I must state to your Lordship, that the allied army, after a night march of sixteen hours from the camp near Veger, arrived in the morning of the 5th on the low ridge of Barrosa, about four miles to the southward of the mouth of the Santi Petri river. This height extends inland about a mile and a half, continuing on the north the extensive heathy plain of Chiclana. A great pine forest skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down to Santi Petri; the intermediate space between the north side of the height and the forest being uneven and broken.

‘A well-conducted and successful attack on the rear of the enemy’s lines near Santi Petri, by the vanguard of the Spanish army, under Brig. General Ladrizabel, having opened the communication with the Isla de Leon, I received

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘Sir,

‘S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, and its enclosures, likewise one of the 13th, which you

General La Pena’s directions to move down from the position of Barrosa to that of the Torre de Bermeja, about half way to the Santi Petri river, in order to secure the communication across the river, over which a bridge had been lately established. This latter position occupies a narrow woody ridge, the right on the sea cliff, the left falling down to the Almanza creek, on the edge of the marsh. A hard sandy beach gives an easy communication between the western points of these two positions.

‘My division, being halted on the eastern slope of the Barrosa height, was marched about 12 o’clock through the wood towards the Bermeja (cavalry patrols having previously been sent towards Chiclana, without meeting with the enemy). On the march I received notice that the enemy had appeared in force on the plain, and was advancing towards the heights of Barrosa.

‘As I considered that position as the key of that of Santi Petri, I immediately countermarched, in order to support the troops left for its defence; and the alacrity with which this manœuvre was executed served as a favorable omen. It was, however, impossible in such intricate and difficult ground to preserve order in the columns, and there never was time to restore it entirely.

‘But before we could get ourselves quite disentangled from the wood, the troops on the Barrosa hill were seen returning from it, while the enemy’s left wing was rapidly ascending. At the same time, his right wing stood on the plain, on the edge of the wood, within cannon shot. A retreat in the face of such an enemy, already within reach of the easy communication by the sea beach, must have involved the whole allied army in all the danger of being attacked during the unavoidable confusion of the different corps arriving on the narrow ridge of Bermeja nearly at the same time.

‘Trusting to the known heroism of British troops, regardless of the numbers and position of their enemy, an immediate attack was determined on. Major Duncan soon opened a powerful battery of ten guns in the centre. Brig. General Dilkes, with the brigade of Guards, Lieut. Colonel Browne’s (of the 28th) flank battalion, Lieut. Colonel Norcott’s two companies of the 2d rifle corps, and Major Acheson, with a part of the 67th foot (separated from the regiment in the wood), formed on the right.

‘Colonel Wheatley’s brigade, with three companies of the Coldstream Guards under Lieut. Colonel Jackson (separated likewise from his battalion in the wood), and Lieut. Colonel Barnard’s flank battalion, formed on the left.

‘As soon as the infantry was thus hastily got together the guns advanced to a more favorable position, and kept up a most destructive fire.

‘The right wing proceeded to the attack of General Rufin’s division on the hill, while Lieut. Colonel Barnard’s battalion, and Lieut. Colonel Bushe’s detachment of the 20th Portuguese, were warmly engaged with the enemy’s tirailleurs on our left.

‘General Laval’s division, notwithstanding the havoc made by Major Duncan’s battery, continued to advance in very imposing masses, opening his fire of musketry, and was only checked by that of the left wing. The left wing now advanced, firing. A most determined charge by the three companies of Guards and the 87th regiment, supported by all the remainder of the wing, decided the defeat of General Laval’s division.

enclosed to Lieut. Colonel Jackson*, although the Lieut. Colonel is not yet arrived.

‘I beg to congratulate you, and the brave troops under

‘The eagle of the 8th regiment of light infantry, which suffered immensely, and a howitzer, towards this charge, and remained in possession of Major Gough, of the 87th regiment. These attacks were zealously supported by Colonel Belson with the 28th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Prevost with a part of the 67th.

‘A reserve formed beyond the narrow valley, across which the enemy was closely pursued, next shared the same fate, and was routed by the same means.

‘Meanwhile, the right wing was not less successful. The enemy, confident of success, met General Dilkes on the ascent of the hill, and the contest was sanguinary; but the undaunted perseverance of the brigade of Guards, of Lieut. Colonel Browne’s battalion, and of Lieut. Colonel Norcott’s, and Major Acheson’s detachment, overcame every obstacle, and General Rufin’s division was driven from the heights in confusion, leaving two pieces of cannon.

‘No expressions of mine could do justice to the conduct of the troops throughout. Nothing less than the almost unparalleled exertions of every Officer, the invincible bravery of every soldier, and the most determined devotion to the honor of His Majesty’s arms in all, could have achieved this brilliant success against such a formidable enemy so posted.

‘In less than an hour and a half from the commencement of the action the enemy was in full retreat. The retreating divisions met, halted, and seemed inclined to form; a new and more advanced position of our artillery quickly dispersed them.

‘The exhausted state of the troops made pursuit impossible. A position was taken on the eastern side of the hill; and we were strengthened on our right by the return of the two Spanish battalions that had been attached before to my division, but which I had left on the hill, and which had been ordered to retire.

‘These battalions (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real) made every effort to come back in time, when it was known that we were engaged.

‘I understand, too, from General Whittingham, that, with three squadrons of cavalry, he kept in check a corps of infantry and cavalry that attempted to turn the Barrosa height by the sea. One squadron of the 2d hussars, King’s German Legion, under Captain Busche, and directed by Lieut. Colonel Ponsonby (both had been attached to the Spanish cavalry), joined in time to make a brilliant and most successful charge against a squadron of French dragoons, which were entirely routed.

‘An eagle, six pieces of cannon, the General of Division Rufin, and the General of Brigade Rousseau, wounded and taken; the chief of the staff, General Bellegarde, an aide de camp of Marshal Victor, and the Colonel of the 8th regiment, with many other Officers, killed; and several wounded and taken prisoners; the field covered with the dead bodies and arms of the enemy attests that my confidence in this division was nobly repaid.

‘Where all have so distinguished themselves, it is scarcely possible to discriminate any as the most deserving of praise. Your Lordship will, however, observe how gloriously the brigade of Guards, under Brig. General Dilkes, with the commanders of the battalions, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Onslow, and Lieut. Colonel Sebright (wounded), as well as the three separated companies under Lieut. Colonel Jackson, maintained the high character of His Ma-

* Major General Sir R. Jackson, K.C.B.

your command, on the signal victory which you gained on the 5th instant. I have no doubt whatever that their success would have had the effect of raising the siege of Cadiz, if

jesty's household troops. Lieut. Colonel Browne, with his flank battalion, Lieut. Colonel Norcott, and Major Acheson, deserve equal praise.

'And I must equally recommend to your Lordship's notice Colonel Wheatley, with Colonel Belson, Lieut. Colonel Prevost, and Major Gough, and the Officers of the respective corps composing his brigade.

'The animated charges of the 87th regiment were most conspicuous; Lieut. Colonel Barnard (twice wounded) and the Officers of his flank battalion executed the duty of skirmishing in advance with the enemy in a masterly manner, and were ably seconded by Lieut. Colonel Bushe, of the 20th Portuguese, who likewise (twice wounded) fell into the enemy's hands, but was afterwards rescued. The detachment of this Portuguese regiment behaved admirably throughout the whole affair.

'I owe too much to Major Duncan, and the Officers and corps of the Royal Artillery, not to mention them in terms of the highest approbation: never was artillery better served.

'The assistance I received from the unwearied exertions of Lieut. Colonel Macdonald, and the Officers of the Adjutant General's department; of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. C. Cathcart, and the Officers of the Quarter Master General's department; of Captain Birch and Captain Nicholas, and the Officers of the Royal Engineers; of Captain Hope, and the Officers of my personal Staff (all animating by their example), will ever be most gratefully remembered. Our loss has been severe: as soon as it can be ascertained by the proper return, I shall have the honor of transmitting it; but much as it is to be lamented, I trust it will be considered as a necessary sacrifice, for the safety of the whole allied army.

'Having remained some hours on the Bairosa heights, without being able to procure any supplies for the exhausted troops, the commissariat mules having been dispersed on the enemy's first attack on the hill, I left Major Ross, with the detachment of the 3d battalion of the 95th, and withdrew the rest of the division, which crossed the Santi Petri river early the next morning.

'I cannot conclude this dispatch without earnestly recommending to His Majesty's gracious notice for promotion, Brevet Lieut. Colonel Browne, Major of the 28th foot; Brevet Lieut. Colonel Norcott, Major of the 95th; Major Duncan, Royal Artillery; Major Gough, of the 87th; Major the Hon. E. Acheson, of the 67th; and Captain Birch, of the Royal Engineers, all in the command of corps or detachments on this memorable service; and I confidently trust that the bearer of this dispatch, Captain Hope (to whom I refer your Lordship for further details), will be promoted, on being permitted to lay the eagle at His Majesty's feet.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Earl of Liverpool.*

'THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut. Gen.

'P. S. I beg leave to add, that two Spanish Officers, Captains Miranda and Naughton, attached to my Staff, behaved with the utmost intrepidity.

'T. G.'

Lieut. General Graham to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

'My Lord,

'Isla de Leon, 10th March, 1811.

'I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship the return of the killed and

the Spanish corps had made any effort to assist them; and I am equally certain, from your account of the ground, that if you had not decided with the utmost promptitude to

wounded in the action of the 5th instant, and I have the satisfaction to add, that the wounded in general are doing well.

‘ By the best account that can be collected from the wounded French Officers, the enemy had about 8000 men engaged. Their loss, by reports from Chielana, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, is supposed to amount to 3000: I have no doubt of its being very great.

‘ I transmit, too, a return of the ordnance in our possession, and also the most accurate note that can be obtained of prisoners, most of whom are wounded. They are so dispersed in different hospitals, that an exact return has not yet been obtained.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ THOMAS GRAHAM, Lieut. Gen.

‘ P. S. Detachments of cavalry and infantry have been daily employed in carrying off the wounded, and burying the dead, till the evening of the 8th instant, by which time all the enemy's wounded that could be found among the brushwood and heath were brought in. ‘ T. G.’

‘ *Return of the nature and number of pieces of Ordnance taken in the action of Barrosa, on the 5th of March, 1811.*

‘ Two 7 inch howitzers, three heavy 8 pounders, one 4 pounder, with their ammunition waggons, and a proportion of horses.

‘ *Return of Prisoners of War taken in the action of Barrosa, on the 5th of March, 1811.*

‘ Two General Officers, 1 Field Officer, 9 Captains, 8 Subalterns, 420 rank and file.

‘ N. B. The General of Brigade Rousseau, and 2 Captains, since dead of their wounds.

Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops under the Command of Lieut. General Graham, in the Action of Barrosa, with the French Corps d'Armée commanded by Marshal Victor, on the 5th March, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	7	6	189	24	202
Wounded	55	45	940	42	1040
Missing	—	—	—	—	—

attack the enemy, and if your attack had not been a most vigorous one, the whole allied army would have been lost.

‘ You have to regret that such a victory should not have been followed by all the consequences which might reasonably be expected from it ; but you may console yourself with the reflection that you did your utmost, and, at all events, saved the allied army ; and that the failure in the extent of benefit to be derived from your exertions is to be attributed to those who would have derived most advantage from them.

‘ The conduct of the Spaniards throughout this expedition is precisely the same as I have ever observed it to be. They march the troops night and day, without provisions or rest, and abusing everybody who proposes a moment’s delay to afford either to the famished and fatigued soldiers. They reach the enemy in such a state as to be unable to make any exertion, or to execute any plan, even if any plan had been formed ; and then, when the moment of action arrives, they are totally incapable of movement, and they stand by to see their allies destroyed, and afterwards abuse them because they do not continue, unsupported, exertions to which human nature is not equal.

‘ I concur in the propriety of your withdrawing to the Isla on the 6th, as much as I admire the promptitude and determination of your attack of the 5th ; and I most sincerely congratulate you, and the brave troops under your command, on your success.

‘ Mr. Wellesley will communicate to you the state of affairs here.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To — —.

‘ SIR,

‘ S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th January in duplicate by the last post.

‘ I beg to inform you that I have nothing to say to the accounts of the Lusitanian legion, or to your demands as an Officer belonging to that corps ; and I forward your letter to Sir William Beresford, with a copy of this.

‘ I perfectly recollect that you applied to me for leave of absence at Talavera, and I answered you that your applica-

tion ought to be recommended by your Commanding Officer, — — —, who was on the spot, and that, at all events, as you were in the Portuguese service, I could not give you leave without reference to Marshal Beresford.

‘ You quitted the army without any leave from me, or any further communication with me, and you went to the south of Spain. Upon an application from Marshal Beresford that you should be sent back to Portugal to arrange some Portuguese unsettled accounts with the Government of the Lusitanian legion, I endeavored to have you sent back from Cadiz, but you went to England, certainly without any leave from me, or from any other authority that I know of.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ — — —.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 19th and 21st, and I am very uneasy at your not having received my letter of the 18th, which I sent you again in duplicate on the 20th. Unfortunately the magistrate at Goes stopped the guide on the 20th from an excess of zeal, as his horse was shod in the French mode, although the guide was Portuguese.

‘ I still hope that you will save Campo Mayor. If so, the first thing to do will be to drive Mortier across the Guadiana, and shut up Badajoz.

‘ The possession which the French have got of Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara may render it necessary for you to alter the course of proceeding, the general outlines of which were chalked out in my letter of the 20th. You must get these places from Mortier again; and it will be necessary to cover the operation against them by a respectable force on the right of the Guadiana, close to Badajoz. When you have cleared Estremadura between the Tagus and the Guadiana, then will be the time to make your arrangements for crossing the latter, and closing in Badajoz on the left of that river.

‘ The French have gone towards the Coa. Their left will cross at Sabugal, I should think, and their right about Pinhel and Almeida.

‘ We have been a little distressed for provisions, which

has prevented us from pressing them so hard for these last days as I should have wished. We are getting right now, however.

‘ General Graham has returned to the Isla, after having fought the hardest action that has been fought yet. The Spaniards left him very much to his own exertions. The Spanish General is to be brought to a court martial. Graham took two General Officers, six pieces of cannon, an eagle, and 500 prisoners. He lost 1100, principally wounded. The two Portuguese companies of the 20th behaved remarkably well; Bushe is wounded. I will send you the dispatches as soon as Sir Brent shall return them.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the Portuguese troops here are diminishing in numbers terribly. Pack’s brigade has only 1700; the 21st regiment but little more than 500; Pakenham tells me either the 3d or 15th only 300; but I have not seen this return. They are fed, and indeed have been ever since they marched, by our Commissaries, except Pack’s, Ashworth’s, and Barbacena’s cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant, regarding the number of French prisoners at Lisbon. I have applied to Government for permission to send them to England, and it is necessary that I should wait for their decision before I incur any expense for their detention.

‘ The Commissary General will be ordered to disembark the corn from His Majesty’s troop ships.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 19th, and I will take care that in future there shall be no difficulty about your

seeing the dispatches. I have written to Government respecting the number of our prisoners.

‘I should be very happy to forward your wishes for your son, who has, in my opinion, every claim for promotion. I am afraid, however, I could not send him home with dispatches written by me, which could give the bearer of them a claim to promotion, as he is not in my family, and it is the invariable practice of the army to send dispatches of that description by an aide de camp.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘S^{ta} Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘I have received your private letter of the 19th, and your official letter of the 21st; and I yesterday received one from Dom Miguel Forjaz of the 19th, to which I have sent a reply. In that letter I have explained to what department of the state I attributed blame. The first want is money, and the next is an efficient and active commissariat, and punishment for neglect. The Portuguese army are really falling off to an alarming degree, and much time will elapse, and much care must be given to them to bring them about again. Some of the regiments which ought to be 1400 men have not 500 in the ranks.

‘The orders respecting the countries evacuated by the enemy are like everything else the Government do; they sound well to the ear, and look well to the eye: but there is the want in them of the practical experience which is to carry them into execution. Our soldiers, who fed the people in their cantonments, were better legislators than Principal Souza. They should open markets of provisions at every point on the Tagus, and on the coast, as high up as the Mondego: nothing but that measure will save the people, who are in a very miserable state.

‘I have written to England about the prisoners; the Officers should be sent home at all events. The French are crossing the Coa; but we have not been able to press them since they passed Cea, from the want of supplies for the army. We are getting them now, however.

‘ I have begun to supply the Portuguese troops in our divisions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. This part of the country has received but little damage.

‘ W.’

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Sth Marinha, 25th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st February, and I have called for the returns of arms and accoutrements in possession of the several battalions of the army. In the course of an extensive service, in a country but ill provided with means of transport, some arms must be broken, and others and accoutrements lost, belonging to every battalion in the army. The consequence is that when recruits come out, there are no arms or accoutrements for them. The returns called for, however, will show what the state of the several battalions will be in this respect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 25th March, 1811.

‘ Colonel Campbell arrived last night, and has given me a note from your Lordship, enclosing an abstract of the military operations in Portugal, drawn up for the use of His Majesty’s Ministers, I imagine, by Colonel Bunbury. I think that Colonel Bunbury has in every instance over-rated the British and Portuguese force. He has taken the total of the returns without adverting to the deductions of the effective strength for sick, prisoners of war, on duty in garrisons, on command at Lisbon, &c.; and as, in stating the French force opposed to us, he has mentioned only the effectives in the field, he has given those to whom he communicated his paper an erroneous notion of the comparative strength of the contending armies. Even the column fit for duty exceeds the number to be reckoned upon for any operation, because the troops at Lisbon and in garrison must be deducted from these numbers; but still those numbers

would be much nearer the mark than the statement of the totals. Then, in reckoning the cavalry, the number of men, and not the number of horses, is reckoned.

‘ Just to show you how this mode of statement alters the relative strength of the contending armies, I mention that in April, 1810, Junot’s return of the 8th corps was about 25,900 effective. The total was 38,000. Ney’s corps was above 40,000 total, the effectives more than 31,000; their returns of July were nearly the same, or rather more. The two together are called in the abstract 57,000 in July, which they were under arms; but our totals against them would have given us an equal army; whereas I never had, British and Portuguese, 32,000 in Beira. The Portuguese regulars in July are called 40,000, including 4000 cavalry, and the British 32,000, and the militia 45,000. Your Lordship has a return of July, which shows you the effective force of the Portuguese regulars, and how disposed of. The militia are called at the same time 45,000; the same return states 36,000 armed, but the fact is, there never have been 25,000 under arms; and of the total militia there were in that month nearly 7000 absent without leave. In October, in the same manner, the totals are stated instead of the effectives. I refer your Lordship to my letter of the 3d of November* for an accurate account of the effective strength of both armies, including Spaniards.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 26th March, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 22d instant. The supply of the Portuguese troops is certainly an object of very great importance; but it is impossible for me to allow the demands of the Portuguese Minister for the stores of the British army to be complied with, without reference to the Commissary General or me; more particularly as, under the arrangement of the 5th instant, we are actually feeding three fourths of the effective army. Mr. Kennedy and I had already settled, upon a view of the state of our

* See Vol. VI.,

supplies and the demand for them, that we would not give the barley demanded; and I have frequently refused to give the flour. The reason for making this demand is that the Junta de Viveres do not choose to take the trouble or incur the expense of sending the corn to the mills to be ground.

‘I do not understand Lord Wellesley’s dispatch as authorizing any departure from the usual mode of transacting business with the Portuguese Government. He only desires that you should adopt measures to insure an effectual control over the expenditure of this large supply.

‘His order would appear to be founded on a notion that the money already at the disposal of the Portuguese Government had been misapplied, which I believe none of us ever suspected. What I have complained of is deficient means to defray the expenses of the Government, and a disinclination in the Government to increase their means, or to reform abuses, so as to increase the disposable part of the revenue already existing.

‘As it appears that the Government are now setting seriously to work to increase their means, and I think that the letter which I wrote yesterday to Dom Miguel Forjaz will induce them to hasten their measures upon this subject, I recommend that they should not be informed of this addition to the subsidy till it shall be absolutely necessary, on account of their acquiring a knowledge of it from other quarters.

‘As a preparatory measure for the introduction of any system into the Portuguese army, I then recommend, first, that the Junta de Viveres should be abolished, and that in lieu of that Board a commissariat should be appointed, consisting of a Commissary General and a certain number of deputy commissaries and assistant commissaries and clerks, to perform the task of provisioning the Portuguese army.

‘The commissariat and the medical department to be placed under military law; but it is to be clearly understood that the rise of each individual is not to be regulated on any military principles, but each to be promoted according to his merits.

‘The Commissary General to receive possession of all the

magazines and stores of the Junta de Viveres, and to correspond in the same manner with the magistrates in the different districts.

‘ In my opinion it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to increase our payments in specie to the Portuguese Government; and considering that we now feed so large a proportion of the army, it will not probably be necessary. I shall direct the Commissary General to furnish you with an account of everything issued to the Portuguese Government up to the 24th of March, as soon as possible; and I recommend that you should begin by settling and closing the account with the Portuguese Government up to that day. It would not do to allow the quibbles of Joaquim da Costa, or of the Conde de Redondo, to impede this settlement. We are decided upon the justice of the view which we have taken of the intentions of the King’s Government in regard to past transactions, and the account must be settled and closed according to that view.

‘ We ought then, in my opinion, to insist upon the Government finding funds,—first, to pay their Officers and troops, regulars as well as militia, regularly.

‘ Secondly, to pay the *bagajeiros* attached to the several regiments, who, by the bye, have not been paid or fed for the last six months.

‘ Thirdly, to pay all the departments of their army.

‘ Fourthly, the Medical Officer should, on the 1st of every month, give in an estimate of the expense of his department; and the Government should be obliged to find funds to discharge it.

‘ Fifthly, the Commissary General should be obliged to give in an estimate, on the 1st of every month, of the articles and their cost, required for his department, stating for what purpose required, where to be sent, the expense of transport, &c., for which the Government should be obliged to find funds.

‘ The Commissary General must show in each estimate the state of his magazines in every part of Portugal, and how far each can be made available for the service.

‘ These are the most important departments, in order to keep an efficient army in the field; and I think that the money which we can afford to supply from time to time, and

the assistance which we can give in kind, will enable the Portuguese Government to answer the demands of these several departments. The balance of the whole subsidy, if any shall be due after all payments and advances on account of the Portuguese army shall have been carried to account, might be paid to the Portuguese Government, either half-yearly or yearly, either in specie or in kind.

‘ It must be understood, however, that all useless establishments must be discontinued; the navy, for instance; and everything must be done to increase to the utmost the disposable revenue of the Government.

‘ If Joaquim da Costa is not dismissed, he should be warned of the necessity of honest and upright conduct, and clear accounts and estimates given in at an early period in future.

‘ Our Government should be requested to send us as much specie as they can. The next best thing is wheat, barley, or oats, or wheat flour. I cannot say exactly what quantity should be sent in each month, but probably Dom Miguel Forjaz might be able to let you know what quantity it would be desirable for the Portuguese army to have.

‘ I have written this letter without consultation with Beresford; but I recommend that you should send it to him, for his consideration and opinion on the subject to which it relates.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will observe to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that the large quantities of provisions which he proposes to send to Figueira will only create there an accumulation of supplies of *bacalao*, sardinias, and rice, principally, if some measures are not adopted to have the articles brought to the troops. It is certainly a great point gained to get the articles out of Lisbon to Figueira, or to any other deposit; but they will rot in this deposit, unless the Junta de Viveres should correspond with the Commissaries of brigades, and find means to forward the articles to the troops, into whose stomachs they are finally to go. It is very necessary to attend to all this detail, and to trace a biscuit from Lisbon into the man’s mouth on the frontier, and to provide for its removal from place to place, by land or by water, or no military operations can be carried on, and the troops must starve.

‘ I had a letter from Beresford of the 22d, in which he tells me that Campo Mayor held out at 2 o’clock on the 21st. I therefore do not credit the telegraph.

‘ I can make nothing of the lists of persons who get the newspapers. The Portuguese Government must be the best judges who are likely to transnit them to the enemy.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. As the Portuguese Government experience great difficulty in baking biscuit, probably a monthly supply of that article from England would be useful to them, as well as wheat, &c.

‘ W.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 26th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copies of two letters which I have received from Lieut. General Sir John Stuart, from which it appears that he has not sent from Sicily the troops for which your Lordship directed that I should send transports to that island, and which I imagined, when I wrote to your Lordship on the 21st, had arrived, and had been landed by General Graham.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 26th March, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter of the 9th instant, which I have received this day from Marshal Sir William Beresford, on the subject of your Lordship’s letter to me of the 17th of January, regarding the clothing of the Portuguese army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Gouvea, 27th March, 1811, 2 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d this morning; the fall of Campo Mayor is very unfortunate. I conceive that the letters which I have already written to you are applicable to all the cases that can occur.

‘ We cannot venture to cross the Guadiana till we get the French out of these small places, and we must begin our operations towards the south with an attack upon Badajoz, for which Elvas must supply the means, if possible: if it has them not I must send them there; this will take time, but that cannot be avoided.

‘ Mr. Kennedy sent 100,000 dollars, to be at your disposal for ordinaries or extraordinaries; he has now ordered 50,000 more: he had ordered 10,000 pairs of shoes; he now orders 10,000 more to be sent to Abrantes. He desired Mr. Dalrymple to keep the Alentejo supplied with provisions for 25,000 men. A Commissary is to be stationed at Abrantes, which had better be, for the present, yours.

‘ The French appear to stick about Guarda: they had yesterday some people well on towards Manteigas; but I have heard nothing of them from Grant, and I conclude they were only a patrol. Our troops are on the Mondego, towards its source, and I manœuvre upon Guarda to-morrow or next day. I cannot venture to leave this till concerns here shall be settled, and even then it will be difficult.

‘ The Portuguese troops are falling off terribly; the effectives with me are only 11,586 infantry, and 549 cavalry! The infantry have nearly 5800 sick.

‘ The British Government propose to give another million subsidy. Mr. Stuart will send you my letter to him on this subject; in the meantime say nothing about it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d. I can neither send the Officers of the army away from their duty to arrange their baggage, nor can I venture to touch it without being arranged by themselves.

‘ All that Dr. Frank requires is the longest notice that can be given to him of the intention to send home the invalids. There is really much business to be done on such an occasion.

‘ I cannot allow any prisoner to be sent to Bordeaux.

The French Commander in Chief and Government have behaved so ill upon this point, that it is really not fair towards British subjects to allow of any indulgence of any description to French prisoners.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a note received last night from General Pack, which shows how matters are going on with him. I also beg you to mention to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that of a gross force which ought to be 18,572 infantry, which are with this part of the army, there are only 11,586 under arms, and 5800 sick; that is to say, not two thirds of the numbers doing duty, and nearly one third of the numbers sick.

‘ Only conceive the expense of every man produced in the field for service !

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. However, since writing the other side, I have heard that Colonel Ashworth’s brigade of Portuguese infantry are as badly off as General Pack’s; they have nothing to eat, and have sent here for it, having before sent to Coimbra and Figueira, where they found nothing!! So much for rice, *bacalao*, and sardinias !

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter, C, to the 13th instant, and I enclose my dispatches to this day, which I beg you to communicate to General Graham.

‘ I propose to go into Alentejo as soon as I shall have settled matters here, and I shall be able to decide what line I shall take respecting the south.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Gouvea, 27th March, 1811.

‘ When I found that the enemy retired with such celerity from Moita, I continued the pursuit of them with the cavalry, and the Light division under Major General Sir William Erskine only, supporting these troops with the 6th and 3d divisions of infantry, and by the militia on the right of the Mondego; and I was induced to halt the remainder of the army till the supplies which had been sent round from the Tagus to the Mondego should arrive. This halt was the more desirable, as nothing could be found in the country; every day’s march, increasing the distance from the magazines on the Tagus, rendered the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious; and the farther advance of the main body for a few days did not appear to be necessary.

‘ The cavalry and light troops continued to annoy the enemy’s rear, and to take prisoners; and the militia under Colonel Wilson had an affair with a detachment of the enemy on the 22d, not far from Celorico, in which they killed seven, and wounded several, and took fifteen prisoners. The militia under General Silveira also took some prisoners on the 25th.

‘ The enemy retired his left, the 2d corps by Gouvea, through the mountains upon Guarda, and the remainder of the army by the high road upon Celorico. They have since moved more troops upon Guarda, which position they still hold in strength. Our advanced guard is in front of Celorico, towards Guarda, and at Alverca; and the 3d division in the mountains, and occupying Miserelha and Prados.

‘ The allied troops will be collected in the neighborhood of Celorico to-morrow. Marshal Beresford’s corps assembled at Portalegre on the 22d; but I have reason to believe that the enemy had made a practicable breach in Campo Mayor on the 21st, and that the Spanish garrison was obliged to capitulate. I have not yet heard the details of the capitulation. The enemy, while engaged in the attack of Campo Mayor, had also obtained possession of the Spanish forts of Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara. They had made prisoners part of the garrison of the former.

‘ Since I addressed your Lordship on the 21st I have re-

ceived letters from Cadiz to the 13th instant, from which I have been made acquainted with the details of the proceedings of the expedition which left that place in the latter end of February, and of the glorious action fought on the 5th instant, and of the result of the expedition.

‘ I am convinced that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent will duly appreciate the promptitude with which Lieut. General Graham decided to attack the enemy in the important position of which they had obtained possession, the vigor with which he carried that decision into execution, and the gallantry displayed by all the Officers and troops upon that glorious occasion.

‘ From the accounts which I have received of the ground, and from what I know of the nature and disposition of the allied army, I have no doubt that if General Graham had not determined to make this attack immediately, the allied army would have been lost.

‘ I feel equally confident that His Royal Highness will approve of Lieut. General Graham’s decision in retiring to the Isla de Leon on the 6th instant, adverting to the losses which the troops had sustained, the fatigues they had undergone, and the omission of the Spanish Commander in Chief to afford them any support in the action which they had fought on the preceding day.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, from my dispatch of the 26th, that I had been misinformed respecting the arrival of the troops from Sicily.

‘ General Ballesteros surprised General Remond on the 10th at Palma, dispersed his detachment, and took from him 500 prisoners. General Ballesteros has since retired to Valverde, and I hear that General Zayas has been detached from Cadiz with 6000 men, including 400 cavalry, to be disembarked at Huelva, to join General Ballesteros.

‘ It is reported from the north of Spain, that the Imperial Guard had been ordered back to France.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Earl of Liverpool.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above, I have received the report of a gallant action of one of our patrols yesterday evening, between Alverca and Guarda, under the command of Lieuts.

gone to Salamanca, it is said in arrest. Loison certainly commands the 6th corps, and was at Guarda.

‘ I have accounts that Almeida is very badly supplied with provisions; and it is reported that the enemy think of blowing up the place. It would be a good end to our concerns on this side, to oblige him to adopt that measure, or to give up the place; and I think of trying it, if the Commissary General is sure of our supplies. Silveira was here yesterday, and is gone this day across the Douro, and I shall send there the remainder of the militia, as soon as I shall have determined what I shall do respecting Almeida.

‘ You will have heard from Austin of the reinforcement to Ballesteros. Soult will have to make an option, whether he will try to save Badajoz or Seville; and I think, that having got Campo Mayor, and I should suppose Alburquerque and Valencia de Alcantara, you ought to lose no time in closing up Badajoz, and making your arrangements to attack it. If Elvas should want guns, after supplying what will be required for the attack of Badajoz, I can send them from Lisbon easily, as well as powder. I will also send to Elvas all our spare engineers. The breach at Badajoz can scarcely be more than stockaded.

‘ I have omitted to answer a question you put to me respecting Captain Dickson’s artillery, because I conceived the garrison order of the 19th decided the matter very fully. But I see in a letter from Dom Miguel Forjaz to Mr. Stuart, that he considers it still undecided which of the brigades of artillery are to be taken care of by our commissariat. I have always considered Captain Dickson’s artillery as being in General Hamilton’s Portuguese division; the mountain 3 pounders in General Pack’s brigade, and the carriage 3 pounders in Colonel Ashworth’s. These, of course, are to be taken care of by the Portuguese commissariat.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Fletcher, giving information that the Portuguese chief engineer had

directed certain reports to be made to him by the Portuguese engineers employed in our works under Captain Williams. I shall be obliged to you if you will intimate to the chief engineer, that, as the Portuguese Government do not pay any part of the expense, he has nothing to say to them, or nothing to do with the execution of the work, it does not appear to me to be very necessary that he should have this information, and that information of this description, when not necessary to give it, should be withheld from everybody.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

6 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th instant. Besides the boats in Elvas there are fifteen river boats in Juru-menha, under which place there is an excellent ford. — — appears to me to be a little inclined to make difficulties about the passages of the rivers; and upon all this I can only say that, if the Guadiana cannot be passed in safety with the means in possession or at command, the troops must remain on the right of the river, and of course can do nothing. Tin pontoons are just as good as others; and whatever — — may say, they will positively bear field pieces. Between chevalets, boats, Spanish and English pontoons, and a ford, I should hope that the Guadiana may be passed in safety.

‘ I am concerned to hear that the troops are so much distressed for want of shoes: 20,000 pairs have been ordered; but it must be understood that the shoes sent by the British commissariat are for the British troops. 150,000 dollars, also for the British troops only, have been ordered into the Alentejo; and an hospital for 500 men, for British troops only, has been ordered to Estremoz, and I believe has arrived there; and another hospital has been ordered to Abrantes. I believe you will find all this sufficient for the British troops. But if more is wanted it shall be added, although I believe that, of all articles, the troops in the Alentejo have more than their proportion.

‘ I have just seen Mr. Kennedy : the 10,000 pairs of shoes, and the 100,000 dollars, were ordered to be sent to Mr. Thompson on the 9th of this month. The hospital was ordered six weeks ago. I think that, considering that only one brigade of General Stewart’s division did more than march from the Tagus, and that Cole’s division does not amount to 5000 British, 10,000 pairs of shoes would, in the first instance, be a reasonable supply ; unless, indeed, the men should have sold their shoes. The second 10,000 pairs have been ordered to Abrantes, and were not ordered till your requisition was received. The order for the gun ammunition went long ago.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ *Sir,*

‘ Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th March, regarding the baggage in the transports. I have given directions that an Officer belonging to each regiment may be sent to Lisbon to arrange the baggage, and to destroy such part as may be useless. In the meantime, I request that a transport, or other vessel, may be allotted to hold the baggage of one, two, or three, battalions in the same division, and that the remainder of the transports may be sent to England, according to the request contained in my letter of the 20th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ *MY DEAR SIR,*

‘ Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

‘ It always gives me pleasure to attend to any suggestion of yours ; but it is very desirable that, as I am now at a great distance from Lisbon, and the communication is so slow that a reference to me must take eight days, the directions which I give to the inferior departments of the army should be carried into execution without reference, as I generally con-

sider well the various conveniences and inconveniences of any orders before I give them.

‘ When I know that the present Ministers complain of the expense of the war in the Peninsula, that their opponents declare that they would withdraw the army, and that the conduct of the Spaniards affords a good reason for so doing, I consider it my duty not to be unprepared to obey such an order if I should receive it; and to be able to obey it without exposing to insult, by the populace at Lisbon, the King’s Minister, yourself, and those of His Majesty’s Officers and subjects who should reside there. On this ground I have determined that the regimental baggage should remain in the transports, or otherwise afloat; and I have directed the Commanding Officers of the regiments to send an Officer of each down to Lisbon to arrange it, and to destroy such of it as is useless; and I shall be obliged to you if, till that is done, you will allot a transport to hold the baggage of one, two, or three, battalions belonging to the same division.

‘ In respect to the ordnance stores, they must be at St. Julian. I am aware of the delay in getting what we shall require from thence, and was aware of it before I made that arrangement; but if I am willing to put up with that inconvenience, Colonel Fisher need not complain of it.

‘ I have ordered the 58th regiment to Lisbon to relieve the marines that belong to Sir Thomas Williams’ squadron.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Celorico, 30th March, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 25th. We victual the 1st and 3d caçadores in the Light division, and the 2d caçadores in the 7th division, the 1st Lusitanian legion in the 4th division, and the 2d Lusitanian legion in the 5th division.

‘ The 4th caçadores are in General Pack’s brigade, the 5th in General Hamilton’s Portuguese division, and the 6th in Colonel Ashworth’s brigade, and these must be victualled by the Portuguese Commissaries.

‘ I enclose a copy of my order of the 19th, which, in my opinion, leaves no difficulty on the subject of what troops are to be victualled by us, and what by the Portuguese commissariat. The difficulty is to get anything from the latter.

‘ There is a note from General Pack this morning, whom I have been obliged to leave behind. He has had one day’s rice, and one day’s Indian corn or bread (mentioned in his last note, which I sent to you), since I saw him, twelve days ago!! It is really a joke to talk of carrying on the war with these people.

‘ By your letter of the 25th it would appear that you wish that I should extend the arrangement of the 5th March to the whole Portuguese army. I am perfectly aware of the advantage which I personally should derive from this measure, and you may depend upon it that I limited the operation of the arrangement for good reasons.

‘ To find provisions for an army is doing only half what is necessary, as you will see when you recollect that there are plenty of provisions, as Dom Miguel Forjaz says, at Villa Franca, Figueira, Tojal, and Lisbon; but these provisions are useless to the troops in the field, if there are not means of transport to carry them up to the troops who are to consume them.

‘ The means of transport which I have at my command are Spanish muleteers, and no others. These will not attend the Portuguese troops. When the Portuguese troops are in British divisions, the muleteers believe that the provisions they carry are for the English soldiers, and of course there is no difficulty; but they would refuse to attend General Pack’s brigade, for instance, and therefore I cannot pretend to supply them. The Government, who can, or pretend they can, command the means of transport of the country, must supply this part of their own army.

‘ I do not know what to make of the French army. They had yesterday, some say, the whole force, but certainly not less than two corps, under Massena himself, upon Guarda, which is one of the strongest positions in the country. We manœuvred them out of it, in five columns, without firing a shot; and they went off towards the Coa in considerable confusion, except the rear guard, which retired in excellent

order. They were much stronger than we. I had only three divisions on the hill.

‘ You see that Beresford has retaken Campo Mayor; and he would have cut off the troops there, and their artillery, if it had not been for our dragoons, who invariably get out of order, and pursue any little advantage they acquire too far.

‘ I think there is a chance of getting the French out of Almeida.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Lobo.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ I wrote some time ago to the Government to request that a bridge might be laid over the Zezere, at Punhete, and that the bridge belonging to Abrantes, which is now laid over the Tagus, at Tancos, might be removed to its old situation. I beg you to let me know whether any, and what, progress has been made in these services.

‘ I now write to the Government to request that a flying bridge may be sent up to Villa Velha; but as some time will necessarily elapse before that can be done, I request you to direct that some of the boats belonging to the other ferries on the Tagus, between Abrantes and the Portuguese frontier, may be taken to Villa Velha, as it is of the utmost importance that the communication between the troops in Beira and those on the Guadiana should be opened by that route as soon as may be practicable.

‘ I request you to report to Marshal Beresford that you have received these directions, and report to him, as well as to me, the progress which may have been made in performing the service directed.

‘ I shall pay the proprietor of the ferry boats any reasonable sum for the time they may be detained at Villa Velha.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Lobo.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ I think it would be advisable that the senior Officer with the Portuguese troops with this part of the army should

have some general charge of the whole, as far as regards their communication with the civil departments, viz., pay, medical, and commissariat, as it is impossible for me to enter into the details of these departments; and, unless somebody does regulate the communication between the several corps and them, we shall get into sad confusion.

‘ It is very desirable that some steps should be taken to get the Portuguese troops out of the hospitals. To send a soldier to the hospital, under existing circumstances, is tantamount to giving his discharge; and the regiments are terribly reduced in numbers. The 9th regiment have 694 rank and file for duty; the 21st regiment, 496; the 2d batt. Lusitanian legion, 378; 3d infantry, 601; 15th, 460; 8th, 780; 7th, 702; 19th, 856; 2d caçadores, 365; 1st ditto, 352; 1st regiment, 749; 16th, 691; 4th caçadores, 352; and 6th ditto, 342. This is but little more than half their strength.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have seen Dr. Frank about your hospitals. He says that the hospital must now be at Estremoz, and another at Abrantes. The former left Aldea Galega on the 18th, and an order went express from Lisbon on the 24th to stop it at Estremoz. The latter is ordered up from Villa Nova. The medical establishment of the former is sufficient for any number of sick you can have. Indeed it was formed in the expectation that you might have a general action. It has 300 beds, which can be increased to 600 or 800 if you like it. The latter has 300 beds. Both are formed on the principle, that all cases likely to be tedious should be sent to Lisbon, and that very slight cases should remain with their regiments.

‘ Pakenham wrote to you, by mistake, that I thought the Estremoz hospital ought to go to Crato. You must be the best judge where it ought to be. I think Estremoz the best situation till you have Elvas in the rear of your corps, and then Elvas.

‘ The greatest part of the French army have crossed the Coa. We shall be at that river to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th instant. Captain Holloway, of the Engineers, is the Officer charged with the construction of the jetties at St. Julian.

‘The person who requested from you the pile-driving machine is a person to be employed specially in that business; and he will not begin, of course, till he shall receive his instructions from Captain Holloway.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘In addition to the bridge of boats over the Zezere, and that over the Tagus at Abrantes, respecting which I had the honor of addressing you on the 16th March, it is desirable that a flying bridge should be established over the Tagus, at Villa Velha; and I request you to apply to the Portuguese Government to give directions that one may be established there of large dimensions, as soon as it may be practicable.

‘As it is desirable that the troops may be able to communicate with those on the Guadiana by this route, as soon as may be practicable, I have sent to the Governor of Abrantes the directions of which I enclose the draft; and I request you to apply to the Portuguese Government to aid the performance of this service, by their orders to the civil magistrates, without loss of time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘The wants of the Portuguese Government of an immediate supply of money induce me to suggest for their consideration the expediency of calling upon the mercantile body of the kingdom to pay into the treasury, in the course of the month of April, their income tax for the year 1811.

‘I conclude that the Government will have adopted some

measure to force this body to pay to the state the real tenth of their incomes ; and if they have done so the measure which I now suggest will give them immediately a very large available resource, which would go far to defray their expenses, till the other improvement in the revenue should take place. At the same time it can be no hardship upon the mercantile body, who, notwithstanding that they have realized such enormous profits by the war, have contributed comparatively nothing to the expenses of the State.

‘ I also request you to draw the attention of the Government to the increasing profits of the Oporto Wine Company, as to an available resource to a large amount. I understand that this company have recently quadrupled the amount of their purchases under their monopoly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ I beg you again to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the want of supplies by Brig. General Pack’s and Colonel Ashworth’s brigades of Portuguese infantry. I have been obliged to leave the former in the rear. The latter are in the neighborhood of this place. The troops comprising it have had nine days’ provisions in twenty four days, of which the greatest part of the bread, and nearly all the meat, were supplied by the British commissariat, and the Commanding Officer has this day reported that the troops are without subsistence of any description. I have desired them to halt likewise, if they cannot get provisions.

‘ This is the assistance I receive from the Portuguese Government !

‘ I also beg you to draw the attention of the Government to the operations on the frontiers of Alentejo. These are becoming of the utmost importance, not only to Portugal, but to the allies in general. It is obvious that they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the magazines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon ; for the inhabitants of the Alentejo will supply nothing to the troops.

‘ I now request you to give notice to the Government, that

they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of the Alentejo to give the Commissaries of the army the use of their carriages, for the payment of hire; or that the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines.

‘That province has been untouched by the enemy. The carriages must be in it; and yet I have been able to procure only thirty four, to remove the articles necessary for the establishment of an hospital for Marshal Beresford’s corps at Estremoz.

‘If the Government are tired of the war, and do not choose to exert themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are required to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British Government, that they may adopt such measures on the subject as they may think proper.

‘This is the only letter which I shall write upon this subject; and if I should find that efficient measures are not adopted to force the people to bring forward the means of transport in the province, I shall withdraw the army to the neighborhood of its magazines.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘The difficulty experienced at different times in this country, in collecting boats and materials for a bridge over the several rivers over which the army may have to pass, induces me to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of sending to this country a bridge consisting of 80 pontoons, with their carriages, &c. complete.

‘As this description of equipment is not always required with the army, I do not think it necessary to require horses for it; and I propose to move it by bullocks, if it should be wanted. But the harness for the horses might be sent with the carriages, in case at any time it should be expedient to move it with extraordinary celerity, and to use for this purpose horses of the artillery.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Earl of Liverpool.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ The demand for shoes increases to such a degree that it is desirable that 150,000 pairs should be sent to the Tagus as soon as it may be practicable. It is very desirable that the shoes sent to the army should be of the best quality for wear, and should be made of the largest size.

‘ The destruction of this necessary article to a soldier is very much increased by the bad quality of the shoes sent out, and by their being in general too small; and as the operations of the army have now been removed to a distance from Lisbon, the inconvenience and difficulty of supplying their consumption are much increased; at the same time, that, as the soldiers pay for the shoes they receive, it is but just towards them that they should be of the best quality for their purpose, and should fit them.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it is desirable that I should inform your Lordship, that the Portuguese troops feel the inconvenience of the want of their shoes, which ought to have arrived at Lisbon in January last; and that it is necessary that the shoes sent for them should be as large in size as those sent for the British troops.

‘ It is also desirable that 100,000 pairs of soles and heels should be sent out at the same time with the shoes; and that the Commissary General should be made acquainted with the price of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Fletcher of the Royal Engineers. It is desirable that the corps of Engineers with this army should be increased, if it can be done consistently with other objects.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Viscount Palmerston, Secretary at War.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Celorico, 31st March, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 16th February, regarding the bounty given to deserters from the enemy on enlistment into the King’s German Legion ; in answer to which, I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that the German Legion were never authorized by me to give any bounty to any recruit on enlistment, beyond that stated in the letter from the Deputy Adjutant General of the 16th February.

‘ The object of the different orders from the Secretary of State was to encourage desertion, with which the King’s German Legion had nothing to do. It was my business to encourage soldiers to desert from the enemy by every means in my power, under the orders from the Secretary of State; and that of the Commanding Officer of the German Legion to enlist such men as chose to enlist in that corps, likewise under the orders from the Secretary of State, upon a bounty of four guineas, which was never altered.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Viscount Palmerston.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Celorico, 1st April, 1811.

‘ I have desired that Brig. General Alten, with two light battalions of the German Legion, may march into the Alentejo. He will go either by the direct road of Aldea Galega, &c., if he should not have left Lisbon before the orders shall reach him ; but if he should have left Lisbon he will cross the Tagus at your bridge at Tancos, and will proceed by Gavião.

‘ To these two battalions I propose to add the 71st regiment; and I shall place this brigade in the 2d division, from which I shall withdraw Houghton’s brigade, as soon as these troops shall arrive at Elvas.

‘ The French yesterday destroyed the bridge over the Coa at Almeida, upon Waters’ patrolling up to the river. All their troops are on the other side of that river, towards Alfayates.

‘ We do not move this day as I intended, as Mr. Kennedy was not quite prepared with our supplies, but we shall move to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Marmeleiro, 2d April, 1811.

‘ The allied army were collected in the neighborhood and in front of Celorico on the 28th, with a view to dislodge the enemy from the position which they had taken upon Guarda, which they still occupied in force, and of which they apparently intended to retain possession. On that day a patrol of light infantry from Major General Alexander Campbell’s division, commanded by Colonel the Hon. J. Ramsay, had some success against a detachment of the enemy at Avelans; and a patrol of the light cavalry, with a detachment of the 95th, with which was Major General Slade, obliged the enemy to retire from Freixedas. Both took many prisoners; but I am concerned to add, that Brigade Major Stewart, of the 95th, was killed with the last.

‘ On the morning of the 29th the 3d, 6th, and Light divisions, and the 16th light dragoons and hussars, under the command of Major General Picton, Major General Alexander Campbell, and Major General Sir William Erskine, moved upon Guarda in five columns, which were supported by the 5th division in the valley of the Mondego, and by the 1st and 7th from Celorico; and the militia, under Colonel Trant and Colonel Wilson, covered the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might have been made on that side to disturb it.

‘ The enemy abandoned the position of Guarda without firing a shot, and retired upon Sabugal, on the Coa. They were followed by our cavalry, who took some prisoners from them. On the 30th Sir William Erskine, with the cavalry and horse artillery, fell upon the rear guard of the 2d corps, which had been near Belmonte, and had marched for the Coa during the night; and he killed and wounded several and took some prisoners. The enemy have since taken a position upon the Coa, having an advanced guard

on this side; and the allied troops have this day been collected on the left of that river.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing the terms of the capitulation of Campo Mayor; and I have likewise the honor of enclosing his report of his first operations against the enemy, from which your Lordship will observe that he has got possession of that place again, and has had considerable success against the enemy’s cavalry. This success would have been more complete, and would have been attended by less loss, if the ardor of the 13th light dragoons, and 7th Portuguese regiment of cavalry, in the pursuit of the enemy, could have been kept within reasonable bounds. Some of the men missing of both those regiments were made prisoners on the bridge of Badajoz.

‘ The enemy have likewise abandoned Alburquerque.

‘ I have received no accounts from Cadiz or from the north since I addressed your Lordship on the 27th March.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

· *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have received your letters of the 28th and 29th; but I have had so much to do, that I have not been able to write to you. I wrote to you on the 25th, 27th, 30th, and 31st March, and 1st April, all of which letters I hope you will have received.

‘ I do not understand by whose orders the shoes and money for you were stopped at Aldea Galega. I believe, however, that Mr. Thompson is very unequal to the management of the great concern now in Alentejo. Mr. Thompson, therefore, is ordered to Abrantes, and Mr. Ogilvie will manage the whole concern in the Alentejo.

‘ The French army were posted on the Coa, with their right at Ponte Sequeiros; their left, the 2d corps, here; Loison at Rovina, opposite Rapoula de Coa; and a considerable body, and the head quarters, at Alfayates.

‘ We moved on the 2d, and the British army was formed opposite to them; the divisions of militia, under Trant and

Wilson, were sent across the river at Cinco Villas, to alarm Almeida for its communication. Yesterday morning we moved the whole army (with the exception of the 6th division, which remained at Rapoula de Coa, opposite Loison) to the right, in order to turn this position, and force the passage of the river. The 2d corps could not have stood here for a moment; but unfortunately the Light division, which formed the right of the whole, necessarily passed first, and the leading brigade, Beckwith's, drove in the enemy's piquets, which were followed briskly by four companies of the 95th, and three of Elder's caçadores, and supported by the 43d regiment. At this time there came on a rain storm, and it was as difficult to see as in the fogs on Busaco, and these troops pushed on too far, and became engaged with the main body of the enemy. The light infantry fell back upon their support, which instead of halting, moved forward. The French then seeing how weak the body was which had passed, attempted to drive them down to the Coa, and did oblige the 43d to turn. They rallied again, however, and beat in the French; but were attacked by fresh troops and cavalry, and were obliged to retire; but formed again, and beat back the enemy. At this time the 52d joined the 43d, and both moved on upon the enemy, and to be charged and attacked again in the same manner, and beat back. They formed again, moved forward upon the enemy, and established themselves on the top of the hill in an enclosure, and here they beat off the enemy.

‘ But Regnier was placing a body of infantry on their left flank, which must have destroyed them, only that at that moment the head of the 3d division, which had passed the Coa on the left of the Light division, came up, and opened their fire upon this column; and the 5th division, which passed this bridge and through this town, made their appearance.

‘ The enemy then retired, having lost in this affair a howitzer, and I should think not less than 1000 men.

‘ Our loss is much less than one would have supposed possible, scarcely 200 men. The 43d have 73 killed and wounded. But really these attacks in columns against our lines are very contemptible.

‘ The contest was latterly entirely for the howitzer, which was taken and retaken twice, and at last remained in our hands. Our cavalry, which ought to have crossed the Coa on the right of the Light division, crossed at the same ford, and therefore could be of no use to them. Besides they went too far to the right.

‘ In short, these combinations for engagements do not answer, unless one is upon the spot to direct every trifling movement. I was upon a hill on the left of the Coa, immediately above the town, till the 3d and 5th divisions crossed, whence I could see every movement on both sides, and could communicate with ease with everybody; but that was not near enough.

‘ We took 6 Officers,* and between 200 and 300 prisoners, and Soult’s* and Loison’s baggage.

‘ After this affair the whole French army retired from the Coa upon Alfayates, and this morning from thence; and if they are not out of Portugal, they are, at the utmost, in the frontier villages of Aldea da Ponte and Aldea Velha. I suspect that they will have destroyed Almeida either last night or this morning.

‘ You will be concerned to hear that Waters is at last taken prisoner. He crossed the Coa alone, I believe, yesterday morning, and was looking at the enemy through a spying glass, when four hussars pounced upon him. Nobody has seen him since yesterday morning; and we have the account from the prisoners, who tell the story of an Officer attached to the Staff, a Lieut. Colonel, *blond*, with a *petit chapeau*. They saw him with Regnier.

‘ To counterbalance the effect of this bad news, I announce to you the birth of the *King of Rome*, on the 20th of March. This event was announced to the Armée de Portugal on the 2d instant, by the firing of 101 pieces of cannon!!!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ I have received Cole’s report, &c., upon Campo Mayor. Now that you are upon the spot you had better determine what shall be done with that place, and give orders upon it.

* General Soult, nephew of the Marshal.

A good place in that situation would be very useful. Can the place, or the citadel of Campo Mayor, be put in such a state as to render it probable that either will hold out so long as to render it worth while to risk the loss of the men who must be left in it ? ‘ W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th March, regarding the transports prepared to be sent home. I beg to refer for your consideration the expediency of further reducing the number, by sending away the six ships of 1276 tons, detained to carry detachments to Figueira, and using for that purpose the ten ships of 3996 tons ; also by sending away that proportion of the victuallers and store ships attached to the army, included in the number of forty-two of 9659 tons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I think it is desirable that the Officers of the navy attached to the telegraphs should return to their duty on board the fleet, as you suggest. ‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 4th April, 1811.

‘ We beat Regnier here yesterday, and forced the passage of the Coa at this place. The enemy retired upon Alfayates, and this day are either entirely out of Portugal or at most at the frontier villages. I have not yet heard what they have done at Almeida.

‘ I cannot allow either prisoners of war or galley slaves to go into St. Julian. We are going to put our stores there, as I do not like to leave them at the mercy of the people of Lisbon, in the existing temper of the Government ; and adverting to the impressions which the Government have endeavored to give to the people. They should fit out more large ships to receive the prisoners. We did nothing that I

know of excepting feed the people, and give them medical assistance and comforts, and subscribe money to feed them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major Ridewood¹, 2d Batt. 52d Light Infantry.

‘ Villar Mayor, 6th April,
1811.

‘ MY DEAR MAJOR RIDEWOOD,

‘ I received only yesterday your letter of the 1st April. and I am much concerned that any letter written by me should have given you a moment’s uneasiness.

‘ It is impossible for me to enter into an explanation with anybody on the contents of a public dispatch; but I am very certain that it is misunderstood by you, if you suppose that it contains any expression which can convey a notion that I was not convinced you had done your duty in the affair to which it relates, or that I was not satisfied with your conduct, or that any expression is omitted by which omission such meaning is conveyed.

‘ I have had more than one occasion to be satisfied with the whole Light division in the late affairs in which they have been engaged; and I have not failed to convey the expression of that satisfaction to the Prince Regent in the manner which I thought most suitable to the occasion, and I have certainly expressed dissatisfaction with none.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Ridewood.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villar Mayor, 6th April, 1811.

‘ I received this morning, at Alfayates, your letters of the 31st March and 1st instant, both under the same cover.

‘ I hope that you will be in time to prevent the supplies from getting into Badajoz. It is very unfortunate that you could not move for that object as soon as the right of the Guadiana was cleared of the enemy.

‘ There was, and I believe there still is, an Assistant Paymaster General attached to the troops in the Alentejo, and

* Afterwards Lieut. Colonel Ridewood; of the 45th, in command of which regiment he received a mortal wound at the battle of Vitoria.

Hill signed the warrants for the ordinaries for them. If the Assistant Paymaster is still in the Alentejo, I beg you to sign the warrants for the ordinaries as Hill did, and let the corps be paid according to the proportion of the means you propose to allot to defray the ordinaries. If the Assistant Paymaster is not in the Alentejo, I beg you to desire Mr. Ogilvie to make to the Paymaster of each battalion an advance on account of the Paymaster General, equal in amount to the sum which you would propose to allot to the ordinaries. The regiments have received half of the balance of their estimates to the 24th February; those here have lately received the balance of their estimates to the 24th February, and half of the balance to the 24th March; and I should think yours might receive the same, or the whole balance to the 24th March. The payment of the *bât* and forage must be postponed for the present.

‘ In regard to debts incurred at Elvas, I refer Mr. Ogilvie to my orders and proclamation of last year, directing those debts to be settled, and to be paid by bills upon Lisbon.

‘ I have been obliged to act as you recommended in respect to Pack’s brigade, that is, I have left it behind to get provisions; and it is now, I believe, near Mangualde. Colonel Pamplona’s is with the army: we have supplied it with beef; and I have told them repeatedly, if that is not sufficient for them they may go back. I have not communicated personally with Barbacena; but I have no complaints from him, and I conclude that he continues to plunder subsistence. Pamplona’s brigade is in full strength; that is to say, on the 20th March it had 2626 men; so that if that brigade can keep with us, it is better that it should stay.

‘ In regard to the others, there is now no excuse of want of provisions, as the whole of the infantry of the army are admirably supplied, and it would be really too ridiculous to send the regiments to the rear to refit after one month’s service, they having before had five and six months’ rest.

‘ What is wanted is to get the soldiers out of the hospitals and *depositos*, and from the latter in regular order to the regiments. The regiments cannot be better than with our divisions. But just to show you how much this department of the Portuguese army still wants regulation, I mention that Pack tells me that 100 men for the 1st regiment

marched from the *deposito* at Lisbon on the 14th March, under charge of a *Cadete*. Only fifty of them reached the regiment, and these in a very bad state. These men, if belonging to our army, would have had at least two Officers and a proportion of non-commissioned officers with them, and the Officers would have marched by a regular route, and would have answered for every man. We shall never make the army effective till something of the same kind is adopted and enforced in the Portuguese army.

‘ It is very extraordinary that you had not been informed of the fifteen boats in Jurumenha. Captain Mallet mentions them in his report to Murray; and he was desired to attend you at Portalegre, with the information he should acquire respecting the Guadiana.

‘ In respect to Badajoz, the first thing to do is to blockade it strictly, and let it receive nothing: this will not be very difficult if the Guadiana should continue fordable, or in any event with your force and Castaños. We must then prepare to lay siege to the place at all events; and I am most anxious to receive the accounts of what Elvas can supply for this purpose, that I may order up from our battering train the deficiency. I also beg you to let me know what stores which Elvas will supply it will be most urgent to replace.

‘ All the transports from Elvas for this operation must be made by bullock carts, and General Leite should set seriously to work to get together as many as he can. Bullocks must also draw the guns from Elvas.

‘ I have not yet received the reports of the patrols this day. The French were all across the Agueda yesterday, excepting, I believe, a corps at Carpio, &c., on the Azava. They have destroyed all the bridges on the Coa, excepting that at Sabugal; and I am therefore obliged to keep well up the river, and, till I shall have re-established the bridges, to be satisfied with frightening Almeida with the cavalry; otherwise I should take up the position on the Dos Casas, on which I placed Craufurd’s advanced guard last year, and should have my advanced guard on the Azava.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I enclose a Spanish memorandum respecting the murder of two soldiers at Ponte de Sor. It would be desirable to have inquiry made into this matter, to ascertain who the soldiers were. I have written to Mr. Stuart to have the murderers tried. ‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Villar Mayor, 6th April, 1811.

‘ The French crossed the Agueda yesterday. I am trying to frighten Regnier out of Almeida.

‘ It appears to me that the Government neglect several very essential measures to re-settle the country. One is to send to their dioceses all the bishops, and to their parishes all the clergy. A month has now elapsed since the French marched from Santarem, and the post is not yet established. We ought to have it through Lower Beira, in order that I might communicate more directly with Beresford. But the Government have sent no mules, and no means to feed those that they have placed even near the capital.

‘ They are really going backwards instead of forwards. All this was done in half the time when the country was recovered from the French in 1809.

‘ The troops are still in sad want of provisions. Pack’s brigade have been obliged to stay behind. Pamplona’s are here; but they got nothing but beef, with which the British Commissary supplies them. Yet the Portuguese Government will not bear to hear of their neglect of their army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR, ‘ Villar Mayor, 6th April, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum which has been given to me by a Spanish serjeant, who lately passed by Ponte de Sor, in which he gives an account of the murder by the inhabitants of two British soldiers.

‘ I have written to Sir William Beresford to request that he will take measures to discover what soldiers they were, and the circumstances attending the murder; but as it ap-

pears that the criminals are in custody, I trust that the Governors of the Kingdom will consider it expedient to give directions that this murder may be inquired into, and that, if possible, these criminals should be tried, and punished if found guilty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain Chapman, Royal Engineers.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th March this day. I shall recommend you to the Commander in Chief to be made a Major by brevet, in any manner that may be most likely to attain that object for you. I certainly think you are entitled to that reward for your services, adverting to the confidential manner in which you were employed by Colonel Fletcher and me, and to the efficient service which you rendered to us both. Consult Colonel Torrens upon this subject, and let me know how I can forward your object.

‘ We have given the French a handsome dressing, and I think they will not say again that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do; but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor 2d corps received a terrible beating from the 43d and 52d on the 3d.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Chapman.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st only yesterday morning.

‘ I have written to the Secretary of State respecting the French prisoners in this country, whose numbers are increasing fast. I expect his answer soon; but in the meantime I recommend that you should send home the Officers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

SIR,

Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 31st March, in which you have enclosed the copy of Dom Miguel Forjaz' note of the 29th of March, upon the contents of certain letters recently written by me on the state of the Portuguese army, in consequence of the omission of the Government to supply the troops regularly with food.

Although the facts are clear upon this subject, and the further discussion of it would appear to be unnecessary, I cannot allow this note to pass unnoticed.

Although it is admitted in terms, by Dom Miguel Forjaz, that there are and have been deficiencies in the supplies to the troops, which he attributes to the deficiencies of the financial resources of the Government, he still contends that the troops have been sufficiently supplied, as he endeavors to prove, as usual, by documents from the Junta de Viveres. I know from experience that all these documents are false; and it is obvious, upon the face of them, that they do not state the date of departure and arrival of each article of supply sent from Lisbon.

Articles sent from Lisbon on the 5th and 6th of March could not be available for the Portuguese troops with this army, which marched from their cantonments on the Rio Mayor on the 6th; nor could articles shipped at Lisbon and sent to Figueira be of any use to the troops at a later period, unless means of transport were provided to remove them to the station which the army should occupy. Salt meat, and *bacalao* particularly, which the Junta de Viveres have been frequently desired not to send, could be of no use, as these articles are more expensive than fresh meat, and the further expense and inconvenience must be incurred of removing them by means of transport to the troops, as they cannot walk.

While adverting to this part of the subject, I am concerned to add that I have been obliged to leave General Pack's brigade at Mangualde for want of food, and that Colonel Pamplona's brigade receives nothing but beef, with which they are supplied by the British Commissaries.

I was in hopes that the arrangement, by which I under-

took to supply with food three fourths of the Portuguese effective army, would have given satisfaction to the Government, and that at least the remainder of the troops would have been supplied regularly. The last object has failed entirely; and in regard to the first, the Government, instead of expressing their satisfaction that I should gratuitously have taken upon myself and the British Commissaries increased trouble and responsibility, have, as usual, complained that I have not done enough for them. To these complaints I answer that I can undertake for no more. The means of transport which we have in the British army generally are Spanish mules and muleteers, and these do not choose to attend the Portuguese troops. When the Portuguese troops are in British divisions, the muleteers do not know that they are carrying provisions for their use, and the business is done; but it would not be done if the muleteers were to be desired to attend a Portuguese brigade.

‘When supplies are provided, but half the business is done. There must be means of transport to remove them to the station occupied by the troops; and, as the means of transport of which I have the command will not attend the Portuguese troops not in British divisions, I cannot undertake to supply them.

‘I repeat that the Portuguese troops were not regularly fed when they were in the cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; that some of the corps were obliged to plunder for food; and, if there is any further discussion on the subject, I shall call for the returns from the corps, which will prove what I have asserted.

‘In respect to the want of previous information of the movements of the army, complained of by Dom Miguel Forjaz, I answer,

‘First, that the Government had all the information that I had.

‘Secondly, that it had been arranged by Marshal Sir William Beresford and me that the troops should have at all times in their cantonments a reserve of six days’ provisions, with means of transport for three days, in order that they might be in readiness for any movement which circumstances might render expedient.

‘I am aware that this arrangement was much ridiculed by

some of the members of the Government, and it certainly was not carried into execution for the Portuguese troops. Not only they had no reserve, but their daily allowance was not provided for them; and the consequence has been, that when they moved the whole were supplied by the British Commissaries, to the great inconvenience of the British army and the manifest disadvantage of the cause.

‘ The consequence of this neglect of the army has been that the following regiments, which ought to be 1400 rank and file each, have only as follows:—

{	9th	. .	694
{	21st	. .	496
{	3d	. .	601
{	15th	. .	460
{	8th	. .	780
{	12th	. .	1017
{	7th	. .	702
{	19th	. .	856
{	1st	. .	749
{	16th	. .	691

And the 2d batt. Lusitanian legion, which ought to have 1000 rank and file, have only 378 rank and file; and the following battalions of caçadores, which ought to have 600 each, have only as follows:—

2d	. .	365
4th	. .	352
6th	. .	342

‘ Many of the corps produce in the field less than half their numbers; and the whole Portuguese force with this part of the army amounts to less than half what it ought to be.

‘ Under these circumstances, Dom Miguel Forjaz talks of the Portuguese Government paying and maintaining 90,000 men! This assertion makes it my duty to draw your attention to the fact, that the whole Portuguese army employed in the field, as well with this army as with the troops under Sir William Beresford, do not amount to 20,000 effective men, while His Majesty supposes that he pays for 30,000 men.

‘ I do not mean to assert that there are no more than 20,000 men in the service; but the great proportion of the

army unfit for service is alone sufficient to show that the system which has been adopted is as unfavorable to economy as it is to military efficiency.

‘Then, as to the militia, there have never been 25,000 militia in arms; and all those in the works of Sobral, &c., were fed by the British commissariat.

‘The divisions of Silveira, Trant, and Wilson, do not amount to 8000 men, instead of 15,000, to which number at least they ought to amount.

‘All this is to be attributed to the system on which the Government have acted.

‘It is perfectly true that the demands upon Government are enormous, that they undertook their task under great disadvantages, and that many circumstances have tended to decrease the revenues of the state; but, having undertaken the task of governing the country, it was their duty to meet the difficulties under which they labored by adequate resources.

‘They have recently adopted some of the measures recommended to them to provide an increase of revenue; but I would beg to know why those measures were not adopted in November, 1809, when I apprised them of the approaching crisis, and recommended to them to provide for their finances. Why were they not adopted when ordered by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent? Why not adopted when repeatedly recommended by yourself and by me?

‘If they had been so adopted, the world would have been convinced that Portugal was straining every nerve in the contest; and the assistance of Great Britain would have been given with increased alacrity to a country whose Government was making wise arrangements and great exertions in its own cause.

‘In respect to the alteration of system, to which I refer in my letter of 18th March, I beg leave to refer the Governors of the Kingdom to what I have frequently recommended upon this same subject.

‘First, I recommend to them to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous

services. The resources which a wise Government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those popular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have the contrary effect.

‘The enthusiasm of the people in favor of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged, by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things, and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the Government to carry on this necessary contest.

‘Secondly, I recommend to the Government to abolish the Junta de Vivres, and to appoint a Commissary General, under good regulation, to carry on all affairs concerning the provisioning their army.

‘Thirdly, I recommend to the Government to place under military law the commissariat, the medical department, and the department of the arsenal, and all those connected with the military operations.

‘Fourthly, I recommend to the Government to alter the military law, according to the repeated suggestion of Marshal Sir William Beresford and myself.

‘Fifthly, I recommend to the Government to enforce strictly their own laws and regulations respecting the means of transport to be supplied by the country for the use of the armies.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘SIR,

‘Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th March, regarding a complaint of Captain —— of the ——, forwarded by the Governors of the Kingdom.

‘I enclose a letter of the 5th March, which Captain —— had written to his Commanding Officer, under the expectation that his conduct might be complained of; and another letter of the 31st March, written in answer to one which I desired might be sent to him, to inquire whether he wrote the letters enclosed in yours of the 16th instant.

‘Excepting in cases in which it appears that there has been some gross and flagrant departure from the laws of

hospitality, or violence has been used, or gross fraud practised, it does not answer to bring cases of seduction under the cognizance of the military tribunals. It is probable that Captain —— would be acquitted, and the young lady and family would be disgraced by the sentence.

‘ I acknowledge that, from what I have heard upon this subject, I would recommend to the family to drop it entirely. If, however, they should determine to bring it forward in the Portuguese civil courts, it will be necessary that the Government should apply to me to have Captain —— made over to them to answer for his conduct.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ I write you a letter this day in answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’ note of the 29th March. I have received your letters of the 1st and 2d. You will observe, from my former letter about Mascarenhas, that I did not think our Government would like to urge the Portuguese Government to carry into execution the 11th article of the Convention. I believe the King declined to ratify that article, and I am almost certain that Mr. Canning instructed Mr. Villiers not to press the Portuguese Government to carry into execution that article.

‘ All that I contended for was, that to hang Mascarenhas for serving the French, under all the circumstances of the Prince’s proclamation and the 18th article of the Convention, was not consistent with justice.

‘ All the returns of provisions to Figueira are as valuable as so much waste paper. The troops receive none of them, because none are brought up to them. Barbacena’s brigade will soon be annihilated. Indeed I am sorry to say that our excellent cavalry are falling off very fast. There are thousands of carts in Upper Beira; but I cannot get one, and the unfortunate mules are obliged to carry our provisions and corn for the horses the whole way, from the Ponte da Murcella to the Agueda. The consequence is that the horses are starving, and I much fear that I shall be obliged to retire.

‘ We knocked a division of the 9th corps, from Almeida, out of Portugal very handsomely yesterday, and I believe the whole army have crossed the Agueda this day. We have cut off all communication with Almeida, where the French are still. But I fear it will not do, and that I shall be obliged to draw in. I cannot afford to lose our cavalry. I do not know what I shall do with these cart people; if the Government will not enforce their own law it is useless to endeavor to defend the country any longer.

‘ I shall send the dispatches from hence to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. They tell me that the 2d corps lost 2500 men on the 3d, at Sabugal! Their loss must have been enormous certainly, but I can hardly believe so many.

‘ W.’

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 6th March, received this day, regarding the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of this army who are prisoners with the enemy, I have the honor to inform you, that I do not think there is the smallest chance of their being exchanged, and that it is desirable the vacancies should be filled up. But very few prisoners have been taken by the enemy this campaign, whereas I have now in my possession many thousands, besides those already sent home.

‘ The greatest number of the prisoners on our returns are the men left by General Cuesta at Talavera, in August, 1809, and the Prince of Essling has no power over these. He however executed with so little good faith the only agreement for an exchange that I ever made with him, that it is impossible to propose another, to get out of his hands the few prisoners he may have. Upon that occasion, having, as he stated, 120 British soldiers, and Captain Percy and Lieut. Carden, and a midshipman of the navy, as prisoners, he detained the three Officers and sixty of the soldiers, and sent instead of them Portuguese militia and ordenanza to be exchanged for French soldiers. He has since made repeated

propositions for the exchange of Portuguese Officers, for he has none British, excepting Lieut. Colonel Waters (taken by accident on the 3d instant); but I have refused to attend to any proposition for a cartel, till the plan first proposed by himself, and accepted by me, shall be strictly carried into execution. From this detail you will see, not only that the Prince of Essling has no control over the greater number of the men returned as prisoners of war in the returns of this army, but that there is no chance of an exchange of any description.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ I received this day your letter respecting the two Officers of the 21st regiment. That regiment is still in Sicily, and will not, I apprehend, join this army; but if it should, I shall be happy to attend to those gentlemen. I refer you to my dispatches to Lord Liverpool for an account of the state of affairs here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. S. Perceval.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

‘ I received this day your note of the 19th March, containing some information regarding a supposed communication from Massena to me, that he intended to fire a *feu de joie* upon the birth of the King of Rome. The fact is that no such communication ever took place, and the whole story is a fabrication of the English newspapers. I believe that in one of the communications which my aide de camp, Major Gordon, had with an aide de camp of Regnier, the conversation turned upon a strong reconnaissance which the enemy had made a day or two before towards our posts on the upper part of the Rio Mayor river; and this aide de camp said that we should hear some heavy firing in a day or two, when they should receive the news of the birth of the King

of Rome, but that it need not create any alarm in our posts on the Rio Mayor river.

‘ I confess I thought for some time that the intention of this communication was to mislead us when they should make an attack, which I thought not improbable, on Beresford’s posts on the Tagus; but I believe the Officer was serious, as they did announce the birth of the King of Rome to the army on the 2d, by firing 101 pieces of cannon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for Colonel Fletcher and the Commissary General.

‘ Villar Mayor, 9th April, 1811.

‘ Colonel Fletcher is to give directions that the stores, of which he has given me a list, should be sent by sea to Setuval. I shall write to the Admiral upon the subject. He will make a requisition upon the Commissary General for boats at Setuval, to remove the articles from thence to Alcacer do Sal, and for carriages to remove them from Alcacer do Sal to Elvas. The Commissary General will take measures to supply these boats and carriages.

‘ Colonel Fletcher will give directions that Marshal Sir William Beresford may be apprised at what time these articles will arrive at Setuval, Alcacer do Sal, Evora, and Elvas, respectively. The Marshal is directed to provide an escort for them; but they must not wait for the escort, unless there should be an appearance of danger from their moving without.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 9th April, 1811.

‘ When I last addressed your Lordship the enemy occupied the Upper Coa, having his right at Rovina, and guarding the post of Rapoula de Coa with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias*, and his left at Sabugal, and the 8th corps was at Alfayates.

‘ The right of the British army was opposite Sabugal, and the left at the bridge of Ferrerias. The militia, under General Trant and Colonel Wilson, crossed the Coa below

* Below the bridge of Sequeiros.

Almeida, in order to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the enemy's army.

' The river Coa is difficult of access throughout its course; and the position which the enemy had taken was very strong, and could be approached only by its left. The troops were therefore put in motion on the morning of the 3d to turn the enemy's left above Sabugal, and to force the passage of the bridge and town; with the exception of the 6th division, which remained opposite the 6th corps, which was at Rovina, and one battalion of the 7th division, which observed the enemy's detachment at the bridge of Ferrerías.

' The 2d corps were in a strong position with their right upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of Sabugal, and their left extending along the road to Alfayates, to a height which commanded all the approaches to Sabugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The 2d corps communicated by Rendo with the 6th corps at Rovina. It was intended to turn the left of this corps, and with this view the Light division and the cavalry, under Major General Sir William Erskine, and Major General Slade, were to cross the Coa by two separate fords upon the right; the cavalry upon the right of the Light division; the 3d division, under Major General Picton, at a ford on their left, about a mile above Sabugal; and the 5th division, under Major General Dunlop, and the artillery, at the bridge of Sabugal.

' Colonel Beckwith's brigade of the Light division was the first that crossed the Coa, with two squadrons of cavalry upon their right. Four companies of the 95th, and three companies of Colonel Elder's caçadores, drove in the enemy's piquets, and were supported by the 43d regiment.

' At this moment a rain storm came on, which rendered it impossible to see anything; and these troops, having pushed on in pursuit of the enemy's piquets, came upon the left of their main body, which it had been intended they should turn. The light troops were driven back upon the 43d regiment; and, as soon as the atmosphere became clear, the enemy having perceived that the body which had advanced were not strong, attacked them in a solid column, supported by cavalry and artillery. These troops repulsed this attack, and advanced in pursuit upon the enemy's position, where

they were attacked by a fresh column on the left, and were charged by the lussars on their right. They retired, and took post behind a wall, from which post they again repulsed the enemy, and advanced a second time in pursuit of them, and took from them a howitzer. They were, however, again attacked by a fresh column, with cavalry, and retired again to their post, where they were joined by the other brigade of the Light division, consisting of the two battalions of the 52d, and the 1st caçadores. These troops repulsed the enemy; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade and the 1st batt. 52d again advanced upon them. They were attacked again by a fresh column, supported by cavalry, which charged their right, and they took post in an enclosure upon the top of a height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which the 43d had taken; and they drove back the enemy.

'The enemy were making arrangements to attack them again in this post, and had moved a column on their left, when the light infantry of Major General Pieton's division, under Lieut. Colonel Williams, supported by Major General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, opened their fire upon them.

'At the same moment the head of Major General Dunlop's column crossed the bridge of the Coa, and ascended the heights on the right flank of the enemy, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the enemy's left; the enemy then retired across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer in the possession of those who had so gallantly gained and preserved it, and about 200 killed on the ground, 6 Officers, and 300 prisoners in our hands.

'Although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner in which I intended they should be, I consider the action that was fought by the Light division, by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally, with the whole of the 2d corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in.

'The 43d regiment, under Major Patrickson, particularly distinguished themselves; as did that part of the 95th regiment, in Colonel Beckwith's brigade, under the command of Major Gilmour, and Colonel Elder's caçadores. The 1st batt. 52d regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Ross, likewise showed great steadiness and gallantry when they joined Colonel Beckwith's brigade.

'Throughout the action the troops received great advan-

tage from the assistance of two guns of Captain Bull's troop of horse artillery, which crossed at the ford with the Light division, and came up to their support.

'It was impossible for any Officer to conduct himself with more ability and gallantry than Colonel Beckwith.

'The action was commenced by an unavoidable accident, to which all operations are liable; but having been commenced, it would have been impossible to withdraw from the ground without risking the loss of the object of our movements; and it was desirable to obtain possession, if possible, of the top of the hill, from which the enemy had made so many attacks with advantage on the first position taken by the 43d regiment. This was gained before the 3d division came up.

'I had also great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Colonel Drummond, who commands the other brigade in the Light division.

'When the firing commenced the 6th corps broke up from their position at Rovina, and marched towards Rendo. The two corps joined at that place, and continued their retreat to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry, part of which was that night at Soito.

'The enemy continued their retreat that night and the next morning, and entered the Spanish frontier on the 4th. They have since continued their retreat; and yesterday the last of them crossed the Agueda.

'I have the honor to enclose the returns of killed and wounded from the 18th March. I am concerned to have to report that Lieut. Colonel Waters was taken prisoner on the 3d, before the action commenced. He had crossed the Coa to reconnoitre the enemy's position, as had been frequently his practice, without having with him any escort; and he was surrounded by some hussars, and taken. He had rendered very important services upon many occasions in the last two years, and his loss is sensibly felt.

'I sent six squadrons of cavalry, under Sir William Erskine, on the 7th, towards Almeida, to reconnoitre that place, and drive in any parties which might be in that neighborhood, and to cut off the communication between the garrison and the army. He found a division of the 9th corps at Junça, which he drove before him across the Turon and Dos Casas; and he took from them many prisoners. Captain

Bull's troop of horse artillery did great execution upon this occasion. The enemy withdrew in the night across the Agueda.

' The allied army have taken up the position upon the Dos Casas which Brig. General Craufurd occupied with his advanced guard in the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having our advanced posts at Gallegos and upon the Agueda. The militia are at Cinco Villas and Malpartida.

' The enemy have no communication with the garrison of Almeida, from whence they have lately withdrawn the heavy artillery employed in the summer in the siege of that place.

' My last report from Cadiz is dated the 13th of March.

' I have not heard from Sir William Beresford since the 1st instant. At that time he hoped to be able to blockade Badajoz on the 3d.

' I learn by letters of the 3d March, received this day from the south of Portugal, that after General Zayas had landed his corps at Huelva and Moguer, the Prince d'Arcemberg moved upon Moguer from Seville, with 3000 infantry and 800 cavalry, upon which the Spanish troops embarked again. It is stated that the cavalry had lost some of their equipments.

' I have no accounts of a late date from the north of Spain.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Earl of Liverpool.*

' WELLINGTON.

' *Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the several Affairs with the French Army, from the 16th of March to the 7th of April, 1811, inclusive.*

' Head Quarters, Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	3	1	16	8	20
Wounded . . .	11	8	128	11	147
Missing . . .	1	—	4	1	5

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 9th April, 1811.

‘ My dispatch of this date will give you an account of the operations to this day. The enemy’s loss in this expedition to Portugal is immense; I should think not less than 45,000 men, including the sick and wounded; and I think that, including the 9th corps, they may have 40,000 on this frontier.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received this day from one of my correspondents at Salamanca, which shows the state in which they are. The whole army is dispirited and dissatisfied. Ney left them about a fortnight ago, it is said, in arrest; and I understand that the other Generals are equally dissatisfied with Massena’s operations. It was reported that they intended to blow up Almeida; and I have taken up this position with the army, because I know the place is ill supplied with provisions; and I am in hopes that I may be able to obtain possession of it in a complete state, by cutting off its communication with this country. It is doubtful, however, that I shall be able to remain here, as I cannot feed the cavalry, owing to the difficulty of procuring means of transport to the army from our magazines on the Mondego, and nothing can be got in the country. I shall remain here, however, as long as I can, and do what I can to obtain possession of this place; but I have reconnaitred it this day, and I am very apprehensive that I shall not be able to obtain possession of it, excepting by the wants of the garrison.

‘ I beg your Lordship to send us out more horses for the cavalry and artillery. We are still in great order; but it must be expected, that after such a march as we have made, and such constant hard service in very bad weather, and and with but little food latterly, the horses must fall off; and I am very desirous not to be found in an incomplete state, if we are to be attacked.

‘ I beg that the enclosed letter may not be made public.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Bacellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

‘ I request you to carry into execution the disposition of the division under Colonel Wilson, and of your own head quarters, which I communicated to you verbally this morning.

‘ I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the evacuation of your country by the enemy, and to return you my thanks for the assistance which I have received from you in the operations which have been carried on throughout the year, and have been brought to this result.

‘ I likewise request you to convey my thanks to Generals Silveira and Trant, and to Colonel Wilson, for the assistance which I have received from each of them; and for the zeal they have manifested in the cause, and the ability with which they have conducted themselves in the arduous situations in which they have severally been placed.

‘ I likewise request you to convey to the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, who have served under your directions, and under the immediate command of Generals Silveira and Trant, and Colonel Wilson, the expression of the high sense which I entertain of their gallantry and discipline as soldiers, of their patriotism, and of their loyalty to their sovereign, and my assurances of confidence in the ultimate result of the just cause in which we are engaged, if they, and others in similar situations, continue their exertions, and to act in a manner worthy of the ancient reputation of their country.

‘ As Marshal Sir William Beresford is at a distance, I make this communication direct to you, and I shall send him a copy of it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to General Bacellar, upon ordering the divisions of militia, and other troops under his command, to cross the Douro, and return to the provinces north of that river.

‘ I recommend that you should insert this letter in the General Orders of the army ; and I request you to take the same opportunity of expressing my sense of the services rendered to their country by the several corps of militia, volunteers, and ordenanza, which did duty in the works constructed between the Tagus and the sea ; viz., the militia of Tondella Viseu, Castello Branco, Covilhão, Idanha, Leyria, Thomar, Santarem, Setuval, Alcacer do Sal, the militia of Lisbon, and the battalions of volunteers of Lisbon.

‘ It is necessary, however, at the same time, to observe upon the conduct of those individuals, both Officers and soldiers, who deserted their colors at the period above referred to, when their country was in danger ; and I beg you to have the names of the Officers, in particular, made public throughout the country, and that those men who have not returned to their regiments, under the amnesty recently published by the Government, may be sought for, and punished according to the laws of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Villa Ferosa, 10th April, 1811.

‘ I received your letter of the 2d, and two of the 4th, yesterday evening. I do not understand the subject of either of Blunt’s complaints ; but I am making inquiries respecting them.

‘ The delay in crossing the Guadiana is most unfortunate, for I see that the French have got plenty of provisions into Badajoz.

‘ I cannot understand ——’s division being so reduced in shoes, as I understand that when they marched they had 500 pairs more than they wanted. It is difficult to ascertain which of two roads would wear out shoes fastest ; but it is certain that that division has not marched so much in the last month as the whole army on this side ; and although these have called out for shoes, they are not yet reduced to the extremity of being unable to make another march, to which ——’s division was reduced on the 22d of last month.

‘ Then, the length of time which the shoes, &c, have been on the road is too bad. Mr. Thompson must be called to account for this delay, for which I shall be held seriously responsible in England, and which may have the most important consequences.

‘ In answer to your letter (No. 2) of the 4th, I agree with you respecting the Lusitanian legion; and I am of opinion that all the new levies ought to be caçadores. I have no doubt whatever, that if the Government will exert themselves they might get from the country 50,000 very fine men without difficulty. The villages, in which there are many people, are full of fine young men.

‘ I sent all the arms for the Spaniards to my brother at Seville, excepting some kept for Don Julian, and for Downie’s legion. The whole of the latter have been taken by Cascaños, excepting 1000 stands, which I am about to give to Downie. But I shall write to England for more arms, and you shall then have those advanced by the arsenal at Lisbon to the Spaniards.

‘ By the routes given to the militia, I rather understand that you mean, not only that they should return to their districts, and remain there embodied, such individuals having leave of absence as require it, but that you have disembodied the whole, and allowed them to return to their homes. I meant no more than the former; because I do not think that affairs are yet in such a decided state as to enable me to say that in the course of two or three months it may not be necessary to call out the whole again. I am fully aware of the difference of expense to the Government; but that cannot be avoided, and it is necessary to continue in a formidable state of defence in this country.

‘ It is necessary that measures should be immediately adopted on the following subjects; and I beg you to write your sentiments upon them to the Government.

‘ First, the recruiting the line.

‘ Secondly, the recruiting and keeping complete the militia. Trant says that if this branch were put in the hands of the Capitão Mor it would succeed better than in the hands of the Colonels of regiments.

‘ Thirdly, the organization of the ordenanza. My opinion upon this subject is, that we ought to revert to the ancient

constitution of the country, and make the Capitão Mor the Commanding Officer of the ordenanza. The Capitães Mor ought to be properly selected, and those who have shown themselves unfit for their station dismissed. But in my opinion we gained nothing by changing the title of the ordenanza into that of guerrilla, and but little by making Captains of guerrillas. It was the only expedient at the time by which any assistance could be derived from this class of the population, because the Capitães Mor had fled. But as there is a little leisure now to organize this force, it will be better to place it under the Capitães Mor, according to the ancient practice, and put down those bands of robbers who call themselves guerrillas, and are now plundering the country and our convoys. I will make the Government adopt what may be proposed on this subject, provided it does not entail upon them a large expense.

‘ I was in hopes that the return of ordnance at Elvas would have been accompanied by a return of stores in the garrison, by which I should have seen what the garrison could spare for the siege of Badajoz, and we should have been saved the time, the trouble, and expense of sending up the articles of which I enclose the list.

‘ I enclose the list of our ordnance and ammunition at Elvas, which Fletcher thinks ought to be prepared to be taken out for the siege of Badajoz, and a list of stores which I have ordered from Lisbon to Setuval, Alcacer do Sal, and Evora, for that service. It is desirable that you should afford an escort to these stores; and I have directed that you may be apprised when they may be ready to set out from Setuval, and when from Alcacer do Sal.

‘ The French are across the Agueda, and in full march for the Tormes, having left garrisons in Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. I think they intended to attack Trant, &c., on the day before yesterday. They were hanging about the Agueda, and on the 7th, Junot, with the whole, or a large part, of the 8th corps, crossed the Agueda from Ciudad Rodrigo, and came to the Dos Casas above Concepcion. It is said that the 6th corps was there also, and the 2d was certainly at Gallegos. Claparède's division of the 9th was at Junça, and Val de la Mula. I sent a strong patrol of cavalry and light artillery on that day to Almeida, and

showed Campbell's division on the high ground above this place. The cavalry fell upon Claparède, who had neither cavalry nor guns, and drove him very handsomely with the light artillery across the Turon and Dos Casas, and then the whole party broke up, and retired in some confusion across the Agueda in the course of that night and the following morning, and they are now all gone from the Agueda.

' We have a distant blockade of Almeida, the works of which are as perfect as ever; and I mean that Don Julian should render the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo difficult by the left of the Agueda, while our cavalry shall do it by the right. Both places appear to have small garrisons, and provisions for about a month.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.R.

' WELLINGTON.

' P.S. Fletcher thinks it desirable that fascines and gabions should be prepared for Badajoz. ' W.'

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

' SIR,

' Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

' I have directed the chief engineer to forward to Setuval, in order to be sent from thence to Elvas, certain stores; and I shall be obliged to you if you will afford him the means of removing these stores from the Tagus to Setuval as far as may be in your power, and that you will take such measures as you may think fit to secure their arrival.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.'

' WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

' SIR,

' Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

' I request you to draw the attention of the Governors of the Kingdom to the disobedience of their orders by the civil magistrates, who have not yet returned to their stations.

' The whole country is infested by robbers, who plunder my convoys, and have robbed the muleteers attached to the army of their mules. If the civil magistrates do not adopt

measures to prevent these outrages, I must, however unwillingly, take upon me to punish those guilty of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

‘ I enclose copies of my last dispatches to the Secretary of State, which contain all the news from this quarter.

‘ We have given the French some terrible beatings, and they are completely dispirited and disorganized. We have cut off the communication with Almeida, in which place there is a month’s provision; and I have desired Don Julian to distress the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, in which there may be as much. I hope we shall be able to stay here, to get at least the first mentioned of these places; but our cavalry are miserably provided with forage, and I cannot afford to lose it.

‘ I enclose a letter which Don Julian has sent me, to which you ought to draw the attention of the Spanish Government.

‘ I receive terrible accounts from Colonel Walker of Mahy. If it be true, as is stated, that Massena is going to the Douro with his army, Mahy’s situation becomes a very important one, and there should be some person in Galicia upon whom some reliance can be placed.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right. Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Arms are wanting to arm Castaños’ army, and Downie’s legion; and Ballesteros is picking up vagabonds every day, and calling out for arms for them. It would be desirable, therefore, that you should send back to the Tagus some of the arms which I sent to Cadiz, if you should not have disposed of them all.

‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th April, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 20th ultimo, I have received the proceedings of the council of war at Badajoz, previous to

the surrender of that place, which I do not transmit to you, as I conclude that you will receive it from other quarters.

I beg to draw your attention to the extraordinary circumstance, that the Governor Imaz, who called the council of war to deliberate upon the expediency of surrendering the place, delivered his opinion the last, excepting General Garcias, and was of opinion that the place ought not to be surrendered. I also request you to observe that my message to General Imaz was not formally communicated to the council of war; and indeed I should doubt if it was communicated to them at all, if one of the members, who voted for the surrender of the place, had not declared that the council had no *official* knowledge of any assistance being likely to be sent to the garrison.

‘ I should not trouble you upon this subject, only that as I conceive the surrender of Badajoz at the moment, and in the manner it occurred, to be the most important event of the war in the Peninsula, every circumstance which can throw light upon it is interesting.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

PROCLAMATION.

‘ 10th April, 1811.

‘ The Portuguese nation are informed that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

‘ The Marshal General refers them to the Proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this Proclamation.

‘ The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the Marshal General was not mistaken either in the nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz., decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and everything which could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

‘ Nearly four years have now elapsed since the tyrant of

Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered or injuries done by the benevolent Sovereign of this kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power, as the Portuguese Government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

‘ The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same want of plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the Marshal General appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage, are not the sole objects of their attention, from the General down to the soldier.

‘ Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, their laws overturned, their religion destroyed, and, above all, they have deprived themselves of the honor of that manly resistance to the oppressor of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

‘ The Marshal General, however, considers it his duty, in announcing the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that, although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavor to plunder them: they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent Sovereign; and he will endeavor to destroy their happiness: they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavor to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger

shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, and is the great object of their invasion, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

‘ Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and everything which can tend to facilitate the enemy’s progress; for this may be depended upon, that the enemy’s troops seize upon everything, and leave nothing for the owner.

‘ By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honor.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 11th April, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letters of the 4th and 5th. We are very unlucky certainly in our Guadiana concerns; and I observe that you have still heard nothing of the fifteen boats at Jurumenha. In respect to boats from the Tagus, or the Alcacer do Sal river, you surely do not think it necessary to refer to me before you order either the Portuguese authorities, or the British Commissary, to supply anything of that kind you think the country can furnish.

‘ You have all the pontoons we have, and all that I could prevail upon the Spanish authorities to send out of Badajoz; and I was in hopes that these, with other assistance of *chevalets*, and the boats said to be at Jurumenha, would give you a sufficiently good passage, if the river should not be fordable.

‘ I have always required the Portuguese Government to supply boats for the bridges wanted; but if you want them, and prefer to order Mr. Ogilvie to supply them, give him the order.

‘ I have spoken to Mr. Kennedy respecting Mr. Fletcher. He was employed to bake biscuit at Elvas, he being the only person who would undertake this concern for us. If he

has not performed that business to your satisfaction, or if he does not conduct himself in any other manner as you wish, let him be deprived of the contract, and of all participation in British concerns.

‘ In respect to your supplies, you are aware of the orders that have been given ; and Abrantes, according to your own desire, has been made your *entrepôt*.

‘ I have ordered carts to be provided in the Alentejo, to be placed in stages on the roads, as I had them when I was on the frontier. I cannot be certain that these will be provided.

‘ I have given notice to the Government, and now I give you directions, that if the army cannot be supplied in its operations on the frontier, or in Estremadura, it shall withdraw to its magazines. In respect to Ballesteros, I beg you not to undertake or refrain from any operations in consequence of any movements or designs of his, as he is not to be depended upon for one moment. Be guided by your own view of your own situation, referring to his only as far as it may affect yours, and do not do anything, or leave anything undone, because it may affect him or his situation. Depend upon it, he will not operate in conjunction with you.

‘ There is nothing new. The French appear to be off to Salamanca.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Ferosa, 11th April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, in which you have apprised me that orders have been given by the Portuguese Government for the establishment of a flying bridge at Villa Velha. I hope that these orders have been given to somebody who will obey them, as similar orders, given some time ago for the establishment of a bridge upon the Zezere, and the removal of the bridge now at Tancos to Abrantes, have unfortunately been delivered to a person who has not obeyed them, and no steps have yet been taken respecting these bridges.

‘ All the orders referred to in your private letter of the 5th April, to which the enclosed papers refer, have been

equally unfortunate. General Pack's brigade are still at Mangualde, waiting for provisions. Colonel Pamplona's brigade are near Sabugal, plundering the country, and starving; and the Visconde de Barbacena's brigade of cavalry, I may safely say, no longer exist in the shape of cavalry. The horses might as well have been left in the hands of the owners as have been destroyed for want of food. I send this brigade an order this day to go to the rear, as they are absolutely worse than useless, because the Portuguese Government have neglected to take measures to provide for the food of the horses or men.

'I sent two regiments of British dragoons from this army into the Alentejo, in order to render the corps there more efficient, and in the hope that I should have the service in this quarter of two efficient regiments of Portuguese dragoons. In this hope I have been disappointed, and this army is deficient in that essential arm, its cavalry; and I have been induced to enter upon a scale of service to which the efficient troops at my disposal are not equal.

'I beg that you will inform the Portuguese Government that I propose by the next packet to inform His Majesty's Ministers that it is my opinion that they cannot with propriety continue to risk a British army in this country unsupported by any exertion of any description on the part of the Portuguese Government.

'I beg you also to draw the attention of the Portuguese Government to another circumstance in regard to their troops. Their detachments marching through the country have come to the British Commissaries for provisions. I am not authorized to incur these large expenses; and it never was the intention of His Majesty, or of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that the establishments of Portugal should be allowed by the Government to go to ruin, and that no person in the country should do his duty.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'C. Stuart, Esq.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

'MY DEAR BERESFORD,

'Villa Fermosa, 13th April, 1811.

'I have received your letters of the 6th and 7th. There must of course be in this part of the country some Com-

missary to take charge of provisioning the Portuguese troops not fed by our Commissaries, and also of all detachments absent, &c. &c. But besides this, it would be desirable to have some Staff Officer through whom I might communicate with the several departments, who would know at least the names of the heads of them, and the orders under which their several duties are to be performed. As things are now, the Portuguese troops with this part of the army, particularly those not fed by our Commissaries, are in a deplorable state; and it is quite impossible for me to enter into the details of their concerns, without having the assistance of one of the Staff of the Portuguese army, which would answer better than the plan I before proposed.

‘As soon as Arbuthnot comes out Hardinge ought to come here; and, in the meantime, any native with common intelligence, and a knowledge either of English or French. I see that Fergusson has equipped the Portuguese army, as he did ours, with regimental hospitals, and it is impossible that there can be now a single bed with any corps, or anything which can enable them to establish any hospital.

‘There is no movement of this army now, nor can there be any, so long as Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo hold out. As soon as one or other of those places fall, it may be a question what shall be done. In the meantime, there is no reason why the corps should not get their convalescents and recruits. Indeed, if they do not, there will soon be no Portuguese army at all.

‘From your account of the disposal of the money transmitted to you I should hope that you will not find it fall short. Mr. Ogilvie must pay for his supplies by bills upon Lisbon, and he must make no difficulties about doing that which has been the constant practice of this army. The muleteers are equally in arrears with this part of the army. One or two months’ pay will, I doubt not, satisfy them, and will not run away with a very large part of the 150,000 dollars already sent. They will not require the whole arrear from October to this time, certainly, and if they did they ought not to get it.

‘I wrote to you about the boats the other day, and I am glad you have given your own directions on the subject.

‘I have omitted to mention to you, that some horses for

the artillery having arrived, I have ordered to join you three English 9 pounders and a heavy howitzer, and four 6 pounders of the horse artillery.

‘ I am very much concerned to hear of the loss sustained by the 13th light dragoons, and particularly of the cause of it.

‘ General Fane will, I fear, not be able to come out again this summer, and I intended General —— should command the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, conceiving him to be the best we have. He does not appear, however, to have conducted matters much better than others would ; and if you think proper to employ Madden with that force, he, as senior, must of course take the command of the whole. I have no General Officer to send there, excepting ——, whose presence would not be of much use. I have no arrangement in contemplation for the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, excepting what is now established there.

‘ Waters has made his escape, and is come in ; he was ill treated, and would not accept his *parole*.

‘ The French have but little provisions in Ciudad Rodrigo, as well as in Almeida, and I have sent some troops over the Agueda to shut up the former. They certainly, however, will not allow this place to fall, particularly if they keep their army upon the Douro, and I therefore keep nothing on the other side of the Agueda, but a light corps, more particularly as that river is not fordable.

‘ I have just seen Mr. Kennedy, and have desired that 30,000 dollars may be sent into the Alentejo for your troops every week.

Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. I send to Colonel Le Cor to go into Lower Beira ; but I do not know what he is to do there, till the principle on which the ordenanza are to be organized shall be established.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th April, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 11th instant I have received a report from the governor of Abrantes, that a flying bridge has been placed on the Zézere.

‘ I beg to observe that a standing bridge of boats is required on this river, as specified in my first letter upon that subject.

‘ I request you to urge the Government to adopt measures to have the post mules fed at the several stations at which they are fixed.

‘ When first the enemy withdrew from their position in Portugal, I gave directions to the British Commissaries to supply the post mules with forage. But it cannot be intended that the British Government should defray the expense, or its servants perform the duty of every department of the Government in Portugal; and I trust that effectual measures will be adopted by the Government to feed the post mules on the several roads, otherwise there must be an end to all communication between the several armies, and between the armies and the capital.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th April, 1811.

‘ I am very much concerned that I cannot allow money to be given by the commissariat for the use of the Portuguese Government without my consent. My first care must be of the British troops, on whom all our hopes depend; and Marshal Beresford is not less ready to cry out when those with him experience any deficiency than he is when the resources of the Portuguese Government fail him.

‘ I have but one answer to give to all the statements of the inconveniences resulting from the delays of reference to me, which is, that I cannot be in two or three places at the same time; and if Government choose to undertake large services, and not supply us with sufficient pecuniary means, and to leave to me the distribution of the means with which they do supply us, I must exercise my own judgment upon the distribution, for which I am to be responsible. Mr. Dunmore has only to let us know, from time to time, what money he has in his hands, and I shall order issues to be made of it, to the chest of aids, when I find I can do so without inconvenience.

‘ I think that the Portuguese Government have misin-

formed you regarding the tenths upon mercantile property, and regarding the profits of the Wine Company. The profits of the latter are, I am told, enormous; and it appears to me that it would be worth while to enter into the details of both subjects.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I enclose a letter, which Mr. Kennedy put into my hands, regarding the distresses of the people at Barquinha. The Tagus is easily navigable to that place, the Alentejo is only on the other side of the river, and is untouched; surely a good Government would not allow the people to starve. It cannot be necessary that I should give the supplies for the army to keep them alive.

‘ Mr. Kennedy tells me that he ordered the money to be issued which you had requested to have. The Visconde de Barbacena has just been with me; the magazine from which he is to draw supplies for his brigade is at St. Miguel de Poyares, only twenty six leagues distant from hence. This is the notable arrangement by which this brigade is to be kept in order!!

‘ Just direct that a calculation may be made of the quantity of transport that will be required to supply the men and horses of this brigade with their food daily, allowing that a mule will carry 200 pounds, and will go from twelve to sixteen miles every day, and see how it is possible that the thing can be done, without the assistance of the carriages of the country. I have desired the Visconde to turn his horses to grass, in order, if possible, to save their lives.

‘ W.’

To Major General the Hon. C. Stewart.

‘ MY DEAR STEWART,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 9th, and I am glad to hear of your return. We are blockading Almeida, in which there may be provisions for about a month; and as the French army are gone towards the Duero, I do not think they are inclined, or able, to interrupt this undertaking.

‘ I am thinking of going to the Guadiana; but I shall certainly return here, and most probably before you could

arrive at either place. I hope that you left Lord Castle-reagh and Lady Catherine quite well.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. C. Stewart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 9th instant. You will find your division in your old quarters, Gallegos, and the sooner you can come up to them the better.

‘ We are blockading Almeida, in which there may be about a month’s provisions. The greater part of the French are gone to the Duero.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Memorandum for Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ The enemy having succeeded in getting provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday morning, it is useless to endeavor to blockade that place; and the extension which the attempt would give to the position of the army would invite the enemy to make enterprises upon it. My opinion is, therefore, that we should confine ourselves to the blockade of Almeida, which operation should be given over to Major General Campbell’s division and General Pack’s brigade; and that the remainder of the army should be so posted as to cover and protect that operation, to get green forage for the horses and cattle of the cavalry and artillery, and to be able to collect the whole in a short space of time, as hereafter pointed out.

‘ Orders will be given respecting the positions to be taken by the 6th division, and General Pack’s brigade, for this operation.

‘ The enemy have a garrison, it is supposed, of 3000 infantry and artillery, but no cavalry, in Ciudad Rodrigo; being one battalion of the 64th, one of the Irish legion, and the remainder of the 15th of the line, together with some stragglers of different regiments. Before the arrival of the convoy they had a month’s provisions.

‘The main body of the army are gone to the Tormes, and I imagine the larger part to the Duero, about Zamora and Toro, where alone they can be supplied with provisions. A part of the 9th corps still remain upon the Yeltes, and they have barricaded the bridge of Yecla upon that river. It does not appear that they have anything on this side of it.

‘Although there ought to be no permanent post beyond the Agueda, we should derive great advantage in obtaining intelligence, and drawing supplies from the towns between the Agueda and the Yeltes, if we were to send patrols into that country occasionally of cavalry and infantry, which might stay out a night or two, and then return to this side of the Agueda. Our operations beyond the Agueda ought to be confined to these patrols, which, however, might be made constantly and successively.

‘In case the enemy should move forward, in order to relieve or interrupt the blockade of Almeida, the following disposition ought in the first instance to be adopted.

‘Major General Campbell’s division, and General Pack’s brigade, to continue in the blockade of Almeida, with the Visconde de Barbacena’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, a part of which should be employed in observation upon the Agueda, from the point of the junction of the Dos Casas, as far down as its junction with the Douro.

‘The Light division to defend the passages of the Agueda, viz., the bridge of Barba de Puerco, the ford of Val de Espino, the ford of Cesmiro, the ford of Molino de Flores. The first and last of these only are now practicable for infantry, the last only for infantry and artillery.

‘The 5th division to remain in its position upon Fort Concepcion, to support the Light division.

‘The British cavalry, with the exception of those necessary to keep up the communications of the Light division, on the right towards Guinaldo and El Bodon.

‘The remainder of the army, that is, the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions, and Colonel Pamplona’s brigade, in the cantonments near Nave d’Aver.

‘If the enemy are determined to raise the blockade of Almeida, it is probable that they will move their whole army, or the greatest part of it, upon Ciudad Rodrigo, from whence they would turn the heads of the ravines of the

Azava, Dos Casas, and Turon, on which we might take a position to protect the blockade.

‘ If the enemy should make this movement, it would be necessary to raise the blockade of Almeida, so far as to order the 6th division to march by Mealhada Sorda and Villar Mayor to Bada Malos, &c.; the 5th division by Nave d’Aver and Aldea da Ponte upon Alfayates; the Light division in different columns by Gallegos, or Aldea del Obispo upon Nave d’Aver, and thence upon Aldea da Ponte; and the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions by Aldea Velha, Aldea da Ponte, and Aldea da Ribeira; and the cavalry to a position which has its right upon high ground behind Aldea Velha, and its left extending towards Nave, to which the 5th and Light divisions, and the cavalry, would fall back, as circumstances would render necessary. General Pack’s and Barbacena’s brigade of cavalry would, in this case, keep up the blockade of Almeida as long as circumstances would permit, and when obliged to retire, they would proceed by the bridge of Cinco Villas across the Coa, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ I return the papers which you sent me from Blunt, which I acknowledge that I do not understand. It appears that he has some complaint against Mr. —, the Commissary; but I do not understand of what nature it is, nor what is the crime of which Mr. — has been guilty, or how the Portuguese Government can have lost a large sum of money by the conduct of Mr. —.

‘ In respect to the other complaint regarding the conduct of the master of a ship at Peniche, I beg to observe that I have nothing to say to it. General Blunt should specify whether his complaint is of a King’s ship, or a merchant ship, and what authorised rule of the port was infringed. The complaint should then be forwarded to the British Minister, who would settle it with the Portuguese Minister. I have nothing to say to His Majesty’s ships, or even to the merchant ships attending upon this army.

‘ In all these points, however, General Blunt should take care that his rules, if not authorised, are at least reasonable, and have some foundation in public convenience, as it will not do to call on Mr. —, who is performing a public service at Peniche, or the master of a vessel who may be proceeding on his voyage to Figueira or Oporto with provisions or stores for the army, to attend to rules which have no foundation in reason or public convenience, and are dictated solely by the caprice of an individual.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ I received yesterday evening the copy of your letter of the 9th, which came by Villa Velha, and I am concerned to find that matters are not going on according to your wishes. I had hoped that before you wrote you would have been relieved from Mr. —.

‘ Sir William Erskine did not send a detachment over the Agueda in time, as I had desired him, and the consequence was that the French got their convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday morning. At all events I was not very sanguine of the result of the blockade of that place, and indeed had determined not to make it in any strength; and now it is useless to keep anybody on the other side of the Agueda, excepting for the sake of food and observation. I confine myself, therefore, to the blockade of Almeida, and as this is a simple operation, which I do not think the enemy have the means or inclination to interrupt, I propose to go over to you, and if I can, I shall set off to-morrow morning.

‘ I see that Generals Stewart and Craufurd and Lieut. Colonel Arbuthnot are arrived; as soon as Arbuthnot reaches you it would be very desirable to send Hardinge here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To C. W. Flint, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th April, 1811.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 12th March. Besides the application from Mr. Keogh, of the 2d January, in favor of Mr. Plunket, I received another from him of the 8th December (which I have not got by me), in favor of a Mr. Grey Johnston, to obtain an Ensigncy, to which I wrote the answer of which I enclose a copy. To my answer of the 12th January, I received the enclosed reply of the 4th February, with a letter from Lord Kingsland, recommending Mr. Grey Johnston for an Ensigncy.

‘ I suspect that all the letters from Mr. Keogh to me have been forged, and that the recommendation from Lord Kingsland has been forged, as well as the recommendation from Lord Fingall in favor of Mr. Plunket. If that is the case, it is probable that my letter to Mr. Keogh of the 12th January, of which I enclose the copy, was opened by the person who forged his letters to me. I request you, therefore, to enclose all these letters to Major Sirr, with this and the letter from Lord Fingall to you of the 7th March, which I return, and desire Major Sirr to see Mr. Keogh, and communicate them to him. Mr. Keogh will then see that his letter to me of the 12th January must have been forged, and consequently that a suspicion attaches to any other letter which he may write to me, or which may be signed by his name; and he will, I am convinced, excuse me for requesting that he will inform Major Sirr whether he wrote to me on the 8th December, and on the 4th February, forwarding a recommendation of Mr. Grey Johnston by Lord Kingsland.

‘ The circumstances which will be disclosed to Mr. Keogh by the perusal of those papers will probably induce him to take measures to prevent his name from being signed to papers of this description in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. W. Flint, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General Howorth.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter applying for leave of absence for Captain —; and, considering all that has

passed respecting Officers absent on leave from the army on active service, I was in hopes that I should have been spared the pain of considering whether an Officer ought to be allowed leave or not, from any private concern, however important.

‘ However, as I am called upon to decide this application, I answer, that I hold you responsible that there are with the 9 pounder brigade the required number of Officers of the proper rank; and as soon as this is the case, I have no objection to your allowing Captain —— to quit his duty with that brigade. He may be absent from the army for six weeks, but of course he cannot expect to join the 9 pounder brigade again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Howorth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR COTTON,

‘ Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

‘ I am going into the Alentejo, but intend to return to the army in less than three weeks.

‘ Your bātman, Smith, has charge of a mare of mine at Celorico, which has had the fever in her feet. I understand that she is nearly well, and if that should be the case, and you want Smith, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow the mare to go with your horses, and allow her to stand in your stables till I shall return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

‘ A Sabugal, ce 15 Avril, 1811.

‘ Je suis arrivé ici aujourd’hui, et j’ai reçu votre lettre du 13. Je suis en route pour l’Estremadure, et je compte arriver à Elvas le 20, où je serai bien aise de vous rencontrer; mais en attendant que j’aie le plaisir de vous voir je ne veux pas perdre un moment pour vous prier d’envoyer quelqu’un en Galicie qui soit capable et digne de votre confiance pour remplacer le Général Mahy.

‘ Il y a plusieurs mois que j’ai eu des renseignemens sur son compte que j’ai envoyés à Cadiz, et sur lesquels j’ai

souvent causé avec le Marquis de la Romana et Alava ; et nous sommes convenus qu'il était urgent qu'il fut remplacé. J'ai reçu dernièrement encore des lettres de cette partie là, dans lesquelles on me dit que tout le monde se méfiait du Général Mahy, et qu'on crie pour qu'il soit bien vite remplacé.

‘ Quoique les Français soient excellens militaires, leurs nécessités et leur politique mensongère les forcent souvent à adopter des plans militaires qui ne conviennent pas du tout à leur situation ; par exemple, l'expédition de l'Andalousie, et celle du Portugal.

‘ En pensant à ce qu'ils doivent faire dans les circonstances actuelles, je trouve qu'ils feront l'invasion de la Galicie avec le corps de Bessières, pendant que Massena donnera du repos à ses troupes dans les cantonnemens occupés jusqu'à présent par les troupes de Bessières. Ou ils feront cette opération, ou ils se joindront pour tomber sur mon corps sur la frontière de la Castille, ce qui n'est pas très vraisemblable ; ou ils ne feront rien jusqu'à ce que les troupes de Massena soient reposées et remises en état, quand ils rassembleront une grande armée dans l'Estremadure.

‘ En tout cas, et surtout dans le premier, qui est le plus vraisemblable, il est urgent d'avoir un bon commandant en Galicie sans perdre un moment de temps. Ainsi, nommez le, et envoyez le à Lisbonne, et quand je vous verrai, ou en route, j'écrirai à l'Amiral pour lui donner un vaisseau de guerre pour le conduire à la Corogne.

‘ Je vous parlerai d'autres choses quand j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir.

‘ J'ai laissé mes troupes occupées du blocus d'Almeida, qui j'espère va se rendre. J'aurais fait la même chose pour Ciudad Rodrigo avec la droite de l'armée, mais par un malentendu on a laissé entrer un convoi dans cette place. A quelque chose cependant malheur est bon ; les Français ne m'auraient pas permis de prendre deux places à la fois, et peut-être m'auraient forcé à lever les deux blocus. En tout cas, je n'aurais pu quitter l'armée dans ce moment ci, et je n'aurais pas eu le plaisir de vous voir de sitôt.

‘ Toujours votre fidèle, &c.

‘ *Le Capitane Général*
Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Je vous suis bien obligé des lettres interceptées. Le chiffre est une grande acquisition. ‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

‘ I write by a messenger of Castaños, to let you know that I am so far on my way towards you. I shall be at Castello Branco on the 17th, at Portalegre on the 19th, and at Elvas on the 20th.

‘ I enclose a letter from General Picton, which deserves your attention. There is a letter from Pack, whom I have at last got up to the army, proposing to have a brigade hospital near him. Is this consistent with your hospital regulations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

‘ I am so far on my way to the Guadiana. I received yesterday your letter of the 10th. The papers which you enclosed contain no particular complaints against our Commissaries; but if they did, I should doubt their being well founded.

‘ We suffer very much now from having had anything to do with the Portuguese army in the way of river transport last year. Boats and carts were delivered to our Commissaries, and they delivered a proportion to the Portuguese. These were never paid for, and the consequence is increased difficulty in getting any this year.

‘ You will see from my official letter of this day that there is reason to believe that there is misapplication, at least, of the funds supplied by Great Britain for the payment of the army.

‘ I beg that the French prisoners may not be employed on any works on the left of the Tagus.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I shall send the mail from Castello Branco on Wednesday, or from Niza on Thursday. ‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 15th April, 1811.

‘ I beg you will inform the Governors of the Kingdom that I have this day received a report from Colonel Pamplona, stating that his brigade is still without bread.

‘ I likewise beg leave to draw your attention to a fact which was communicated to me this morning by Colonel Le Cor, viz., that the Officers of the Portuguese army have not been paid since the month of January last; and those particularly who have not the good fortune to be fed by the British commissariat, are suffering distresses of a description to which Officers ought not to be subjected. But this is not the only view in which this subject deserves your attention. His Majesty granted a subsidy to the Prince Regent for the pay of 30,000 men, Officers included; and an additional sum of £130,000 *per annum*, to make up certain additional pay, not only to the Officers of 30,000 men, but to all the Officers of the Portuguese army. Besides the pay of the 30,000 Officers and soldiers, the estimate included a certain sum for their provisions.

‘ If this statement be correct, it is obvious that the sums paid in subsidy for the months of February and March have been misapplied. This is a subject which requires serious inquiry.

‘ Although I have always been ready to bear testimony to the disinterested and upright views of the Governors of the Kingdom, and sincerely believe that they have no concern in the misapplication of the sums paid in subsidy to purposes different from those for which they were granted, I have not the same good opinion of the person employed in the pay department of the army; and, adverting to the general distresses of the Government in all its branches and departments, I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I believe the misapplication of the sums received for the subsidy in February and March to have been corrupt.

‘ At all events, it is absolutely necessary that the whole arrear should be paid forthwith; and I shall hereafter call for a return of the periods to which both Officers and soldiers are paid.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Pedrogão, 16th April, 1811.

‘ I arrived here this day, but have not yet heard either from you or from Beresford. I have a letter from Castaños of the 13th, who was appointed to command in Galicia, as well as in Estremadura, &c. Blake was come out of Cadiz to command in the Condado de Niebla.

‘ The inhabitants have returned to this part of the country, and I find that I can go with my own horses from Elvas to any part of our cantonments in three days, leaving my baggage behind. So that supposing a communication from you should be forty eight hours going to Elvas, I should be with you in sixty hours after I should receive it.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will tell Waters, that I beg him to send trusty people to Zamora and Toro, and likewise to Alba de Tormes, Ledesma, and Salamanca, to bring back information what regiments (stating the number of each) are at each place. It would be desirable that he should station a person at Zamora, to come off to him with all expedition, when the troops there should move.

‘ In respect to your position, it is obvious that so long as we can maintain ourselves upon the line of the Dos Casas, the enemy cannot interrupt the blockade of Almeida. But if we move from Nave d’Aver, the enemy has the choice of attacking us in the new position pointed out to you, or of relieving Almeida.

‘ I should wish you, therefore, not to be in a hurry to take up the position behind Aldea Velha. The necessity for taking it up at all must depend upon the enemy’s strength; and if his strength should be such as to render it desirable that you should take it up, which it is probable that it will, your movement should be delayed till it is quite certain that the enemy propose to turn your right. This delay may be made with great safety, as there are many good roads leading to the ground pointed out.

‘ In case there should be any difficulty in the movements of the 5th and 6th divisions, or of that part of the Light division which will be on the left in consequence of the delay,

these troops might cross the Coa at the ford of Junça, or at the bridge of Castello Bom, and proceed along the left bank of the Coa, by the bridge of Sequeiros, or to the ford of Rapoula de Coa, where they could cross again, and take their places in the line. All these roads should be well reconnaitred by the Staff Officers, without stating for what object.

‘ I believe it would be necessary that the guns attached to the divisions which might cross the Coa should march along the great road which runs between the Turon and the Coa to Aldea da Ponte, if they should not be in time to be able to march on that which is between the Turon and Dos Casas. If this should be the case, (and it must be observed that the guns with both these divisions are Portuguese 6 pounders,) it will only be necessary to draw them towards Nave d’Aver in time, and to leave the divisions without their guns for a few hours.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To R. Kennedy, Esq., Commissary General.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pedrogão, 16th April, 1811.

‘ As I was coming through Villar Mayor yesterday Colonel Le Cor informed me that his Portuguese brigade, in the 7th division, had not received bread for six or seven days till yesterday, when the people of the village of Bismula were baking a day’s bread for them. I had understood from you that all the troops were supplied regularly with bread; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will inquire from Mr. Gauntlett how this matter stands.

‘ If there should be hereafter any deficiency in this or any other division I do not think it ought to fall exclusively upon the Portuguese troops. As we have engaged to supply them, we should do so equally with our own, or alter our arrangements, and throw them back again upon the Government. I am in hopes, however, that it will turn out that this deficiency has been exaggerated; and I shall be obliged to you if you will furnish me with the means of

stating what quantity of bread particularly this brigade has had from the 1st to the 15th April.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *R. Kennedy, Esq.,*
Commissary General.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ Castello Branco, 17th April, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

2 P.M.

‘ I have not yet heard from you ; and I conclude that you did not find it necessary to write to me till last night. I have heard from Beresford, and I hope that by this time he has Olivença.

‘ In case you should wish to communicate anything to me, and to be quite certain that it reaches me as soon as it can, I recommend to you to send a Staff Officer, on his own horses, to Sabugal, and to order him to proceed on with the horses of the guides by the following route from Sabugal :—

Memoa, leave Penamacor on the left.

Pedrogão *, from Sabugal about 27 miles.

St. Miguel d’Arche . . . 8 „

Escalhas da Cima . . . 10 „

Castello Branco * . . . 10 „

Sarnadas 10 „

Villa Velha, across the Tagus 10 „

Niza 11 „

Portalegre.

Elvas.

‘ * Thus marked there are guides ; and I shall hereafter let you know the detail of the road from Niza, and where the guides will be found. If he should be able to procure mares or post mules, he should not take the horses of the guides ; and if he does take them, he should not press them above a league an hour, as they will not be able to carry him these long stages if he does.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I received last night your letter of the 16th, and am much obliged to you. I conclude that the rain of yester-

day has reached you, and puts out of the question all possibility of crossing the Agueda by either side.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Castello Branco, 17th April, 1811.

‘ I received this morning the original of your letter of the 9th, that of the 10th, and your letter of the 13th. I have heard nothing from the army since I left it on the 15th.

‘ I shall draw up a memorandum of my notion of the operations of all the armies, from Galicia to the Condado de Niebla, which I will send to General Blake. In the meantime it is desirable that he should not commit his corps; and that Ballesteros should not commit any part of it for him. If Soult should move upon you, he ought to move upon Seville, the possession of which place will of itself raise the siege of Cadiz. General Blake should be prepared with boats, &c., for the passage of the Guadiana.

‘ I recommend to you to construct two good redoubts on your ground at Badajoz, as a security to your stores, &c., in case you should be obliged to collect your army in consequence of the movements of the enemy to disturb the siege. These might be executed at the same time with the other works of the siege.

‘ I shall be at Elvas on the 20th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. The 14,000 pairs of shoes should be carried to account against your estimate; they will be charged to the regiments at, I believe, 6s. 6d. each pair.

‘ The detachments of cavalry, &c., which you have out, should be extremely vigilant, and the Officers should adopt every measure in their power to procure intelligence, besides those of a military nature, such as patrols, &c. I am afraid that the Spaniards in Andalusia and Estremadura are very tired of the war, and averse to its continuance and its existence in their own country, if they are not positively attached to the French cause, and we must expect that they will give intelligence to the enemy.

‘The Officers of the Castello Branco militia have just been here, and have informed me that their men are in want of provisions. I understood that the militia never received provisions in their own towns; and if that is the case, it should be explained to this regiment without loss of time.

‘W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘SIR,

‘Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose you a letter, and its enclosure, addressed to Lieut. Colonel Bathurst, which Lord Fitzroy Somerset has received from Brig. General Blunt. I am concerned to observe that Brig. General Blunt conceives that he has reason to complain of any Officer of the British army, and that he should on that account have been induced to make use of intemperate language to Mr. —*; and although I have hitherto received no complaint from Mr. —, I think it will save trouble, and be most satisfactory, if I consider and decide upon the subject of Brig. General Blunt’s statement.

‘Brig. General Blunt is in the Portuguese service, and as such he commands, under an appointment from Portuguese authority, in the fort of Peniche. His British commission, while he is in the Portuguese service, lies dormant, notwithstanding that his rank in His Majesty’s service continues progressive. Mr. — is a Deputy Assistant Commissary, appointed to take care of stores lodged in the fort of Peniche by my order, and he is liable to all the orders of the British army, and of the British Government, for the abuse or waste of stores, and every misapplication of them.

‘It is a difficult and delicate task to define how far a person in Mr. —’s situation is bound to obey the orders of the governor of a Portuguese fort in which he may be stationed. Probably the safest line to be drawn would be to say that Mr. — ought to obey every order which the Portuguese governor was authorised to give him. Here the question arises whether the Portuguese Government was authorised in any manner, or by any circumstances, to order Mr. — to make an issue of provisions from the

* This commissariat Officer was afterwards dismissed the service.

stores under his charge, contrary to the orders of the army, to those of the Treasury, and of all his superiors in the department to which he belongs. I should think that even Brig. General Blunt himself, when he divests himself of his character of a British Officer (and even as a British Officer he has no such authority), will decide this question in the negative. In fact, if it were otherwise, it would not be in my power, as Commander of the British army, to lodge stores in any fort or place in which a Portuguese Officer should command, to the great inconvenience and detriment of the service.

Under these circumstances it is in my opinion desirable that Brig. General Blunt should endeavor to conciliate Mr. —, and to prevent the complaint from coming forward.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To the Adjutant General of the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter, enclosing one from Lord Harcourt, relative to the appointments of the 16th light dragoons; and, having consulted with the General and Commanding Officers of regiments of cavalry, I am decidedly of opinion that it is desirable that not only the 16th light dragoons, but all the regiments of cavalry, should be supplied with cloth overalls by the Colonels, instead of leather breeches, the Colonel giving to the dragoon a compensation in money equal to the difference in price between the overalls and the leather breeches to which he is now entitled.

‘ In consequence of communications with the same authorities, I likewise beg leave to recommend that the Colonels of regiments of cavalry, serving in this country, may be directed to supply the men with strap ankle boots, instead of long or hussar boots, particularly after they shall have supplied them with overalls. The dragoons are almost constantly booted, and if they should have an opportunity of taking off their boots to dry them, they can do it without incurring the risk of tearing off the heel. It is besides to be observed, that these boots will not only be more convenient

to the dragoon, but a saving to the Colonels of regiments of cavalry, in an article of which the expense of the wear and tear on service must greatly exceed the allowance made for purchasing it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adjutant General
of the Forces.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major General Low, in which he applies for allowances for Captain Schlutter, whom I have permitted him to employ as his extra aide de camp.

‘ In order to prevent the growth of expense, and, if possible, the applications of General Officers to employ extra aides de camp, I have made it a rule that those extra aides de camp only, who have received the permission of the Commander in Chief to be employed as such, shall receive the allowance of bāt and forage, &c. It is impossible for me to depart from a rule which I have made myself; and I request the Commander in Chief to decide whether he will give his sanction to the employment of Captain Schlutter as his extra aide de camp by General Low, otherwise he will not receive the allowance of bāt and forage, &c.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Gordon, Commissary in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I beg to inform you, that it is my opinion that Mr. Deputy Commissary General ——— is not fit to be employed as a Deputy Commissary General with this army, owing, according to my opinion, to his incapacity for the performance of the duties of his office in an active situation, and his want of success.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Gordon,
Commissary in Chief.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I beg to refer your Lordship to the last weekly statement sent from this country, in which you will see the strength of the detachment of the Staff corps with this army. Adverting to the services on which this army may possibly be employed in the course of this year, and to the great utility of the Staff corps, I beg leave to recommend that, if it should not be inconvenient to other services, two more companies of the Staff corps may be sent to this country.

‘ As I understand that there are no people of the description of pontoneers belonging to the service, I beg leave to recommend that ten warrant artificers may be sent with the pontoons which I have requested for the service in this country; who will be employed to superintend the persons who must be hired in Portugal to attend them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Major General Campbell, the Colonel of the York light infantry volunteers, in which he desires permission to send to England fifty recruits belonging to that regiment enlisted from deserters from the enemy’s army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ When I was lately making arrangements for sending to England the transports which had been till now attached to this army, I felt myself under the necessity of detaining a certain number to contain the heavy baggage of the several regiments in this country. This consists principally of arm chests, for containing those arms of which the regiments have none in this country, and therefore do not require the arm chests; of the baggage of individual Officers, which is useful, and even necessary, to them in stationary services or

cantonments, but which they cannot carry with them in the field; and of the overplus of the stores belonging to the Colonels of the regiments after the clothing has been issued to the effectives in Portugal; and for regiments of cavalry of the same articles, and some saddlery.

‘The greatest part of these articles might be sent away, without putting the Officers and troops to any inconvenience. There is no doubt but that transports are the most expensive stores that could be found. But advertg to the possibility that the British Government might think it proper to order that the army should quit this kingdom at a time when the troops should be at a distance from Lisbon, I did not think it proper to expose the British subjects residing in that capital to the insults of the mob, and the regimental baggage to the risk of being lost by their resistance to its embarkation.

‘It is very desirable, however, that this army should be relieved from this baggage; and I beg leave to recommend that a depôt in England may be appointed for receiving the heavy baggage of every regiment in this country, to which it should be sent.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘Having made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, and having reason to believe that the enemy’s army will not be in a situation for some time to attempt to relieve that place, even if they should be so inclined, I have taken advantage of the momentary discontinuance of active operations in that quarter, to go into Estremadura to the corps under Marshal Sir William Beresford, and I have got thus far on my way. Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer remains in command of the corps on the frontiers of Castille.

‘Nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since I addressed your Lordship on the 9th instant. The enemy retired entirely from the Agueda; and it is reported that some of their troops had gone back as far as Zamora and Toro, upon the Duero. This report, however, has not been confirmed.

‘They had sent one convoy from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo; and Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer informs me that the second had since arrived, of whose departure I had heard from Salamanca, before I quitted the army on the 15th. But as I could not pretend to blockade both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, without crossing the Agueda, and exposing the army to great difficulties for want of subsistence (as the communication across the Coa and Agueda would have been very precarious), and the line which we should have taken up would have been long and weak, and the blockade of both places exposed to be interrupted, I have thought it best to confine my attention principally to the former; and to endeavor to interrupt the enemy’s communication with the latter only when circumstances should render it convenient and advantageous.

‘I also learnt from Sir Brent Spencer, that since my departure they have occupied San Felices el Grande with a body of troops; but I imagine it was with the intention of protecting the march of the last convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘Marshal Sir William Beresford was not able to effect his passage across the Guadiana as soon as he had expected, and the enemy have introduced some provisions into Badajoz and Olivença. Sir William Beresford’s advanced guard crossed the Guadiana on the 4th, and I am concerned to report that a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, which were on piquet under Major Morris, were surprised on the night of the 6th by a detachment of the enemy’s cavalry from Olivença. I have not received the return of the loss upon this occasion; but I am informed that the whole squadron, with the exception of twenty men, were taken prisoners. The enemy have since retired, as I am informed, entirely from Estremadura, leaving small garrisons in Badajoz and Olivença. Marshal Soult is stated to be at Seville, and it is said that Marshal Mortier has gone to Cordova. Marshal Sir William Beresford has taken a position to invest both Badajoz and Olivença, and by a letter of the 13th, I learn that he expected on the 14th to open his fire upon the latter from six 24 pounders. I hope that Olivença will not be able to hold out long; but the attack of Badajoz, which I intended should be made by Sir William Beresford’s corps, will be a more serious operation.

‘ A detachment from the 5th army, which is now commanded by General Castaños, is, I understand, at Merida.

‘ Since I last addressed your Lordship, General Zayas had again landed the troops under his command, and had again embarked them, and returned to Cadiz. General Ballesteros’ division alone, therefore, continues in the Condado de Niebla; but, by a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 11th, I learn that General Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the command of General Ballesteros’ division, and the troops which had been under the command of General Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. The whole corps will amount to 12,000 men, of which 1100 are cavalry; and General Blake had expressed an anxious desire to co-operate with Marshal Sir William Beresford.

‘ General Castaños has been appointed to command the army in Galicia, as well as the 5th army, lately the army of the left, commanded by the late Marques de la Romano.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Niza, 18th April, 1811.

‘ I do not know exactly what quantity of provisions they have in Almeida. The garrison is said to consist of 1400 men. We shut them up on the 6th, and from all that I have heard, they must have had then about a month or six weeks’ bread, and from what I have seen of their cattle, fresh meat for the same period. The place had some salt provisions in it when it was surrendered, and I think it probable that some may still remain.

‘ The French certainly intended to abandon the place and blow it up; and they are now mining it for that purpose. At the same time, I think it probable that they believed that they could never again communicate with the garrison, as they are generally foreigners. Much will be gained to get them out of the place, but still more to get the place entire for the Portuguese Government.

‘ In Ciudad Rodrigo there is a good garrison, and we certainly shall not get that place without a siege; for which God knows if we shall have time before the enemy will be

reinforced. The first object is certainly Badajoz, and, as soon as I shall know whether any or what part of our train is required for the attack of that place, I shall send the remainder to Oporto, and make all the arrangements for the eventual attack of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I cannot yet tell how matters stand at Badajoz ; but I understand that the garrison is very weak, and I should hope that it would not hold out long. It does not appear that there is any chance of the place being relieved, unless the enemy should determine to raise the siege of Cadiz and quit Andalusia.

‘ I propose to be at Elvas on the 20th, and to be back again in Castille by the end of the month, or in the first days of May.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 20th April, 1811.

‘ I arrived here this day, as I intended. I have not heard from you since I received your letter of the 16th. Beresford has taken Olivença, and he has since advanced to the south as far as Zafra and Los Santos. At the latter place he had an affair with the enemy’s cavalry, in which he took 160 prisoners without sustaining any loss. He has gone too far to the south for his object ; and I have written to remind him of his object and to urge his early return.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Any Officer you may send to me will find horses at Castello Branco, Niza, Portalegre, and I believe at Assumar, or at S^{ta} Olaya. The distances are from Castello Branco to the Tagus,—

Villa Velha,	20 miles.
Niza,	11 „
Portalegre,	24 „
Assumar,	12 „
S ^{ta} Olaya,	14 „
Elvas,	10 „

‘ There is an officer of guides, and by this time guides, at Castello Branco, Niza, and Portalegre. But the officer of guides has been left to forward your letters by messengers, if the guides should not have arrived at their stations. ‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BARES福德, ‘ Elvas, 20th April, 1811, 3 P.M.

‘ I have received your four letters of the 18th, for which I am much obliged to you. In regard to the first, I hope that I shall have an opportunity of talking over with you the subjects to which it relates, and it is useless to write upon them at present.

‘ I congratulate you upon the surrender of Olivença, and entirely concur in the directions which you gave that the garrison should have no terms; and I hope that they were well plundered by the 4th division. I shall see Captain Squire and Major Dickson immediately; and if I can I shall go to-morrow to Jurumenha, and, if I can get anything to cover me, I shall take a look at Badajoz.

‘ I hope that you will be able to return; but if you cannot, I shall write to you my opinion upon the several points which occur to me, in regard to the siege of Badajoz, which is your principal object. I cannot venture to stay long away from the frontiers of Castille, and I shall return to that quarter as soon as I shall have looked about me here.

‘ I cannot pretend to give directions at this distance. My opinion is, that you are too far advanced for your object, and the sooner you come back the better. But it is impossible for me to judge whether you can with propriety come back immediately. I refer you to what I wrote in a late letter respecting Ballesteros. The scrapes into which he or any of them will get themselves must not be suffered to induce you to depart one *iota* from the plan which you will deem the best to secure your object, which is Badajoz.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have seen Major Dickson and Captain Squire. I find from the former that everything stops in respect to

the ordnance, till the army shall invest the place ; he would then begin to move the ordnance and stores from Olivença to the park, and, having moved these, he would use the means of transport to move what he should require in addition from hence.

‘ Captain Squire says that he has intrenching tools in sufficient quantities to begin, and that it is desirable that the place should be invested, as well to commence the work as to obtain possession of a pine wood, about a league and a half from Badajoz, and to set the people to work in it. This is desirable also, in order to fix the bridge in its new situation. There will be no protection for it till the place shall be invested.

‘ Will you let me know whether there are at Lisbon any 24 pounders and carriages, or any 24 pound shot, in order to replace what are taken from hence for the siege? If there should be none, those of our train must be sent up, which will cripple us for other operations. ‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Elvas, 21st April, 1811, 8 A.M.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received your letter of the 16th.

‘ Let me know as soon as you can whether the Portuguese arsenal have any 24 pounder shot, and whether your 24 pounder shot will fit their guns ; also respecting the 24 pounder guns for Elvas.

‘ It is reported here that the French have again got a post in Talaverilla. I shall sleep at Olivença to-morrow night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. You will have seen Austin’s letter of the 13th. I see that Soult is fortifying Seville, which is a serious event, as affecting our operations at Badajoz. It is therefore more urgent that not a moment should be lost in commencing them.

‘ The mode of co-operation by Blake and Ballesteros becomes a matter of importance.

‘ Since writing the above I have received your letter of the 20th, from Almendral. Your letter of the 9th certainly put me in movement sooner than I intended; and when I received your letter of the 13th I was on the point of returning, and I should have returned if I had not thought that, upon the whole, it was better that I should come and see things here myself.

‘ If I can get over the ford to-morrow I propose to go and look at Badajoz, and to sleep at Olivença. If I can get over the ford I shall go to Olivença by Jurumenha. I shall be at the ford at 7 o'clock. I have sent directions to General Alten to move out of Olivença in the morning, in order to cover the reconnoissance on Badajoz, and to send a squadron of cavalry to meet me at the ford.

‘ P. S. Since writing the above I have received your three letters of the 19th. ‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 21st April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th; and, having perused the enclosures, I observe that they consist, as usual, of orders from one department to another, of principal to deputy, and of deputy to his inferior, but no report of obedience or execution.

‘ In respect to the bridges at Abrantes and Punhete, I cannot say how they stand from personal inspection; but I write to the governor of Abrantes, and I expect to have a report immediately.

‘ Having had occasion to pass the Tagus at Vilha Velha a few days ago, I can state that there is no bridge there; that a few ferry boats had been collected there from the neighboring ferries by my desire; and that the boats which had been sent up there by the governor of Abrantes had been abandoned by their owners.

‘ In answer to Dom Miguel Forjaz’ letter of the 16th instant, I have to observe that, as usual, he has been misinformed of the real state of the affairs on which he has written. The magazines in Upper Beira are not waiting in the Mondego for want of water carriage. As I informed you in my letter of the 13th instant, the magazines are at S^t Miguel de Poyares, which is as high as the Mondego can carry them,

and they are there waiting for means of land transport to the troops between the Coa and the Agueda.

‘ I conclude that it will now be discovered that the British Commissaries take all the land transport; and any excuse will be admitted and brought forward rather than adopt the only remedy, which is to dismiss and punish those who neglect their duty, and do not bring forward the means of transport which exist in the country, and which are necessary to provide for the subsistence of the army employed in its defence. But I beg to put an end to this excuse, by informing you that the British Commissary General has purchased the means of transport with which he supplies the troops on the frontiers of Beira, and has none from the country.

‘ I observe that the Governors of the Kingdom are now aware of the difficulties which exist in maintaining the war upon the frontier, as they order their Minister to declare that it is impossible to supply troops stationed at such a distance, which troops consist of one brigade of cavalry and two brigades of infantry.

‘ The Portuguese translation of the arrangement of the month of June, 1809, regarding the commissariat affairs of the two nations, is erroneous; and I shall send you a copy of the English original, which you will see does not state that detachments of Portuguese troops passing through the cantonments of the English army shall be provided from the English magazines, but only that when detachments of the troops of one nation are supplied from the magazines of the other, what price shall be paid for each ration.

‘ The demands of which I complained were not for troops passing through British cantonments, but for troops passing through towns in which magazines were forming for the use of the allied army on the frontier; which magazines were so far consumed by detachments starving, because the means had not been provided to supply them on their march. One of the consequences of this mode of transacting business is, that the convalescents from the hospitals, and recruits for the regiments on the frontier, never reach their destination.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 21st April, 1811.

‘ I have not written to Lord Liverpool on the subject on which I told you I should, because I was desirous of giving the concern a farther trial before I should communicate an opinion to Government which would certainly put an end to it. Besides, I think it not impossible, but that if we adhere strictly to our objects, and carry on our operations in conformity to directions and plans laid down, we shall preserve our superiority over the French throughout the campaign; particularly if they should be involved in disputes in the north of Europe.

‘ But I am decidedly of opinion that, unless the Portuguese Government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for the British army to remain in the country, if we are not able to preserve the superiority; and I should incur a very serious responsibility, if I did not communicate that opinion to the Regent’s Ministers. Has any magistrate been yet punished or even dismissed from his office for neglecting his duty? Has any alteration been made of any description in the old system of allowing every booby to do as he pleases, provided only that he cries “*Viva*,” and attends the levees of the members of the Government and of the Ministers? Have any of the really efficient measures been adopted which have been recommended, either to bring money into the treasury, which is most wanted; to raise recruits for the army or militia; or to render the former a force efficiently equal to its numbers; or to force the latter to attend to their duty?

‘ A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last year; and I do not think it would be safe to trust the King’s army in this country, after such discouraging circumstances, and after the experience which the enemy have acquired of the country, its roads, &c. &c.

‘ However, although affairs are in a very bad state with the Portuguese part of us at present, they are worse with the French, and the opinion would not at this moment be true, and therefore I shall not communicate it; and I will send it to you, to be shown to the Regency when I shall do so.

‘ I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here; and I am come here principally to put matters in the right road; and to come to an understanding with Castaños, and if possible, with Blake, respecting our future operations.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘ Marshal Beresford will receive with this memorandum the copy of one drawn for his use, and that of the Chief Engineer, and Commanding Officer of Artillery.

‘ During the siege of Badajoz his object will be to place his troops in such situations as that they will be best able to carry on the operations, and to join, in case the enemy should attempt to relieve the place.

‘ If the enemy should make the attempt, Marshal Beresford will consider of, and decide upon, the chance of success, according to a view of the relative numbers of both armies, and making a reasonable allowance for the number of Spanish troops which shall co-operate with him in any attack which the enemy may make upon him. If he should think the enemy too strong for him, with the assistance which he will know that he will have from the Spanish troops, he will retire across the Guadiana, and thence, if necessary, towards Portalegre, taking the position of the Caya and Portalegre, successively.

‘ If Sir William Beresford should think his strength sufficient to fight a general action, to save the siege of Badajoz, he will collect his troops to fight it.

‘ I believe that, upon the whole, the most central and advantageous place to collect his troops will be at Albuera. If the enemy should attempt to turn his left, in order to march upon Badajoz by Talavera, he has his choice between attacking them in that operation, or marching by his own left, along the Talavera rivulet. If they attempt to turn his right, he has the same choice, or to march by his right upon Valverde, and place his right upon the Valverde rivulet.

‘ All this must of course be left to the decision of Sir Wil-

liam Beresford. I authorize him to fight the action if he should think proper, or to retire if he should not.

‘ If the enemy should advance, different measures must be adopted in respect to the operations of the siege, according to the state in which they will be when the enemy shall make the attempt to relieve the place, and according to Sir William Beresford’s intentions of fighting the battle, or not.

‘ Sir William Beresford is aware of the degree in which Elvas will be dismantled of ordnance and stores, in order to make the siege of Badajoz ; and therefore, if he should determine, in consequence of the enemy’s strength, not to fight the battle, it will be necessary that he should make every effort to send back the ordnance and stores to Elvas before he shall raise the siege.

‘ If it should be necessary, and he should determine to fight the battle before he shall have obtained possession of Fort San Christoval, it will be necessary that he should send back from Fort San Christoval to Elvas all the ordnance and stores collected there, and afterwards by degrees, from the ground on the left of the Guadiana, the ordnance and stores collected there ; keeping on the latter, if possible, only what could be drawn away at one trip by the cattle and other means in his possession.

‘ If he should determine to fight the battle, after he shall have obtained possession of San Christoval, he should leave there the ordnance and stores necessary and sufficient to command the passage of the Guadiana by the bridge of Badajoz ; and on the left of the Guadiana, what can be removed at one trip by the cattle, or other means in his possession ; and all the rest should be moved to Elvas.

‘ If it should be possible, a redoubt, or two redoubts, should be constructed on the ground on the left of the Guadiana, in which 1000 men could remain in safety from the attacks of the garrison during the absence of the army, and 200 or 300 men in the works at San Christoval.

‘ I intend to propose to General Castaños the following plan of co-operation with Sir William Beresford for the troops composing the 5th army, as well as those under General Ballesteros, and eventually of General Blake ; and to request that Sir William Beresford may be informed whether they will, or not, perform what is herein pointed out.

‘ First, that, during the siege of Badajoz, the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur should be pushed as far forward as they can go with safety towards the enemy, taking care not to engage in any affair of importance ; and to send Marshal Beresford regular daily reports of their position, numbers, &c., and of all circumstances that may occur. The Conde de Villemur might be towards Llerena, Guadalcanal, &c., and should fall back, in case of the advance in force of the enemy, by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almen-dralejo, &c., to the left of the position of the army, ascertaining and sending daily intelligence of the enemy’s movements.

‘ Secondly, that General Morillo should occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almaraz and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, he should break up, and march by Lobon, and be prepared to join the army either by Talaverilla or by a more direct route.

‘ Thirdly, that General Ballesteros should have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate with the Conde de Penne Villemur, and observe the roads from the southward through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care not to involve himself in any serious affair, and sending daily information to Sir William Beresford of all that passes.

‘ In case the enemy should advance, General Ballesteros should retire by the road of Barcarota upon Valverde, in order to join upon the right of the army.

‘ Fourthly, that when General Blake’s corps shall land, it should take its station at Xerez de los Caballeros ; and if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for General Ballesteros.

‘ Fifthly, that the troops of the several nations and corps d’armée shall be commanded by their several chiefs, but acting upon this or any other plan of co-operation that may be agreed upon ; but that when the whole shall join, in consequence of the advance of the enemy, the whole are to be under the command of the Officer of the senior rank in the army.

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM.

*To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., Colonel Fletcher, and
Major Dickson.*

‘Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘1. The cutting tools having been sent to Olivença this morning, a body of troops to be stationed to-morrow morning in the wood between Olivença and Badajoz to cut materials.

‘2. As soon as a sufficient quantity of materials shall be cut, Badajoz to be invested on the right, as well as on the left, banks of the Guadiana.

‘3. If the weather should become settled before the materials shall be cut, the place to be invested, as stated in article 2d, as soon as the weather shall be so settled as that the troops may be kept out without inconvenience. The importance of the early investment of the place will be observed from what follows hereafter.

‘4. On the day the place shall be invested the following measures to be adopted:—

‘First, the flying bridge to be fixed on the Guadiana, below the junction with the Caya.

‘Secondly, the guns and stores, for which there are conveyance, to be moved up from Olivença to the station fixed upon for the formation of the depôt on the left of the Guadiana.

‘Thirdly, the engineers’ stores to be moved from Olivença, Elvas, and Jurumenha, to the same place, and to the place fixed upon for the depôts on the right of the Guadiana, in their due proportions.

‘Fourthly, the materials made at Elvas, Campo Mayor, &c., for which there may be conveyance, to be moved to the ground fixed for the depôt of stores on the ground on the right of the Guadiana.

‘Fifthly, the materials prepared at Olivença, in the wood, and at all places on the left of the Guadiana, to be moved to the ground on the left of that river.

‘Sixthly, the ordnance and stores, which there may be means of moving, to be sent from Elvas to the ground on the right of the Guadiana.

‘5. On the day after the place shall be invested the car-

riages and cattle to return to Elvas from the stations on both banks of the Guadiana, for more ordnance and stores, and to go back to those stations respectively with the proportions of ordnance and stores required to complete each, on the third day; and the same to be repeated on the fourth and fifth day from the investing of the place, till all the ordnance and stores required shall be collected in the proper deposits.

‘6. Ground to be broke for attacks on the Pardaleras, Picurina, and San Christoval, on the night of the day the materials shall be in deposits on the ground.

‘7. As soon as the British troops shall be in possession of San Christoval, the flying bridge placed below the junction of the Caya to be brought to a station above the town, and, if possible, below the junction of the Gevora; and with this view it is recommended that the fords and passages of the river above the town should be well reconnaitred as soon as the place shall be invested.

‘8. When the British army shall be in possession of San Christoval, Picurina, and Pardaleras, Marshal Beresford will determine upon the point at which he will attack the body of the place. It is believed, however, that, upon the whole, one of the south faces will be the most advantageous.

‘WELLINGTON.’

MEMORANDUM.

To the Officers in Command of Corps in Estremadura.

‘Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘The corps of allied British and Portuguese troops, under Marshal Sir William Beresford, being about to be employed in the siege of Badajoz, it is desirable that the Spanish troops in Estremadura, the Condado de Niebla, and Andalusia, should co-operate in and protect that operation.

‘It has been reported, and there is reason to believe it to be true, that the enemy have fortified their magazines and establishments at Seville; and therefore no diversion which might be threatened, or even attempted upon that city, will have the effect of drawing off the enemy’s attention from the measures which he must adopt to relieve Badajoz. If that relief should be attempted therefore, it will be by the whole

force which the enemy can bring from the blockade of Cadiz, and from his several corps in Andalusia, Granada, &c., and it must be resisted by the whole force of the allies *en masse*; and the following plan is proposed for the consideration of the Spanish General Officers.

‘ Sir William Beresford’s corps will carry on the operations of the siege; and it is requested that General Castaños will aid him with three battalions to work in the trenches.

‘ In case the enemy should endeavor to interrupt the siege, and Sir William Beresford should think proper to fight a battle to save it, he will probably collect his troops in the neighborhood of Albuera. It is proposed that the troops under the Conde de Penne Villemur should observe the enemy towards Guadalcanal, reporting all that passes daily to Marshal Sir William Beresford. In case the enemy should advance in force, the Conde de Penne Villemur should retire by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almendralejo, &c., to the left of the position of the allied British and Portuguese army, ascertaining and sending daily intelligence of the enemy’s force and movements.

‘ It is proposed that the troops under General Morillo shall continue to occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almaraz and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, General Morillo should break up, and march by Lobon, and be prepared to join the allied British and Portuguese army, either by Talaverauela or by a more direct route.

‘ It is proposed that, during the siege of Badajoz, General Ballesteros shall have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate by his left with the Conde de Penne Villemur, and observe the roads through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care to involve himself in no serious affair, and sending daily information to Sir William Beresford of all that passes.

‘ In case the enemy should advance, General Ballesteros should retire by the road of Barcarrota upon Valverde, in order to join upon the right of the army.

‘ When General Blake’s corps shall land, it is proposed that it should take its station at Xerez de los Caballeros; and, if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for General Ballesteros.

‘ It is proposed that the troops of the several nations shall carry on these operations under the command of their several chiefs, of course communicating with each other constantly, as above proposed ; but in case of joining for the purpose of giving battle to the enemy, it will be necessary that the whole should be under the orders of the Officer of the highest military rank.

‘ The Spanish General Officers are requested to state to Sir William Beresford whether they will, or not, co-operate with him in the manner above proposed in carrying on the siege of Badajoz, and what the number is of the effective men of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under their several commands.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, in which you have enclosed one of the 15th instant from Dom Miguel Forjaz, complaining of the conduct of certain British soldiers near Alemquer, supposed to be employed to press cars.

‘ As repeated orders have been given in the British army to prevent the employment of soldiers in this manner, I conclude that these soldiers are marauders from some regiment, or detachments on their march.

‘ I have, however, to inform you that, upon inquiry, I find that no British regiments or detachments have been in that neighborhood since the army broke up from the Rio Mayor river ; but as I am very desirous of punishing and preventing such conduct, I request that the person who has made this complaint may be called upon to state on what day, or nearly at what time, the occurrences took place of which he complains, and, if possible, the uniform worn by the soldiers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant. I have directed a portion of the Officers of the Chasseurs Britanniques to be detached to Cadiz to do duty

with the men belonging to that regiment who are there ; and I will send to Cadiz clothing, &c., for those men whenever the clothing shall arrive in the Tagus ; and I request you to detain at Cadiz this detachment, and to continue to make it do duty with the battalion of detachments which you have formed there, still, however, considering it as part of the Chasseurs Britanniques.

‘ Besides this detachment, there is one nearly of the same numbers at Lisbon, belonging to the same regiment, which I shall send to Cadiz if the Commanding Officer of the regiment should be desirous that it should join the regiment with the army.

‘ You will do well to keep the recruits, not already attached to the Chasseurs Britanniques by orders from head quarters, disposable for the orders of the Commander in Chief, but doing duty in the battalion of foreign detachments which you have formed.

‘ I am concerned to observe that we have found the deserters from the French army, enlisted into our ranks, very much inclined to return again to the French army, even when they knew that the French soldiers were enduring hardships and privations to which it might have been supposed that the human frame was not equal ; and for this reason I think it probable that the Commanding Officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques will think it desirable that these recruits, which are now detained at Lisbon for want of clothing and accoutrements, should not join the regiment while employed in a situation near the enemy, from which they may have it in their power easily to desert.

‘ I attribute this disposition of all foreign recruits to desert from our armies to the regularity of system and to the strictness of discipline which exist, and which must be upheld, in order to keep a British army in the field in a state of efficiency for any length of time. They prefer the profits they derive from the plunder they acquire on their marauding parties, even though attended by extreme labor, and hardships, and privations, to the plenty and comfort of the British army, accompanied as these must be by regularity of habit and by the maintenance of strict discipline ; and their desertion is frequently very inconvenient, as affording to the enemy the only information which he could acquire.

‘ Under these circumstances, I am not desirous of increasing the number of foreign troops with this army, although I think that everything ought to be done that is possible to distress the enemy, by enticing his foreign troops to desert; and that when these have deserted they should be equally well treated with our own troops, and formed into battalions, and prepared for service in stations in which they would not be exposed to the same temptations, and would not have the same facilities, to desert again, as they must have in an army close to the enemy in the field.

‘ In respect to prisoners of war, I have already more in Portugal than I know how to take care of; and the Admiral in the Tagus has received positive orders from the Admiralty to send home neither prisoners nor deserters. I have remonstrated to the Secretary of State on the inconvenience of this order; and if I should obtain leave to send any to England, I shall relieve you from some at Cadiz.

‘ I beg to refer you to my letters to Mr. Wellesley for an account of the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘ I received your letters of the 6th and 10th instant, and I enclose copies of my dispatches to Government.

‘ I have come here to set matters going in this quarter, and to endeavor to gain some advantage from the operations of the Spanish troops. Our first object will be the siege of Badajoz, which I hope will begin immediately.

‘ I have not yet seen Castaños, but I expect him this day, or early to-morrow morning. As-soon as I shall have conversed with him, I propose to set out again for the frontiers of Castille, where the French appear to intend to attempt the relief of Almeida. I shall of course send you a copy of any memorandum, or any other arrangement, which I may make with Castaños, for the support to be given to the troops in the siege of Badajoz.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 23d April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 6th and 10th instant.

‘ When you first apprised me of the possibility that the command of the Spanish armies might be offered to me, I considered it my duty to inform the Secretary of State of this circumstance, and to request to be made acquainted with the sentiments of His Royal Highness’s Government respecting the line which I should adopt in regard to this offer, if it should be made. The answer which I received from the Earl of Liverpool disapproved of my acceptance of the offer; and I now lament that the constant occupation which I have had since I received his letter prevented me from making you acquainted with its contents, which would have saved you the pain which you must have felt in your recent discussions upon this subject with the Spanish Government. Besides, I acknowledge that I never imagined that the proposition would be made which you had expected; and it appeared to me to be useless to write to you to convey the opinion of His Royal Highness’ Ministers upon an offer which it was probable would never be made. I beg you will make the use which you may think proper of this communication.

‘ Although I have not yet had any personal communication with General Castaños, I have had every reason to be satisfied with him, and I hope for the best effects from his appointment.

‘ It is impossible for me to enter into the military convention proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, having no authority from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to make such a convention. I propose, under the instructions which I have received, to carry on such military operations as may be in my power, adverting to the means of the enemy compared with those at my disposal. I shall communicate confidentially, as I have hitherto invariably done, with the Spanish Officers and authorities in the neighborhood of the seat of the operations of the allied British and Portuguese armies, and shall continue to recommend to them such operations and measures as may accord with my views and

may forward the general cause. They will be the best judges of the expediency of attending to the counsels and suggestions which I shall make to them; and I can only say that, whether they do or not, I shall continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my own disposition will enable me to do him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ A Elvas, ce 24 Avril, 1811.

‘ J’espérais que j’aurais eu le plaisir de vous voir et d’avoir une conférence avec vous pendant que je serais dans ce pays ci, mais je suis obligé de retourner en Castille demain matin.

‘ J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer un mémoire en Anglais, détaillant le plan d’opérations que je proposais pour le corps allié Anglais et Portugais sous les ordres du Chevalier Beresford, et la manière dans laquelle il me paraissait que la 5^{me} armée et les corps Espagnols, sous les ordres du Général Ballesteros et du Général Blake, pourraient co-opérer dans ce plan, pour la considération de votre Excellence et des autres Généraux Espagnols.

‘ Malheureusement, le pont que le Maréchal Beresford avait construit sous Jurumenha a été emporté hier au soir par la crue des eaux de la Guadiana; et comme il n’y a plus de gué dans la rivière, le Maréchal n’a plus de communication avec cette place, sans laquelle il ne pourrait ni subsister en Estrémadure ni faire le siège de Badajoz; et sa position deviendrait fort critique si le résultat d’un combat lui était désavantageux.

‘ Je viens donc de lui envoyer ordre de placer son corps de telle manière qu’il pût avoir sa communication avec la rive droite de la Guadiana par le pont de Merida, tenant toujours la place de Badajoz bloquée autant que les circonstances le lui permettront, et qu’il reprenne le plan du siège de Badajoz aussitôt que la communication avec Elvas serait rétablie ou par un pont ou par de gués de rivière.

‘ C’est malheureux qu’on n’ait pas écouté les suggestions que j’ai souvent faites qu’on envoie le pont de bateaux de Badajoz à Elvas.

‘ Je vous prie de faire savoir à Monsieur le Maréchal Beresford si la 5^{me} armée, et les corps du Général Ballesteros et du Général Blake, se conformeront aux opérations indiquées dans le mémoire inclus, quand le Maréchal sera dans le cas d’entreprendre le siège de Badajoz.

‘ En attendant, je crois que les troupes de la 5^{me} armée feraient bien de se tenir en étroite communication avec celles sous les ordres du Maréchal Beresford, et de suivre les mouvemens de celles ci.

‘ Comme les corps sous les ordres des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake paraissent être destinés au service du Condado de Niebla, je ne sais pas quel plan il faut leur proposer. Comme quelque tems se passera probablement avant que le Maréchal puisse entreprendre le siège de Badajoz, il se pourrait que l’ennemi envoyât des troupes en Estrémadure du côté de Madrid ou de la Vieille Castille; et dans ce cas là il serait nécessaire que le Maréchal Beresford dépassât la Guadiana pour conserver la communication avec le corps allié Anglais et Portugais qui est sur la frontière de la Castille. Ce mouvement pourrait contrarier les vues des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake, à moins que ceux ci ne se déterminent à passer la Guadiana aussi, et puis à reprendre leur position dans le Condado de Niebla en repassant cette rivière à Mertola.

‘ J’écris à votre Excellence ce qui est possible, pas ce qui est très probable; mais dans les opérations militaires il faut tout considérer; et je serais fâché si les vues des Généraux Ballesteros et Blake étaient contrariées par les effets d’un plan que je leur aurais proposé. Il me paraît donc qu’il n’y aurait pas d’inconvénient à ce que ces Généraux conservassent leurs positions dans le Condado de Niebla jusqu’à ce que le Maréchal Beresford soit en état de pouvoir attaquer Badajoz, et qu’alors ils se portent dans les positions indiquées dans le mémoire inclus.

‘ Le Maréchal Beresford m’a montré ce matin une lettre du 23, de la part du Conde de Penne Villemur, dans laquelle cet Officier demande le secours de la cavalerie Anglaise. Si on soutient le Conde de Penne Villemur, il faut le faire en force suffisante, pour ne pas perdre la supériorité que nous avons gagnée; et alors voilà un autre objet pour nos opérations. Dans les opérations militaires il est rarement

possible de faire deux choses à la fois : par exemple, de faire le siège de Badajoz, et de donner du secours au Conde de Penne Villemur dans une position avancée qu'il a prise pour couvrir le pays des courses de l'ennemi. Il faut abandonner ou l'un ou l'autre objet ; et il vaut mieux retirer un peu le Conde de Penne Villemur, et abandonner pour le moment un peu de pays aux courses de l'ennemi, que d'interrompre les opérations du siège de Badajoz. Je dis qu'il vaut mieux retirer un peu le Conde de Penne Villemur s'il est sérieusement menacé, ce que j'avoue ne me paraît pas.

‘ En même tems que le Conde de Penne Villemur demande du secours à Llerena, le Général Morillo en demande et en a reçu à Merida, qui est un point plus important à conserver que Llerena.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général*
Don F. X. Castaños.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

‘ I enclose two memorandums which I had drawn for your attention, pointing out the operations which I wished you to carry on with a view to obtain possession of Badajoz, and in the event of the enemy attempting to relieve that place during your operations against it.

‘ The floods of the Guadiana, however, having last night carried away the bridge which you had constructed under Jurumenha, and as it is probable that some time will elapse before you can construct another, on which you can rely for your communications with the left bank of the river, and before the river will again be fordable, it will be necessary that you should place the troops under your command in such a situation as to keep up their communication with the right bank by the bridge of Merida ; and that you should defer your operations against Badajoz till you shall have established a more direct communication across the Guadiana with Elvas, either by bridge or ford.

‘ I request you in the meantime to blockade Badajoz as strictly as may be in your power, consistently with the object of preserving your communication with the bridge of Merida, and continue all your preparations for the siege ; and when

the period comes when you may have it in your power to undertake it, to attend to the suggestions in the enclosed memorandums, as far as the circumstances of the moment may agree with those which exist at present.

‘ It will be necessary that you should place the heavy artillery and stores which are at Olivença out of reach of danger from any movement of the enemy.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have written to General Castaños, with a memorandum for his consideration, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

‘ I send you with this the official letter and memorandum, and letter, &c., for Castaños.

‘ I have received a letter from Sir William Erskine, in which he desires to command your cavalry till Fane comes out. You will find him more intelligent and useful than anybody you have. He is very blind, which is against him at the head of cavalry, but very cautious. Let me know whether you would like to have him, as soon as you can, and send the letter after me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

‘ I received this day your letter of the 21st, yesterday that of the 20th, and yesterday at 2 A.M. that of the 19th, Captain Brown having been eighty hours on his journey.

‘ There is nothing new here. I shall set out to-morrow morning on my return; and, as it appears to me that the enemy cannot attempt anything against you in the existing state of the Agueda, I shall go by the same stages by which I came here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 24th April, 1811.

‘ I write only to let you know that I shall return to head quarters to-morrow, and shall be obliged to you if you will write to me there. I shall send my letters for England from Portalegre to-morrow, and beg you to give charge of them to Colonel Reynell.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 14th instant, in which you have transmitted one from the Lords of the Admiralty, relative to the return to England of the battalion of Royal Marines doing duty in the citadel of Lisbon, under Major Williams*. As their Lordships have been pleased to refer you to my opinion whether they can be spared, I have to inform you that their services can be spared from Lisbon, although it will be very inconvenient to part with them just at present; but as I conclude that Sir Thomas Williams has sailed some time ago, I recommend that you should detain them for some time longer, till I shall receive the orders of the Secretary of State regarding the disposal of the force in this country.

‘ The Royal Marine Artillery might be sent away without inconvenience, whenever you please.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ I enclose two intercepted letters sent me by General Castaños, which are worth your perusal. I shall send you to-morrow their plan of Badajoz, with the plan of their attack upon the place.

‘ I beg you will not forget to send me, as soon as possible,

* Colonel Sir Richard Williams, K.C.B.

Hardinge, or some other Staff Officer who has intelligence, and to whom I can talk about the concerns of the Portuguese army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Military Secretary to the Commander in Chief.

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ The services which Colonel Murray has rendered to the army in their recent operations induce me, most earnestly, to request that you will recommend him to the Commander in Chief, to be made a Brigadier General in the Peninsula.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that since I last addressed you I have been in Estremadura; from whence I am now on my return to the troops stationed between the Agueda and the Coa.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the report of Marshal Sir William Beresford on the surprise of a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, on the night of the 6th instant, together with a return of the loss upon that occasion.

‘ Sir William Beresford employed the 4th division, under the command of Major General the Hon. L. Cole, in the attack of Olivença, which place surrendered at discretion on the 15th instant. I have the honor to enclose the report of Major General the Hon. L. Cole and Sir William Beresford, together with the terms of capitulation which he had proposed to the governor and his answer; and returns of ordnance, arms, &c., and prisoners taken in the place.

‘ As Sir William Beresford deemed it desirable to oblige the enemy to retire from the province of Estremadura entirely before he should commence his operations against Badajoz, he moved forward with this view, while Major General the Hon. L. Cole was engaged in the attack upon Olivença, as well as to give support and protection to

General Ballesteros' division of Spanish troops, which had been obliged to retire from Fregenal successively upon Nerez de los Caballeros and Salvatierra on the 13th and 14th instant, by a division of French troops under the command of General Maransin. The Marshal marched on the 15th to S^{ta} Marta, and on the 16th to Los Santos, where the British and Portuguese cavalry fell upon a body of the enemy's cavalry, took 160 prisoners, and killed and wounded a great many.

' I enclose Marshal Sir William Beresford's report of the 18th instant of these operations, in which your Lordship will observe that the cavalry conducted themselves with the utmost steadiness and good order.

' The enemy having retired to Guadalcanal, and the corps with General Maransin having retired through the Sierra, the troops were put in motion to return to the northward, and to take their stations for the operations of the siege of Badajoz; and the Marshal met me at Elvas on the 21st.

' We reconnoitred Badajoz on the 22d, escorted by the two light battalions of the King's German Legion and two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry. The enemy have in Badajoz a garrison of about five battalions of infantry, with a small body of cavalry, and sufficient artillery for the defence of the place, which is well supplied with provisions. They brought three battalions out of the town, which skirmished with our troops; but I have not yet received the return of our loss upon this occasion.

' As the preparations for the siege are nearly completed, the place would by this time have been regularly invested, only that, on the night of the 23d, the floods in the Guadiana carried away the bridge which Sir William Beresford had, with great difficulty, constructed under Jurumenha; and the river was no longer fordable anywhere.

' Not only Marshal Beresford could not undertake the operations of the siege, and could not subsist the troops under his command during its continuance, without having a constant communication with Elvas, but his situation would have been very critical if the enemy should have made any attempt to retake the place, and Marshal Beresford should have determined to fight an action to protect the siege. Under these circumstances, I yesterday desired him

to delay the operations of the siege till he should have been able to re-establish his bridge, or until the Guadiana should again become fordable; and to place his troops in such a situation as to command the communication with the right bank of the river by the bridge of Merida, still keeping Badajoz blockaded as closely as might be in his power.

‘ I had long been aware of the inconvenience which would be felt in the operations, either for the relief of Badajoz when attacked by the enemy, or for the attack of the place if the enemy should obtain possession of it, from the want of a bridge on the Guadiana; and I had frequently urged the Spanish General Officers to remove to Elvas the boats and materials for a bridge which were in store in Badajoz. They commenced to remove them during the siege; but the unfortunate battle of the 19th February was fought when only five boats had arrived at Elvas. The enemy consequently obtained possession in Badajoz of the remainder of the bridge; and the bridge which Sir William Beresford had constructed was formed of casks principally, and of six pontoons belonging to the British army, which I had sent to Elvas for the purpose.

‘ When in Estremadura, although I did not see General Castaños, I proposed a plan of operations for his corps and those of General Blake and Ballesteros, in co-operation with Sir William Beresford, which I hope will be adopted when that Officer is able to undertake the siege of Badajoz.

‘ Since I quitted the frontier of Castille the enemy have increased their numbers at Ciudad Rodrigo and along the Agueda; and it is reported that they propose to endeavor to withdraw the garrison from Almeida. The Agueda is not fordable at present; and this operation, which would be very difficult under any circumstances, appears now to be quite impracticable.

‘ I have no late intelligence from the north of Spain; and none from Cadiz of a later date than the 11th. I understand that General Blake, with part of the troops under his command, has arrived in the mouth of the Guadiana.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ You will see how we stand in Estremadura by my dispatch. We are certainly now superior to the enemy there, and we shall maintain the superiority, and get Badajoz without much difficulty, if the Spaniards will act reasonably. The stores of Elvas are but badly provided for the siege of Badajoz; however, we shall contrive to do the business, I hope.

‘ It is very desirable that you should not publish the details of my dispatches to your Lordship. You cannot conceive how very deficient the French are in information. All the dispatches from me which are published are sent to Massena from Paris, and they thus acquire the information of what is going on.

‘ When an army is engaged in defensive operations, or in sieges or blockades, or in any other in which it is long in the same position, the enemy acquire all the information they desire if they obtain a knowledge of its position and numbers of the date of a month old. Information of this date Massena can and always does acquire, and it is a serious disadvantage to us.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Portalegre, 25th April, 1811.

‘ In the recent operations in this country I have received very great assistance from Colonel Murray, the Quarter Master General; and I have this day written to Colonel Torrens to request that he might be made a Brigadier General.

‘ Colonel Murray is the Deputy Quarter Master General in Ireland, and he had hoped that when General Brownrigg should be removed from the head of the department in Great Britain, he should succeed to General Hope as Deputy Quarter Master General in Great Britain. He has however been informed by good authority, that, when General Brownrigg shall go to Ceylon, General Hope is to be appointed Governor of the Military College, and that Colonel Gordon is to be appointed Quarter Master General by the Prince

Regent, thus placing aside Colonel Murray, and all those of senior rank to Colonel Gordon, already in the department.

‘ I do not know whether your Lordship would choose to advise the Prince Regent on this subject ; but if you should do so, I earnestly request you to call to his recollection the services of Colonel Murray in this country for two years ; and to his attention the experience which he must have acquired in that situation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ SIR,

‘ Castello Branco, 27th April, 1811.

‘ I beg you to order that the Juiz and the Escrivano of Villa Velha may be ordered to appear before the special commission at the head quarters of the Portuguese army. The former was written to by Mr. Assistant Commissary Haynes, to request that he would give directions that boats might be assembled at the ferry of Vilha Velha, to assist in ferrying me over and the gentlemen of the Staff who accompanied me, to which he answered, in not very civil terms, that Mr. Haynes might himself write to collect the boats ; and afterwards both the Juiz and the Escrivano absented themselves from the town where they expected me, lest they should be called upon to take any trouble to assist in our progress.

‘ If this conduct towards me and the head quarters of the army passes unnoticed, an Officer of inferior rank in charge of a detachment passing this way cannot expect much assistance : I am therefore determined to make an example of these persons, as far as depends upon me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. 3 P.M.—It appears by letters which I have received from Sir Brent of the evening of the 25th, that the enemy are in motion towards the Agueda, apparently intending to attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida. I go on immediately, and shall be with the army to-morrow.

‘ W.’

To Major General Sir William Erskine, Bart.

‘ MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

‘ Alameda, 29th April, 1811.

‘ I received upon the road your letter, conveying your wishes to be appointed to command the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, to which I should have sent you an answer, if I had not been certain that I should be here before any messenger could.

‘ It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to comply with your wishes, and most particularly that you should have yourself attached the condition to my compliance which I should have been anxious to attach to it. If I were ever again to command an army, I should probably settle that, when General Officers absent themselves from the army, they should lose their commands in it; but having settled it otherwise, and having invariably placed a General Officer, on his return to the army, in the station which he filled before he left it, I am anxious that Général Fane, who certainly quitted the army for very sufficient cause, should resume his situation when his health may permit him to return. This, however, I do not think likely to be soon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*

Sir W. Erskine, Bart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Let me know when you will go, that I may put you in orders. I conclude that you will wish to take Macdonald with you.

‘ W.’

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

‘ Alameda, 29th April, 1811, 4 P.M.

‘ I received last night, shortly after my arrival here, your letter of yesterday, with one enclosed from General Brenier*.

‘ I beg that you will tell him that we generally send off immediately any prisoners who may be taken by us; but that I beg him to let me know whether he has any particular wish for any particular men, or belonging to any particular regiment, or division, or corps, or men recently made prisoners.

‘ The truth is, that this gentleman wants to get a little

* The French governor of Almeida.

news. He has found that our men know little, or are but little communicative, and he wants to get some Frenchmen in exchange for them, from whom he thinks he will find out what is going on. It is as well to let him believe that we are good-natured gulls who will easily swallow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
A. Campbell.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Alameda, 29th April, 1811.

‘ Having heard upon the road that the enemy was collecting upon the Agueda, and seriously threatened to raise the blockade of Almeida, I pushed on, and arrived here last night.

‘ The enemy are certainly in force upon the Agueda ; but they have till now made no attempt to establish themselves on this side of that river.

‘ I propose to send off the mail for England on Wednesday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have many letters from you unanswered, to all of which I shall reply as soon as my baggage shall come up.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 30th April, 1811.

‘ I arrived here on the 28th. The enemy are certainly in strength on the Agueda, their principal force being at Ciudad Rodrigo. The river is not yet fordable, at least not for infantry, and they have hitherto made no movement, excepting two of reconnoissance towards the bridge on the Azava near Marialva.

‘ I am much concerned to be obliged to write to you again upon the continued and increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese regiments with this army, which I am afraid cannot now be attributed to the Portuguese Government. The brigade in the 5th division Sir William Erskine reported yesterday to be only 700 men ; General Pack’s brigade,

General Campbell has just told me, is only 1400; the 9th regiment has 700 men; the 21st 400, as General Picton informed me this morning. All the General Officers and the Staff Officers of the army are calling out about the Portuguese hospitals.

‘The recent movements of the enemy of course rendered necessary the removal of all encumbrances from the army; and I saw on Sunday the sick of the 9th and 21st regiments going away in a most shameful state, some men being scarcely able to crawl; others, who were able to walk, plundering the country; and some of them having arms, or accoutrements, or necessities; and there being no carriage for arms or accoutrements with them, of course the arms, and accoutrements, and necessities of all the soldiers sent away upon this occasion will be lost, if the head quarters of the regiment should be moved from their present station.

‘Then upon all these complaints and difficulties I can give no answer, and can apply no remedy, because I do not know upon what principle any of your regulations have been framed: indeed I do not what your regulations are, and I have no means whatever of acquiring the necessary information. I hope that you will have sent off Hardinge, or somebody, immediately upon your return to Olivença on the 24th.

‘I assure you that, if some effectual steps are not taken, the Portuguese force with this part of the army will be annihilated; and I can venture to take no steps till I can get here a Staff Officer who understands what has been done, upon what principle, and what is the regulation.

‘Among other complaints which General Picton made this morning, one was of the absence of Mr. Robertson, the Staff Surgeon.

‘I must report to Government the state of the Portuguese army. The Ministers and the English public believe that we have 30,000 men for whom we pay, and half as many more supported by the Portuguese Government. I do not believe that I have here 11,000, or that you have 5000, and of the number many are not fit for service. There is really now no excuse for this inefficiency, excepting the want of order and regularity, which I cannot enforce without the assistance of some of the Staff of the Portuguese army. The men have

halted for nearly a month, they have nothing to do, and are as well fed as our own soldiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 30th April, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st, 23d, and 24th ; and I am concerned to say that I have not leisure to read the voluminous documents to which they relate. I shall read them, however, upon the first opportunity I have, and shall send you answers to them. I can only now say that the British Commissary General can have nothing to say to the Portuguese commissariat, excepting under the arrangement of June, 1809.

‘ I have referred to Mr. Kennedy all the complaints respecting the Officers of the British commissariat.

‘ I wish that there were no complaints of wants from the Portuguese troops ; but it is really a fact that I have not 11,000 men with this army.

‘ I cannot allow French prisoners to work at any works on our account. It is hard upon me that neither the British nor the Portuguese Government can or will take care of the prisoners taken by this army. I suppose, therefore, I must send them back to the enemy. I have written to England upon the subject, which is all I can do.

‘ The enemy have as yet made no movement ; they are, however, very strong on the Agueda, particularly at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ I have unfortunately lost my keys, and many of your letters are locked up in my boxes. If you should want answers to any, you must send me duplicates.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I enclose another anonymous letter received this day, which I think comes from the same person.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 30th April, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant, conveying the desire of the Portuguese Government that larger proportions of specie than have hitherto been paid into the military chest should be paid in future, as a part of the army is in Spain under the command of Sir William Beresford.

‘ The Portuguese Government appear to forget that the British army are in Spain likewise ; and that four fifths of the Portuguese army are supplied with provisions by the British Commissary : they have also omitted to notice that the Portuguese troops with this part of the army have not been paid since January last, in consequence of which desertion begins to be very prevalent among them.

‘ In respect to the issue of paper or metal to the chest of the “ Aids ” by the Commissary General, it is a matter of indifference in respect to the expense. If the Commissary General issues paper, he allows for the discount, and the Portuguese Government, I should imagine, are able to purchase the metal in the market as well as the Commissary General.

‘ The object of this request, therefore, appears to be to throw upon the British commissariat trouble and responsibility which ought properly to belong to the Portuguese treasury.

‘ But to demand metal from the British commissariat, although the common, is not the most, efficient mode of procuring specie to pay the armies, and provide for the demands upon the Government ; some mode should be devised of collecting the taxes, particularly that upon the property of rich merchants, which has frequently been recommended by me, but hitherto without effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 1st May, 1811.

‘ Having received intelligence from Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer on the 27th April, two days after I addressed your Lordship last, that the enemy were increasing their force on the Agueda, I arrived here on the 28th.

‘ The enemy had, on the 23d, attacked our piquets on the Azava, but were repulsed. Captains Dobbs* and Campbell, of the 52d, and Lieut. Eccles of the 95th regiment, distinguished themselves upon this occasion, in which the allied troops defended their post against very superior numbers of the enemy. Lieut. Prichard, 1st batt. 52d regiment, and seventeen soldiers, were wounded.

‘ The enemy repeated their attack upon our piquets on the Azava on the 27th, and were again repulsed; and this day again they reconnaitred the banks of this river with eight squadrons of cavalry, and three battalions of infantry. They did not make any attempt to pass the river, nor did they attack the piquets upon the bridge of Marialva.

‘ They have collected a very large force at Ciudad Rodrigo. Marshal Massena, and the head quarters of the army, are at that place; and it is generally reported in the country that they propose to raise the blockade of Almeida. I do not intend to allow them to relieve this place, unless I should be convinced that they have such a superiority of force as to render the result of a contest for this point doubtful.

‘ From all the accounts which I have received, I believe that they have still in that place provisions for the garrison, which is stated to consist of 1500 men, for one fortnight.

‘ The enemy may be stronger than they were when they were obliged to evacuate Portugal, and they may be reinforced by detachments of troops, particularly the Guards, under the command of Marshal Bessières; but still I feel confident that they have it not in their power to defeat the allied army in a general action; and I hope to be able to prevent them from relieving this place, unless they should bring the contest to that issue in a situation unfavorable to us.

‘ The river Agueda is not yet fordable for infantry, but is so for cavalry.

‘ Sir William Beresford has taken up the position which I had proposed for him in Estremadura; but I have not yet heard that he had re-established his bridge at Jurumenha.

‘ I have no late intelligence from Cadiz or from the north of Spain.

* Afterwards killed in the assault of the lesser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ It has been frequently reported that King Joseph was about to quit Madrid; and I have always considered these reports to be so little founded, excepting in the wishes of those who circulated them, that I have omitted to communicate them to your Lordship. However, at last, I have reason to believe that there is some foundation for a report which I have received, that King Joseph was to be at Valladolid, on his road to France, on the 27th April. The guerillas are all active to intercept his progress; but he has with him a considerable escort, of 1000 French troops; and all the Spanish troops in his cause, called *Juramentados*.

‘ The departure of the King, whatever political effect it may have in Spain, will relieve the French from the necessity of taking care of his person, and will increase their disposable force, particularly in the southern provinces. But if we should be able to obtain possession of Almeida, I hope to have it in my power to reinforce our troops in that quarter to such an extent as to render our operations, at least in Estremadura, free from risk, whatever may be the force which the enemy may be enabled by circumstances to assemble.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 1st May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the states of the army to the 15th of April.

‘ Although the number of sick on the return is considerable, I have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship that the soldiers of the army are remarkably healthy, notwithstanding the fatigues which they have undergone in the last two months. Many of those returned sick absent are recovered and on their road to join, or are at the depôts at Lisbon or Coimbra, and waiting for an opportunity to join.

‘ I enclose a letter from Sir William Beresford, regarding the loss of horses by the 4th dragoons in the late service in Estremadura. Your Lordship will observe how few remain of the horses recently sent to that regiment from the 3d dragoons.

‘ I am concerned to be obliged to report to your Lordship

the very inefficient state of the Portuguese army. His Royal Highness' Ministers will have had under their view the complaints which had been made from time to time by Marshal Sir William Beresford and myself, of the want of provisions by the Portuguese troops while the army were in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river. These wants have produced the usual fatal effects. The twelve Portuguese regiments of infantry, five battalions of caçadores, one battalion of the Lusitanian Legion, and two regiments of cavalry, which are with this part of the army, and which ought to amount to 21,800 rank and file, do not amount to 11,000 fit for duty. Some regiments, which ought to have 1400 men, have only 300 for duty, others 400; and General Pack's brigade, which has always been distinguished on service, and of which the General has taken the utmost care, which ought to have 3400 rank and file, has only 1545, by a return sent me this day.

'The brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which ought to have 1000 rank and file, has only 400 !

'I have not a late return of the Portuguese army, by which I can show your Lordship the state of the whole; but I am certain that, including the garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes, there are not 20,000 rank and file present and fit for duty.

'I am sensible that there must always be a considerable difference in the number of men effective on the establishment and those present for duty; but when the Portuguese Government maintain an establishment of nearly 50,000 regular troops, which is nearly complete, it might be expected that more than half would be fit for duty; yet the number is now reduced below 20,000.

'The expense of every man produced in the field is therefore enormous; and the Portuguese Government is ruined by the failure to keep in order its own departments.

'Your Lordship is aware that I have frequently represented this subject to the Portuguese Government; and at last I deem it proper to draw to it the attention of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Ministers.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Earl of Liverpool.'

'WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD.

‘ Villa Fermosa, 6th May, 1811.

‘ I have not been able to write to you for some days, as we have had the enemy in our front, and on the 3d, and yesterday, we were very warmly, but partially engaged with them. They have a very superior body of cavalry in very good order; but we maintain our ground well, and they have as yet made no progress towards raising the blockade of Almeida.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d. If General Blake does not positively agree to everything proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz. I must finish this blockade in one way or other in the course of a few days.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P. S. The enemy are still close to us. You will have heard that Joseph has quitted Madrid: one consequence of this will be to increase the disposable force of the French by the number of troops constantly kept at Madrid as guards to his person. This circumstance is worthy of attention.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 6th May, 1811.

‘ We have been so close to the enemy since the 1st that I have not been able to write to you. We were warmly but partially engaged on the 3d and yesterday; and the enemy are still close to us; but they have made no progress in raising the blockade. Their loss has been very great in both affairs. They have again got a very superior cavalry, owing to my having believed that the Visconde de Barbacena's brigade was something.

‘ I do not know well what to advise you respecting your seat in the Regency. The principle on which you accepted that situation was that you might be useful to your own Government and to the general cause of the allies; and I

should not think that you ought to resign it without the permission of your own Government, if I had not received the other day the Prince's *Carta Regia*, in answer to my letter.

‘ In that he tells me that he shall write to inform the King that he shall dismiss Principal Souza from his situation, provided His Majesty will recall you from Lisbon, and that no objection is made to his calling Dom Miguel Forjaz to his presence, to answer for the delays of which I complain; which delays, by the bye, he declares, in another part of the letter, that the Governors of the Kingdom had proved to him never existed. It may be said that you have no occasion to be acquainted with the contents of this letter, but being acquainted with it, I think there is no doubt whatever that you cannot continue for a moment a member of the Regency. I also think that, sooner or later, the King's Ministers must consent to your withdrawing from the Regency; and as I do not see any advantage likely to result from your continuance, which will at all compensate for the loss of dignity in omitting to withdraw at the moment at which it may be supposed that you were aware of the Prince's objection to you, I should advise you to withdraw whenever your own feelings suggest to you that you ought to do so: you are therefore at liberty, if you think proper, to withdraw, and to make any use you please of this communication.

‘ In respect to Dom Miguel Forjaz, his loss will be irreparable; and I think, from the contents of the *Carta Regia* to me, and the temper in which it is written, that the step which he proposes to take is the only one which can avert the storm; and, in my answer to the Prince, I shall take care to avoid saying anything which can lead to a belief that I am at all acquainted with his intention to resign.

‘ I learn that you and I are to be appointed to distribute the 100,000*l.* voted by Parliament to the Portuguese nation. Lord Liverpool desires that we should give in kind rather than in money, of which I also approve. The question is, in what kind? And corn is, I fancy, now too late.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Dom Miguel Forjaz.

‘ MON CHER MONSIEUR,

‘ A Villa Fermosa, ce 7 Mai, 1811.

‘ La lettre que vous m’avez écrite le 28 Avril, et que Monsieur Stuart m’a envoyée, m’a fait beaucoup de peine; et malgré que je trouve que vous avez grande raison de refuser à continuer vos services à un Gouvernement qui ne vous traite pas même avec justice, les vœux sincères que j’a formés pour le bien de votre pays, et l’intérêt que j’ai pris à le sauver, sont la cause que je vous demande, avec instance, de continuer de rester en place en attendant que les yeux du Prince puissent s’ouvrir sur les services que vous lui avez rendus, si je n’avais pas reçu une lettre de la part de son Altesse Royale, il y a quelques jours, dans laquelle il se montre si déterminé de vous appeler auprès de lui que je trouve que vous ne pouvez pas mieux faire que d’en faire la demande vous même.

‘ Son Altesse Royale se trompe fort s’il croit qu’aucun intérêt hors celui de son royaume avec lequel celui des alliés est intimement lié, aurait pu me persuader de me mêler d’aucune manière de la nomination de ses Ministres: pourvu qu’ils soient toujours loyaux et capables, cela m’est égal quels sont les Ministres. Mais je ne vous flatte pas quand je vous assure que je ne connais personne en Portugal non seulement qui pourrait vous remplacer, mais qui pourrait d’aucune manière remplir les devoirs pénibles qu’avec des milliers de désavantages vous avez bien remplis depuis que j’ai eu le plaisir de vous connaître.

‘ J’écris au Prince une lettre que Monsieur Stuart vous montrera.

‘ Agréez, &c.

‘ *Dom Miguel Forjaz.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 7th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2d instant; and I have to inform you that Mr. Dunmore has orders to pay into the chest of the “Aids” the sum of 100,000 dollars recently received from Cadiz.

‘ It follows as a consequence of the arrangement of the 6th of March, for supplying with provisions the greatest part of

the Portuguese army, that the sum paid monthly as subsidy must be diminished. Under that arrangement the expense of the provisions was to be deducted monthly from the amount of the subsidy. The expense of the British commissariat has been increased in consequence of the arrangement, and of course it is possible to allot only a diminished proportion of the monthly receipts to the chest of the "Aids."

' I see no mode, therefore, by which the distresses of the Portuguese Government can be effectually relieved, and they can be enabled to transmit to Sir William Beresford the money which he requires to pay for supplies in Spain, excepting only by the adoption of some of those measures so repeatedly recommended to them to increase their own resources.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' C. Stuart, Esq.'

' WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

' MY DEAR LORD,

' Villa Fermosa, 7th May, 1811.

' I had the honor of receiving yesterday morning, by the messenger, your Lordship's letter of the 11th of April, to which I proceed to reply without loss of time.

' Your Lordship will have observed in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I do not know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them.

' All measures recommended to the existing Government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no value whatever; and the countenance which the Prince Regent of Portugal has given to the Governors of the Kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to everything proposed for the increase of the resources of the Government, and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils.

' The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the Government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged.

' The increase of the subsidy by Great Britain will have no direct effect in increasing the pecuniary means of the Por-

tuguese Government, as the greatest part of the increase must necessarily be given in kind; and that which will be given will most probably be in lieu of what was irregularly plundered from the country heretofore.

‘ On all these accounts I have urged the Portuguese Government most earnestly to adopt every measure in their power to augment their own pecuniary resources, but hitherto without much effect. And yet until the amount of money at their command is increased, it will be impossible to apply an effectual remedy to the evils which have gradually decreased, and continue daily to decrease, the numbers of the army.

‘ However, I am decidedly of opinion that if the British Government are determined to do no more in the Peninsula than to maintain themselves in Portugal, 30,000 effective British troops would be sufficient, to be aided by a reserve maintained in Great Britain or Ireland, and ready to sail at a moment’s notice. But these troops ought to be effective; and I would beg to refer your Lordship to the first letter which I addressed to you upon the subject, on the 14th of November, 1809.

‘ In respect to the second question which your Lordship has referred for my consideration, viz., the use to be made of our existing force, in the present state of the Peninsula, for active operations, I will inform your Lordship what plan I intended to follow under the existing instructions; and, indeed, however they may be enlarged, something of the same kind must be done.

‘ The first object of our attention must be to regain Badajoz. This is very important, not only in respect to Portugal, but to the subsistence of Cadiz, the greatest part of which is, I understand, drawn from the Condado de Niebla. If Badajoz were not regained, it could not be expected that the war could be maintained at all in the Condado de Niebla. The loss of Badajoz is also very important in reference to the safety of Portugal. The siege of Elvas might be opened immediately.

‘ Circumstances have enabled us to attempt to reduce Almeida by blockade, at the same time that we attempt to obtain possession of Badajoz by siege. A few days must bring the blockade to an issue; but if I find that I can neither maintain it, nor bring the enemy to a general action

on terms which I shall think advantageous, I shall have no scruple in giving it up, as I undertook it not as a part of a plan, but as the consequence of our preceding operations during Massena's retreat, upon finding by intercepted letters and other intelligence that the place was but ill supplied with provisions.

‘ If we should obtain possession of Badajoz, circumstances may render one or other of two lines of offensive operations expedient: viz., one directed to the south for the relief of Cadiz, remaining on the defensive in Beira; the other, supposing Almeida to have fallen by blockade, to undertake the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; or, if Almeida should not have fallen by the blockade, to undertake the siege of both places, and afterwards to push on our operations into the heart of Spain, and open the communication with Valencia. This latter plan, if practicable, would relieve Cadiz and the south of Spain as soon and as effectually as the first mentioned.

‘ I consider myself authorized to undertake the first by the existing instructions: the instructions must be altered to enable me to undertake the second. Circumstances vary to such a degree in this extraordinary war every day, that it is impossible for me to say which plan would be best, at the moment at which I should have it in my power to execute either.

‘ Just to give you a notion of the degree in which circumstances have altered within this last month, which ought to weigh in determining upon any of the operations which are now carrying on, or which must be carried on in future, I mention to you the detachment of a considerable body of Spanish troops under General Blake from Cadiz; on the other hand, the removal of the King from Madrid, which will set at liberty a considerable force which always attended his person; the junction with Massena of all the French cavalry in Old Castille, Leon, &c., while the army in Galicia, which was kept in check by this cavalry, still remain inactive. Then all plans would be overturned by the defeat of one of the Spanish corps which must co-operate with us; or by the refusal of the Spanish Government to co-operate with us according to any plan founded on the reasonable system of security, on which alone I can venture to act under your Lordship's instructions.

‘ All plans of offensive operation would also of course be destroyed by the arrival in Spain of fresh reinforcements to the enemy’s armies.

‘ From this statement your Lordship will see how difficult it is’ for me to lay down a plan of operations for the campaign. I have not yet received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajoz ; and I have been obliged to write to Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they shall positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence. All that I can say is, therefore, that I shall carry on offensive operations against the enemy as far as it may lie in my power, and as my instructions will allow me, on one or the other of the plans which I have above detailed to you, according to the best judgment which I may be able to form of the situation of affairs at the time.

‘ It will be necessary that you should continue to reinforce us, and that you should send out to us particularly good horses for the cavalry and artillery.

‘ I earnestly recommend to you not to undertake any of the maritime operations on the coast of Spain upon which you have desired to have my opinion. Unless you should send a very large force, you would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which you might obtain possession. Then that large force would be unable to move, or to effect any object at all adequate to the expense or to the expectation which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient.

‘ It is in vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance, to such expeditions from the Spaniards. The first thing they would require uniformly would be money ; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and everything which your expedition would have a right to require from them ; and, after all, this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of your expedition to have a voice in the decision on the plan of operations to be followed, when the whole should be ready to undertake one.

‘ Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be; upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commanders must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone they will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies.

‘ While writing upon this subject I may as well reply to your Lordship’s official dispatch of the 11th, No. 19.

‘ Of course all operations of an offensive nature must cease if the battalions, mentioned in the memorandum enclosed in that dispatch, are sent home before they shall be relieved. The plan which I would propose would be:

‘ First, to draft the seven battalions of the legion into the three others, and send home the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the seven line battalions.

‘ Secondly, to form into six companies the 2d battalions of the 24th, 31st, 38th, 42d, 53d, 58th, and 66th, and to send home to recruit, or to form the recruits, the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the four companies drafted.

‘ Thirdly, to send home entirely the 2d battalions of the 24th, 53d, and 66th, as soon as they shall be relieved; although, by the bye, the last two are two of the best 2d battalions we have.

‘ According to this plan we should reduce in some degree our expense in this country. We should keep here Officers inured to the climate, and accustomed to the service; at the same time that we should send to England Officers and non-commissioned officers to raise and train recruits. Indeed it would be desirable if I were authorized from time to time to incorporate the ten companies of a regiment into eight or six companies, according to their numbers, and to send home to recruit, or train recruits, the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the drafted companies.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Thomas Ross, Esq., Surgeon to the Forces.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th of February by the last post, and I am much concerned that you should have lost your baggage in Portugal. I possess no authority to grant a warrant for the payment of compensation for the loss of any baggage, unless the claim for the payment should have been submitted to the consideration of, and passed by, a Board of Claims; and there is no such Board now sitting in Portugal.

‘ I would also beg to observe that, your baggage having been lost in a transport, or in an army store, I doubt whether I could refer your claim for compensation to the consideration of a Board of Claims, as one of the rules for the guidance of those Boards (as well as I can recollect, for I have not the book by me) is that compensation shall not be given for baggage lost under these circumstances. I am much concerned that it is not in my power to comply with your wishes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Thomas Ross, Esq.,
Surgeon to the Forces.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ I enclose you a letter and a dispatch from my brother. The latter contains a copy of my dispatch on our affairs here, which I beg you to peruse.

‘ I heard yesterday, from our friends at Salamanca, that the battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to regiments stationed in Andalusia, are to march to join their regiments under Drouet, who they say is to command the 5th corps: this must be a mistake, as it appears that Latour Maubourg commands it.

‘ My book is locked up in one of my boxes, of which I have lost the keys, and I cannot therefore tell you how many battalions there were in the 9th corps belonging to regiments in Andalusia. I saw them the other day, and I think they do not exceed four battalions, very weak; they can scarcely be 2000 men. There is one of the 64th regi-

ment, and one of the 100th, I know, but forget of what other regiments; they are certainly not gone yet, and I will let you know when they do go. As the corps is broken up, you may depend upon their going, as Massena will have done with them. There is nothing particular this day: I think the French are going back; some are certainly gone.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ From the 5th to this day the two armies have been not only in sight, but literally within shot of each other. The French, however, withdrew in the night and this morning towards the Azava, and I cannot tell yet how far they are going, or what shape they will take. Almeida still holds out.

‘ You cannot sign warrants for any extraordinaries, and the Commissary ought not to pay the veterinary surgeons’ and farriers’ bills without warrants.

‘ If General Houghton chooses to come here without a brigade I have no objection; but I cannot with propriety remove his brigade at present.

‘ I will try to give you some money, but I am apprehensive that I shall find it difficult.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ The enemy commenced their retreat last night; and I propose to send you my dispatches for Government tomorrow with the account of all the operations, and shall be obliged to you if you will detain the packet till they shall arrive.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ The enemy’s whole army, consisting of the 2d, 6th, and 8th corps, and all the cavalry which could be collected in Castille and Leon, including about 900 of the Imperial Guard, crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 2d instant.

‘ The battalions of the 9th corps had been joined to the regiments to which they belonged in the other three corps; excepting a division consisting of battalions belonging to regiments in the corps doing duty in Andalusia; which division likewise formed part of the army.

‘ As my object in maintaining a position between the Coa and the Agueda, after the enemy had retired from the former, was to blockade Almeida, which place I had learned from intercepted letters, and other information, was ill supplied with provisions for its garrison, and as the enemy were infinitely superior to us in cavalry, I did not give any opposition to their march, and they passed the Azava on that evening, in the neighborhood of Espeja, Carpio, and Gallegos.

‘ They continued their march on the 3d, in the morning, towards the Dos Casas, in three columns; two of them, consisting of the 2d and 8th corps, to the neighborhood of Almeida and Fort Concepcion, and the third column, consisting of the whole of the cavalry, and the 6th and that part of the 9th corps which had not already been drafted into the other three.

‘ The allied army had been cantoned along the river Dos Casas, and on the sources of the Azava, the Light division at Gallegos and Espeja. This last fell back upon Fuentes de Oñoro, on the Dos Casas, with the British cavalry, in proportion as the enemy advanced, and the 1st, 3d, and 7th divisions were collected at that place; the 6th division, under Major General Campbell, observed the bridge at Alameda; and Major General Sir William Erskine, with the 5th division, the passages of the Dos Casas at Fort Concepcion and Aldea del Obispo. Brig. General Pack’s brigade, with the Queen’s regiment from the 6th division, kept the blockade of Almeida; and I had prevailed upon

Don Julian Sanchez to occupy Nave d'Aver with his corps of Spanish cavalry and infantry.

' The Light division were moved in the evening to join Major General Campbell, upon finding that the enemy were in strength in that quarter; and they were brought back again to Fuentes de Oñoro on the morning of the 5th, when it was found that the 8th corps had joined the 6th on the enemy's left.

' Shortly after the enemy had formed on the ground on the right of the Dos Casas, on the afternoon of the 3d, they attacked with a large force the village of Fuentes de Oñoro, which was defended in a most gallant manner by Lieut. Colonel Williams, of the 5th batt. 60th regiment, in command of the light infantry battalion belonging to Major General Picton's division, supported by the light infantry battalion in Major General Nightingall's brigade, commanded by Major Dick of the 42d regiment, and the light infantry battalion in Major General Howard's brigade, commanded by Major M'Donnell of the 92d, and the light infantry battalion of the King's German Legion, commanded by Major Aly, of the 5th battalion of the line, and by the 2d batt. 83d regiment, under Major Carr.

' The troops maintained their position: but having observed the repeated efforts which the enemy were making to obtain possession of the village, and being aware of the advantage which they would derive from the possession in their subsequent operations, I reinforced the village successively with the 71st regiment under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and the 79th under Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and the 24th under Major Chamberlain. The former, at the head of the 71st regiment, charged the enemy, and drove them from a part of the village of which they had obtained a momentary possession.

' Nearly at this time Lieut. Colonel Williams was unfortunately wounded, but I hope not dangerously; and the command devolved upon Lieut. Colonel Cameron of the 79th.

' The contest continued till night, when our troops remained in possession of the whole.

' I then withdrew the light infantry battalions, and the 83d regiment, leaving the 71st and 79th regiments only in the village, and the 2d batt. 24th regiment to support them.

‘ On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the position which we had occupied on the Dos Casas river ; and during that night they moved the Duc d’Abrantes’ corps from Alameda to the left of the position occupied by the 6th corps, opposite to Fuentes de Oñoro.

‘ From the course of the reconnaissance on the 4th I had imagined that the enemy would endeavor to obtain possession of Fuentes de Oñoro, and of the ground occupied by the troops behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho ; and in the evening I moved the 7th division, under Major General Houston, to the right, in order, if possible, to protect that passage.

‘ On the morning of the 5th the 8th corps appeared in two columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Dos Casas and Pozo Velho ; and as the 6th and 9th corps also made a movement to their left, the Light division, which had been brought back from the neighborhood of Alameda, were sent with the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, to support Major General Houston ; while the 1st and 3d divisions made a movement to their right, along the ridge between the Turon and Dos Casas rivers, corresponding to that of the 6th and 9th corps, on the right of the Dos Casas.

‘ The 8th corps attacked Major General Houston’s advanced guard, consisting of the 85th regiment, under Major Macintosh, and the 2d Portuguese caçadores, under Lieut. Colonel Nixon, and obliged them to retire ; and they retired in good order, although with some loss. The 8th corps being thus established in Pozo Velho, the enemy’s cavalry turned the right of the 7th division, between Pozo Velho and Nave d’Aver, from which last place Don Julian Sanchez had been obliged to retire ; and the cavalry charged.

‘ The charge of the advanced guard of the enemy’s cavalry was met by two or three squadrons of the different regiments of British dragoons, and the enemy were driven back ; and Colonel La Motte, of the 13th chasseurs, and some prisoners, taken.

‘ The main body were checked and obliged to retire by the fire of Major General Houston’s division ; and I particularly observed the Chasseurs Britanniques, under Lieut. Colonel Eustace, as behaving in the most steady manner ;

and Major General Houstoun mentions in high terms the conduct of a detachment of the Duke of Brunswick's light infantry.

‘ Notwithstanding that this charge was repulsed, I determined to concentrate our force towards the left, and to move the 7th and Light divisions and the cavalry from Pozo Velho towards Fuentes de Oñoro, and the other two divisions.

I had occupied Pozo Velho and that neighborhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, as well as provide for the blockade, which objects it was now obvious were incompatible with each other; and I therefore abandoned that which was the least important, and placed the Light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st division, and the 7th division on some commanding ground beyond the Turon, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Turon and that river.

‘ The movement of the troops upon this occasion was well conducted, although under very critical circumstances, by Major General Houstoun, Brig. General Craufurd, and Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton. The 7th division was covered in its passage of the Turon by the Light division, under Brig. General Craufurd; and this last, in its march to join the 1st division, by the British cavalry.

‘ Our position thus extended on the high ground from the Turon to the Dos Casas. The 7th division, on the left of the Turon, covered the rear of the right; the 1st division, in two lines, were on the right; Colonel Ashworth's brigade, in two lines, in the centre; and the 3d division, in two lines, on the left; the Light division and British artillery in reserve; and the village of Fuentes in front of the left. Don Julian's infantry joined the 7th division in Freneda; and I sent him with his cavalry to endeavor to intercept the enemy's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ The enemy's efforts on the right part of our position, after it was occupied as I have above described, were confined to a cannonade, and to some charges with his cavalry, upon the advanced posts. The regiments of the 1st division, under Lieut. Colonel Hill of the 3d regiment of Guards,

repulsed one of these; but as they were falling back they did not see the direction of another in sufficient time to form to oppose it, and Lieut. Colonel Hill was taken prisoner, and many men were wounded, and some taken, before a detachment of the British cavalry could move up to their support.

‘ The 2d batt. 42d regiment, under Lord Blantyre, also repulsed a charge of the cavalry directed against them.

‘ They likewise attempted to push a body of light infantry upon the ravine of the Turon, to the right of the 1st division, which were repulsed by the light infantry of the Guards under Lieut. Colonel Guise, aided by five companies of the 95th under Captain O’Hare*. Major General Nightingall was wounded in the course of the cannonade, but I hope not severely.

‘ The enemy’s principal effort was throughout this day again directed against Fuentes de Oñoro; and, notwithstanding that the whole of the 6th corps were at different periods of the day employed to attack this village, they could never gain more than a temporary possession of it. It was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 79th regiments, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Cameron; and these troops were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 3d division, commanded by Major Woodgate; the light infantry battalions of the 1st division, commanded by Major Dick, Major M’Donald, and Major Aly; the 6th Portuguese caçadores, commanded by Major Pinto; by the light companies in Colonel Champelmond’s Portuguese brigade, under Colonel Sutton; and those in Colonel Ashworth’s Portuguese brigade, under Lieut. Colonel Pynn, and by the piquets of the 3d division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. R. Trench. Lieut. Colonel Cameron was severely† wounded in the afternoon, and the command in the village devolved upon Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan.

‘ The troops in Fuentes were besides supported, when pressed by the enemy, by the 74th regiment, under Major Russell Manners, and the 1st batt. 88th regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, belonging to Colonel Mackinnon’s brigade; and on one of these occasions, the 88th, with the

* Afterwards killed in the assault of Badajoz in 1812.

† Mortally.

71st and 79th, under the command of Colonel Mackinnon, charged the enemy, and drove them through the village; and Colonel Mackinnon has reported particularly the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Brigade Major Wilde, and Lieut. and Adjutant Stewart.

‘ The contest again lasted in this quarter till night, when our troops still held their post; and from that time the enemy have made no fresh attempt on any part of our position.

‘ The enemy manifested an intention to attack Major General Sir William Erskine’s post at Aldca del Obispo on the same morning, with a part of the 2d corps; but the Major General sent the 2d batt. Lusitanian Legion across the ford of the Dos Casas, which obliged them to retire.

‘ In the course of last night the enemy commenced retiring from their position on the Dos Casas; and this morning, at daylight, the whole was in motion. I cannot yet decide whether this movement is preparatory to some fresh attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida, or is one of decided retreat; but I have every reason to hope that they will not succeed in the first, and that they will be obliged to have recourse to the last. Their superiority in cavalry is very great, owing to the weak state of our horses, from recent fatigue and scarcity of forage, and the reduction of numbers in the Portuguese brigade of cavalry with this part of the army, in exchange for a British brigade sent into Estremadura with Marshal Sir William Beresford, owing to the failure of the measures reported to have been adopted to supply horses and men with food on the service.

‘ The result of a general action, brought on by an attack upon the enemy by us, might, under those circumstances, have been doubtful; and if the enemy had chosen to avoid it, or if they had met it, they would have taken advantage of the collection of our troops to fight this action, and throw relief into Almeida.

‘ From the great superiority of force to which we have been opposed upon this occasion, your Lordship will judge of the conduct of the Officers and troops. The actions were partial, but very severe, and our loss has been great. The enemy’s loss has also been very great, and they left 400 killed in the village of Fuentes, and we have many prisoners. I particularly request your attention to the conduct of Lieut.

Colonel Williams, and Lieut. Colonel Cameron, and Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan; and to that of Colonel Mac-kinnon and Lieut. Colonel Kelly, 24th regiment; of the several Officers commanding battalions of the line and of light infantry, which supported the troops in Fuentes de Oñoro; likewise to that of Major Macintosh of the 85th, and of Lieut. Colonel Nixon, of the 2d caçadores, and of Lieut. Colonel Eustace, of the Chasseurs Britanniques, and of Lord Blantyre.

‘Throughout these operations I have received the greatest assistance from Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, and all the General Officers of the army; and from the Adjutant and Quarter Master General, and the Officers of their several departments, and those of my personal Staff.

‘By intelligence from Sir William Beresford I learn that he has invested Badajoz, on the left of the Guadiana, and is moving their stores for the attack of the place.

‘I have the honor to inform you that the intelligence which I transmitted in my last dispatch has since been confirmed, and that King Joseph passed Valladolid, on his way to Paris, on the 27th of April. It is not denied by the French Officers that he is gone to Paris.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

, *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the affairs at Fuentes de Oñoro, on the 3d and 5th May, 1811.*

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	11	16	208	49	235
Wounded . . .	81	72	1081	101	1234
Missing . . .	7	10	300	5	317

The Portuguese killed, wounded, and missing, are included in the above numbers.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ The attention of the British Government has been frequently drawn to the state of affairs in this country by the reports of Mr. Stuart and myself, particularly as that state affects the military departments and establishments ; but as the success of the military operations has recently been much impeded by the defects of constitution, by the disobedience and neglect of those employed, and by the failure of all the departments of the Portuguese army, I consider it my duty to draw your Lordship’s attention to the subject again in a particular manner.

‘ The Portuguese troops with this part of the army do not produce in the field half of their effective strength, because the soldiers have been ill fed and taken care of; and vast numbers of them are in hospitals. Before I broke up from the cantonments on the Rio Mayor river I took upon me to make an arrangement by which the troops serving in the same divisions with British troops should be fed by the British Commissaries, of which I enclose a copy; under which arrangement five brigades of infantry of seven doing duty in this part of the army were taken charge of, and there remained but two, and one brigade of cavalry, to be taken care of by the Portuguese departments.

‘ These two brigades of infantry have been starving ever since; and, whenever there is any call for the military service of the troops, they are obliged to call upon the British commissariat for subsistence, thus reducing the quantity for the consumption of the British divisions.

‘ The Portuguese cavalry are so much reduced by want of food, that a regiment which I was desirous of employing in the recent affairs with the enemy could produce in the field only sixty men.

‘ None of the Portuguese Officers or troops are paid; and the consequence is that the Officers are suffering the extremity of distress, and the soldiers desert in large numbers.

‘ The mules attached to the artillery, not having been fed during the winter, were unable to perform service when the army broke up from the Rio Mayor river. After having re-

duced the quantity of ammunition drawn with each brigade, I have lately been obliged to send away two pieces of cannon belonging to one Portuguese brigade of artillery.

‘ In the actions of the 3d and 5th the quantity of ammunition expended by the Portuguese brigade of artillery engaged very nearly amounted to the whole quantity they carried with them ; and I was obliged to have recourse to the expedient of picking up the enemy’s shot which had been fired into our camp, and of making it up into ammunition with powder and materials drawn from the British artillery.

‘ The reserves of Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition are at this moment not less than six marches from the army, owing to the want of means of transport to convey them ; and I have been obliged to order the Commissary General to use the means of transport destined to convey provisions for soldiers and forage for horses, to bring up the Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition.

‘ The Portuguese wounded soldiers are taken care of in our hospitals, as they have none of their own.

‘ These are facts affecting our existing situation which press upon me at the moment ; and I state them to your Lordship as instances of the description of inconvenience, which might amount to risk and danger, resulting from the defects, the neglects, and the ignorance of the Portuguese departments. It is obvious that no Officer can venture to conduct any military operation against an active enemy with such means ; and I do not scruple to acknowledge that I have felt the greatest uneasiness respecting the success of the operations which I am now carrying on, on both sides of the Tagus, in consequence of the diminution of the numbers and of the efficiency of the Portuguese army, owing to the defects of all the departments attached to it.

‘ These defects have not been unnoticed by me in my communications with the Portuguese Government ; and I enclose to your Lordship the extract of a private letter, of the 26th March, to Mr. Stuart, upon that subject ; and the copy of a dispatch to that gentleman, of the 8th of April. Nothing has yet been done in consequence of the recommendations contained in these letters ; and the Portuguese Secretary of State, in answer to Mr. Stuart, tells him that

the local government have not the power from the Prince Regent to make the alterations suggested.

‘ My Lord, the state to which the enemy are reduced in the Peninsula may enable us to carry on our operations under all the disadvantages described in this and the enclosed letters ; but your Lordship will judge for yourself of the consequences which might result from the facts which I have related. I think it proper, however, to inform your Lordship that, if the enemy should be enabled to increase his force again in the Peninsula, the difficulties, which are the consequence of the defects in the Portuguese departments, will be vastly aggravated, and the danger increased to such a degree, that it may become a question whether His Majesty’s troops ought to be exposed to it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ Some time ago, certain persons, with whom I have long been in correspondence, at Salamanca, informed me that — —, who commanded the Irish Legion, was desirous of quitting the French service and of returning to his own country, if he could be assured of being unmolested by the Government in consequence of his having served the French Government. After some remonstrances with these persons upon the imprudence of their giving information to anybody of the existence of a correspondence between them and me, I stated to them that I could not promise that — — should receive His Majesty’s pardon without knowing the circumstances which had occasioned his departure from Ireland ; but that, if he would make me acquainted with those circumstances, I would state them to your Lordship ; and if he had been guilty of no act which would necessarily prevent the Government from recommending that he should be pardoned, I would recommend him to your Lordship, that he might be permitted to return to his native country, with His Majesty’s pardon for having served the French Government.

‘ — — was afterwards taken by a party of Don

Julian's guerrillas, in consequence of an arrangement made by himself, and he came in here some days ago. I have had a conversation with him, in which I desired him to put in writing all the circumstances which had occurred to occasion his quitting Ireland after the year 1798; and to conceal nothing, as he might depend upon it that every circumstance respecting him was known, and that the attempt to conceal the share he had in the transactions of that period might have the effect of preventing the accomplishment of his wishes.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the letter which I have received from — —, from which I should judge that he may have been informed of, and concerned in, the transactions in Ireland of that period; but that he was not guilty of any of those acts for which none of those who have been guilty have hitherto received a pardon.

‘ Under these circumstances, that of which he has been guilty is, to have served the French Government, a foreign Power at war with His Majesty; and as he has taken a most decided line upon that subject, as the manner in which he was taken prisoner is no secret, I hope that your Lordship will deem it proper to recommend him to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent for a pardon for this act.

‘ I entertain no doubt of the disgust which he and others feel at the system of fraud and robbery which prevails in the French service, nor of that which must have been occasioned in their minds by the contempt with which they have been treated by the French Government, in the violation of all engagements to them. It appears to me, that, besides the advantage of obtaining from the service of France one of His Majesty's subjects holding the rank of Colonel, it would not be disadvantageous to the Government that there should be some person in Ireland, able and interested, to give his countrymen an account of the real state of affairs in France and in the armies; of the manner in which engagements entered into by the French Government are performed, with foreign countries as well as individuals; and particularly of the manner in which those of the Irish nation, who have been so unfortunate as to have been obliged, or have chosen, to quit their own country, have been treated in France.

‘ On these grounds I earnestly recommend to your Lord-

ship that ——— should be pardoned, and that he should be allowed to return to his native country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th April, and I now enclose my dispatches to Government to the 8th instant.

‘ We have had warm work in this quarter, but I hope we shall succeed in the end. The French, it is said, lost 5000 men, we 1200, in the affair of the 5th: on the 3d we lost about 250; the French left 400 dead in the village of Fuentes de Oñoro. We lost the prisoners by the usual dash and imprudence of the soldiers.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Pray let General Graham know how we are going on. ‘ W.’

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 8th May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose you the copy of a report which I have made to the Secretary of State, of actions in which a part of the troops under my command were engaged with the French army on the 3d and 5th instant, together with returns of killed and wounded upon those occasions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Commander in Chief.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 9th May, 1811.

‘ I have taken an opportunity of reading over the enclosures in your letter of the 21st of April, in regard to the reforms of the departments attached to the Portuguese army, from which I find that nothing that was proposed is to be done. We are now getting beyond trifling upon these important subjects; and I must draw the serious attention of Government to the state of things here. I assure you that, in a very short time, there will be no Portuguese army

left, if all the military departments are not reformed as proposed, and all connected with them are not made liable to punishment for neglects under the military law.

‘ There is Barbacena’s brigade, which is not now so numerous as one of our squadrons. General Campbell sent me a regiment of it the other night, which he reported to consist of sixty horses. Is this to be borne? Can the war go on in this way?

‘ Everything else is the same. The sick and wounded are taken care of by our medical Officers; the artillery have no mules, and the guns must be sent away; they have no ammunition, and we are at this moment picking up the French ammunition in our camps to make up again with powder and materials furnished by us!! It is because the departments at Lisbon do not take care to find means to move forward the reserves; and then, in order not to lose a battle, the British Commissary General must find means of transport for the musket as well as the gun ammunition of the Portuguese army, which means of transport ought to be used to bring up food for the horses and soldiers of the army.

‘ All this falls upon me. I am involved in a most serious situation, and it is quite impossible for me to allow matters to go on as they are.

‘ The Portuguese army are not paid, positively; and many men, particularly of Pack’s brigade, have consequently deserted.

‘ I enclose the letter which I have written to the Prince Regent under a flying seal; and I beg you to peruse it, to allow Dom Miguel de Forjaz to peruse it, and then to close and forward it to the Brazils.

‘ I cannot but observe that either —— is very ill informed of what passes at Rio Janeiro, or else he must, on the 12th of February, have been acquainted with the contents of the letter of the Prince, of the 7th of February, to me.

‘ If you think that any alteration of my letter would be advisable, let me know it, and I will alter it. I conceived it best to appear perfectly indifferent about you or Dom Miguel Forjaz; but to hold out that I should go.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘SIR,

‘Villa Fermosa, 9th May, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, and of a memorandum, which I sent to General Castaños on the 24th April, proposing a plan of co-operation for the siege of Badajoz, to which letter I have hitherto received no answer.

‘I have therefore written to Marshal Sir William Beresford to desire that, until the Spanish Generals will positively engage to co-operate with him in the siege of Badajoz in the manner pointed out, he should proceed with caution in that operation; as I think there is reason to believe that the removal of the King from Madrid will occasion the march of the army of the centre to the southward, or into Estremadura, and I know that some battalions, now in this quarter, which have been in Portugal, are eventually destined to reinforce the 1st, 4th, and 5th corps d’armée, which are in Andalusia.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of my dispatch of the 8th instant to the Secretary of State, from which you will see the state of affairs here.

‘I beg you to inform the Spanish Government that I am much gratified by the alacrity of Don Julian Sanchez to communicate with me, and to give me every assistance in his power, and by the constant attention and assistance I receive from Brig. General Don Miguel Alava and Colonel Don José O’Lalor.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. 10th May.—I enclose the copy of my dispatch of this day to the Secretary of State, from which you will learn the result of the enemy’s operations for the relief of Almeida.

‘W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Villa Fermosa, 10th May, 1811.

‘I enclose my dispatch, &c. to my brother, to which I have added the copy of that of this day to the Secretary of State, from which you will see that our concerns here are happily concluded. My only anxiety now is on your side,

and I propose immediately to put in motion some troops towards the Alentejo, to continue their march as soon as the place shall fall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th May, 1811.

‘ The enemy retired on the 8th to the woods between Espeja, Gallegos, and Fuentes, in which position the whole army were collected on that day and yesterday, with the exception of that part of the 2d corps which continued opposite Almeida. Last night the whole broke up, and retired across the Azava, covering their retreat by their numerous cavalry; and this day the whole have retired across the Agueda, leaving Almeida to its fate. The 2d corps retired by the bridge of Barba de Puerco, and the fort of Val de Espino on the Agueda.

‘ Our advanced posts are upon the Azava and on the Lower Agueda, and the army will be to-morrow in the cantonments on the Dos Casas.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 10th May, 1811.

‘ I enclose a dispatch, which I hope will be in time to go with the letters.

‘ It occurs to me that the articles most suited to relieve the distress of the Portuguese would be wheat, of which there are several cargoes now at Lisbon; Indian corn; planks and beams for building; nails, large pipe staves, and iron hoops, or rather casks (shapen), with their hoops, &c. If you are of the same opinion, write for these articles to England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

‘ Au Quartier Général,
ce 11 Mai, 1811.
‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ Le Capitaine Salles, du 66^{me} régiment, a été envoyé en parlementaire aux avant postes de l'armée alliée, dans la nuit du 3^{me} de ce mois, par le Colonel de son régiment, d'une manière très irrégulière, et à une heure très indue. J'ai cru de mon devoir de le retenir pendant la durée de l'état des affaires qui existait dans ce moment là. Mais étant persuadé qu'il a vraiment été envoyé en parlementaire, quoique dans des circonstances très irrégulières, je le renvoie à l'armée Française.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Massena,*
Prince d'Essling.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Massena, Prince d'Essling.

‘ Au Quartier Général,
ce 11 Mai, 1811.
‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ Monsieur le Général Brenier, gouverneur d'Almeida, avait fait prisonniers quatre soldats Anglais qu'il a renvoyés sur parole, j'envoie avec Monsieur le Capitaine Salles quatre soldats Français, en échange pour les quatre soldats Anglais renvoyés par Monsieur le Général Brenier.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Massena,*
Prince d'Essling.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Long.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Villa Ferosa, 11th May, 1811.

‘ You will have observed by the General Order of the day, that I have altered the arrangements which I had made for the command of the cavalry on the left of the Tagus. When I was at Elvas I found, upon communication with Sir William Beresford, that it would be impossible to continue to employ Brig. General Madden's brigade as I had proposed, and that this body of troops must have been joined to the remainder of the cavalry in Estremadura. Under these circumstances, Brig. General Madden, the senior General Officer, must have commanded the whole, notwithstanding the previous arrangement for the command which I had made.

‘ As I was returning from Elvas I received a letter from Sir William Erskine, who had for some time had the command of our cavalry in this quarter, connected in their operations with the Light division, requesting to be employed with the cavalry on the left of the Tagus, where, under different circumstances, I had appointed you. I intended to appoint you to the command of a good brigade of light dragoons with this army, only that I yesterday received the notification of the appointment, by command of the Prince Regent, of Major General Alten to command the hussars of the Legion. This appointment, and his expected early arrival, must alter that arrangement; and I have not yet determined in what manner it will be most advantageous to the service to employ you.

‘ I request you, therefore, to remain with the troops under Sir William Beresford till you shall hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Long.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 11th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, regarding the prisoners of war proposed to be sent to England.

‘ I consider it most desirable that even 1500 should be sent away, as the number is increasing daily; but I have had no answer from the Secretary of State upon the subject, and the Lords of the Admiralty have ordered you not to send home any more on any account whatever. I should think it very improper if I were to request you to send home any, so long as that order exists.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ Villa Fermosa, 11th May, 1811,

‘ SIR,

Half past 10 A. M.

‘ Lieut. Cuyler, of the Royal dragoons, has just arrived here with a verbal report that the enemy’s garrison had made their escape from Almeida, and that the 36th regiment

and the 4th foot were on the Agueda near Barba de Puerco, that the enemy were drawn up in some force on the other side of the Agueda, and that you desired to have orders.

‘ It is not easy to forward orders upon so indistinct a representation of the situation in which you find yourself, and I had hoped that I should receive some report from you in writing. However, as the garrison have escaped, there appears now no reason why the troops should be extended so far as Barba de Puerco. The 36th regiment, therefore, may be drawn into their cantonments.

‘ The 4th regiment, belonging to the 5th division, was, I conclude, at Barba de Puerco, in consequence of the orders sent to Major General Sir William Erskine; and orders will be sent to the 5th division respecting the disposal of that regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General*
A. Campbell.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 11th May, 1811.

‘ I am concerned to inform you that Almeida was blown up last night, and I fear that the garrison has, in great part at least, escaped. I cannot tell how this occurred; the troops which had been taken from the duty of the blockade were sent back to it yesterday afternoon, and in the whole were four times more numerous than the garrison. However, I suppose that I shall hear from General Campbell soon.

‘ I have had two conversations with ——; and I am concerned to say that, notwithstanding his abilities, he appears to me but little calculated to do the business I require from him. I want him to assist me in obtaining a knowledge of the mode in which the connection between the troops and the several civil departments is regulated; to know how all that business is now going on here; and to see how we can make the matter work better than it does under the existing regulations. He thinks of nothing but new regulations and establishments, which are very necessary perhaps; but it is not his business to propose them, nor mine to carry them into execution. I hope that we shall understand each other

better, and that I may be able to put everything on a good footing here.

‘ You will hardly believe that we were obliged to pick up the French shot in our camp to make up ammunition for Arentschildt’s guns, his reserve having been left behind at Saragoça, and there being no Portuguese means of transport to carry on the ammunition; the Commissary General is obliged to undertake the business. The Commissary carried up the musket ammunition. Then I have been obliged to send back two guns of the brigade in the 6th division for want of mules to draw them!!! I have reported the state of things to the British Government, and they will do as they please. In the meantime the Prince Regent of Portugal insists upon Dom Miguel Forjaz’ going to his presence, and upon Mr. Stuart being recalled from Lisbon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I shall be much obliged to you if you will make General Castaños acquainted with the state of affairs here, and point out to him how important it is that no time should be lost in getting on foot the army of Galicia. The French will invade and obtain possession of that province as sure as we are alive if some decided measure is not adopted immediately.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 12th May, 1811.

‘ I have been to Almeida, of which I do not think the destruction so complete as that the place cannot be re-established. All the outworks are entire and uninjured, excepting that in front of the gateway, the counterscarp uninjured, the exterior revêtement of the rampart uninjured, and the rampart itself so little injured, that, on our walking upon it, it is not perceived that the interior revêtement has been blown away; three fourths of the exterior revêtement uninjured, and where it is blown away it appears that the foundation is uninjured. I think that they had opened the mines on a level with the *terre pleine* of the fort, and have carried them along the exterior revêtement, which being the line of least resistance, was blown away, while the rampart

itself stood firm, and the guns are generally still in their embrasures, and the interior of the parapets standing.

‘ There is a great deal of ordnance and shot in the place, better carriages, and I think more ordnance, than when we left it. I think that with some labor we might clear the rubbish out of the ditch, then scarp down the earth of the rampart where the revêtement is blown away, and stockade it at bottom and at top, by which we should make the place secure against a *coup de main*; and hereafter Government might repair it. To do anything, however, will require workmen and money, and I shall supply neither the one nor the other. The 7th division begin their march towards you to-morrow, the 3d next day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ P.S. I think the escape of the garrison of Almcida (although we have taken and destroyed a good lot of them) is the most disgraceful military event that has yet occurred to us. Excepting a few cavalry, which I believe crossed this morning, the whole French army have crossed the Agueda, and quitted Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 12th May, 1811.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 7th. I do not think that the conclusion which you have drawn, “ that the troops have all been paid to the end of April,” is warranted by Joaquim da Costa’s paper. I have never perused a more loose performance on an official fact which ought to be stated in one line, and which the Paymaster General of this army would state in two minutes regarding every individual in the army. The conclusion which you have drawn does not agree with the state of the fact, even with this part of the army. I will let you know, if possible by this post, to what day Officers and troops have been paid.

‘ I beg to draw your attention to the fact, that the British Government give the old subsistence for the Officers of 30,000 men in the subsidy, as well as the new addition to the whole army. Surely we have a right to expect that the Officers of the regiments composing the 30,000 men shall

have their old subsistence regularly, as well as the new addition.

‘ In respect to money, you do not appear to me to have observed that, now that we feed six brigades of Portuguese troops, the claim of the Portuguese Government to subsidy in money is much reduced ; at the same time, that our means of supplying them with money must be diminished. However, I ordered that they might have 100,000 dollars last week.

‘ I have considered it my duty to write seriously to the Government upon the whole subject. The responsibility resting upon me is too great for any individual, particularly for one so circumstanced as I am. As long as the French are not reinforced, matters will go on well enough ; but, as soon as they are, there will be a terrible crash.

‘ The unfortunate Government of Portugal, by their miserable intrigues at the Brazils, and their weakness here, are losing their country and the cause ; and if our Government do not produce a radical change, I will have nothing more to say to the concern.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Villa Formosa, 12th May, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote to you this morning I have received your letter of the 8th instant.

‘ The Portuguese Government appear to me to wish to have their full subsidy, and to have their army provisioned likewise, which I conceive will not answer ; and, at all events, I will neither give them a shilling which is required for the British army, nor allow a shilling to be raised for them in the money markets, allotted for us upon British credit, at least, if my opinion is consulted upon the subject.

‘ In regard to increase of subsidy, by payments in kind, I understand that none is to be given till they shall change their mode of proceeding in respect to commissariat, medical deparment, arsenal, transport, &c. &c. All that I can say is, that it is useless to consult my opinion upon any part of their concerns, unless the changes which I have pointed out are made ; it only takes up your time and mine unnecessarily,

and it is much better to let them go to the devil in their own way than to give ourselves any further trouble about them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ I beg to know what repairs are required to Fort St. Julian, besides a bridge to the ravelin, to enable Colonel Fisher to obey the orders long since given to him, to lodge the ordnance and military stores belonging to the army in that fort.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ I enclose you the extract of a letter which I have received from Sir David Dundas, from which you will see that he allows of the recommendation of six Officers for the brevet rank of Lieut. Colonel or Major. You will select the persons to be recommended, and let me know their names. I beg to remind you of Arbuthnot, Elder, Sutton, and Douglas, as persons having claims, leaving it to you to name them, or others, as you may think proper.

‘ It will be necessary that those promoted on this occasion should clearly understand that they are not, on promotion, to be made Portuguese Colonels, unless circumstances attaching to the Portuguese service should render it expedient on other grounds.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811,

6 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I enclose intercepted letters which I have just received. You see that you have nothing to apprehend from La Martinière. I am glad to find that you have such good pro-

spects at Badajoz. I continue the troops on their march; and I am inclined to go over and have a conference with Blake and Castaños. I have not yet had time to read your letter about the Portuguese troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 8th instant, and it gives me great satisfaction to find that the plan of operations for the allied armies, which I had proposed to your Excellency, with a view to the siege of Badajoz, meets with your Excellency’s approbation, and will be carried into execution by your Excellency and the troops under General Blake.

‘ The alteration which your Excellency has made in the propositions made by me meets with my concurrence. It was my duty to make a proposition upon so delicate a subject as that of the command of allied troops acting in co-operation, which should be so reasonable in itself as to meet with the concurrence of all those to whom it should be made; but it is consistent with the manly good sense, and candor, and knowledge of the state of affairs, which characterize your Excellency, to amend that proposition, by one calculated to give satisfaction to those of the allies who have most to lose in the contest for which it is our object to provide.

‘ It is impossible but that what you have proposed should be approved by all parties; and I assure you, that the disinterested forbearance of your conduct is highly appreciated by me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Don F. X. Castaños.’

To Brig. General Colman.

‘ MY DEAR COLMAN,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ There is nothing like striking while the iron is hot; and I write by this post to recommend that you and Madden

may be allowed to return to the army, with the rank which you would have held respectively if you had not quitted it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Colman.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ Having directed the field ordnance and stores belonging to the British army to be placed in store at Fort St. Julian, it has been reported to me that the bridge communicating from the body of the place to the ravelin, in which the greater proportion of the stores are to be lodged, is in so ruinous a state as to render it dangerous to make use of it.

‘ I beg to know, by return of post, whether the Portuguese Government will or will not repair the bridge; and what orders they will give upon that subject, and to whom; and whether or not the Officer, to whom the orders will be given, will be held at all responsible for the due and early execution of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 13th May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that the enemy blew up a part of the works of Almeida on the night of the 10th instant, when their army had retired and crossed the Agueda.

‘ I enclose a report of a British engineer, stating the extent of the damage done to the works of the place, which, in my opinion, can be repaired at no very great expense.

‘ The first measure to be adopted would be to render the place tenable as a military post against a *coup de main*. This would be very desirable, and the expense would be the work of 300 men for less than a month, according to the report of Lieut. Trench.

‘ The Government would then have time to receive the orders of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, whether he will incur the larger expense of repairing the place entirely, which work I conceive can hardly be completed as long as the war shall last upon the frontier.

‘ I beg to have forthwith the decision of the Government, whether they will or not put this place in repair in the manner first pointed out. If they should determine to do so, it will be necessary that they should collect 200 or 400 men, with tools to perform the work, and Officers to superintend them ; and that they should have on the spot means of feeding them. I expect to have an answer upon this subject in two posts after you shall receive this letter ; and that measures should be in progress to commence the work in one fortnight from this time, or I shall blow up the fort entirely, and withdraw from it all the allied troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Ferosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ I beg that you will write to Colonel Fisher by this night's post, to request that the ships having on board the battering train may be sent off to Oporto without loss of time. I enclose a list of engineers' stores, which I request Colonel Fisher will arrange to have put on board the ships with the battering train.

‘ I write to Admiral Berkeley by this occasion on the subject. There will be no occasion for sending any of the heavy ordnance which is landed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Ferosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ As I understand from you that there are 20,000 stands of arms at Lisbon, I request you to give directions to Colonel Fisher that 20,000 stands may be given to the Spanish Ambassador at Lisbon, for the use of the troops under General Castaños.

‘ I also request you to direct Colonel Fisher to send to Elvas 2000 barrels of gunpowder. He will be so kind as to arrange with the Commissary General respecting the best mode of having this powder transported, whether by sea to Setuval, and thence by the river to Alcacer do Sal, and

thence by land to Elvas, or to be landed at Aldea Galega, and thence by land to Elvas. Colonel Fisher will apprise Marshal Sir William Beresford of the road by which this powder will be sent off.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day’s date. I cannot but observe that, when you write to me to request that orders may be given to have a place put into such a state of repair as to make it capable of receiving stores, you should recollect that it is not in my power to give those orders, without knowing exactly what repairs are necessary; and you should take care, when you have no accurate knowledge upon the subject on which you write, to word your letter accordingly. Had you referred to the paper transmitted by Colonel Fisher, you would have seen that the Colonel does not report any repairs to be absolutely necessary, excepting the bridge from the body of the place to the ravelin.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received this morning from Admiral Berkeley, to which I beg you will attend. It is desirable that the guns in St. Julian, Cascaes, Fort Bugio, and other batteries bearing upon the entry of the harbor at Lisbon, should be pointed towards the sea; and that you should be prepared to occupy those points with the troops at Lisbon, in case of the appearance of the enemy’s fleet in that quarter, which I do not conceive very probable.

‘ I beg, at the same time, that you will understand that you are not to detain at Lisbon any men belonging to the regiments with the army who may be deemed sufficiently recovered to do their duty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ I request you to give directions that the ships, having on board the battering train belonging to the army, may proceed to Oporto under suitable convoy, as soon as certain engineers’ stores, which Colonel Fisher will have been ordered to have put on board these ships, shall have been embarked.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To General Bucellar.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ I request you to let me know, as soon as it is in your power, in what state, in respect to numbers, arms, and other equipments, the several regiments of militia are in the provinces of Tras os Montes, and Minho, and in the Partido d’Oporto; what orders you have given to have the regiments completed; and what progress has been made in completing them.

‘ I beg that you will let the Officers commanding in those provinces respectively know that I hold them responsible for having the regiments complete, and that, if any of the civil magistrates omit to exert themselves to perform their duty in completing them, they are to be sent, with their crimes in writing, and the proofs, without loss of time, to appear for trial before the Special Commission sitting at Marshal Beresford’s head quarters; and these magistrates, and others, may depend upon it, that I will do everything in my power to have those punished who shall be found by the Special Commission guilty of any neglect of duty, in so important a concern as providing for the defence of the country.

‘ I was much concerned to learn by intelligence from Colonel Trant, that some of the soldiers of the militia had deserted on a march which he recently made towards the frontier. I beg that Colonel Trant may be called upon to supply a return of the names of those men who had deserted, and that proceedings may be commenced against them and their properties; and that application may be made to Marshal Sir William Beresford to order a General Court Martial to try some of those recently guilty of this offence.

‘ As the enemy have retired from this part of the frontier, and have apparently gone off towards the Douro, it may be expected that their future plan of operations may be directed on the Portuguese provinces north of that river. I have no intelligence that that is their intention, but it is possible ; and it is necessary to be prepared with a plan to meet this possible contingency.

‘ I beg leave to refer you to the instructions which were sent last year by Marshal Beresford to the Officers commanding divisions in the northern provinces, for the line of operations to be adopted by each, in case of the invasion of the enemy by the several lines of attack upon the country. As soon as General Silveira shall find that the enemy are collecting in force upon the frontier, it will be necessary that he also should collect his troops. It is not impossible but that the enemy may detach some of his moveable columns within the frontier, principally with a view to plunder, and General Silveira will be able to meet and defeat them, without incurring the risk of defeat.

‘ But if the enemy should threaten a serious invasion of the province of Tras os Montes, it will be necessary that General Silveira should act precisely on the plan, and according to the instructions above referred to, given to him last year by Marshal Sir William Beresford.

‘ I beg that the Officers commanding in the several divisions will, in the meantime, employ themselves assiduously in completing, in equipping, and in disciplining their several corps, so that if the enemy should invade Tras os Montes, they may meet with that steady opposition which can alone be successful.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Bacellar.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘ The 3d division marched this morning. The 2d hussars will likewise proceed in the same direction from Celorico, probably to-morrow, so that if the siege should be prolonged (and I think it must be longer than you expect), and if the enemy should attempt to raise it, we shall be in strength in that quarter.

‘I do not think it possible for me to undertake more to the south, under existing circumstances, than the siege of Badajoz. I cannot, by any effort I can make, raise the British and Portuguese army beyond 30,000 men, to which the Spanish force may add from 8000 to 10,000 men more. Exclusive of Sebastiani’s force, I conceive that Soult cannot have less in Andalusia than from 30,000 to 35,000; intrenched at Seville, and afterwards at Cadiz, we cannot dislodge them by a direct movement upon them. Then as to movements to cut off their communication with Madrid and the north, from all that I know of the French, and of their situation in Andalusia, I judge that they are completely established in the southern provinces of Spain, independently of any communication north of the Sierra Morena, and that unless they can be deprived *permanently* of Seville, or of their lines of contravallation before Cadiz, nothing can shake them in that part of the Peninsula. It is out of our power to effect the former unless we can effect the latter; and my opinion is, that we cannot effect the latter with any force that I can venture to detach to the south.

‘The intention which I have, therefore, is to assemble the army, or the greatest part of it, here, to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, if possible, and afterwards either to move to the southward, or otherwise, as I may find most advantageous.

‘I communicate to you the course of my reflections on this subject at present, as you wrote to me about it in a letter of the 10th. I have no objections to your communicating what I say to General Castaños in confidence. At the same time, my mind is not entirely made up; and as soon as I shall have received all the reports upon Almeida, I shall take another ride to your quarter, to see how matters really are to the south, and what are the opinions of Generals Castaños and Blake, and yourself, and what are the objects, and to settle what shall be their operations, while we shall be engaged in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

‘I wonder that you allow —— to manage your concerns on the right of the Guadiana.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*

‘WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘I enclose the statement of the period to which the several regiments of this army have received their pay and gratification, Officers and men, from which you will perceive that Joaquim da Costa’s statement is false.

‘I have not yet got the returns of other regiments; but they are equally in arrear with those of which I have the returns.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘WELLINGTON.’

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘SIR,

‘Villa Fermosa, 14th May, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 23d April; and I assure you that I am highly flattered by the gracious mark of approbation which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased to convey of the conduct of the troops under my command. I am convinced that His Royal Highness’ favor will be gratefully received by the Officers of the army, and that the desire to deserve the continuance of His Royal Highness’ protection will be an additional incentive to all to continue those exertions which have already received His Royal Highness’ most gracious notice and approbation.

‘I have now the honor to submit for your consideration the names of six Majors of the army, to be promoted by brevet to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Among these there are two Majors, Coghlan of the 61st, and Way of the 29th, for services previous to the late operations; for which services I had before recommended them to your Excellency, and particularly that Major Way should be promoted to the Lieutenant Colonelcy of the 29th regiment.

‘I am not certain whether His Royal Highness had in his view, and intended to convey his approbation of, the conduct of the army in their recent, or in all their operations. If the recent only, and Major Coghlan and Major Way cannot be included, I have added the names of Major Woodgate of the 60th, and Major M’Intosh of the 85th.

‘I likewise enclose the names of twelve Captains to receive the brevet rank of Major.

‘ I beg leave to draw your notice to the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Beckwith, and of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. Cado-gan; and to recommend to your Excellency’s favor, when there may be an opportunity of promoting them; Lieut. Bell of the 52d regiment; Lieuts. Weyland and Tomkinson of the 16th light dragoons; Lieuts. Townshend and Badcock of the 14th light dragoons; Lieuts. Kranchenberg, Cordemann, and Wish of the 1st hussars; and Lieut. Eckersley of the royal dragoons.

‘ I have referred to Marshal Sir William Beresford that part of your Excellency’s letter which notifies His Royal Highness’ gracious intentions regarding the British Officers serving with the Portuguese army; and I shall have the honor of addressing you regarding them as soon as I shall have received his answer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

the Commander in Chief.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

‘ I am obliged to you for your recollection of Elder: I had not, however, forgotten him. Besides the six field Officers whom I am allowed to recommend to be Lieutenant Colonels, I have been allowed to recommend certain Officers serving with the Portuguese army for promotion. Of course I have not made the arrangements for promotion without consulting Sir William Beresford’s wishes; but I have recommended Elder to Sir William Beresford as one of those whom I think he ought to recommend to me; and I have no doubt that he will name Elder as one.

‘ I shall speak to the Commissary General about Mr. Purcell, of whose merits I have a very high opinion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General*

R. Craufurd.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Cameron, 79th Regiment.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

‘ When I wrote to you last week I felt that I conveyed to you information which would give you great pain; but I

hoped that I had made you acquainted with the full extent of the misfortune which had befallen you. Unfortunately, however, those upon whose judgment I relied were deceived : your son's wound was worse than it was then supposed to be : it was mortal, and he died on the day before yesterday, at 2 in the morning.

‘ I am convinced that you will credit the assurance which I give you, that I condole with you most sincerely upon this misfortune, of the extent of which no man is more capable than myself of forming an estimate, from the knowledge which I had, and the just estimate which I had formed, in my own opinion, of the merits of your son.

‘ You will always regret and lament his loss, I am convinced ; but I hope that you will derive some consolation from the reflection that he fell in the performance of his duty, at the head of your brave regiment, loved and respected by all that knew him, in an action in which, if possible, the British troops surpassed everything they had ever done before, and of which the result was most honorable to His Majesty's arms.

‘ At all events, Providence having deprived you of your son, I cannot conceive a string of circumstances more honorable and glorious than those under which he lost his life, in the cause of his country. Believe me, however, that, although I am fully alive to all these honorable circumstances attending his death, I most sincerely condole with you upon your loss.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Cameron.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Alexander Campbell.

‘ SIR,

‘ Villa Fermoza, 15th May, 1811.

‘ Adverting to your report of the transactions of the morning of the 11th instant, in the pursuit of the garrison of Almeida, I have to state that nothing has given me more concern than the conduct of Lieut. Colonel —, of the — regiment.

‘ When the enemy had passed the bridge of Barba de Puerco, the farther pursuit of their troops was useless ; and every step taken beyond the point to which the Lieut. Colonel was ordered to proceed was one of risk to the Officers

and soldiers under his command, from which the retreat was next to impossible. The Lieut. Colonel did not know possibly that the whole of the second corps d'armée were at San Felices, but a short distance on the other side of Barba de Puerco, and upon hearing the firing, formed upon the Agueda to protect the retreat of those troops; he knew, however, that the garrison of Almeida, although, perhaps, in disorder, were a body far superior in numbers to those he had under his command, and he did not know what troops were in San Felices to support them. This advance, however, and his passage of the bridge, was an imprudence to which all the losses of the day must be attributed.

‘ The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by Officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they are ordered and beyond all bounds, such as the loss of the prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 3d and 5th instant; the loss incurred by the 13th light dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on the 25th March; the severe loss incurred by the troops in the siege of Badajoz on the right of the Guadiana on the 10th instant; and the loss incurred by Lieut. Colonel — on the 11th instant, have induced me to determine to bring before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, any Officer who shall, in future, be guilty of this conduct.

‘ I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the Officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty, and that of every General and other Officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to expose the soldier to contend with unequal numbers in situations disadvantageous to them; and, above all, not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to situations in which they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten.

‘ The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the Officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders, and

act with such vigor and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity.

‘The Officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than they are powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large; nor has the experience of any Officer realized the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.

‘I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to circulate to the General Officers commanding divisions, with directions to circulate it among the Officers of the army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect seriously upon the duties which they have to perform before the enemy, and to avoid the error which is the subject of it, which is really become one of serious detriment to the army and to the public interests.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General
A. Campbell.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘MY LORD,

‘Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

‘I beg leave again to draw your Lordship’s attention to the orders of the Admiralty, that neither prisoners nor deserters from the enemy shall be sent to England.

‘Under your Lordship’s former orders many deserters have been enlisted into regiments, some of them not serving in this country; and these are all waiting at Lisbon for leave to be removed to England; and of course a considerable expense is incurred in provisioning them. Those enlisted with regiments serving in this country ought likewise to be sent to depôts elsewhere, as they are generally addicted to desertion; and the desertion of the foreign troops from this army is not only very disgraceful, but very inconvenient, on account of the information which they convey to the enemy, which is frequently the only information which they can acquire.

‘In a recent instance twenty six men, who had been en-

listed from the prisons at Cadiz, and had belonged to Dupont's army, deserted from the Chasseurs Britanniques in one night; and it frequently happens that twelve desert in a night from that regiment, and from the Brunswick Oels corps.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

‘ No part of the enemy's army remained on the left of the Agueda on the evening of the 10th instant, excepting one brigade of cavalry, close to the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo. The 2d corps had crossed at Barba de Puerco and the ford of Val de Espino, and were cantoned in that neighborhood; and our advanced posts were upon the Azava and the Lower Agueda.

‘ The 6th division resumed the duty of the blockade of Almeida on that evening; and Major General Sir William Erskine was ordered to send a battalion to Barba de Puerco to guard the bridge there, which had been previously ordered, and had been posted, to observe the passages of the Dos Casas between Aldca del Obispo and Barba de Puerco.

‘ The enemy blew up some mines which they had constructed at the works of Almeida at a little before 1 of the morning of the 11th, and immediately attacked the piquets by which the place was observed, and forced their way through them. They fired but little; and they appear to have marched between the bodies of troops posted to support the piquets; and in particular could not have passed far from the right of the Queen's regiment.

‘ Upon the first alarm Brig. General Pack, who was at Malpartida, joined the piquets, and continued to follow and to fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops employed in the blockade; and Major General Campbell marched from Malpartida with a part of the 1st batt. 36th regiment. But the enemy continued their march in a solid, compact body, without firing; and were well guided between the positions occupied by our troops.

‘ The 4th regiment, which was ordered to occupy Barba de Puerco, unfortunately missed the road, and did not arrive

there till the enemy had reached the place, and commenced to descend to the bridge, and at the same moment with the 36th regiment with Major General Campbell, and the light battalions of the 5th division, which Major General Sir William Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo to Barba de Puerco, as soon as he had heard that the enemy had come out from Almeida.

‘ The enemy suffered very considerable loss, both in prisoners and in killed and wounded, as well in the march from Almeida as in the passage of the Agueda. It appears that that part of the 2d corps which were in San Felices formed upon the river, to protect their passage, as soon as they heard the firing; and Lieut. Colonel — of the —th, who had crossed with a detachment of the —th and —th regiments, was obliged to retire with some loss.

‘ I enclose the reports of Major General Campbell, Brig. General Pack, and other Officers employed, upon the transactions of this night; to which I add the reports of General Regnier, and of General Brenier to the Prince of Essling, which have been intercepted and brought to me. From the former your Lordship will observe that the arrival of the garrison at Barba de Puerco was entirely unexpected; and that it was, as reported in my letter of the 10th instant, left to its fate by the enemy.

‘ The enemy are indebted for the small part of the garrison which they have saved principally to the unfortunate mistake of the road to Barba de Puerco by the 4th regiment. During the whole period of the blockade, but particularly during the period that the enemy’s army were between the Dos Casas and the Azava, the garrison were in the habit of firing cannon during the night; and the piquets near the place were frequently attacked. On the night of the 7th there had been a very heavy fire of cannon from the place, and the piquets were attacked; and another on the night of the 8th; and the Queen’s regiment in particular, and the other troops employed in the blockade, were induced to believe that the explosion which they heard on the morning of the 11th was of the same description with those which they had heard on the preceding nights; and the Queen’s regiment did not move at all, nor the other troops, till the cause of the explosion had been ascertained.

‘ Since the 11th instant the enemy have continued their retreat towards the Tormes; and it has been reported to me that they have crossed that river, and are on their march towards the Douro. But I have not received this report from any authority on which I can rely.

‘ I have detached from this army, into the Alentejo, the 3d and 7th divisions of infantry; and I have ordered the 2d hussars, which have arrived at Celorico, to march in that direction likewise. My reason for making this detachment is to be able to support Sir William Beresford in strength, if the enemy should attempt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz; and as all is now quiet on this frontier, I propose to return to the Alentejo in the course of a few days.

‘ Sir William Beresford invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 8th, and broke ground on both sides on that night. The enemy made a sortie, and endeavored to prevent our troops from occupying the ground, from which they were to direct their attack against the outwork of San Christoval, but the enemy were driven in. They had made another sortie on the morning of the 10th, in large force, and were driven in again by our troops; but I am concerned to add that our loss upon this occasion was very severe, owing to the gallant but imprudent advance of the troops quite to the glacis of San Christoval, and to a situation in which they were exposed to the fire of musketry and grape from that outwork, as well as from the body of the place. I have not received the official reports of Sir William Beresford of these transactions, nor of his opening his fire, which, I have reason to believe, commenced on the Pardaleras, Picurina, and San Christoval, on the morning of the 11th.

‘ Your Lordship will observe from Major General Campbell’s report of the transactions at Barba de Puerco, that the same imprudence to which I have above referred was the cause of the loss sustained upon that occasion; and all the loss of prisoners in the action at Fuentes de Oñoro on the 3d and 5th instant, was to be attributed to the impetuosity of the Officers and troops, which could not be kept within bounds.

‘ The corps of Spanish troops under General Blake, which had been landed in the Guadiana, had drawn near the fron-

tiers of Estremadura, in order to co-operate with Sir William Beresford in the attack of Badajoz; and I understand that Marshal Soult is employed in fortifying Seville, where he has collected a large body of troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops engaged at Barba de Puerco. ‘ W.’

‘ *Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Army under the Command of Lieut. General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., at Barba de Puerco, on the 11th May, 1811.*

‘ Head Quarters, Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummeas.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	—	4	—	4
Wounded . . .	1	—	15	—	16
Missing . . .	1	1	14	—	16

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

‘ You will receive by this post the account of the blowing up of Almeida; and, although I believe that we have taken or destroyed the greatest part of the garrison, I have never been so much distressed by any military event as by the escape of even a man of them.

‘ The enemy having retired across the Azava during the night of the 9th, I went forward in the morning to observe their subsequent movements. About 1 o’clock of the day of the 10th, having seen their whole army in march to cross the Agueda, I sent orders for the right of the army to resume their cantonments on the Dos Casas; the advanced guard and cavalry upon the Azava and Upper Agueda; the 5th division (Sir W. Erskine) to send a regiment to Barba de Puerco; and the 6th division (Major General Campbell) to resume the blockade of Almeida.

‘ Sir W. Erskine was dining with Sir Brent Spencer at head quarters, and received his orders about 4 o’clock; and he says he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which were stationed, under former orders, on the Dos Casas, half way between Aldea del Obispo and Barba de Puerco. General Campbell called upon me about half-past 5 or 6 o’clock, and told me that, before dark, his division would have resumed their positions for the blockade.

‘ At about half-past 12 the place was blown up; and the garrison had about fourteen miles to march to Barba de Puerco, and nearly the same distance to the only fords on the Agueda, the whole of which were occupied by our dragoons.

‘ General Pack and General Campbell both expected that the garrison would attempt to escape, and were both at Malpartida, about four miles from Almeida, on the road towards the Agueda and Barba de Puerco. General Pack joined the piquets, and followed the enemy with ten men, and kept up a fire upon them, as a guide to the other troops, which he supposed were following. General Campbell did follow with eight companies of the 36th regiment. The 8th Portuguese regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Douglas, which were at Junça, on the south-west side of Almeida, marched when the explosion was heard, and arrived at Barba de Puerco before the French; but finding nobody there excepting a piquet of cavalry, they passed the Dos Casas again, and thus missed them.

‘ The Queen’s regiment, which were within a mile of Almeida, on the road to Malpartida, were not aware that the place was blown up, and did not march at all; and the 4th regiment, which it is said did not receive their orders before midnight, and had only two and a half miles to march, missed their road, and did not arrive at Barba de Puerco till after the French, and with General Campbell and General Pack; and the flank battalions of the 5th division, which Sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo (so long after he had heard the explosion, that he had sent an Officer to Almeida, between five and six miles, to ascertain what it was, and this Officer had returned), arrived nearly at the same time.

‘ The other corps of the 6th division had marched dif-

ferent distances in pursuit of the enemy ; but, excepting the 36th and the 8th Portuguese, none had crossed the Turon.

‘ Thus your Lordship will see that, if the 4th regiment had received the orders, issued at 1, before it was dark at 8 o’clock at night, or if they had not missed their road, the garrison must have laid down their arms ; and the same would have occurred if Lieut. Colonel Douglas had remained at Barba de Puerco ; and possibly the same would have occurred had the pursuit been judiciously managed.

‘ Possibly I have to reproach myself for not having been on the spot ; but really, when the enemy’s whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made ; and having employed two divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape, the necessity of my attending personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone in the whole operation in which I have to reproach myself, as everything was done that could be done in the way of order and instruction.

‘ I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped that the General and other Officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details ; and by tracing every part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ 15th May, 1811.

‘ By all accounts which I have received, it appears that the enemy have retired beyond the Tormes, leaving a gar-

rison in Ciudad Rodrigo, with but a small body of cavalry attached to them. It is even reported that they have crossed the Tormes, and have moved towards the Douro; but of this report I have no certainty. It is probable, however, that some time will elapse before the French army, in this part of Spain, will be capable of making any movement against the allies.

‘ Having made so considerable a detachment of the army to the south, it is necessary that what remains of this army should be for the present on the defensive.

‘ If, therefore, the enemy should collect again a large force upon Ciudad Rodrigo, it will be necessary that our army should be collected about Nave d’Aver, still, however, holding its advanced posts upon the Azava; and that it should be prepared, if necessary, to fall back upon the position behind Aldea Velha, Alfayates, &c., and its left towards Badamalos, and thence to the position with its right behind Soito and the left to Rendo; and thence across the Coa to Sabugal.

‘ If the collection of the enemy should be of such force, or made under such circumstances, as to create a belief that they will enter Portugal with a view to establish themselves again in the country, it will be necessary that the troops in this part of the country should fall back, when necessary, from Sabugal upon Belmonte, and thence by the Estrada Nova towards the Zezere.

‘ The strong country, however, between Belmonte and the Zezere must not be given up in a hurry; and a magazine, for a few days, should be formed at Belmonte, and care should be taken to remove from Celorico, and on the Mondego, the magazines, hospitals, &c., formed at those places.

‘ It is desirable that the troops should remain in the positions which they now occupy as long as possible, with the exception of the cavalry, which it might be desirable to move to the rear, for the sake of forage.

‘ Brig. General Pack should keep one regiment in Almeida; and should have advanced posts at Barba de Puerco. In case of the necessity of assembling the army in consequence of the advance of the enemy, and should it be necessary for General Pack to evacuate Almeida, he should set fire to the carriages, &c., in Almeida, and to the mines not

already blown up; and move either by the Caril road, or by the left of the Coa, or by the road of Freixedas, Alverca, and Guarda, according to the situation of the remainder of the troops, to join the army.

‘ It is desirable, however, that until the Government shall have determined what they will do respecting Almeida, that place should not be abandoned till it shall be necessary; and further directions will be sent respecting the collection and arrangement of the ordnance, stores, &c., preparatory to any future plan for keeping and making use of the place.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Major General Picton.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

‘ The bearer of this letter is attached, in some manner or other, to the Portuguese brigade of infantry in the 3d division; and I found him employed here embargoing mules, by order of Colonel Sutton, with a guard of one of the regiments of the brigade; and he embargoes those belonging to the army, which are, I believe, the only mules in the country. This irregularity cannot be permitted, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Colonel Sutton to adopt some other mode of completing the brigade in mules besides that of pressing those already in the British service, by means of the Portuguese soldiers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Picton.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

‘ I request that you will adopt measures to have the carriages of the 24 pounders, as well as the mortar beds and howitzer carriages, in the garrison of Almeida, put in a state to be fit for service. It is desirable that these carriages should be parked in a separate place on the ramparts; and that those belonging to guns of other calibres should, in like manner, be parked, those of each calibre by themselves, so as to be in readiness to be either removed or destroyed, according to the orders which may hereafter be given respecting them.

‘ I also request you to have the several carts and transport carriages in the garrison examined ; and let those be set apart which are fit for any service, and the others likewise brought together for the farther disposal of them.

‘ It is desirable that measures should be adopted to enable you to have the guns in the fort drilled when I shall send you directions for that purpose ; and that you should, therefore, send to Lisbon, without loss of time, for the persons who are able to perform this work, with the instruments which they require for it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

‘ When the army were employed on the pursuit of the enemy out of Portugal, the Light division of infantry and the cavalry were placed under the directions of Major General Sir W. Erskine, which has led to an alteration of the organization of the army that may be very inconvenient.

‘ Although the cavalry may at times be joined to one or more divisions of the army for particular services, and that the senior Officer present would of course command the whole, still each division, as well as the cavalry, must be considered as a separate body, under its own Commanding Officer, for all matters of interior regulation, having its Staff Officers and departments exclusively attached to it, and employed under the directions of the General Officer commanding the division, in the duties of the division to which they are attached.

‘ In all duties of a general nature, of course the senior Officer of the two or three divisions acting together, would give his directions, and would be responsible, leaving the execution of the duty to be performed by each division, under the direction of its Commanding Officer, who would be responsible to him for it. As the Light division and the cavalry were a good deal jumbled together on the late service, I had determined to draw this line, but I forgot it before I came away ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate this letter to Sir Stapleton Cotton and General Craufurd.

‘As for our advanced guard, at present I think it ought to consist of the Light division and four squadrons of cavalry, and Pack ought to have two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry with his post at Barba de Puerco, &c.

‘Sir Stapleton will decide whether he will remain forward with these four squadrons, taking the command of the advanced guard on the principle above laid down; or whether the four squadrons shall be employed, also on the principle above laid down, with the Light division under the orders of General Craufurd. In either case Sir Stapleton will of course relieve the four squadrons as often as he may think it expedient.

‘I also forgot to mention that Colonel Hervey, of the 14th, asked me for leave to go into the Alentejo, to which I have no objection.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

‘I received last night your letters of the 12th and 13th, and I immediately determined to set out for the Alentejo; to which quarter I had intended to go, in a day or two, at all events.

‘I am much concerned to hear of your want of provisions. Mr. Kennedy tells me that he never heard even of the probability of want, excepting of corn and of cattle, which he had ordered to be supplied; that there are in Abrantes, he believes, above 700,000 rations of biscuit; and that no post ever comes from Lisbon that does not bring him a report of articles sent for the use of the troops in Estremadura.

‘Unless I should see reason on the road to move more quickly, I shall be at Elvas on the 21st. I should hope that you have been able to leave some troops long enough near Badajoz to have time to move off all your stores, if you had begun on the night of the 11th and 12th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Sabugal, 16th May, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the reports which I received last night from Marshal Beresford, dated the 12th and 13th, I set out this morning for the Alentejo. I shall be at Castello Branco on the 18th, Portalegre the 20th, and Elvas the 21st, unless I shall see reason on the road to go a little quicker.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ Pedrogão, 17th May, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

Half past 2 P.M.

‘ In consequence of a letter of the 14th, which I have received from Beresford, I am about to go on to Castello Branco to-night, and I shall push on without my baggage to-morrow.

‘ There is no very particular intelligence in the letter; but I see that he does not like his situation, and I think it best to go to him.

‘ I shall be obliged if you will desire Pakenham to correspond with the Officers commanding at the hospitals at Celorico and Coimbra, and with Captain Tucker, to send to the regiments with you the men who may recover, as fast as they shall be well enough to move, according to our old regulation upon this subject.

‘ Pray direct the General Officers commanding divisions to keep the men in the habits of exercise, by marching occasionally.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 19th May, 1811, 4 P.M.

‘ I arrived here this day, and received your letter of the 17th this morning.

‘ Beresford had an action with the French at Albuera, on the 16th, in which he repulsed Soult, but suffered great loss. General Houghton and Sir William Myers killed, and Ge-

neral Cole wounded. I do not yet know the particulars of the action, nor the extent of the loss ; but it is certainly very severe.

‘ I understand that Soult retired on the morning of the 18th, and that Beresford marched to S^{ta} Marta ; but of this I am not certain.

‘ I understand that the Spaniards did not behave ill, and their loss has been heavy ; the Portuguese were but little engaged ; those that were behaved well, and they have not suffered much.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Will you tell Sir Stapleton Cotton that I have no objection to his removing the head-quarters of the cavalry here ; but he must leave with General Slade the means of carrying on the duty.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Elvas, 19th May, 1811,
Half past 4 P. M.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ I arrived here about 2 this day, and received your letter of the 17th. I had not received any from you since the 14th.

‘ Your loss, by all accounts, has been very large ; but I hope that it will not prove so large as was at first supposed. You could not be successful in such an action without a large loss ; and we must make up our minds to affairs of this kind sometimes, or give up the game.

‘ As I hear you have marched to S^{ta} Marta, and I see that some troops have taken up the ground before Badajoz, I do not propose to move from hence in the morning, unless I should hear from you this evening.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ You will have heard that Marshal Beresford fought a severe action on the 16th ; in consequence of which it is

necessary that all the medical and surgical attendance which our hospitals at Lisbon can afford should be sent as soon as possible, together with 2000 sets of bedding. Desire the medical gentlemen at the head of the hospitals at Lisbon to act upon this order, respecting which I shall write to Dr. Frank.

‘ I also request that one company of British artillery may be sent here without delay by the usual route and stages. Desire Colonel Fisher to settle which company it shall be; and tell him that I shall write upon this subject to Major General Howorth.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Besides the company of artillery above mentioned, it will be necessary to send here three Officers of the civil department of the ordnance who have some intelligence.

‘ W.’

To Dr. Frank.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ You will have heard that Sir William Beresford fought a severe action on the 16th; the result of which is a great number of wounded in the hospitals, in addition to a considerable number which were already here.

‘ The gentleman here appears to me to be doing everything that is in his power, and has written to Lisbon for further assistance. I have written also to General Peacocke, and have desired that all possible assistance may be sent here, and 2000 sets of bedding. It is impossible to calculate the number of wounded there will be; but I should think at least that number. You will know best whether, from the state of the hospitals elsewhere, it will be possible to send assistance from other quarters.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Dr. Frank.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have desired Mr. Hogg to take care not to allow his hospitals there to become too crowded, and to evacuate upon Estremoz in time.

‘ W.’

To Major General Howorth.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ In consequence of the loss of artillerymen in the late action, and the want of them in this quarter, I have written to General Peacocke to desire him to send here a company of Royal artillery, of those now at or near Lisbon, upon which Colonel Fisher will make the necessary arrangements.

‘ From what I hear, I think it probable that we shall have to transfer our German brigade to the Royal artillery, keeping only one German brigade with the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have desired General Peacocke to send here three Officers of the civil department of the ordnance, besides the company of British artillery. Upon recollection, we have at Lisbon a German company of artillery. I shall not determine, therefore, whether our German brigade shall be broken up, till I hear from you. ‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811, 5 P.M.

‘ It is reported that you are coming here this day ; but lest you should not, I write to tell you, that unless I should hear, during the night, that you are coming to-morrow, I shall go to Valverde by the ford over the Guadiana, by which I crossed before ; and from thence to Albuera, if I should not find you at Valverde. My baggage will not be up till to-morrow or next day ; therefore I must live upon you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811, 9 P.M.

‘ Arbuthnot is arrived ; and as I find you are at Albuera, and it appears desirable that you should remain there, I shall go straight there in the morning, not going by Valverde.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON,

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will allow certain sheep belonging to General the Hon. C. Stewart, to the number of 1200, to go to England in the empty transports, or store ships, about to be sent home. He communicated with the Transport Board on this subject when he was in England, and understood there was no objection; and I shall be obliged to you if you will signify to Captain Poulder your consent to the removing the sheep in the transports: of course the General’s agent will put fodder on board for them.

‘ I am much obliged to you for having ordered the ships you mention in your letter of the 13th to the Mondego.

‘ You will have heard of the Marshal’s action on the 16th: the fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, advertg to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious and honorable to the character of the troops of any that has been fought during the war.

‘ I arrived here only yesterday, and have not yet seen the Marshal, and do not know, and can scarcely form a guess, what the loss is. Generals Houghton, Sir William Myers, and poor Duckworth, are killed; and General Cole, Colonels Ellis* and Blakeney† wounded. Soult retired on the 18th, and Badajoz was invested yesterday.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘ Since I wrote you my letter of this day I have received yours of the 16th.

‘ The calculation on which the grant of the subsidy was

* Of the 23d Welsh Fusiliers, afterwards killed at Waterloo.

† Lieut. General Sir Edward Blakeney, K.C.B.

founded, contained the estimate of the expense of two principal heads of the military expenditure, viz., the pay and the provisions for the number of men for whom the calculation was made.

‘ There could be no mistake about the pay: the mistake was in the provisions, and in omitting entirely some establishments and heads of expense which belong to all armies.

‘ I contend for it, therefore, that we do supply the pay of 30,000 Officers and men, and the gratuity to all the Officers of the Portuguese army, and that this pay so supplied ought to be regularly given to them. I admit that Marshal Beresford’s return is a sufficient voucher on which you may issue the money; but if you should find, as in this case I conceive it to be proved, that for several months the Officers have not been paid, and for a considerable time the soldiers have not been paid, there is ground for serious representation, and even report, to our Government. I do not believe there is any peculation among the heads of the Government, but there is gross misapplication of funds. The Junta de Viveres, and the Junta of the Arsenal, are connected possibly in trade, but certainly by friendship or acquaintance, with all the merchants and dealers of Lisbon; and those who could best afford to wait for their money are, and have been, invariably paid regularly; while the dealers in the country and the Officers and troops wait, and the former are never paid. The fears of the Government, and their desire of popularity, lead to the same disposal of funds by their authority; and this evil is one of those which I expected would be remedied by the abolition of the Junta de Viveres.

‘ In respect to the payments to the chest of the “Aids,” you will recollect that upon an estimate of the expenses of the British army in Portugal, compared with the amount of the subsidy, it was settled that the Portuguese Government, having a demand of about 80,000*l. per mensem*, should receive a certain proportion, two sevenths, of the sums raised by bills at Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Lisbon, or sent from England to the Commissary General. After this arrangement was made the strength and the expense of the British army were much increased, and the proportions ought to have been altered; but still they were continued as settled, and the Portuguese Government received in money only, last

year, much more than the subsidy. Then lately we have increased the expense of the British commissariat, by undertaking to feed six Portuguese brigades of infantry and a proportion of the artillery; and of course not only this would alter the proportions by adding to our expense, but would diminish the demand for money subsidy by the Portuguese Government.

‘ On these grounds I conceive that it will be found that, in the months of March and April, they have been overpaid; and I hope soon to be able to send you the accounts of our demands for the provisions to the 24th of April, and hereafter regularly for every month before its close.

‘ In this statement I have not adverted to the new subsidy, as I conceive it is not the intention of the King’s Government that any part of it should be given till the reforms which have been suggested shall be made. But there is another reason for not giving more to the Portuguese Government, which is, that we have it not to give. This part of the army have now three months’ pay due to them, the other two months, and there is not a shilling here to pay them. It is perfectly true that Major Arentschildt left the reserve of his artillery, that is, the spare ammunition, at Saragoça, between Celorico and Ponte da Murcella. Why? because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Mayor, and could not draw it any farther; and because the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on.

‘ I do not know the person at Batalha, and the British head quarters were never there. I have no objection, however, to any advance you please to make to the person you mention; but I should think that it cannot be made in money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *C. Stuart, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. You do not mention whether you received my letter enclosing one for the Prince Regent of Portugal.

‘ W.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Elvas, 20th May, 1811.

‘I enclose the copy of a memorandum which has been put into my hands by Major Dickson, of the artillery, regarding the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of these guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make inquiry upon this subject.

‘I am not able to give you any details upon the battle of the 16th, as I have not seen or heard from the Marshal. Our loss is very large; but we must expect loss whenever we engage the British troops with the Spaniards as allies.

‘The Spaniards, by all accounts, behaved remarkably well; but they were immovable; and their want of discipline, and of the power of manœuvring, appears to me to have created a necessity for using the British infantry in all parts of the field, and to have thrown upon us the great burden of the battle. This was exactly the case in the battle of Talavera; and, only that the Spanish troops were more distant from the fire, I suspect it was the case at the battle of Barrosa.

‘I have received your letter of the 17th, and return the newspapers.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘C. Stuart, Esq.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I think it very desirable that, if possible, no flying details of the battle of Albuera should go home till Sir William Beresford’s report shall be sent. I conclude that the account that there had been a battle went by the mail yesterday, which is of no importance; but where there are many killed and wounded the first reports are not favorable; and it is not doing justice to the Marshal to allow them to circulate without his.

‘W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘I went yesterday to Albuera, and saw the field of battle. We had a very good position, and I think should have gained a complete victory in it, without any material loss, if

the Spaniards could have manœuvred; but unfortunately they cannot.

‘The French are retiring; but I do not think it clear that they are going beyond the Sierra Morena. As I know you have plenty of correspondents, I do not give you any details of the action here, or of our loss. I think the action, upon the whole, to be the most honorable to the troops that they have been engaged in during the war.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I received your letter of the 20th this morning; I think it appears that the enemy’s loss cannot be less than between 8000 and 9000 men.

‘W.’

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘SIR,

‘Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘I have received the directions of the Secretary of State to request that you will send to Cork tonnage to convey to Portugal 200 horses for the Royal Artillery, and likewise tonnage to convey to Portugal the Enniskillen dragoons, consisting of 680 horses; and that you will send all the remainder of the tonnage for horses, which may be, or may arrive, in the Tagus, to Plymouth, to convey from thence remount horses for the different services.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘I am about to send Colonel Arbuthnot home with the accounts of Sir William Beresford’s action of the 16th instant; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send a ship of war with him, as it is desirable that he should arrive as soon as possible. He goes to Lisbon with this letter, and the dispatches will follow him to-morrow or next day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Vice Admiral*

the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811, 11 A.M.

‘ I have received your letter of yesterday; and I shall send to England your official letter, and the intercepted enclosure. I think that Gazan’s letter refers to the march of the wounded, with whom he is, he being himself wounded. I believe the confusion is there; but I doubt there being much among the others, excepting the plunder, which is not unusual wherever the French troops are. It is very desirable, therefore, that you should not go too far from our main object.

‘ I think it probable, from one part of Gazan’s letter (that in which he says that he has sent to order the troops at Almaraz to join Soult), that the latter proposes to maintain himself in Estremadura, and has sent back only his wounded, covering them by the troops with himself. There is an expression in the order of the 19th at Solana, respecting the distribution which will be made from the resources of the country, which would tend to show that that is their object, and the march on Los Santos would show the same.

‘ I do not know what to do about the French wounded at Albuera. We must remove our own in the first instance, and I will then endeavor to remove them; but we are very hard run for carriages. You should leave some few men and an Officer to take care of them, and some provisions for them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 20th instant I have to inform you that I have no arms to give to Souza.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 18th I must only say that I have not leisure to read long papers, which are called documents, but which contain not one syllable of truth. I have no money to give to the Portuguese Government; and I believe it was never intended by our Government that they should have the increased subsidy (nor do I believe they have any official knowledge of its grant) till they shall

make the necessary alterations in their military system to render it efficient. I do not think they have any right to mention the increased subsidy in an official document; nor can they say with any truth that any part of the old subsidy is in arrears.

‘ I have written my opinion of the state of affairs to the British Government; and the Portuguese Government will find that their intrigues and their folly will end in the ruin of their country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ C. Stuart, Esq.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose my dispatch of the 15th instant to the Secretary of State, likewise that of this date, in the last of which you will find copies of Marshal Beresford’s reports of his operations before Badajoz and of the action of the 16th instant at Albuera.

‘ I beg that you will do me the favor to congratulate the Regency upon this success, and to express the satisfaction with which I have read Marshal Sir William Beresford’s reports of the conduct of the Spanish General Officers, Officers, and troops, throughout the action, as well as in the operations previous to it.

‘ In my letter of the 9th instant, I transmitted the copy of my letter to General Castaños, and the memorandum on the plan of operations, and I omit now to enclose another copy; but I send you the copy of his answer to me, and of my letter to him of the 13th instant.

‘ In my opinion, nothing can be more honorable to General Castaños than this act of self denial, which I hope will be duly appreciated by the Regency, as it is by me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ We have had warm work here; however, I hope that the French have suffered more than we have.

‘ I mean, if Soult goes far enough from me, to renew the operations of the siege of Badajoz ; but he will soon have a large reinforcement from Castille, and another such battle would ruin us.

‘ The Spanish troops, I understand, behaved admirably ; they stood like stocks, both parties at times firing on them, but they were quite immovable ; and this is the great cause of all our losses. After they had lost their position, the natural thing to do would have been to attack it with the nearest Spanish troops, but they could not be moved ; the British troops were the next, and they were brought up, and must always in these cases be brought up ; and they suffered accordingly.

‘ The battle of Talavera was an example of the same defect in the Spanish troops ; they could not be moved, however advantageous this movement might have been ; and I suspect that the battle of Barrosa was something of the same kind.

‘ It is scarcely to be believed, that any Officer, who could depend upon the discipline of his troops in their movements, would have remained the quiet spectator of such an action at such a moment.

‘ From these circumstances, you will believe that I am not very easy about the result of another action, if we should be obliged to fight one. What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to discipline their troops ! We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops ; we manœuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them ; but these Spaniards can do nothing, but stand still, and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.

‘ Beresford tells me that it would be a great point gained if Blake were to return to the Regency, as he is not very accommodating, although he adhered strictly to the letter of everything I laid down for his guidance.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. Show everything to Graham.

‘ W.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Torrens, Secretary to the
Commander in Chief.*

‘ MY DEAR TORRENS,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I write to the Commander in Chief this day, to recommend Captain Chapman for promotion to a Majority by brevet; and I send an official recommendation for Major the Hon. H. Arbuthnot* to be promoted to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 52d, and Rowan† to the Majority. Besides this, I conceive that, Way‡ having lost his arm in the late action, the Commander in Chief would be disposed to give him the vacant Lieut. Colonelcy of the 29th, for which I long ago recommended him; and thus some vacancies would be left among the brevet commissions for which I was permitted to recommend.

‘ I have not yet been able to arrange the promotions, in consequence of the casualties in the recent battle; but there is one Officer, Major L'Estrange§, of the 31st, whom I must recommend in the strongest manner for promotion in some way or other. After the other parts of the same brigade were swept off by the cavalry, this little battalion alone held its ground against all the *colonnes en masse*!

‘ I desired Beresford to recommend Arbuthnot|| for one of the brevet Lieut. Colonelcies in the Portuguese service; but the windfall of the action of the 16th will probably give him the rank. I have not yet received from Beresford his list; but I shall be obliged to you if you will let Arbuthnot stand the first, if I should be able to transmit it by this dispatch, which at present is not very likely.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Torrens.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. The late action has made a terrible hole in our ranks; but I am working hard to set all to rights again.

‘ W.’

* ‘ Major General the Hon. H. Arbuthnot, C.B.’

† ‘ Colonel Rowan, C.B.’

‡ ‘ Major General Sir G. Way, Kt.’

§ ‘ Major General Sir G. L'Estrange, K.C.B.’

|| ‘ Major General Sir Robert Arbuthnot, K.C.B.’

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ When I had the honor of addressing you on the 14th instant, in consequence of the permission which you had given me to recommend to your notice certain Officers for promotion, I omitted the name of one, to whom I consider myself and the army more indebted than certainly to any other Officer of his rank in the service: I mean Captain Chapman, of the Royal Engineers, now Secretary to the Master General of the Ordnance.

‘ Captain Chapman being absent from the army, and having understood that your Excellency was disposed to recommend that he might be promoted, and considering that he, as an Officer of the corps of engineers, did not stand within the scope of your Excellency’s letter to me of the 23d April, I omitted his name; but I beg to assure you that the services rendered by Captain Chapman are of the highest description, and I earnestly entreat that he may be promoted to the rank of Major by brevet, in priority to any of those Officers whom I recommended to your Excellency in my address of the 14th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Commander in Chief.’

To the Right Hon. the Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report, which I have made to the Secretary of State, of the recent operations in this quarter by the troops under the command of Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing his reports to me of the operations of the siege of Badajoz and of the action of the 16th instant.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

the Commander in Chief.’

To the Right Hon. Charles Yorke.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut Colonel Cadogan, in which he has requested

recommend to your consideration his brother, Captain George Cadogan's claim for employment in the navy. I shall be much obliged to you if you will take these claims into consideration.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. C. Yorke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To P. Colquhoun, Esq.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th instant, in which you have informed me of the loss which you and the country have sustained by the death of Lieut. Colonel Barclay. I assure you that there is no man more sensible than myself of the excellent qualities of that gallant Officer, and I lament his loss most sincerely.

‘ It gives me much concern to find that he has left his widow and child slenderly provided for; and I wish that I could relieve the affliction which you feel upon this occasion, and that provision should be made for them; but I have done everything in my power to obtain it for them. I have written and forwarded your letter to Mr. Perceval, whom I have always found disposed to attend to my requests in favor of the families of Officers who have lost their lives in the service; and I have earnestly entreated him to endeavor to provide for the family of the late Colonel Barclay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *P. Colquhoun, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from the father of the widow of a most respectable Officer, the late Colonel Barclay of the 52d regiment, giving me an account of his death, and apprising me of the distressed circumstances in which he has left his family. Lieut. Colonel Barclay commanded a brigade in the Light division, in which he had served during the entire war in the Peninsula, and he was wounded in the battle of Busaco, and never recovered. I believe that there was not a more meritorious Officer in the army, and I beg leave to recommend his widow to your favor and protection.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for your attention to my recommendation in favor of my friends, the Portuguese nation, who really deserve the generosity of the people of England. My soldiers have continued to show them every kindness in their power, as well as to the Spaniards. The village of Fuentes de Oñoro having been the field of battle the other day, and not having been much improved by this circumstance, they immediately and voluntarily subscribed to raise a sum of money, to be given to the inhabitants as a compensation for the damage which their properties have sustained in the contest.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. S. Perceval.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ On the night of the 15th instant I received from Marshal Sir William Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that Marshal Soult had broken up from Seville, and had advanced towards Estremadura, about the 10th, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously raised, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works; and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.

‘ I therefore set out on the following morning from Villa Fermosa; and having received further information of the 14th from Sir William Beresford, of the enemy’s movements, I hastened my progress, and arrived here on the 19th, and found that Sir William Beresford had raised the siege of Badajoz, without the loss of ordnance or stores of any description, had collected the troops under his command, and had formed a junction with Generals Castaños and Blake, at Albuera, in the course of the 15th instant. He was attacked there on the 16th, by the French army under the command of Marshal Soult; and after a most severe engagement, in which all the troops conducted themselves in the most gallant manner, Sir William Beresford gained the victory. The enemy retired in the night of the 17th instant, leaving between 900 and 1000 wounded on the ground. Sir

William Beresford sent the allied cavalry after them, and on the 19th in the morning reinvaded Badajoz.

‘ I enclose the reports of Sir William Beresford of the 16th and 18th instant, on the operations of the siege to the moment of raising it, and on the battle at Albuera*; and I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to the ability, the firmness, and

* *Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B., to Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Albuera, 18th May, 1811.

‘ I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your Lordship that the allied army, united here under my orders, obtained, on the 16th instant, after a most sanguinary contest, a complete victory over that of the enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult; and I shall proceed to relate to your Lordship the circumstances.

‘ In a former report I have informed your Lordship of the advance of Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our united forces, rather than, by looking to two objects at once, to risk the loss of both.

‘ Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the relief of Badajoz; and for this purpose he had drawn considerable numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, and also, I believe, from the French army of the centre. Having thus completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th instant, with a corps then estimated at 15,000 or 16,000 men, and was joined on descending into Estremadura by the corps under General Latour Maubourg, stated to be 5000 men.

‘ His Excellency General Blake, as soon as he learned the advance of Marshal Soult, in strict conformity to the plan proposed by your Lordship, proceeded to form his junction with the corps under my orders, and arrived at Valverde in person on the 14th instant, where, having consulted with his Excellency and General Castaños, it was determined to meet the enemy and to give him battle.

‘ On finding the determination of the enemy to relieve Badajoz, I had broken up from before that place, and marched the infantry to the position in front of Valverde, except the division of Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole, which, with 2000 Spanish troops, I left to cover the removal of our stores.

‘ The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Marta by the cavalry of General Blake; that of General Castaños, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, had been always with it.

‘ As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz entirely open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got, in this widely open country) at this place, thus standing directly between the enemy and Badajoz.

‘ The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th instant. The corps of General Blake, though making a forced march to effect it, only joined in the night, and could not be placed in its position till the morning of the 16th instant; when General Cole’s division, with the Spanish brigade under Don Carlos de España, also joined, and a little before the commencement of the action. Our cavalry had been forced on the morning of the 15th instant to retire from Santa Marta, and joined here.

the gallantry manifested by Marshal Sir William Beresford throughout the transactions on which he has written. I shall

‘ In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. The next morning our disposition for receiving the enemy was made, being formed in two lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde, though your Lordship is aware that the whole face of this country is everywhere passable for all arms. General Blake’s corps was on the right in two lines; its left, on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major General the Hon. William Stewart’s division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where commenced the right of Major General Hamilton’s division, which closed the left of the line. General Cole’s division, with one brigade of General Hamilton’s, formed the second line of the British and Portuguese army.

‘ The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack. At 8 o’clock he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right; and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to us a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera. During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right; and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and to cut us off from Valverde.

‘ Major General Cole’s division was therefore ordered to form an oblique line to the rear of our right, with his own right thrown back; and the intention of the enemy to attack our right becoming evident, I requested General Blake to form part of his first line, and all his second, to that front, which was done.

‘ The enemy commenced his attack at 9 o’clock, not ceasing at the same time to menace our left; and after a strong and gallant resistance of the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been formed. Meanwhile the division of Major General the Hon. William Stewart had been brought up to support them, and that of Major General Hamilton brought to the left of the Spanish line, and formed in contiguous close columns of battalions, to be moveable in any direction. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under Brig. General Otway, remained at some distance on the left of this, to check any attempt of the enemy below the village.

‘ As the heights the enemy had gained raked and entirely commanded our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble one was made by the division of General Stewart, headed by that gallant Officer.

‘ Nearly at the beginning of the enemy’s attack a heavy storm of rain came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern anything distinctly. This, with the nature of the ground, had been extremely favorable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in his subsequent attack.

‘ The right brigade of General Stewart’s division, under Lieut. Colonel Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant manner; and finding that the enemy’s column could not be shaken by fire, proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; and, while in the act of charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry), which the thickness of the atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed (and which was, besides, mistaken by those of the brigade, when discovered, for Spanish cavalry, and therefore not fired upon), turned it; and, being thus attacked unexpectedly in the rear, was unfortunately broken, and

add nothing to what he has said of the conduct of all the Officers and troops, excepting to express my admiration of it,

suffered immensely. The 31st regiment, being the left one of the brigade, alone escaped this charge, and, under the command of Major L'Estrange, kept its ground until the arrival of the 3d brigade, under Major General Houghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously gallant; and that of the 2d brigade, under the command of Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercrombie, was not less so. Major General Houghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds.

‘ Though the enemy’s principal attack was on this point of the right, he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner by Major General Baron Alten, and the light infantry brigade of the German Legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, conspicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major General Hamilton’s division had been brought up there; and he was left to direct the defence of that point, whilst the enemy’s attack continued on our right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the defence of this place.

‘ The enemy’s cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had endeavored to turn it; but, by the able manœuvres of Major General the Hon. William Lumley, commanding the allied cavalry, though vastly inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavors were foiled. Major General Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy’s left, and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the brigades of General Stewart’s division, to force the enemy to abandon his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve. Here the Fusilier brigade particularly distinguished itself.

‘ He was pursued by the allies to a considerable distance, and as far as I thought it prudent, with his immense superiority of cavalry; and I contented myself with seeing him driven across the Albuera.

‘ I have every reason to speak favorably of the manner in which our artillery was served, and fought; and Major Hartman, commanding the British, and Major Dickson, commanding the Portuguese, and the Officers and men, are entitled to my thanks. The four guns of the horse artillery, commanded by Captain Le Fevre, did great execution on the enemy’s cavalry; and one brigade of Spanish artillery (the only one in the field) I saw equally gallantly and well served. We lost in the misfortune which occurred to the brigade commanded by Lieut. Colonel Colborne (whom General Stewart reports to have acted, and was then acting, in a most noble manner, leading on the brigade in admirable order) one howitzer, which the enemy, before the arrival of the gallant General Houghton’s brigade, had time to carry off with 200 or 300 prisoners of that brigade. After he had been beaten from this his principal attack he still continued that near the village, on which he never could make any impression, or cross the rivulet, though I had been obliged to bring a very great proportion of the troops from it, to support the principal point of attack; but the enemy seeing his main attack defeated, relaxed in his attempt there also. The Portuguese division of Major General Hamilton in every instance evinced the utmost steadiness and courage, and manœuvred equally well with the British.

‘ Brig. General Harvey’s Portuguese brigade, belonging to General Cole’s division, had an opportunity of distinguishing itself when marching in line across the plain, by repulsing, with the utmost steadiness, a charge of the enemy’s cavalry.

and my cordial concurrence in the favorable reports made by Sir William Beresford of the good conduct of all.

‘ It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valor shown on this severely contested day; but there never were troops that more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honor of their respective countries. I have not been able to particularize the Spanish divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were particularly engaged, because I am not acquainted with their denominations or names; but I have great pleasure in saying that their behaviour was most gallant and honorable: and though, from the superior number and weight of the enemy’s force, that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good order to support their allies; and I doubt not his Excellency General Blake will do ample justice on this head, by making honorable mention of the deserving.

‘ The battle commenced at 9 o’clock, and continued without interruption till 2 in the afternoon, when, the enemy having been driven over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading and skirmishing.

‘ It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops; but every individual most nobly did his duty, which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th regiment, were lying as they had fought in ranks, and every wound was in front.

‘ Major General the Hon. William Stewart most particularly distinguished himself, and conduced much to the honor of the day; he received two contusions, but would not quit the field. Major General the Hon. G. L. Cole is also entitled to every praise; and I have to regret being deprived for some time of his services by the wound he has received. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. A. Abercrombie, commanding the 2d brigade, 2d division, and Major L’Estrange, 31st regiment, deserve to be particularly mentioned; and nothing could exceed the conduct and gallantry of Colonel Inglis* at the head of his regiment. To Major General the Hon. William Lumley, for the very able manner in which he opposed the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and foiled him in his object, I am particularly indebted. To Major General Hamilton, who commanded on the left during the severe attack upon our right, I am also much indebted; and the Portuguese brigades of Brig. Generals Fonseca and Archibald Campbell deserve to be mentioned. To Major General Alten, and to the excellent brigade under his orders, I have much praise to give; and it is with great pleasure I assure your Lordship that the good and gallant conduct of every corps, and of every person, was in proportion to the opportunity that offered for distinguishing themselves. I know not an individual who did not do his duty.

‘ I have, I fear, to regret the loss to the service of Colonel Collins, commanding a Portuguese brigade, his leg having been carried off by a cannon shot. He is an Officer of great merit; and I deeply lament the death of Major General Houghton, and of those two promising Officers, Lieut. Colonel Sir William Myers and Lieut. Colonel Duckworth.

‘ It is most pleasing to me to inform your Lordship, not only of the steady and gallant conduct of our allies, the Spanish troops under his Excellency General Blake, but also to assure you that the most perfect harmony has subsisted between us; and that General Blake not only conformed in all things to

* The late Lieut. General Sir H. Inglis, K.C.B.

‘As Sir William Beresford frequently refers in the enclosed dispatches to the instructions from me, and to the

the general line proposed by your Lordship, but in the details; and in whatever I suggested to his Excellency I received the most immediate and cordial assent and co-operation; nothing was omitted on his part to ensure the success of our united efforts; and during the battle he most essentially, by his experience, knowledge, and zeal, contributed to its fortunate result.

‘His Excellency the Captain General Castaños, who had united the few troops he had in a state to be brought into the field to those of General Blake, and placed them under his orders, assisted in person in the field; and not only on this, but on all occasions, I am much indebted to General Castaños, who is ever beforehand in giving whatever can be beneficial to the success of the common cause.

‘Though I unfortunately cannot point out the corps, or many of the individuals of the Spanish troops, that distinguished themselves, yet I will not omit to mention the names of General Ballesteros, whose gallantry was most conspicuous, as of the corps he had under his command; and the same of General Zayas and of Don Carlos de España. The Spanish cavalry have behaved extremely well; and the Conde de Penne Villemur is particularly deserving to be mentioned.

‘I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day: it is very severe; and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under his Excellency General Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about 2000 dead, and we have taken from 900 to 1000 prisoners. He has had five Generals killed and wounded: of the former, Generals of Division, Werle and Pesim; and Gazan and two others amongst the latter. His force was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not think he displayed less than from 20,000 to 22,000 infantry, and he certainly had 4000 cavalry, with a numerous and heavy artillery. His overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and, with his artillery, saved his infantry after its rout.

‘He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, but occupying it in position; and on this morning, or rather during the night, commenced his retreat on the road he came, towards Seville, and has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on the ground he had retired to, and to whom we are administering what assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy; but in that arm he is too powerful for us to attempt anything against him in the plains he is traversing.

‘Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from our opposition to the attempts of the enemy; and, whilst he has been forced to abandon the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult harangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed army, and, what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a diminished reputation.

‘In enumerating the services received from the Officers of my own staff, I must particularly call your Lordship’s attention to those of Brig. General d’Urban, Quarter Master General to the Portuguese army; and which I cannot sufficiently praise, though I can appreciate. On all occasions I have felt the benefits of his talents and services, and more particularly on this, where they very essentially contributed to the success of the day: and I cannot here omit

correspondence between General Castaños and me; and as I think it possible that the papers may not have reached England from Cadiz, I now transmit copies of my instructions to Marshal Sir William Beresford, and of my letter to General Castaños, on the plan of co-operation for the allied troops in the siege of Badajoz.

‘ I likewise enclose General Castaños’ answer to my letter upon this subject, agreeing to carry into execution the plan proposed; and I beg to draw your Lordship’s attention to

the name of Lieut. Colonel Hardinge, Deputy Quarter Master General to the Portuguese troops, whose talents and exertions deserve my thanks. To Brig. General Mozinho, Adjutant General of the Portuguese army, and to Lieut. Colonel Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General to the united British and Portuguese force, and to Brig. General Lemos, and to the Officers of my own personal staff, I am indebted for their assistance.

‘ To the services of Lieut. Colonel Arbuthnot (Major in His Majesty’s service) I am also much indebted; and he is the bearer of this to your Lordship, and is fully enabled to give you any further information you may desire, and is most deserving of any favor your Lordship may be pleased to recommend him for to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ W. C. BERESFORD,

‘ Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

‘ Marshal and Lieut. Gen.

‘ P. S. Major General Hamilton’s division, and Brig. General Madden’s brigade of Portuguese cavalry, march to-morrow morning to reinvest Badajoz on the south side of the Guadiana.

‘ W. C. B.’

‘ *Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Corps of the Army under the command of Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, K.B., in the Battle with the French Army commanded by Marshal Soult, at Albuera, on the 16th of May, 1811.*

	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	34	33	917	63	984
Wounded	181	146	2666	35	2993
Missing	14	28	528	17	570

The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return.

that part of the General's letter in which, with great delicacy and propriety, he declines to agree to that part of the proposed plan which would have given him the command of the allied army in the action, for which it was the object of the plan to provide, and proposes another mode of settling this delicate question, by which the command would rest with Marshal Sir William Beresford.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of my answer to this last letter.

‘ All has remained quiet in Castille since I quitted that part of the country.

‘ The battalions of the 9th corps belonging to regiments serving in the corps d'armée in Andalusia had marched from Salamanca on or about the 15th, and went towards Avila, and were to come by Madrid.

‘ I send this dispatch by Major (Lieut. Colonel) Arbuthnot, the Secretary of Marshal Sir William Beresford, who was present in the battle of Albuera, and can give your Lordship any further information you can require; and I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ Referring to my dispatch to your Lordship of this date, in which I have enclosed the copies of a correspondence with General Castaños on the co-operation of the allied troops in this quarter, I have to mention to your Lordship that, when I proposed that plan to General Castaños, it was understood that the General, having been appointed to command the army in Galicia, as well as that in Estremadura, was aiming to establish his head quarters near mine; and Marshal Sir William Beresford would of course, as the senior to General Blake, have had the command in the action, for which it was the object to provide; and this delicate question would thus have been settled in a manner satisfactory to all parties, and on the principle of the orders recently conveyed by your Lordship to General Graham.

‘ General Castaños, however, remained in Estremadura, contrary to my expectations, and he has settled the question

in a much more satisfactory manner; but in one which I could not with propriety have proposed; and if I had proposed it, it would in all probability have been rejected.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter of the 21st instant, which I have received from Marshal Sir William Beresford, containing a letter from General Gazan to Marshal Soult, which had been intercepted by some of our parties.

‘ General Gazan, wounded himself, was marching with the wounded; and from his account of those with him, from the account of those at Almandralejo, and those left on the ground at Albuera, from the number found dead on the field, and the prisoners, the Marshal computes the enemy's loss not to fall short of 9000 men.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ As the 3d and 7th divisions of the allied British and Portuguese army are on their march to this part of the country, and will arrive in the course of to-morrow and next day at Campo Mayor, it is my intention to resume the operations of the siege of Badajoz, as soon as I shall be able to collect means of transport to move the stores and materials from hence to the ground in the neighborhood of Badajoz: by which time I shall see what line the enemy has taken, whether to retire entirely from the province, or to maintain a position in the mountains within it.

‘ I have likewise ordered here the 2d hussars, which will arrive in a few days.

‘ The troops marching with General Drouet, mentioned in my dispatch marked A of this date, cannot arrive at Toledo, where it is said they are to cross the Tagus, till the end of the month; and I should hope that by that time I may have made some progress in the operations of the siege. However, so much depends upon means of transport, which it is

difficult to collect, and so large a proportion of the means we possess are employed in the removal of the wounded in the action of the 16th, that I cannot be certain of being able to effect my object.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 22d May, 1811.

‘ Your Lordship will be anxious to know what measures I propose to adopt, in order to render the several battalions of the army, which have been lately employed in this quarter, more efficient.

‘ I propose immediately to form the two battalions of the 7th regiment into one; and to send the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the 2d batt. home to England; and the same with the 48th regiment.

‘ As soon as I shall receive your Lordship’s reply to my private letter of the 7th instant, on the subject of the battalions therein referred to, I intend, if the plan which I proposed should be approved of, to apply it to all the regiments which have suffered severely in the late action; viz., the 3d or buffs, 29th, 57th, the 2d batt. 66th, the 2d batt. 31st, and to any others to which it can in my opinion be applied with advantage; and I will send home to recruit such proportions of the Officers and non-commissioned officers of each as I may think can be spared from this country with advantage, classed in companies; keeping here such number of companies as there will be men to fill.

‘ By the time I shall receive your Lordship’s answer to that letter I shall be able to judge of the real amount of the loss which we have sustained; as men, supposed to be and returned as prisoners, are constantly appearing with all the regiments who, having been sent from the field of battle with wounded Officers or soldiers, and having been still absent when the returns were made out, were returned as missing.

‘ It may be expected also, that a large proportion of the wounded will soon be fit for service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 23d May, 1811,
quarter before 4 P.M.

‘ I have received your letters of this day, and I still think that the enemy mean to hang about the limits of Estremadura; so that you should be cautious in your advance. Blake has written to Alava respecting his cavalry, which he wants to have at his disposal; and you had better send it to him. Will not his division at Feria be a little exposed?

‘ We have letters from England to the 9th. Affairs appear to be coming to blows in the north of Europe. People are in great good humor with the affairs of Portugal. I believe the 11th dragoons have sailed; and they have authorized me to send for the Enniskillen dragoons.

‘ Drouot marched towards Avila, on the 17th, with seventeen battalions. Massena has gone to France, with many other General Officers.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letters of the 28th April and 7th May, regarding the remounts for the cavalry; and I write to Admiral Berkeley to send transports to Cork to bring to Portugal 200 horses of the artillery, and 680 of the Enniskillen dragoons; to send all the other horse transports to Plymouth. I rather believe, however, that all the transports are by this time gone home, and that transports must be taken from those coming out with the horses to remount the cavalry and artillery, and with the 11th light dragoons.

‘ The enemy’s superiority now consists in his cavalry alone; and I should entertain no doubt of any of our concerns, if ours were complete: however, that on the frontier of Beira is coming about, and I shall bring the 11th dragoons here.

‘ I think it would be desirable to keep in this country only three squadrons, or six troops of each regiment, and two squadrons, or four troops at home; the home squadrons could then supply the casualties, as well of men as of horses of those abroad; and we should have at all times an equally

efficient cavalry at a smaller expense. If this arrangement were agreed to I can easily carry it into execution. It must be recollected, however, that the Peninsula is the grave of horses; I have lost no less than twelve for my own riding since I have been here, and many more of an ordinary kind.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

‘ I am obliged to you for your letter of the 7th, regarding the publication of my dispatches. I generally confine myself to a relation of facts, and seldom give any opinion upon them, and always send the same dispatches to the Portuguese Government, with the exception only of any detail to which it may refer, which is purely a British concern: I then mark in the Portuguese dispatch those facts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published; but that opinion goes no farther than to what appears to me that it would be inconvenient that the enemy should obtain a knowledge of, and seldom to circumstances which it would be desirable to withhold from the knowledge of the public.

‘ I will, with your Lordship’s permission, adopt the same practice with my dispatches to you, and mark with a pencil in the margin those parts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published; leaving it to you afterwards to omit such other parts as you may think proper.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th.

‘ When Hill comes he must return to his command; and I must confine Beresford to the management of the detail of the Portuguese army, which has suffered from his employment in this campaign, as well as from other circumstances. I should like to have General Graham; but I rather think that your Lordship’s letters do not go so far as to allow me to call him to this country, till the force at Cadiz shall be reduced to 2000 men.

‘ You see from my dispatches how affairs are here. Soult had south of the Sierra Morena an army of about 53,000 effectives on the 25th March, including what is called the Catholic army, which is Desolles’ reserve, and was sent to him from the army of the centre; of this number 7000 are cavalry. Drouet is marching to him with seventeen battalions, which, however, are weak, and can scarcely make 3000 men, and some cavalry, of which I do not exactly know the number. From this force must be deducted the losses since the 25th March, which cannot be less than 10,000 men, including the battle of the 16th May, and the garrison of Badajoz about 2500; and Soult will remain, when Drouet arrives, with about 50,000 effective men.

‘ From this statement you will see that, supposing that I can get through the siege of Badajoz, it will be impossible to do more to the southward, till I shall have closed the door upon Beira, by obtaining possession of Ciudad Rodrigo: indeed I am thinking of bringing another division from Castille, in order to make sure of Badajoz, in consequence of Beresford’s large losses; but I can scarcely venture to do that, and certainly cannot do more, without exposing to risk the frontier of Beira.

‘ Fortunately for me, the French armies have no communication, and one army no knowledge of the position or of the circumstances in which the other is placed; both depend upon orders from Paris, whereas I have a knowledge of all that passes on all sides. From this knowledge I think I may draw more troops from Beira for my operations against Badajoz; but I cannot venture farther south till I shall get Ciudad Rodrigo, without exposing all to ruin. I beg, therefore, that people in England will have patience about Cadiz, and allow us to do our work gradually.

‘ I should feel no anxiety about the result of any of our operations, if the Spaniards were as well disciplined as the soldiers of that nation are brave, and if they were at all moveable; but this is, I fear, beyond all hope; all our losses have been caused by this defect. At Talavera the enemy would have been destroyed, if we could have moved the Spanish army; at Albuera, the natural thing would have been to support the Spaniards on the right with the Spaniards who were next to them; but any movement of

that body would have created inextricable confusion; and it was necessary to support the right with British, and thus the great loss fell upon our troops: in the same way, I suspect, the difficulty and danger of moving the Spanish troops was the cause that General Lapena did not support General Graham at Barrosa.

‘I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the north. God send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am very certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Samuel Whitbread, Esq.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Elvas, 23d May, 1811.

‘I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th April, which I received last night; and I beg leave to return my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing me of the favorable change of your opinion respecting affairs in this country.

‘I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons, for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered erroneous opinions, as I thought, respecting affairs in this country; and I prized their judgments so highly, at the same time that I was certain of the error of the opinion which they had delivered, that I was induced to attribute their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party.

‘I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by the approbation of — —, and yourself and others, that which gives me most pleasure in the account which I received last night from England, is to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an Officer in the service of the country abroad; and that the opinions which they had delivered, however unfavorable to him, were the real dictates of their judgments, upon a fair view of all the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the gratification arising from this conviction, to one who appears

destined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which I received from your obliging letter; and I assure you that I am very sensible of the kindness towards me which induced you to write to me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *S. Whitbread, Esq.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Junta of La Mancha.

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Villa Ferosa, 24th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter by Los Señores Don Joaquim Gomez, and Don Ramon Rodriguez Belasco, and it would give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to assist the province of La Mancha with arms; but I have at present none in my possession; and I request you to apply to Mr. Wellesley, His Majesty’s Minister at Cadiz, for arms.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Junta of La Mancha.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Colonel Murray, Quarter Master General.

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ The siege of Badajoz to be undertaken immediately, and to be carried on by the following troops: the 3d, 7th, and General Hamilton’s divisions of infantry, the 17th Portuguese regiment from the garrison of Elvas, regiments of militia from the garrison of Elvas, General Madden’s brigade of cavalry, 3000 Spanish troops, the two companies of Portuguese artillery from Lisbon, and 300 artillery from the garrison of Elvas.

‘ The British and Portuguese cavalry, and the 2d and 4th divisions of allied infantry, with the cavalry attached to them, and the Spanish divisions under Generals Castaños and Blake, will cover the operation.

‘ On the 25th instant, the 7th division of infantry will take up its ground to invest the place on the right of the Guadiana. This division is to be joined, and to bring with it a brigade of Portuguese six pounders from the 3d division.

The 17th Portuguese regiment and one regiment of militia are likewise to march from the garrison of Elvas on the 25th, and to join the 7th division on the ground; and Brig. General Madden is to send across the Guadiana, above the town, one regiment of his cavalry to join Major General Houstoun.

‘ On the 25th instant the flying bridge is to be placed on the Guadiana at the place fixed upon; and Major Dickson and Lieut. Colonel Fletcher are to commence forming their depôts for the attack of the place, to be continued from day to day till they shall be prepared to break ground, according to the means of transport which will be supplied to them.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22d, and I agree in opinion with you that it is best to change one German for a British complete brigade: I have therefore ordered another company of artillery with guns to march from Lisbon, according to the terms of the enclosed copy of a letter to General Peacocke. Colonel Framingham is forward with the troops; and I do not think it expedient to wait to send orders through him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ I received this day your letters of the 22d, and that of the 23d of 1 P.M.

‘ I think the French are about to do exactly what I expected, viz., collect their army about the Tagus. Having sent seventeen battalions of the 9th corps to the southward, and the Officers and non-commissioned officers of the 3d battalions of regiments to France, they are not so strong in infantry even as you are, and Marmont’s movement is decidedly this way, or farther to the rear. Murray sends you a route this day for the march here of General Howard’s

brigade, and of Colonel Ashworth's Portuguese brigade; and as these troops will be within your reach for two or three days after they shall have marched, I beg you to stop them, and to order them to rejoin you if you should find that the enemy is moving towards you, notwithstanding my expectations to the contrary, as above expressed.

' I enclose a letter for Marshal Marmont, which I beg you to forward the moment you receive it: in order that he may believe I am still at Villa Fermosa, I date it the 25th.

' The Portuguese Government have determined to repair the fort of Almcida, upon which subject I will write to you hereafter.

' The French have retired to Llerena.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

' WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

' MY DEAR BERESFORD,

' Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

' I have received your letter of the 23d from Almendra-lejo, but not that from Villa Franca, and I cannot tell therefore what disposition you have made. The 3d division having, however, arrived this day at Campo Mayor, I have determined to go on with the siege of Badajoz; and I send you a copy of the memorandum which I arranged this day for our operations. I have ordered General Howard's and Colonel Ashworth's Portuguese brigade from Beira to this place: the 2d hussars can scarcely be here before the 29th.

' My news from Salamanca is, that Marmont, who now commands the army of Portugal, is about to move, as it is said, towards Avila: this looks like reinforcing this point. I shall make corresponding movements with our army of Beira, particularly the cavalry.

' I should be very glad if we were together for a few days; for we have a monstrous quantity of business to settle of different descriptions. Could we not bring out of Abrantes Lobo's regiment, at least, in our existing dearth of troops? Hill is arrived in Lisbon.

' Although this place is the most convenient for head quarters for the siege, I do not know whether it is not too far for the conduct of the operations of the covering army:

however, there is no hurry in deciding that point, and I wait to receive your distribution of the force which you sent from Villa Franca.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ Besides the company of artillery ordered to Elvas by my letter of the 20th instant, I have to request that another company of artillery, with a brigade of six pounders, and as many horses as there may be at Lisbon to draw the guns, and the usual complement of drivers and artificers for a brigade of artillery, may be sent to Elvas as soon as may be convenient.

‘ If there are at Lisbon a sufficient number of horses fit for service to draw the guns, they are to be sent to Aldea Galega, and to march by the usual route. If there are not, the guns are to be sent by water to Abrantes, and the men and horses are to march to that place, and a report is to be made to the Quarter Master General of the day they shall arrive there.

‘ I request you to give these orders to Colonel Fisher, and inform him that I shall send a copy of them to General Howorth.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.’*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ Since I addressed you on the 22d instant I have received reports that Marshal Soult had retired to Llerena; and the 3d and 7th divisions having arrived at Campo Mayor, I have given directions that Badajoz may be closely invested on the right of the Guadiana to-morrow; and I propose forthwith to recommence the operations of the siege.

‘ I learn from Castille that the Prince of Essling, Generals Junot, Loison, and others, had set out for France; and that the three corps d’armée, the 2d, 6th, and 8th, had been formed into six divisions, still called the army of Portugal

having for its Commander in Chief the Duc de Raguse, and General Regnier as second in command.

‘ Marshal Sir William Beresford reports that the greatest number of the Officers and men returned missing in the action of the 16th instant have rejoined their regiments.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 24th May, 1811.

‘ I write you a few lines, thinking it possible that my letter may overtake Colonel Arbuthnot, or that, at all events, it will be in time for the packet on Sunday.

‘ I hear from Salamanca that the army of Portugal are about to move; and it is reported, and I think it probable from the movement of their detachments, that they are about to approach the Tagus: however, I am ready for them at all points.

‘ Drouet has with him seventeen battalions and some cavalry, as a reinforcement for the troops in Andalusia, and they may join about the second week in June. I do not know when Marmont will be ready to co-operate with Soult: however, as the siege of Badajoz can be raised with so much ease, and without loss of any kind, whenever it may be necessary, I have thought it best to lose no time about it, and to adopt every measure to get that place, if I can, before the enemy's troops can join; and if I cannot, to raise the siege and fight a battle, or not, as I may find most proper, according to the state of our respective forces. I think that, if you intend to reinforce this army, you should send the men out soon.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse.

‘ Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL, ce 25 Mai, 1811.

‘ Je n'ai reçu que la 22^{me} la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 16^{me} de ce mois; et j'ai tardé d'y envoyer une réponse jusqu'à ce que j'aie pu savoir si le Colonel La Motte était toujours à Celorico, où on

l'avait envoyé. Je suis fâché de vous faire savoir qu'il était déjà parti pour Lisbonne, mais si vous voulez avoir la bonté d'envoyer Monsieur le Lieut. Colonel Hill aux avant-postes de l'armée, j'aurai soin que Monsieur le Colonel La Motte soit tout de suite renvoyé à l'armée Française.

‘ Peu de jours après que M. le Prince d'Essling eut pris le commandement de l'armée, qui est à présent sous les ordres de votre Excellence, je lui avais proposé. que les chirurgiens et les Officiers des autres départemens civils des armées fussent considérés comme non-combattans, et que s'ils étaient pris, ils seraient rendus des deux côtés. Mais son Excellence ne m'a donné aucune réponse sur cette proposition, malgré qu'elle fut accompagnée par l'offre de lui rendre quelques Officiers de santé de l'armée Française qui avaient été pris. Après, quand toute l'ambulance de l'armée Française fut prise à Coimbra, son Excellence m'a proposé que les Officiers de santé seraient censés non-combattans, et que les non combattans seraient rendus de part et d'autre. Mais c'était alors trop tard ; car dans le temps qui s'était passé, depuis que je lui fis la même proposition, j'avais reçu la copie des pièces d'une négociation entre les Gouvernemens Anglais et Français pour l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, par lesquelles j'ai vu que les non-combattans de toute espèce, des voyageurs, des marchands qui suivaient leurs affaires, des personnes qui n'avaient rien à faire avec la guerre, détenus en France quand elle a malheureusement commencée, étaient censés prisonniers de guerre, et devaient être changés comme tels, en cartel, pour des Officiers et des soldats de l'armée Française.

‘ Il n'est plus donc dans mon pouvoir de mettre en liberté quelque prisonnier que ce soit, comme non-combattant ; et je le regrette d'autant plus, que j'aurais eu les plus grand plaisir à me rendre aux désirs de votre Excellence en faveur de Monsieur le Sous Inspecteur Ville sur Ance.

‘ J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

‘ *Le Maréchal Murmont,
Duc de Raguse.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 25th May, 1811, 4 P.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23d. I understand from O'Lalor that you have sent our friends at Salamanca

1000 dollars, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give direction that they may have 2000 more, making in the whole 3000 dollars.

‘ We have invested Badajoz on this side this day. Nothing new.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ Elvas, 25th May, 1811, P.M.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send back General Madden’s brigade to the siege of Badajoz; and if you will write to General Leite to let us have as many regiments of militia as will make up 1000 men, for the attack on each side of the river.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

‘ MY DEAR VILLIERS,

‘ Elvas, 25th May, 1811.

‘ I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of yesterday, and I am very much obliged to you for it.

‘ No man can appreciate better than yourself the difficulties with which I have had to contend; but I believe that you are not aware of all of them. I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwithstanding that it was the opinion of every British Officer in the country that I ought to embark the army; while, on the other hand, the Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be maintained on the frontier, for which he wanted not only physical force, but the means of providing for the force which they could produce in the field. I believe nothing but something worse than firmness could have carried me through the nine months’ discussion with these contending opinions. To this add that people in England were changing their opinions almost with the wind, and you will see that I had not much to look to excepting myself.

‘ I am concerned to tell *you*, who are interested in everything concerning this country, that we are in rather an un-

comfortable state with the Portuguese Government. In August last, Principal Souza was appointed to the Government; and, at the same time, we learned that he was a kind of agent of an intrigue to remove Beresford from the command of the army, and to give it to the Duke of Brunswick, which you will readily believe was not very agreeable to me. He then began the persecution of French partisans, and nobody was exempt from his accusation. Mozinho, Lemos, even Sodré, were accused, and would have been sent off, if I had not set my face against such proceedings, of which, by the bye, he afterwards said we were the authors; and, as he was appointed with a view to curb "the despotism of the Secretariat," as ——— calls it, he immediately made a dart at Forjaz, the instrument of which, since you had arrived at Lisbon, the servants of the British Government had availed themselves to manage the affairs of Portugal.

'Then there was no subject in which the mischievous activity of his mind did not interfere, and he was the most active partisan of carrying on the war on the frontier; and, in his conversations upon this subject, was so indiscreet as to infuse into the militia of Lisbon opinions so dangerous, that Beresford and I thought it expedient to *honor these corps* by calling them to the army, providing others for the duties of the city. Then, by his influence in the Regency, he delayed, by the discussions on this point, all the measures which had been recommended early in the summer for the removal of persons, property, and provisions, and rendering useless the mills, till it was too late; and to him is to be attributed the length of time which the French were enabled to remain in the country.

'These circumstances brought me into direct discussion with this gentleman; and I complained of him to the Prince, in a letter which I wrote in December last, and sent open to the Regency, in which I told the Prince that it was my opinion that it would not be to his advantage to retain Principal Souza and me in his service at the same time. To this letter the Prince has sent an answer which shows that intrigue is hard at work in the Brazils.

'However, upon all this I should be indifferent, as it must be indifferent to me who are the Governors of the Kingdom, only that things are growing to such a state as to threaten

the existence of the country, if the French should be able again to invade it. We can get the Government to do nothing. All the departments of the army are worse than useless. The army is not near complete; indeed we have not 20,000 Portuguese troops in the field; and some circumstances have occurred lately which have demonstrated the positive danger resulting from the system on which we are acting to such a degree, as to induce me to tell our Government that it was my opinion that the British army ought not to be exposed to it, if the French should again be able to get the superiority in the country.

‘Forjaz has sent in his resignation; Mr. Stuart no longer attends the Regency. I have no intercourse with them; and I think the country will be lost, if we cannot re-establish the influence of Great Britain (not of ———) in the councils of the Brazils, if the French should be again able to attack it. After all that you have done here, this account will not be very pleasing to you; but it is perfectly true, and I assure you that I have not exaggerated the consequences which are likely to follow from this state of things. The worst is, that I do not know how they can be remedied. The removal of Principal Souza from the Government would not now answer; and I do not know what will, excepting a radical change of system in the Government, as well here as in the Brazils.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*The Right Hon. J. Villiers.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. I hope that the people in England will not be out of temper with the loss in Beresford’s action with Soult: it was owing to the Spaniards, who could not be moved. Beresford was rather in a hurry in making his returns, and nearly all the men returned missing have since joined their regiments.

‘W.’

To the Right Hon. Lord Eldon, Lord High Chancellor.

‘MY LORD,

‘Eivas, 25th May, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 29th April, in which your Lordship enclosed the resolutions of the House of Lords of the 26th April, expressing the approbation of their Lordships of the conduct of the

army under my command, during the late campaign in Portugal, which I have communicated, according to your Lordship's desire, to the allied British and Portuguese armies.

'The approbation of the House of Lords must be highly gratifying to the General Officers and Officers, by whose able assistance and support, and to the troops, by whose good conduct, discipline, and bravery (under Providence), the service has been performed, which their Lordships have been pleased to distinguish in this manner; and I request your Lordship to convey to the House of Lords the expression of my gratitude for the favor with which they have been pleased to view my endeavors to serve His Majesty, and for the high honor which their Lordships have conferred upon me. I likewise request your Lordship to accept my acknowledgments for the handsome terms in which your Lordship has conveyed to me the sentiments of the House of Lords.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Right Hon. Lord Eldon,*
Lord High Chancellor.'

'WELLINGTON.

[*A letter in nearly the same terms to the Right Hon. Charles Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons.*]

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

'Elvas, 26th May, 1811,
12 at noon.

'MY DEAR SPENCER,

'I have just now received your letter of the 24th.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will desire General Howorth to report particularly on the 8 pounders you mention as being in Almeida, whether our 9 pounder shot will fit them; and whether he has, in that part of the country, or can get, horses to horse them: if he has not, I think he had better make arrangements to send them down to Coimbra by bullocks, and thence to Lisbon by sea.

'I do not yet understand what the French are about on your side: I should think a movement towards the Tagus the most probable; but this is not yet quite clear, and their preparation of biscuit at such a distance as Llerena does not look like it.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.'

'WELLINGTON.

' To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Elvas, 26th May, 1811.

‘ I received by the last mail the duplicate of your letter of the 28th April, respecting Santoña ; and by the messenger afterwards, the original ; to which I should have replied by the opportunity which immediately offered in the departure of Colonel Arbuthnot, if my letter of the 7th instant had not contained an opinion on the principle of the operation proposed.

‘ I have no doubt of the utility of such an establishment on the northern coast, as it is proposed to have at Santoña ; but I believe you will find that the demands for your force in this country, and at Cadiz, are fully equal to what you can supply ; and I am convinced that not a man that could be sent here ought to be diverted to any other part of the Peninsula.

‘ It is impossible to say, without knowing more of the ground than I do (for I have no plan), whether the number of men you propose to send to Santoña would be able to hold the ground till it could be so strengthened as to render the tenure of it quite secure. From General Walker’s report and opinion, I should say that 4000 men would be able to hold it, and I have no doubt, from the description, that it might be made so strong as to be almost impregnable ; but I would beg to refer your Lordship to one of the enclosures, viz., the letter from Captain Birch, of the 1st September, 1808, and you will see from his description of the peninsula and the harbor, that even when the former shall be secured, parts of it, and the whole of the harbor, will be exposed to fire from the opposite shore ; and indeed this opinion appears confirmed by Captain Digby’s report on the harbor of Santoña of the 14th September, 1808.

‘ If it be correct, then, we should have possession, when we should have fortified it, only of this barren peninsula, with which the communication would be difficult by sea, as we could not use the harbour ; and with which the communication would be impossible by land, if the enemy should maintain near it a superior force to that which we should have within it.

‘ The proposal to occupy Santoña, however, is founded

upon a notion that the whole of the neighboring provinces would immediately rise in arms; and that this place would immediately be the centre and foundation of their operations. I should be inclined to doubt this effect of our occupying this place; and, whatever might be the case eventually, I have no doubt that in the first instance your force would have to stand the attack of whatever troops Bessières would bring against them. There is now here a very good Officer, General Abadia, who is going to command in Galicia, and I shall turn his mind to this operation. I shall desire him to consult with General Walker, or the British agent at Coruña, respecting the means required, and the troops which he must furnish; and when the experiment shall have been tried in this way, your Lordship will be able to determine whether you will give any or what support to the establishment which will be formed there.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

‘ MY DEAR HILL,

‘ Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

‘ I am very glad to hear that you are returned in good health, and I hope that we shall see you soon.

‘ You will have heard of events here, which I hope will enable us to obtain possession of Badajoz, upon which we are busily employed.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Hill.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th, 6 P.M.; and I enclose an answer for Captain —, which I beg you to peruse, and forward to him.

‘ I do not think it clear that the French have moved more troops yet from the Tormes than the battalions of the 9th corps. However, there can be no inconvenience in the movements which you have made, as the 1st and Light divisions will be as near their positions on the ground pointed out in my memorandum of the 16th, almost as they

would be where they were before, and equally near their provisions, which must come from Celorico.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Nothing new here. The heavy dragoons cut up some of the enemy on the 25th. ‘ W.’

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

‘ Orders will go by this occasion for the 11th light dragoons to march to this place, as soon as they shall be disembarked and prepared to move.

‘ I am excessively anxious that this regiment should reach the army in good order; and I particularly request you to point out to the Commanding Officer how much the condition of his horses will depend upon the attention paid to them by the Officers and men on their first arrival, and on the care with which they are at first moved.

‘ Great attention should likewise be paid to the mode of feeding and watering the horses, as pointed out repeatedly in General Orders; and I recommend that inquiry should be made from the Officers of dragoons, and veterinary surgeons at Lisbon, regarding the mode of treating the prevailing disorder among the horses in this country, in case those of the 11th should be attacked with it on the march.

‘ Great attention should likewise be paid to the backs of the horses; they will otherwise suffer very materially.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Commissary General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

‘ I gave directions some time ago that the Engineer should construct certain jetties at Fort St. Julian for the convenience of embarking and disembarking stores there, and he was to be assisted by means from the arsenal by Colonel Fava, of the Portuguese engineers, for this service. I request you to pay Colonel Fava, from time to time, for such

articles as he may supply, upon certificates, signed by the British Engineer, of the receipt of the articles supplied, and charged for by Colonel Fava.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Commissary General.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Deputy Commissary General —.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 27th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 25th; and I beg that you will put in writing such complaints as you may have to make of Mr. Kennedy, and I shall decide what I will do with them.

‘ It is proper that I should inform you that the report of you, which I made to Colonel Gordon, was not founded on any complaint received of you from Mr. Kennedy. I made that report because the service had suffered, and is now suffering, the greatest inconvenience, owing to delays in that part of the department of which you were the head; and from which post I ordered that you might be removed, from a thorough conviction, which has since proved to be well founded, that the service would be still further embarrassed if you continued to conduct it.

‘ As I made no reflection upon your character, excepting it can be called a reflection to report that you were not able to conduct a very complicated branch of business, to which you were entirely unaccustomed, I do not think that any necessity existed for informing you that you were removed at my suggestion; but as you have been so informed, I have no objection to state to you that I had no wish to do you an injury, and that I have no doubt that you are perfectly competent to conduct those branches of the commissariat to which you have been accustomed, in those scenes in which you have hitherto served.

‘ His Majesty’s Government, and the British public, will not hear excuses for failures in this country; and it is my business to take care, where there is any failure in any department, not to employ again the person who is the cause of it; and in instances in which the Officer who fails is of high rank and standing in respect to others, as you are, there is no remedy excepting to remove him from this country to one in the service of which he may be better

acquainted, and in which failure may be less critical than it is in this.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dep. Commissary General* —.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. I have to mention that I have received no letter from you excepting that of the 25th instant.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 26th; from which I learn that you had moved back the troops which you had moved to Penamacor, with the exception of those I had ordered to move. You will have seen from my letter of yesterday that I considered them, under all circumstances, equally well placed at Penamacor as at their original stations. However, I do not consider it certain that Marmont's troops have moved from the Tormes, as reported by Don Julian on the 24th, notwithstanding the respect I have for Don Julian.

‘ I have this day ordered some dragoons to move to Caria, where they will be in rear of your right instead of the rear of your left, equally well foraged, and some marches nearer me.

‘ It appears that the French are tolerably well informed at Ciudad Rodrigo. However, we cannot help that. I hope that my letter, which they expected, will help to deceive them.

‘ Ashworth's brigade were to have marched with Howard's brigade; and the Commissary of the latter was to have fed them. I do not know how this is arranged now, but I will speak to the Commissary General on the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th; and I beg that you will tell Colonel Fisher that it is very desirable that every horse or mule at Lisbon, at all capable of rendering

any service, should be sent to Abrantes; and therefore that I desire that such of the old, worn out, and convalescents which he mentions, as may be capable of performing service of only a few days, may be sent to Abrantes, according to my former directions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 28th May, 1811.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 26th instant, I have to inform you that the Secretary of State has not informed me which of the services for the horse transports, detailed in my letter of the 22d instant, ought to have the priority; but as you mention that several horse transports have been sent to Plymouth, and as there will be at Cork for embarkation what we must require, viz., horses for the artillery and the cavalry, I conceive that it will be desirable that the number stated should be sent in the first instance to Cork.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th. I have no objection to your withdrawing all the British and German artillery from the works in front of Lisbon, the Officer in command of them taking care to give notice to the Engineers severally in charge of the works of his department, in order that they may take measures to have the works occupied, and the ordnance and ammunition guarded by the ordenanza.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Howorth.

‘ SIR,

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th instant, enclosing returns of the ordnance and ammunition

found in Almeida ; and I am very much obliged to you, and very sensible of the pains taken by Colonel Robe, Major May, and the Officers and soldiers of the artillery, to perform this service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Howorth.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 27th ; and having conversed, on the subject to which it relates, with the Commissary General, he says that he has given no authority whatever to any Officer of the commissariat to make such a purchase as it has been reported to you an Officer of the commissariat is making of a vessel in the Tagus : I therefore trust that you have been misinformed.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the account of the arrival of the 11th light dragoons.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811, 9 A.M.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th, in the afternoon ; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence from Captain Grant, which confirms the notion which I had, that the enemy had not made any serious movement this way, excepting the battalions of the 9th corps.

‘ In respect to Almeida, the Portuguese Government propose to repair the place entirely eventually, and in the meantime to occupy it as a post ; in order to do this, it will be necessary to remove the rubbish from the ditch, and the Portuguese Government are sending men and tools to perform this work, and Beresford has ordered militia to occupy the place.

‘ Although Mr. French was employed to survey and report upon the existing state of the place, and Colonel Fletcher gave him an opinion, which it was intended he should convey to the Portuguese engineers, regarding the mode of rendering it a post for the present, I was desirous of avoid-

ing that any of the British engineers, or any of the regular troops of the army, should be employed either in setting it to rights, or in occupying it, excepting the latter only, till the militia garrison should arrive; and for this reason I never troubled you upon the subject, intending to write to you about it when all should be prepared by the Portuguese authorities, as well for setting it to rights as for occupying it. My reason for this was, that knowing that it might be necessary to abandon Almeida before it could be put to rights, either to prosecute our views in this quarter, or that you might collect your troops as stated in my memorandum of the 15th instant, I did not wish to be embarrassed by having regular troops to take care of Almeida; or, on the other hand, to incur the disgrace of abandoning an object which I had manifested an intention of occupying.

‘ I think therefore it will be best to leave matters as they are at Almeida, keeping Pack’s brigade there, and thereabouts, till the militia shall arrive to take their post; unless you should find it necessary to collect your force and withdraw, as pointed out in the memorandum of the 15th instant.

‘ You may depend upon it that, although I may not have leisure to give instructions upon more points than it is necessary you should attend to, my mind has been made up, and a plan formed, upon every point that can occur; and, generally speaking, it is desirable that, until you shall hear from me, you should not make any alterations in the general situation of affairs, not adverted to in my memorandum of the 15th instant.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. There is nothing new here.

‘ W.’

MEMORANDUM

For Captains Generals Castaños and Blake, the Quarter Master General, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘ All the preparations being made, it is intended to break ground before Badajoz to-morrow, on both sides of the river

Guadiana; and it is desirable that, as long as the enemy shall remain at and in the neighborhood of Llerena, the following disposition should be made of the allied armies:—

‘ The infantry and artillery of the allied British and Portuguese army, with the exception of that part of both employed at the siege at Almendralejo and in that neighborhood, and the allied British and Portuguese cavalry at Ribera, and together with the cavalry of the 5th Spanish army, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, observing the roads leading from Llerena by Usagre. It is proposed, that the infantry and artillery of the 5th Spanish army, and the infantry and artillery of the corps immediately under his Excellency General Blake, should be cantoned in the villages extending from S^{ta} Marta towards Barcarrota on their right, and communicating on their left with the allied British and Portuguese infantry at Solana. The advanced guard should not be farther on than Zafra, with General Blake’s cavalry at Bienvenida and Calzadilla, observing the roads towards Monasterio and Llerena, and communicating on the left with the cavalry of the 5th army and the allied British and Portuguese cavalry.

‘ In case the enemy should advance again in force, it will be desirable again to collect the whole force of the allies about Albuera; and, according to this proposed distribution, the whole of the infantry will be within one easy march of that place, excepting the infantry which his Excellency General Blake may think proper to place at Zafra, which can easily join him by Feria, &c., and the whole of the cavalry within one forced, or two easy marches.

‘ It is very desirable that the General Officers commanding the several corps of troops in advance should endeavor to ascertain the enemy’s force about Llerena; acquiring, if possible, a knowledge of the number of the several regiments of which it is composed, and of the several squadrons and battalions in each, and of the names of the General Officers commanding.

‘ If the enemy should withdraw from Llerena, it will be in the power of the allied troops, not employed in the siege of Badajoz, to canton themselves more with a view to their convenience than they can under existing circumstances; keeping, however, the great body of the infantry within two, and the advanced guards of the infantry and the cavalry

within three marches of the ground at Albuera. In this case it is proposed that the Conde de Penne Villemur's cavalry should occupy Llerena, and observe the enemy in that quarter; the infantry of the advanced guard of his Excellency General Blake's corps at Monasterio, with his Excellency General Blake's cavalry observing the road through the mountains, and his advanced guard communicating with the Conde de Penne Villemur.

‘As the object of all the operations of the allied armies is the siege of Badajoz, it is desirable that nothing should be undertaken which can divert the attention of any from that object; and that, if necessary, the whole should collect in a position, in which the armies have already acquired the greatest glory, by which the operation can be covered, if it should be possible to continue it; or the siege can be raised, if it should be necessary to raise it.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To Lieut. General Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 9th instant, and of the 24th and 25th (Nos. 7 and 8).

‘You will see by my letter to Mr. Wellesley of this date, that I have persevered in the siege of Badajoz, of which town I hope to be able to obtain possession, before the enemy can be in force to relieve it. I acknowledge that I have very little faith in distant diversions, and am very much of opinion, that if it is an object with Soult to collect another army to make a second attempt to relieve Badajoz, he will not be prevented by any diversion that may be made. If, however, he should be wavering in his opinion upon the subject, and should be inclined to wait for the arrival of the battalions of the 9th corps, which I know are on their march from Castille, the appearance of our troops on the coast might have the effect of inducing him to delay his movement till their arrival, before which time I hope that the fate of Badajoz must be decided.

‘Under these circumstances, I am anxious that you should adopt any one of the modes which you propose which you may think will have most effect, and will expose your own force the least, to alarm the enemy for his situation before Cadiz or for the security of Seville.

‘ My opinion is, that the allied armies are not now sufficiently strong, particularly in cavalry, to attempt the relief of Cadiz ; and they cannot be made so for some time, and not at all with any safety to our communication with Lisbon, until we shall have more effectually secured the frontier of Old Castille.

‘ I mention this to you at present, in order that you may not turn your attention to San Lucar, in preference to any other point at which you might think your appearance would create an earlier or a more general alarm.

‘ I assure you that there is nothing I am more anxious for than to have your personal assistance.

‘ I understand that the French have but few prisoners of ours in their hands, nearly all the missing having joined their regiments ; and I think you will do well to send to England the prisoners you mention.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Graham.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Elvas, 29th May, 1811.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 25th instant, containing Lord Wellesley’s dispatch of the 18th April, with postscript, directing you to require that the command of the Spanish troops in this and in other provinces of Spain should be given to me ; upon which you desire to have my opinion.

‘ I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish Government will not comply with this requisition ; and from all that I see and hear, I am convinced that the demand will tend to interrupt much of the harmony and good will which exist among us at present.

‘ To tell you the truth, also, I think that the plan does not go far enough. It is impossible to expect to discipline troops without paying them ; British Officers, of all others, could not effect that object, nor indeed could they be expected to serve with the Spanish troops without pay or reward of any description. I think, therefore, that the plan, even if consented to, would not give discipline to the Spaniards, would indispose towards us all the principal Officers of the army, and of course their adherents and followers

in the several armies; and we should probably not have so much effective control over their operations, or so much assistance as we may expect under the existing arrangement; but it is probable that the demand would not be acceded to by the Government, and therefore, on every ground, it is my opinion that it ought not to be made.

‘You will have seen, by my letter and dispatch of the 23d instant, the real state of the fact regarding the Spanish troops in the action. There is no doubt that they fought bravely; but they want the power of movement, which they can acquire only by the instruction of the Officers, from the heads of the army to those of the lowest rank.

‘We break ground at Badajoz to-morrow, and we hope to get the place in a few days. If we do not succeed in a few days, we shall not succeed at all, as the seventeen or nineteen battalions, and some cavalry of the 9th corps, are on their march to join Soult, and I think will join him the second week in June.

‘I shall be much obliged to you if you will not allow people at Cadiz to run away with the notion that, when we shall get possession of Badajoz, we shall relieve Cadiz. We cannot attempt that operation without having our whole army, and we cannot bring our army without being more secure on the side of Castille. However, if we can hold our superiority throughout the summer, I think that we may make the attempt.

‘I received your letter of the 9th; and I now enclose that of Lord Liverpool, to which my dispatch of the 23d April referred.

‘Ever yours most affectionately,

‘*The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P. S. Tell Graham that I shall send Captain Walpole back to him.

‘W.’

To Major General the Hon W. Stewart.

‘Between Elvas and Badajoz, 30th May, 1811.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

Half past 6 P. M.

‘I have received your letter, 3 P. M. of the 28th, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset has shown me that of noon yesterday, and

Colonel Murray will have written to Sir William Erskine instructions on the subject to which yours relate.

‘ We are not in Estremadura to save the country from the plunder of the French, but to obtain possession of Badajoz : the attention of all must be directed to this object ; and I have no intention to engage in any affair of any description, in any situation more advanced than Albuera, to save this siege. At the same time, I do not mean that the allied troops should give up any ground which it is not necessary they should give up, owing to the superiority of the enemy’s force, and that they should retire gradually upon Albuera, obtaining, as far as it may be in their power, a knowledge of the enemy’s force in their front.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General*
the Hon. W. Stewart.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 30th May, 1811.

‘ We invested Badajoz on the 25th instant, on the right of the Guadiana ; and the ordnance and stores for the siege having been brought forward, we broke ground last night.

‘ The enemy have retired their main body upon Llerena, and hold the advanced posts of their cavalry at Usagre.

‘ I enclose the copy of the report of Major General the Hon. W. Lumley, of a very gallant affair of the cavalry near that place on the 25th. The Major General has reported that he received very great assistance upon this occasion from Major Holmes, of the 3d dragoon guards, who was acting in the department of the Adjutant General, and from Lieut. Heathcote, who was acting in the department of the Quarter Master General, as well as from the Officers mentioned in his report.

‘ As the object of the troops in Estremadura is to carry on the siege of Badajoz with the utmost activity, and as I have every reason to believe that the reinforcements of the 9th corps will have arrived at Madrid by the 24th or 25th of this month, I have not thought it expedient to delay the operations of the siege, in order to drive Marshal Soult further back, having reason to hope that he will not attempt to interrupt them till he shall be reinforced, and that we may

reduce the place to extremities before his reinforcements can arrive.

‘ After the enemy’s reinforcements shall arrive the proportions of force will alter, although I have ordered further reinforcements from the army on the frontiers of Castille. But at all events, if we should not be able to obtain possession of Badajoz in a short time, we shall not be able to obtain it at all, as it will not be advisable to expose the soldiers to the heat of the weather of Estremadura and to the labor of the siege in a more advanced season.

‘ The enemy have made no movement in Castille since I addressed you last; but it is generally reported that the army of Portugal is about to move towards Avila and the Tagus. From the preparations which have been made, I have no doubt that some movement is in contemplation.

‘ My last accounts from Cadiz are of the 25th instant. Your Lordship will have received from thence the reports of the fall of Figueiras.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 30th May, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s dispatch, No. 85, of the 16th instant.

‘ Your Lordship will have observed, from the dispatches of His Majesty’s Minister at Lisbon to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Mr. Stuart did not consider himself authorised (nor did I) even to announce to the Portuguese Government the recent increase of the subsidy, till he should have prevailed upon them to introduce such reforms in the several civil departments of the Portuguese army, as should insure to the army and to the cause all the benefits of the increase of aid, which His Royal Highness the Prince Regent had been authorised by the vote of Parliament, and had it in contemplation to afford to them. And your Lordship will have observed with concern, from the same correspondence, not only that the local Government of Portugal have declined to make the reforms which have been recommended to them in detail by Marshal Sir William Beresford and me, but that they declare they are not authorised by the Prince Regent of Portugal to make them.

‘ I have already taken occasion to apprise your Lordship that the great evil in Portugal is a want of money. The local Government have no money to pay their servants, or those employed by them in any department, and they possess no influence over them; and the occurrences of the last few years have excited such a desire in the leading men in the Government to acquire popularity by all means, that it is impossible to persuade them to exert the authority which the laws or their own regulations give them, in any instance of neglect, disobedience, or delinquency, by any public servant.

‘ Owing to the difficulties in obtaining specie for the payment of the expenses in the Peninsula, even of the British army, the increase of the subsidy (if the King’s Minister considered himself authorized to announce it) would not increase the pecuniary means of the Portuguese Government. The advances would be made, in kind, of articles for which, I think, there is reason to believe that the local Government in Portugal have not paid hitherto, the troops having seized many articles for their subsistence and equipment in a very irregular manner, for which no payment has ever been made by the Government. The distressed state of the country, in the existing seat of the war, will no longer afford supplies in this irregular manner; and I imagine that the advances, in kind, on account of the new subsidy, will only make up for those supplies heretofore irregularly plundered from the country.

‘ Indeed this fact is strongly proved by the existing distress of the Portuguese Government. More than half of the active Portuguese army are now fed by the British commissariat; but notwithstanding this arrangement, which it would be supposed would relieve all the pecuniary difficulties of the Portuguese Government, they appear to have increased; and their demands for money are more urgent than previous to this arrangement, which was attended by a bargain that the expense of these provisions should be stopped out of the subsidy; and I know that the payments to the army, and to all the departments, are now in arrear to an unexampled degree.

‘ Even if the King’s Minister considered himself authorized to increase the subsidy, I doubt whether I could with propriety authorize the issue of increased money payments

by the Commissary General to the King's Minister; and therefore it has always appeared to me that the only chance the Portuguese Government had of being extricated from their pecuniary difficulties was to increase their own pecuniary resources to the utmost extent, as well by opening new sources of revenue as by the improvement of the old, and by the general reform of the numerous abuses which prevailed in all the departments of the Government, particularly in the collection of the revenue.

‘ The unfortunate desire to acquire and retain a low and vulgar popularity, and to please and flatter the lower orders, which has characterized almost every man who has appeared in a conspicuous situation throughout the recent events in Spain and Portugal, prevented the adoption of any of these measures till very lately; and I believe that some inefficient measures have been adopted upon these subjects, which, if they should ever produce any, can produce no effect for some months; and in the meantime the pecuniary distresses of the Government are increasing daily, are undermining their strength and authority, and will end by overwhelming everything.

‘ From this detail your Lordship will observe that there is no permanent remedy for these evils, excepting a change of system by the local Government; and no temporary remedy, excepting the advance to them of a large sum of money in specie to relieve their immediate distresses.

‘ Your Lordship will have been apprised by my dispatch of the 8th inst., of the measures which I had adopted to assist and relieve the Portuguese commissariat, and of the measures which I had recommended to the Government for the reform of all the civil departments of the army; with which recommendations, as I have above stated, the Government have not complied. I do not think I should improve the concern by placing at the head of it English Commissaries. In truth, the great difficulty consists in want of money, and want of authority to enforce obedience to regulations; and I fear that there is no English Commissary who could find a remedy for these difficulties.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

‘Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811,
Half past 6 P.M.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘I have not been able to take a look at you for these two days; but I hear from Major Gordon that Colonel Fletcher thinks he shall not be ready to open till the 3d, as there was some mistake in the arrival of the working parties from General Hamilton’s division last night.

‘I hope that the fire which the enemy will bring to-morrow upon the batteries which are constructing will not do them so much injury as to prevent their opening next day; but, independently of the probable increase of difficulty in the ultimate attack upon the place by the delay already occasioned, I think it not improbable that the batteries will receive much damage from the enemy’s fire in the course of the next twenty four hours. On this account I am most anxious that, if they can at all open to-morrow, they should; at all events, I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know the cause of the disappointment of the working parties from General Hamilton’s division last night, and if you will urge the General from me to take measures to prevent a similar disappointment in future.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Picton.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 30th, for which I am much obliged.

‘As soon as the persons ordered by the Portuguese Government to work at the fort of Almeida shall arrive, the engineers you mention may begin to remove the rubbish in the ditch, and to dispose of it as directed in Colonel Fletcher’s letter to Mr. French; and Mr. French will make these gentlemen acquainted with the intention I had of making Almeida an infantry post, tenable against a *coup de main*. Two regiments of militia are ordered there for a garrison.

‘From all the reports which I have received, it appears

to me likely that the army of Portugal will move by its left, and will bring its left upon the Tagus.

‘As soon as you shall find that this movement is commenced, I beg you to break up from your present position, and march by your right. First bring your right to Penamacor, and your left in the cantonments about Sabugal, with your advanced guard either where it is now, if the enemy show nothing about Ciudad Rodrigo, or, if they do, further back to Nave d’Aver, or even Alfayates.

‘If you should find that the movement of the enemy is decided, or if they should move any troops through the Puerto de Baños, or through the Puerto de Perales, you might continue your march, and bring the troops to Castello Branco and the neighboring cantonments. The 5th division must remain in the cantonments on the Upper Coa, about Sabugal; and General Pack must remain at Almeida and the neighborhood, till the militia garrison shall arrive. One regiment of Barbacena’s cavalry must remain with Pack, the other regiment with the 5th division.

All the British cavalry might move by the road of Belmonte and Caria, if that should be convenient, and all the troops march by cantonments.

‘We have gone on prosperously hitherto with the siege of Badajoz, and without material loss. We shall open our fire, I hope, to-morrow, from fifty pieces of ordnance.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. General*
‘*Sir B. Spencer, K.B.*

‘WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General R. Craufurd.

‘Quinta de Granicha, near Elvas,
1st June, 1811.

‘MY DEAR GENERAL,

‘I received yesterday your letter of the 29th; and I shall certainly recommend Lieut. Hopkins and Lieut. M’Culloch to the Commander in Chief for promotion, being thoroughly convinced of their merits.

‘I am well aware of Major Ridewood’s merits, and I shall be happy to have an opportunity of recommending him; but it would not be doing justice to the remainder of the army, when I am allowed to recommend a limited number of Officers for promotion, if I did not recommend some from

all parts of it; but Major Ridewood is recommended, if other arrangements which I had proposed are made for the promotion of other Officers, recommended in the list recently sent home.

‘I have long wished to carry into execution a plan of the description which you have suggested for the employment of Captain Stewart, of whose merits I entertain a very high opinion; but this plan must be undertaken in concert with General Castaños, if not with the Spanish Government. I have spoken to the General upon it; but, notwithstanding his good inclination, I could not bring him to a decision; and I rather believe that he, and all the Spanish Officers, have such decided objection to our interfering with their army in any manner, that they will not allow of the adoption of any plan, of which the result might be to prove the benefit which would be derived from our services.

‘You will have heard of our concerns here. I hope that we shall open our fire from fifty pieces of cannon on Badajoz to-morrow, and that it will not hold out long. Our loss in this siege has been very trifling hitherto.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Brig. General*
R. Craufurd.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

‘I agree with you respecting the supplies to the people of Portugal. What they want are cattle, carts, seed corn, and some materials for building. The first, unless sent from Ireland, will require money to purchase them. Money we cannot give, and therefore I did not at first mention cattle. Nails, and the rough materials for building, might be brought from England likewise, which would save money.

‘I approve highly of loans without interest, because they give a chance for the revival of industry, which is half the battle. In fact, however, the people of Portugal have not lost their money so much as the articles of primary necessity which I have above mentioned, viz., cattle, carts, seed corn, and materials for building, and implements of husbandry.

‘The country which I think least likely to recover, because farthest removed from water conveyance, or a district which has not been ruined, is the tract to the northward of the road from Thomar to Leyria, bounded on the north by the road from Condeixa to Ponte da Murcella. It is a barren country, having some fruitful valleys in it; but I fear the people in these valleys must starve.

‘I believe that in the remainder of the country but little more is required to save the people than to open the markets, and to send their priests and medical people with medicines among them; and aid in the articles which I have above enumerated will entirely re-establish the country.

‘Upper Beira, with the exception of the country about Guarda and the Coa, has not suffered. Lower Beira was always a bad country, at least that part between Castello Branco and the Zézere. I have passed through that part between Castello Branco and the Upper Coa three times lately, and it has not materially suffered.

‘We are getting on well with the siege. Our loss hitherto has been most trifling; and I think we shall open our fire to-morrow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
C. Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR HENRY, ‘Quinta de Granicha, 1st June, 1811.

‘I received this morning your letter of the 28th May; and I now enclose my dispatch to the Secretary of State of the 30th May.

‘We are going on very well with the siege. We shall open our fire, I think, to-morrow morning, and, up to this moment, our loss has been very small. Notwithstanding General Castaños’ good inclination, there is not a Spanish soldier at the siege; but the fact is, that these people have not the power of carrying into effect what they are most anxious for. If, however, we are obliged to raise the siege again, and have it in our power to undertake it again, the Spanish troops must come and work; for the season is be-

coming too hot for the constitution of our northern troops. I shall have two more brigades of infantry at Campo Mayor to-morrow and next day.

‘ Let me hear from you when you shall get intelligence of any moment from before Cadiz.

‘ I think the title offered to Beresford is a strong proof of the disinclination of the Cortes and Spanish Government to allow us to have anything to say to their army. The honor which it would have been natural to confer upon him is the rank of Captain General, to which he has a better claim than I had, as he commanded the Spanish as well as the other troops in the action, which I did not; but, instead of that, they make him a Marquis of Castille, a title which can be purchased by anybody. He doubts about accepting it; but he will not refuse it, unless it should be really a degradation to accept.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

‘ *The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Burt.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter of the 10th of May, which I have received from the Commander in Chief, announcing the arrival of two squadrons of the 12th dragoons at Lisbon, the horses belonging to which are to be transferred to the regiments of cavalry in this country, and the men are to proceed to Sicily.

‘ As the casualties which have occurred in the service have materially altered the proportions of horses and men in the several regiments since the Commander in Chief gave the orders in the enclosed letter regarding the disposal of these horses, I consider it best to direct you to distribute these horses among all the regiments in Portugal, in proportion to their several wants, and to the means in their possession severally of supplying horse appointments for them, selecting for the heavy dragoons (if you should think proper to allot any to those regiments) the strongest horses: and, adverting to the supply of eighty horses for the 13th light dragoons, expected to arrive, I beg you to be prepared to have charge taken of these horses as soon as they shall land

at Lisbon, in order that the Officers and men of the 12th light dragoons may proceed on their voyage to Sicily.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Secretary of the Commander in Chief, directing that three squadrons, or six troops, of each of the 3d dragoon guards and 4th dragoons should be kept in this country, and that the Officers and non-commissioned officers, and such men as there may be supernumerary to the six troops, should be sent home in the 7th and 8th troops, or 4th squadron. I beg you accordingly to give directions that the private men of these two regiments may be formed into six troops, each consisting of five serjeants, one trumpeter, and eighty two rank and file; and that the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, who may be above that number in this country, may be sent home in the 7th and 8th troops, or 4th squadron. The Commanding Officers of regiments will select to be sent home the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, least fit for active service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.’

To Lieut. General Sir Stapleton Cotton, Bart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘ I enclose a letter of the 10th May from Lieut. Colonel Torrens, on the subject of the purchase of certain horses in England, for the use of the Officers of the British cavalry in this country, which horses I expect will have arrived at Lisbon by this time. The prime cost of these horses having been 50*l.*, it is necessary that those who shall receive them should pay for them 60*l.* each, in order to cover the expenses and losses by the public which may be incurred in their transport to Portugal. The money must be paid to the Commissary General, upon the receipt of the horses, by

those to whom they will be allotted. It is desirable that every Officer in the British cavalry should have at least one English horse, and these horses are to be distributed to the Officers doing duty with the regiments—

Royal dragoons,
3d dragoon guards,
4th dragoons,
1st hussars, K.G.L.
13th light dragoons,
14th ,,
16th ,,

generally of the lowest ranks, who are unprovided with English horses, provided they wish to have them at the price fixed upon them. I beg you to give directions that these horses may be taken charge of at the dépôt at Belem as soon as they shall be landed, in order that the men of the 3d dragoons, who will come out in charge of them, may be sent back to England, and that you will give such directions as you may think proper for the disposal of them to the several regiments.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir S. Cotton, Bart.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘ You will see by my letter of yesterday, that I did not make a bad guess of the enemy’s probable movement, as described in the letter from our friends of the 28th, enclosed in yours of the 31st.

‘ I think it desirable that the military chest which is at Celorico should be moved to Guarda, in order to be in readiness to move upon Castello Branco, as well as the reserves of ammunition. I understand there is money to pay to the 24th May, and I think you will do well to order the estimates to that day to be discharged.

‘ We did not open our fire this day, as was expected; but I understand we shall certainly to-morrow. There is nothing new.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘SIR, Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘I have the honor to enclose a list of the names of certain medical Officers of the French army — —, prisoners on board the *Venus* frigate, who I request may be detained at Lisbon, in order to attend a number of wounded Officers and soldiers of the French army, who will be sent down there.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Brig. General Peacocke.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘MY DEAR SIR, Quinta de Granicha, 2d June, 1811.

‘I received this morning your letter of the 31st, and have communicated with Beresford as to the paragraphs in the Cadiz Gazette, respecting the battle of Albuera. He and I agree that there is very little in these paragraphs deserving attention; that, at all events, it is desirable that nothing should be said or written on our parts to disturb the harmony now existing between us and the Spaniards; and that as Beresford’s letter is not only published in Portuguese, but is gone to Cadiz, it is better to take no notice of any publication of this description.

‘Senhor Vasconcellos has not written to me, and I do not understand what Principal Souza can gain from him. These people are a miserable race; and I am most angry with them that they should believe us to be at all like themselves. Principal Souza and others are much mistaken if they suppose that Senhor Vasconcellos or anybody else can carry them tales from head quarters, at all consistent with truth, which they can in any way turn to my disadvantage.

‘We have not been able to open our fire this day, as I expected; but I hope we shall to-morrow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency
C. Stuart.*’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Major General Picton.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 3d June, 1811,

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL,

1 P.M.

‘ From the manner in which we are going on, I think it not impossible but that we may have a breach in the castle wall this evening, and if that should be the case, I beg you to put a date to the enclosed summons, and send it into the town; if there should be no breach this day, the summons may be delayed till morning. If the gentleman should be disposed to capitulate, you may allow him to march out with honors of war; the garrison to lay down their arms on the glais, and be prisoners of war; the gates to be given over to us to-morrow morning, at 5 o'clock.

‘ You must refuse to allow him to make terms for the inhabitants or Spanish subjects, saying that we have no right to interfere in Spanish concerns. The Officers of the garrison may keep their *bonâ fide* property, and the men their knapsacks; but everything taken from the inhabitants of the town, and the remains of all requisitions made upon them, must be restored to the inhabitants. All plans, returns of stores, &c., and papers belonging to the place must be given up. If the Commandant should refuse to give up the place upon this summons, the Officer who goes in may say that he will not be summoned again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Picton.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. The terms above enumerated are of course not to be referred to, unless the governor should be disposed to capitulate, in which case you will go on with the capitulation on these terms, letting me hear from you, and I will come over immediately.

‘ W.’

To the Officer of H.M. Navy in charge of the flat bottomed boats at Jurumenha.

‘ SIR,

‘ Near Elvas, 3d June, 1811.

‘ I have no doubt whatever that, in the present state of affairs, the army will not require the service of the flat bottomed boats, and of the materials which you have brought with them, on the Guadiana; but as the Officers of the Portuguese service are very slow, I think it not improbable that we may require them at the passage of the Tagus

at Villa Velha. I would, therefore, request you to proceed with them by the route enclosed to that place, and to establish there, either a standing bridge, if the boats and materials should be sufficient, or two or three flying bridges, in aid of the flying bridge which is already established there. I conceive that it would be desirable to leave at Jurumenha a detachment of the seamen who are there, and that you should take with you the remainder; and I will direct the Commissary General to take care that they shall receive provisions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To the Officer of H.M. Navy in
charge of the flat bottomed
boats at Jurumenha.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Brig. General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 3d June, 1811.

‘ As I understood from your letter of the 31st May that certain horses of the artillery are arrived at Lisbon, I am desirous that the two guns belonging to the 9 pounder brigade with this part of the army should be sent to Elvas to join the brigade, with the equipment belonging to them; and that Captain Le Fevre’s troop of horse artillery should be completed by the addition of a gun and a howitzer wanting, of which I beg you to apprise Colonel Fisher.

‘ I am desirous that if only one of these arrangements can be adopted, the 9 pounders should be sent, in preference to the gun and howitzer of the horse artillery.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Brig. General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Deputy Commissary General ———.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st May, to which I have to reply, that I do not consider it to be consistent with justice to appoint a person to receive proofs of the foundation of your complaints against Mr. Kennedy, which complaints you have not stated in writing, and more especially in Mr. Kennedy’s absence. I repeat, that when you shall make your complaints in writing, I will determine whether it is expedient to enter upon any inquiry

into them. In respect to the complaints on the subject of the Spanish troops, I believe I was more to blame than Mr. Kennedy. I had ordered that when these troops should enter Spain they should no longer receive supplies from the British commissariat, as the reasons which had induced me to order that they should be supplied no longer existed. When the Spanish troops passed the frontier, however, Badajoz was invested, and the whole province of Estremadura occupied by the enemy; and although the condition of my order was strictly complied with, and the Spanish troops had passed the frontier, it was impossible that they could be subsisted, unless by means provided by the British commissariat: I therefore desired that the supplies should be continued to them. I cannot understand how that can be a crime against Mr. Kennedy; if anybody was in fault it was myself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Dep. Commis. General* ———.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de Granicha,
4th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ In respect to —, the rule is that, when an Officer has entered the Portuguese service, he is not to be allowed to quit it when he chooses, and most particularly not when his wishes for promotion in the British service have been disappointed.

‘ I wish this to be understood by —, and all others serving with the Portuguese army; at the same time, if you wish that his resignation of his Portuguese commission should be accepted, I shall not object. I likewise beg to observe upon —’s letter, that according to the Commander in Chief’s letter to me of 10th July, 1809, — has not lessened his claim for promotion in the British service, by having for a time quitted the Welsh Fusiliers; but that, on the contrary, I am authorized to say, that a British Officer, by serving with the Portuguese army, strengthens his claim to promotion to any vacancy which may fall in the British regiment to which he may belong.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 4th June, 1811,
Quarter before 8 P.M.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ I have received your letter of 3 P.M., and I think it very desirable that you should mount the guns in the battery which you constructed last night and this day. The wall of the castle appears to me to be constructed of earth, and I can easily conceive that some time must elapse before a slope will be made in it by battering; but I recommend that we should persevere on the point on which we have begun, and to act on the principle on which we have hitherto acted.

‘ The enemy have certainly made an intrenchment from their right of the houses in the castle to the rampart of the place, cutting off the rampart of the castle; and they appear, by a view I took this morning from near No. 4, to have one from the left of the batteries in the castle, to cover the approach to the east from the castle on their flank. We must be prepared therefore to establish ourselves in the castle in the first instance, if it should be necessary. If we should be able to get possession of San Christoval, and to erect a powerful battery, having its right resting on that fort, I have no doubt that we should overpower everything in the castle; otherwise we may not.

‘ I have not been able to see this evening how we got on at San Christoval. I shall go to-morrow morning early to General Houstoun, and thence to the ground on this side of the Gevora, from whence the whole is seen; and if I should not see you, I will write you any observations I may have upon what is going on.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Fletcher.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER,

‘ Elvas, 4th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2d. I will send a warrant for Captain Grant’s account. I believe the Staff Surgeon should settle his account with the Purveyor General; but I will speak to Dr. Frank on that subject, and will have the sum settled.

‘ We opened our fire yesterday, but have not yet breached either San Christoval or the castle: we are, however, very superior to the enemy, and I think we shall breach both in the course of this day and night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P.S. Drouet’s delay is very satisfactory, and I hope is true. ‘ W.’

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

‘ Quinta de Granicha, near Elvas,

4th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

I have received your letter of the 2d instant; and I hope immediately to have it in my power to send you authentic accounts of the demands of the commissariat on the Portuguese Government. The accounts for the 20th regiment at Cadiz alone amount to 70,000 dollars. Besides the 100,000*l.* in paper, which I have ordered to be paid, I have since ordered 100,000 dollars in specie.

‘ In respect to the papers and returns forwarded in your letter, I shall not even take the trouble of reading them, because I know they are fabricated for a particular purpose, and they cannot contain an answer to the strong fact stated by me, viz., that owing to neglect, deficiency of arrangement, and omission of the Government to supply the means, the army and their equipments were starved during the winter, and that, when the moment of action came, the soldiers and animals were unable to perform the service; the former deserted or went to the hospital, and the latter died: and that the army in Beira does not produce in the ranks for action half its numbers. Mind, I do not refer to the army in Alentejo, which, from adventitious circumstances, has been better provided for. It is therefore no answer to that statement to send a gross return of the army, including not only the force in Beira, but all the troops in garrisons, including those at Cadiz, at Oporto, in Elvas, Abrantes, &c.

‘ Since I wrote the letter upon which you have been ordered to make a representation, I have written one still stronger, to apprise the Secretary of State of the deficiencies resulting from these same neglects in the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, and of my opinion that if the whole system of the

Government were not altered, the increase of the enemy's force in the Peninsula might create a danger for this country, in which it might not be expedient that His Majesty's troops should participate.

‘ This is my sincere opinion, which I could not with propriety any longer conceal from the Regent's Government; and the Ministers will determine what they shall do upon it. I have no objection to the Portuguese Government being informed of its existence, in order that they may be prepared with their *documentos* in answer to it; but nothing but a change of system can induce me to change it, or to recommend to the King's Government to support the contest one moment beyond that at which I shall see in the Government, not only verbal professions, but a cordial desire and corresponding exertions to carry it on, and to save their own country. That has been my invariable sentiment, and upon that sentiment I shall evacuate the country as readily as I have defended it. The Government are quite mistaken if they suppose that any selfish desire of acquiring character has, or ever will, actuate my conduct. I come here to perform my duty; and I neither do nor can enjoy any satisfaction in anything, excepting the performance of my duty to my own country, of which a principal part is the communication of my opinions to the Government of Great Britain.

‘ At this moment Colonel Ashworth's brigade, which I have ordered from Beira into Alentejo, in consequence of the battle of Albuera, are living upon the supplies of the British army. As usual, they were living from hand to mouth, generally starving, when the order to march arrived, and Sir Brent Spencer was obliged to supply them with everything to enable them to move! This is called maintaining an army for service!! One brigade cannot move from one province to another, because the Government will not supply it with food!!!

‘ I rather imagine that you have mistaken the nature of the paper I have sent you regarding the ammunition at Coimbra. There are no troops at Coimbra; but we were informed that there was ammunition at Coimbra for the Portuguese army in Beira, which, considering that the battle was fought on the frontier, was far enough, God knows! But the paper which I sent to you proved that

the reserve ammunition for the army was not even at Coimbra; and if a serious battle had been fought the Portuguese troops would have had none.

‘These dignitaries of the church are always dreaming of battles; but I should like to know whether they ever dreamt that a soldier with a musket could not fight without ammunition, and that in two hours he can expend all he can carry.

‘In respect to these papers, such as they are, you must send them to the British Government. They will decide whether they will depend upon them or upon my assertions and opinions. I only say that nothing shall induce me even to read, much less to give an answer to *documentos*, very ingeniously framed, certainly, but which do not contain one word bearing upon the point.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*His Excellency*
C. Stuart.’

‘WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘Quinta de Granicha,
5th June, 1811.

‘MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘Having made Colonel Harvey a Brigadier, I do not see how you can avoid making Colonel M'Mahon one; but I do not know what all the Officers of the British army will say to this. I am glad to find you are better. If you could come to the mill in front of my house at between 5 and 6 this evening, Fletcher and Murray will be there to settle our future proceedings. The French are certainly intrenching the castle. Our breach is getting on at San Christoval, and I think will be practicable to-morrow in the wall of the castle.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Marshal*
Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM

For Lieut. General Hill, Major General Sir W. Erskine, and Captains General Castaños and Blake.

‘Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

‘It appears by an intercepted letter written on the 30th of May by the Baron de St. Pol, the enemy's Commanding Officer at Cordova, that the 9th corps were expected at that

place, through La Mancha, on the 5th or 6th of this month ; in which case they may be at Guadalcanal on the 8th or 9th, and at Llerena on the 10th or 11th. This information is consistent with what is stated in other intercepted letters, regarding the progress of the 9th corps in the neighborhood of Madrid ; but it is positively contradicted by information from Castille, stating that the 9th corps were still at Avila on the 29th of May. It is not impossible that all these letters may have been written to fall into our hands, and mislead us ; and that the last, in particular, may have been intended to mislead the commandant of the army of Murcia, who, it is said, was in the neighborhood of Baylen about the 23d of May : however, the intelligence should put us on our guard. The enemy will certainly move when joined by this reinforcement ; and all the troops should be prepared to move at the earliest notice of that of the enemy, in order to join as proposed in a former memorandum. The commandants of the advanced guards of the several nations, and the persons employed to get intelligence, should endeavor to discover whether it is true that the 9th corps are in march as stated.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

To Major General Peacocks.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d instant regarding the fort of Cascaes.

‘ The occupation of Cascaes might become an object of importance in case the enemy should be able to send a fleet to sea ; and although I am of opinion that it ought not to be occupied by us permanently, it might be desirable to have all the means prepared to move into it, and to occupy it at a short notice.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Fisher should therefore examine the fort of Cascaes, and see what guns and stores would be required there for a temporary purpose of the kind above described, and to be prepared with his arrangements to move them in when it might be necessary. These guns and stores might be taken for this temporary purpose from Fort St. Julian.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General Peacocks.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 5th June, 1811.

‘ I am much obliged to you for having stopped the *Regulus* with the Guards, and I shall be obliged to you for any intelligence you may be able to give me hereafter, regarding the arrival of troops, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral*
the Hon. G. Berkeley.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 4th. It is not very easy to tell which way the enemy are directing their march; but I think it probable by Ciudad Rodrigo and Perales, and others by Baños and Plasencia; the next march would probably decide the point: neither can I decide what is become of Drouet. Don Julian’s Captain’s report would leave him still at Avila on the 29th of May; but I have other reports which state him at Madrid on the 24th, and one yesterday from Cordova, which states that Drouet was to be at Cordova on the 5th or 6th, which is consistent with the account of his progress to Madrid on the 24th: on the other hand, his being at Avila is confirmed by the letter from Alba de Tormes of the 1st of June, or else it is obvious that the troops of the army of Portugal were to march in that direction, for you will observe that supplies from Congosto, &c., were moving to Piedrahita. Our breach in San Christoval is not yet practicable, nor is that in the main wall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*
Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. It is as well to be prepared for every event; and therefore I wish to mention to you, in case the enemy should pass the Agueda with the whole army of Portugal and invade Lower Beira by the entry of Sabugal, and you should think it expedient to retire by the Estrada Nova, it will be necessary that you should send an Officer to take up the flying bridge at Villa Velha, and to send down the river and

destroy all the boats at that place. Your communication with me will then be by Abrantes, where there is a bridge. The country through which you would have to retire towards the Zezere is very strong, and it is not probable that the enemy would attempt in their existing force to oblige you to retire from it.

‘ The great position of all has its right at Villa Velha, its centre at Sobreira Ferosa, and its left upon the continuation of the same ridge on the Estrada Nova. The last very good one is upon the Codes, covering Abrantes, having the left of the corps upon the Zezere, below the junction of the Codes. In case you should find it necessary to quit the Codes, and withdraw across the Zezere at Punhete, it would be necessary to throw into Abrantes one brigade of Portuguese troops besides those now there, in order to secure that place. I merely throw out these memorandums in case of an occurrence by no means probable, to remind you of what it would be necessary to attend to. We have a large magazine at Abrantes, by which you will be subsisted, whether you move by the Estrada Nova or by Castello Branco.

‘ W.’

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ Quinta de Granicha,
6th June, 1811.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD,

‘ You should write a letter to Mr. Wellesley in answer to the enclosed, expressing your satisfaction upon the receipt of the copy of Don E. de Bardaxi’s note.

‘ I enclose a letter from Rooke regarding the disposal of the horses you mention. I likewise enclose the orders given regarding the disposal of these horses : I cannot find this last letter, but Rooke’s letter shows how they have been disposed of. I have a good deal of interesting information this morning, from which it would appear that Don Julian’s man is right ; but, on the other hand, Soult has certainly been reinforced with three battalions from Cadiz, and the army of Portugal has moved from the Tormes on the 3d, apparently for this quarter. This is clear, that either they are going towards Avila, or Drouot was there in the end of May.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

3d, 29th, 31st, 57th, and 66th, into a provisional battalion for the present, until I shall see what number of the wounded of these regiments will recover so as to be fit for service. But, from all I hear, I have little doubt that the Buffs, the 29th, and 57th, will again be very efficient.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

‘ We have continued the operations of the siege of Badajoz with the utmost activity since I addressed your Lordship on the 30th ult., and our fire commenced on the morning of the 2d instant from four batteries on the right of the Guadiana, directed against the outwork of San Christoval, and on the enemy's batteries in the castle constructed to support that outwork; and from eight batteries on the left of the Guadiana, directed against the eastern face of the castle.

‘ The fire from these batteries has continued ever since, and a breach has been made in the outwork of San Christoval, which, however, is not yet practicable for assault; and considerable progress has been made in effecting a breach in the eastern front of the castle.

‘ Notwithstanding that these works have been carried on with great rapidity, I am happy to say that they are in themselves so complete, and the communication from one to the other so well assured, that our loss hitherto, throughout the siege, has been very small. I am sorry to say that Lieut. Hawker, of the Royal Artillery, an Officer who has distinguished himself in these operations, was killed this morning.

‘ The enemy have hitherto made no movement to disturb our operations; but I understand that three battalions were moved from the blockade of Cadiz in the last days of May, and I have received a report that the battalions of the 9th corps, destined to reinforce the army of the south, were to arrive at Cordova on the 5th or the 6th of this month.

‘ The army of Portugal likewise broke up from the Tormes on the 3d instant, and their first march was in the direction of the passages of the Tagus. I am apprehensive, therefore, that we may again be obliged to raise the siege.

‘ I have received a letter from Mr. Wellesley of the 1st instant, from which I learn that General Suchet had invested Tarragona.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

‘ It is very desirable that arrangements should be made to send to the Tagus at an early period 4000 barrels of gunpowder ; that is say, 2000 barrels immediately, and 2000 barrels in a short time hence.

‘ We have consumed powder belonging to Elvas at the siege of Badajoz, which I have ordered to be replaced by 2000 barrels of powder from our stores at Lisbon, upon which stores there may soon be other calls of magnitude ; and it will be desirable to have the deficiency made good.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 6th June, 1811.

‘ You will see from my dispatches of this day how we stand. We have a chance, and in my opinion, not a bad one, of obtaining possession of Badajoz before the enemy can relieve the place ; or we must raise the siege before the 10th, from all that I see of the enemy’s movements.

‘ According to an intercepted letter, they have provisions, I should think, to the 18th or 20th ; so that if we could be assured that we could keep the blockade, we should have the place. I must therefore determine what I shall do when I shall raise the siege according to the means I shall have of maintaining the blockade. If I cannot prevent them from receiving provisions, it is not worth while to risk an action ; for we have not the means, nor would it be fair towards the soldiers, to make them endure the labors of another siege at this advanced season.

‘ Notwithstanding that we have carried on our operations with such celerity, we have had great difficulties to contend with, and have been much delayed by the use of the old ord-

nance and equipments of Elvas, and of the Portuguese artillery, in this siege; some of the guns from which we fire are above 150 years old. The enemy appear to be intrenching that part of the castle which we have breached; but I have strong hopes that they will not be able to keep us out of the place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Earl of Liverpool.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 7th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 5th, for which I am much obliged to you. We made an attempt upon San Christoval last night, which however failed, as the breach was not so practicable as it ought to have been. We do not get on with the breach in the body of the place, and I am much afraid that after all our ammunition will fail.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ *Sir B. Spencer, K.B.*

To Major General Walker.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘ This letter will be delivered to you by General Abadia, who is appointed to command in Galicia; and I have every reason to believe that you will find him disposed to make the most of the means which will be at his disposal in that province; and I shall be obliged to you if you will afford him such assistance as may have been placed at your disposal, or as you can procure from the British Government.

‘ I have had a long conversation with General Abadia on the state of affairs in Galicia, and on the course which it may be expedient that his operations should take. My opinion is, that until he shall have a good body of cavalry and artillery, and his infantry well disciplined, he should not venture into the plains of Leon. The most desirable object for him to look to would be to make the siege of Astorga; and till he can effect that he should be satisfied, first with securing the defence of Galicia, and next with working the French out of the Asturias and La Montaña. I have turned

his attention to the post of Santoña, on which subject he will communicate with you.

‘ General Mendizabal has been appointed to command in Biscay, and his views will be turned to the same object, in concert with General Abadia. General Mendizabal should act upon the French by land, while General Abadia’s expedition would proceed there by sea, and between the two the French may be got out of that interesting post: they must co-operate afterwards with such naval means as we may give them, in keeping possession of this post; for it is very obvious to me, that if Santoña can be retained as a military station, it will be useless as a naval station unless the surrounding country is friendly to the possessor. General Abadia will let you know how affairs are circumstanced here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Walker.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Major General Peacocke.

‘ SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘ I beg that you will give directions to Colonel Fisher to forward to Elvas, as soon as convenient, from the stores in his charge, 2000 stands of arms complete, and 2000 sets of accoutrements, including 425 sets of buff accoutrements.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Peacocke.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Vice Admiral the Hon. George Berkeley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘ General Abadia, who is appointed to command the troops in Galicia, and who will have the honor of presenting this letter to you, is desirous of proceeding to his command by sea; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you can make it convenient to send him in a man of war. I understand that he wishes to be landed at Vigo, which may likewise be more convenient to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral
the Hon. G. Berkeley.*

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

' MY DEAR SIR, ' Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th, and I have no objection to your making any use you please of my letter to you of the 1st, respecting the supplies for the people of Portugal. Badajoz may fall ; but the business will be very near run on both sides. We are going on better with the breaches this day ; but I have never seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance nor artillery so bad as those belonging to Elvas. Soult must be joined by the 9th corps within two or three days. Vasconcellos might as well sail therefore ; for I think it just as likely that he will take bad as that he will take good news.

‘ Believe me, &c.

*His Excellency
C. Stuart.*

‘WELLINGTON.

‘P.S. I see that Marmont has crossed the Agueda in some strength, and Sir Brent has retired towards the Coa.

'W.'

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

' MY DEAR HENRY, ' Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘I have received your letter of the 1st, and I am happy to find that you agree in opinion with me, regarding the propositions to the Spanish Government, in respect to the improvement of the discipline of their army. To be of any service, the measure must originate in a proposition from themselves, which I am convinced they will not make till they are reduced to extremities, any more than they would have proposed to receive us at Cadiz, if they had not been much alarmed for their safety.

‘I enclose a copy of my last dispatch. I do not know what to say to Badajoz. I think Soult will be joined by the 9th corps to-morrow or next day, and we have not yet a practicable breach, either in San Christoval or the body of the place; both are, however, going on tolerably well this day.

‘ Ever yours most affectionately,

'The Right Hon. H. Wellesley.'

‘ WELLINGTON.

'P.S. Marmont has moved a good large force upon Ciu-

dad Rodrigo, and Sir Brent Spencer has fallen back towards the Coa. I am not quite certain that the force has advanced; or that it is not his advanced guard to cover the main body of his army through Baños and Perales.

‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 8th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 6th, 10 P.M. I think it probable, from Captain Brotherton’s report, which you enclosed, that the greatest part of the enemy’s army are in march on the Puertos de Baños and Perales; and that a strong advanced guard has been thrown across the Agueda in order to keep you in check, and to prevent you from disturbing this march. The advanced guard will move probably by Navas Frias, &c. I only hope that Pack will not have been disturbed at Almeida. We are going on better this day, and have made progress towards practicable breaches in San Christoval and the castle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 9th June, 1811.

‘ I have received your letter of the 7th, and I think there is scarcely a doubt that the enemy are coming to the Tagus; they could not go through the Puerto de Perales till they obliged you to withdraw from the sources of the Azava, and everything which goes through Perales must pass by or close to Ciudad Rodrigo. Regnier’s corps was at Fuente Roble on the 5th, and it appears was to halt thereabouts the 6th; that is the road to the Puerto de Baños. We shall attempt San Christoval this night; the enemy cleared the rubbish from the main breach last night; but we are getting on with it this day again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

‘ P. S. From the number of rations demanded near Fuente

Roble, I think it probable that Regnier has with him only one division.

‘ 5 P. M.—Since writing the above, I have seen a letter of the 7th from Plasencia, from which it appears that General Regnier was near the Puerto de Baños on the 6th, and had required rations for 30,000 men at Baños, for the 7th or 8th, but from the mode of expression in the letter I cannot tell which. ‘ W.’

To Lieut. General Sir Brent Spencer, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR SPENCER, ‘ Quinta de Granicha, 10th June, 1811.

‘ I received this morning your letter of the 8th. I am much concerned that General Pack has destroyed the works of Almeida. I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me a copy of the orders which were sent to him by Colonel de Lancey.

‘ I have no doubt that the French are crossing the Tagus; and Murray sends orders for your troops to do the same. We failed last night in the attack of San Christoval; and, as I find the enemy are about to advance again, I have ordered the siege of Badajoz to be raised this night. It will be completed to-morrow night.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General*

Sir B. Spencer, K.B.

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.

‘ MY DEAR BERESFORD, ‘ Quinta de Granicha,
10th June, 1811.

‘ Since I saw you I have heard that Drouet did not arrive at Cordova till the 8th, which is not improbable; but they state his force, some to be 12,000, others 8000 men, having been joined by different detachments, probably Sebastiani’s, on the road. From the reports in circulation of another invasion of Portugal, and from the immense magazines of provisions which both Soult and Marmont have collected, and particularly cattle, I am inclined to suspect that they are for a dart into Portugal, probably to endeavor to sieze our works at Almada.

‘ It would be very desirable to order under arms immediately the Lisbon, Setuval, and Alcacer do Sal militia, and

to have a garrison in Setuval and Palmella. These, with the troops, marines, convalescents, &c., which we have at Lisbon, would hold the works at Almada till I could get a division down, which indeed I ought to do by water if they were to make a dart that way. I am certain there is something more in the wind than the desire to force us out of Estremadura, and it is either this plan or the siege of Elvas.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Marshal*

Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To His Excellency Charles Stuart.

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, 10th June, 1811.

‘ We made another attempt upon San Christoval last night, which failed; and in fact we have not made a practicable breach in that outwork, nor in the body of the place. In the meantime both Soult and Marmont are moving into Estremadura in great strength, and I think will join by the 15th, and I have therefore ordered that the siege may be raised again.

‘ The enemy are either coming into Portugal or they are about to attack Elvas. The only circumstance I have to apprehend is, that Elvas will be ill provided. The Portuguese troops in this part of the country have, as usual, been living upon the stores of the garrison; and I must either leave the place without supplies, or give them from our stores; and it is not impossible but that the necessity of waiting here to collect these supplies, and throw them into the place, may bring us into an awkward situation. Thus this terrible system of Government, and the abuses in all the departments, are getting us into scrapes at every step we take.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *His Excellency*
C. Stuart.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

To Captain General Don F. X. Castaños.

‘ MONSIEUR,

‘ Quinta de Granicha, ce 10 Juin, 1811.

‘ J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer copies de deux lettres interceptées qui m’ont été envoyées aujourd’hui, par lesquelles

il paraît que l'ennemi va rassembler toutes ses forces en Estremadure, à la suite de quelque nouveau projet, qui a été probablement ordonné de Paris

‘ Il est probable par les nouvelles dans ces lettres, et par celles que j’ai reçues de la date de , de nos avant postes, que l'ennemi s’est mis en marche aujourd’hui de Llerena; et je crois par les nouvelles que je viens de recevoir des frontières de la Castille, que le Maréchal Marmont arrivera à Merida le 15^{me}.

‘ Je viens donc de donner ordre qu’on commence à lever le siège de Badajoz ce soir; et j’espère que cette opération sera accomplie demain au soir. L’état de la brèche ne donnait nulle espérance de pouvoir donner assaut pour quelques jours; et nos munitions commencent à manquer.

‘ Il reste à déterminer ce qu’il faut faire dans cette crise de la campagne. Ce n’est pas possible d’attaquer le Maréchal Soult avant sa jonction avec le Maréchal Marmont. Nous ne pourrions marcher pour cet objet que le 12^{me}; nous ne pourrions l’atteindre que le 14^{me}, même s’il ne faisait aucun mouvement pour s’éloigner; et le Maréchal Marmont serait le 15^{me} sur nos derrières à Merida; ou s’il préférerait passer par Medellin, il se joindrait ce jour là avec Soult, si celui-ci se retirait.

‘ D’ailleurs nous ne connaissons pas la force de Soult. Nous savons qu’il est supérieur en cavalerie et en artillerie; et la composition de la force des alliés est telle qu’il n’est pas du tout à désirer de donner des batailles rangées.

‘ Je suis décidé quand l’ennemi s’avancera à faire retirer l’armée alliée Anglaise et Portugaise; et je compte prendre position sur la Caya près d’Elvas pour voir arriver l’ennemi, et pour reconnaître ses projets; et après, s’il est nécessaire, je me porterai vers Portalegre, pour opérer ma jonction avec les divisions qui viennent du nord du Tage, et avec la cavalerie, &c., qui vient de Lisbonne.

‘ Je crois que vous ferez bien de vous tenir en étroite communication avec nous, et que le Capitaine Général Blake fasse la même chose; ou qu’il passe en le Condado de Niebla, pour opérer sur les derrières de l’ennemi ou sur Seville.

‘ Après que Soult aura fait son mouvement de Llerena, surtout s’il passe par Hornachos et va à Almendralejo, le

Capitaine Général Blake aura le choix de deux routes par lesquelles il pourrait passer dans le Condado de Niebla : ou celle à la gauche de la Guadiana, par Xerez, &c. ; ou celle à la droite de cette rivière dans le royaume de Portugal, et en passant la rivière à Mertola.

‘ Si le Capitaine Général se décide à se porter dans le Condado de Niebla, et à choisir cette route, je ferai tout en mon pouvoir pour faciliter sa marche.

‘ Je vous prie de me faire savoir quelles sont vos résolutions et celles du Capitaine Général Blake aussitôt que vous pourrez, parcequ’il est à désirer que je puisse bientôt prendre la position de la Caya.

‘ J’ai l’honneur d’être, &c.

‘ *Le Capitaine Général*
Don F. X. Castaños.’

‘ WELLINGTON.

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